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WAE GOVERNMENT 
FEDERAL AND STATE 

1861-1865 



WAR GOVERNMENT 

FEDERAL AND STATE 

IN 

MASSACHUSETTS, NEW YORK 

PENNSYLVANIA AND 

INDIANA 

1861-1865 

BY 

WILLIAM B. WEEDEN 

Author of Economic and Social 
History of New England 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 

SEfte t*itocr?ibe f>zt$$, Cambridge 

1906 



LIBRARY of CONGRESS 
Two Gooies Received 

APH 23 1906 

op/rljtht Entry 
CUSS d XXc. No, 

/¥ 3 7 7 + 

COPY B. 



COPYRIGHT 1906 BY WILLIAM B. WEEDEN 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



Published April iqob 



PREFACE 

The Civil War will afford ample ground for historical 
research and study for generations to come. Massa- 
chusetts is far ahead of other States in the preservation 
and arrangement of all records, especially those in man- 
uscript. Her " shoestring files " contain the original 
story of the stalwart doings in those days, comprising 
several hundred volumes of manuscript, well arranged 
and kept under lock and key. Careful search was made 
here ; and I was indebted to Governor Crane, Mr. Ham- 
lin, and the other officials, for constant courtesy. The 
archives at Albany and at Harrisburg were examined. 
The excellent biography by Foulke sufficiently lighted 
up and colored the extensive correspondence of Morton 
as it was set forth in the " Official Records of the Re- 
bellion." This enormous collection of printed matter is 
a mine of crude ore, and from it will be drawn the 
maturing history of our pregnant Civil War. 

James Ford Rhodes's account is exhaustive, absolutely 
impartial, and very graphic. I have used freely his wide- 
spread authorities. I differ in construing the facts at 
some important points, as will appear in the following 
pages. Very likely the difference was in that I could 
not rise to the heights of his sedate charitableness. 

W. B. W. 

Providence, R. I., March 1, 1906. 



CONTENTS 

Introduction ix 

I. The Genesis of the Union 1 

II. The Executive Crisis 34 

III. Administration 64 

IV. State Support 125 

V. Federal and State Interference 177 

VI. Party Estrangement 224 

VII. The People under Compulsion 263 

VIII. Government 319 

IX. The Union Vindicated and Developed . . . 359 



INTRODUCTION 

It was my lot to lap two generations of historians. 
George Bancroft, Francis Parkman, and others gave 
me advice and encouragement ; Justin Winsor constant 
direction and suggestion ; Herbert B. Adams much 
sympathy. Perhaps I should not have written had not 
Winsor warmly encouraged it. Sometimes I thought 
there was enough matter already printed ; but he showed 
that sincere and serious effort to " enlarge the bounds 
of knowledge " would never be unwelcome or useless. 
Latterly, I often urged on the students of this genera- 
tion that there was a great field for the study of gov- 
ernment in the interplay of the National Union and 
the State commonwealths, which were principalities in 
the Civil War, especially in its early stages. Likewise 
the personality of the governors was romantic and in- 
teresting. All said " Good " — but no one wrote. When 
I first suggested my own undertaking to a Nestor in 
our circles, and told him of these results, or lack of a 
resultant, he said, " Ah ! those who write about it must 
have lived it." And the number who lived it is narrow- 
ing fast. I realized the force of his saying when I came 
to lay out subject-matter and narrative in the begin- 
ning. Facts which were simple enough alone became 
complex questions when their relation to other doings 
entangled the incidents and enforced a new form or 
frame of suggestion. As Mr. Rhodes well says in his 
fourth volume, a continuous narrative of the Civil War 



x INTRODUCTION 

does not admit consideration of some important issues, 
which often end in grave constitutional problems. 

When President Lincoln assumed control, Union, 
" the bond of all things," existed ; though despoiled 
and damaged, it was not broken or dissolved. Even 
James Buchanan had been able to comprehend that; 
weak and undetermined as he was, he could not betray 
a trust. On the other hand, he could not maintain gov- 
ernment in its natural prerogatives ; could not perceive 
that secession involved immediate coercion, else there 
could be no Union. This entity, represented by the 
administration at Washington, was a necessary whole, 
but not absolute in all its functions. 

On the other hand, the States were not mere aggre- 
gations of people, though their several populations con- 
stituted the people whom Lincoln led and constantly 
had in mind. In this consciousness he was their work- 
ing servant as well as director and leader by right. 
Ultimately he reached the powers of a dictator, but he 
was no Sulla or Caesar ; he used only the abounding 
prerogatives of the greatest servant of the people. 

Meanwhile, the States — what were they? Minor 
principalities, not complete in sovereignty, any more 
than the people are completely sovereign ; but powers 
with many attributes of sovereignty. They could not 
coin money or levy war for themselves ; but they could 
levy war for the Union, on the largest scale conceived 
at that time by any people, whether governed impe- 
rially or democratically. The true functions of these 
partial powers and petty kingdoms were hardly per- 
ceived in 1861. Good people were so busy in putting 
down rebellious States seeking a new confederacy that 



INTRODUCTION xi 

they forgot the importance of these mediatory prin- 
cipalities, powerful in their local representation, and 
instantly ready to support the loyal North. Because it 
was convenient for a bureau at Washington to stretch 
forth the national power and levy on the whole people, 
the bureaucrats were constantly forgetting that this 
process was in a state of necessary gestation. The cen- 
tral power of the Union, destined ultimately to reach 
its imperial hand over every citizen, was being slowly 
developed. As long as all citizens were in substantial 
agreement, it made little practical difference how these 
powers were exercised technically. But when Repub- 
licans and Democrats resumed their old party lines, 
the materials for difference of opinion rapidly became 
national issues of vital importance. The misunder- 
standing of citizens might become half treasonable 
opposition in conducting local parties, and might make 
state legislatures practically hostile to the national gov- 
ernment. 

As the contest advanced and thickened, the func- 
tions of the leaders of these local communities were 
extended and amplified. The term "War Governor" 
grew naturally out of the occasion, and such men were 
Paladins of more than chivalrous devotion to the cause 
of one common country. The name indicates that some- 
thing had been added to the office as it had been 
known in the ordinary civic routine of the States. They 
were indeed detached but assimilated War Ministers, 
wielding the resources of their governments, not only 
in execution of the law, but by mustering all the powers 
of the States according to the need, and under the 
requisitions, of the national government. Their ener- 



xii INTRODUCTION 

gies in most instances were unbounded, while their 
executive resource and tact were unfailing. Their inter- 
course with the President and departments, varying 
according to the traits and characteristics of each indi- 
vidual, affords most interesting ground for investi- 
gation. A vast amount of humanness — of the nature 
and condition of man — shows itself in the interplay 
of these powerful, practical men of affairs with the 
authorities at Washington. The officials of the bureaus 
were more constrained, limited by politics and routine, 
oppressed by a conserving sense of responsibility, than 
were these captains who worked in the midst of the 
people. They had a certain sovereign quality as direct 
representatives of the people ; but their dominions and 
principalities were portions of the Union, — parts of 
its whole, — combined in its structure, and constantly 
affected by the national movement of all the parts. 

There were great personalities developed then; and 
none greater than the three men treated herein, — Mor- 
ton, Andrew, Curtin, — whose service was continuous 
throughout the war. The personages differed as much, 
essentially, as the circumstances and conditions of their 
respective communities. Moreover, the prescribed con- 
ditions of the occasion in some degree forecast the 
resultant action of those personages, which action in 
turn varied its color as personal characteristics came 
into play. 

The main motive of my thesis lies just here. War 
government, federal and state, did the work most potent 
and far-reaching in its results, in the business we are 
now indicating. The rebellion made itself and created 
its necessary issues; the immensity of the war, the 



INTRODUCTION xiii 

hecatombs of slaughter, the wasting of myriad homes, 
were due to occasional incapacities of the adminis- 
tration. 

The administration — president and cabinet — could 
not grasp the whole national issue resting in its hands. 
It was so fearful of doing too much that it tried to 
even the national balance by striking from the recruiting 
measures the heaped-up resources which the governors 
and loyal legislators were constantly offering from the 
very heart of the people. This puttering economy of 
the national rulers turned awry the magnificent stream 
of early recruits — not raw clodhoppers, but soldiers 
amply supplied and equipped by state energy out of 
state treasuries. This mustering force, which ought to 
have marched out in regular tread toward Washington, 
was either checked and hindered like an uncertain desert 
stream, or it was driven like a fitful torrent when the 
recurring panics called hastily for more and more troops. 
The mismanagement of these proffered thousands and 
abounding resources finally exhausted the voluntary 
spirit which prevailed so vigorously in the early days. 
The exhaustion of the volunteers naturally compelled 
the administration to put forth its central authority 
and to bring every citizen of the United States — 
exemptions excepted — under its military control: in 
short, it made a draft. 

But this process, clear in statement, was by no means 
easy and simple as the facts occurred. If the loyal 
communities had been kept at work mustering and 
equipping out of the abundant local resources of the 
States, there could not have arisen those differing issues 
which did arise concerning the powers of the States 



jriv INTRODUCTION 

and the main functions of the national government. 
These disturbing matters became burning questions. 
They were adopted by the old Democratic party, now 
cast adrift and needing as a party a respectable shib- 
boleth. The Republican partisans, on the other hand, 
were by no means self-effacing or modest in their 
assertions. The most intense partisan is a narrow and 
over-virtuous one. But deeper in political consequence 
than these personal or partisan predilections was the 
larger ground of legitimate constitutional evolution. 
There were no actual constitutional means for placing 
States in loyal opposition to the fair course of the 
national government. The well-practiced American 
methods of installing opposition through discussion 
and party debate, failed in times of revolution, when 
the matter touched vital national issues. The practical 
outcome of agitating a Northern State and throwing it 
across the line of action taken by the national govern- 
ment was a veiled support of the seceded and rebellious 
States. There was no essential difference between the 
position advocated by Horatio Seymour in 1863 * and 
that of Robert E. Lee when he resigned his commission 
in the army of the Union. 2 These innate constitutional 
limitations were not fully recognized and comprehended 
at the time ; but the people felt them, endured immense 

1 Cf. infra p. 293. 

2 Lee resigned April 20, 1861, and wrote his sister on the same day : 
" The whole South is in a state of revolution, into which Virginia, after a 
long struggle, has been drawn ; and though I recognize no necessity for 
this state of things, and would have forborne and pleaded to the end for 
redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet in my own person I had to 
meet the question whether I should take part against my native State." 
— Recollections of General Lee, p. 26. 



INTRODUCTION xv 

anxiety accordingly, and cherished bitter hatred of the 
Copperhead. 

v The practical outcome and effect of all this agitation 
was not the repression of the States politically, but their 
disuse as the greatest volunteering agencies ever known. 
The national government, absorbing the strength of the 
Union, reaching forth its natural prerogatives, seized 
every citizen — not exempt from military service — 
through the draft. This did not change the nature of 
the contest, though forms changed. Methods of organ- 
ization were altered greatly ; and to half-developed 
statesmen like Horatio Seymour these methods seemed 
unrepublican and despotic. The people knew better, 
and acted accordingly. 

v There was an immense loss of immediate vigor in a 
people bred to local government, when the large state 
organisms were curtailed of their largest and most far- 
reaching local functions. Morton, Curtin, and Andrew 
were no less loyal patriots when they were striving to 
administer the draft. The contrast between them and 
Seymour's half-way counselors was like Milton's vision 
of Gabriel and Michael arrayed against Satan and 
Moloch, though the amiable Copperhead lacked the 
force of these rebellious angels. But the governors 
could not be the mighty agents they had been, in- 
jecting the national ascendency into every hamlet, 
and stimulating every citizen, through his local func- 
tions and civic pride, to offer himself on the altar of 
his country. It is pathetic to read the anxious expres- 
sions of these governors, and to enter into their strug- 
gles, when trying to ward off the draft. They became 
mere implements and utensils — very serviceable, it is 



xvi INTRODUCTION 

true, in carrying through the national power and in 
distributing its action, but occupying, nevertheless, a 
difficult and unpleasant office. 

Perhaps nothing in the early days of the Rebellion 
impressed observers and critics, at home or abroad, 
more forcibly than the immediate use of the kingly 
power which survived in the office of President. The 
Southern Confederacy differed in character from the 
United States, though its form was much the same. 
The seceding States formed their government in the 
strictest method of representative institutions, such as 
had been followed in the old republic, but adapting the 
new form to the maintenance of slavery. Their orderly 
conduct in these respects justly commended itself. But 
the office of President, though it finally assumed dicta- 
torial powers under the inevitable pressure of war, was 
new and untried in the beginning. On the other hand, 
President Lincoln, instead of surrendering to anarchy 
at Washington, as the rebels hoped and even expected, 
found plenty of prerogatives awaiting his hand. These 
were inevitable powers, emanating directly from the 
people and concentrating in a crisis only in one hand, 
if there is to be any effective government enforced by 
such people or nation. These kingly, though not or- 
ganized, powers, carefully exercised by Lincoln, gradu- 
ally widened into the effective control of a dictator. 
The form was republican and limited, but the substance 
was of the old attributes of sovereignty. 

Nothing more bewildered the average congressman, 
in his Philistine consciousness, than this potent and 
elusive force in the President. The people trusted Lin- 
coln, and, knowing their nature as he did, he never 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

abused their confidence and never doubted their sup- 
port. This serene authority maddened the half intelli- 
gent congressman, who fancied himself the essence of 
a town-meeting, backed at any moment by overwhelm- 
ing popular vote. Seward, with characteristic sagacity, 
noted that Congress frequently represented the Press, 
which they then mistook for the People. 1 Certainly, 
important issues were generally initiated by the legisla- 
tive branch of government, and must be always con- 
firmed, as soon as circumstance would admit. But in 
an extraordinary crisis, legislation was so carved out by 
circumstance and enforced by patriotic necessity that 
the congressional representative felt himself under 
duress, as it were. However, if he could not wholly 
initiate the necessary bill, he could scold ; and there 
was much talk against acting in accord with the " royal 
pleasure," in the words of Ben Wade. 2 

This disappointed energy of congressmen and of 
party leaders generally culminated in the serious revolt 
against Lincoln in the early canvass for his reelection 
in 1864. Though the people had nominated him, these 
petty politicians fancied he could not be elected with- 
out their own instant help. They wanted something 
else, they did not know what, until the great ground 
swell of the people lifted the politicians on the wave, 
and swept away the McClellans and Seymours. 

We must separate the dictatorial powers in the pre- 
sidential hand — and so sparingly used by him — from 
the great act of emancipation, which produced the most 
far-reaching changes. The President herein acted from 
a line of prerogatives differing totally from those of a 

1 Seward at Washington, 1861-72, p. 23. 2 Infra, p. 253. 



xviii INTRODUCTION 

dictator. If they had not differed, the influence of 
learned critics like Benjamin R. Curtis, 1 shouting " Usur- 
pation!" would have created something more than a 
bubble on the surface of the foaming agitation of the 
time. The President, burdened with unsought respon- 
sibility in supervising incompetent generals, had come 
to be literally Commander-in-Chief as the war moved 
on. As soon as possible, the same conscientious ruler 
gladly yielded his baton to General Grant. His great- 
est military act was when his bloodless sword bent into 
a pen and struck the shackles from four million human 
beings. Tremendous powers were given by the Ameri- 
can people to their Dictator and to their Commander- 
in-Chief ; but there was no mingling and confusion of 
the two entities. The capacity to recognize and dis- 
criminate these great governmental agencies, latent in 
the people, always put forth at the right moment, is a 
wonder. 

A salient point of my study consists in the contention 
that, if the powers of the people, voluntarily thrust upon 
the administration in the year following the autumn of 
1861, had been energized and fully employed, the tre- 
mendous changes in the Constitution and government 
of the United States would not have occurred. These 
events and their issues are matter of history. But if 
slavery had not been destroyed as it was, speculation can 
hardly conceive of its abolition. Plainly, legislative 
power could not have been moved to so great a change 
in the Constitution as matters stood. The border States 
were sluggish and indifferent to every kind of compen- 
sation offered ; the Northern Copperheads opposed every 

1 Infra, p. 233. 



INTRODUCTION xix 

and any interference with the wonted enthrallment of 
the blacks. How can we conceive of the successful pas- 
sage of constitutional amendments capable of solving 
the difficulty ? These speculations, however, go beyond 
our province. Our business is to inquire into the rela- 
tions of the Union and the States, and we would ascer- 
tain why such vast popular intelligence, backed by 
enormous resources, did not instantly smash the Rebel- 
lion before arbitrary power could muster every man 
and some children, by desperate conscription, into open 
revolt. 

Pursuing one particular theme, I am forced into some 
unwelcome criticism of Abraham Lincoln. But it is 
particular and not general criticism, intended only for 
the cases cited, and for the question of the moment. 
The record for the first eighteen months compels strict 
examination and considerable criticism. Lincoln's great- 
ness grew with the occasion ; though his magnanimous 
spirit was innate and not installed by any election or 
inauguration. In managing affairs the President showed 
at times great facility ; but there were certain limitations 
inborn which affected his conduct of office, especially 
in the early period. Great in every contact with the 
whole people, he was often little toward his fellow-men. 
The sense of beauty, the quality of taste in truth and 
nobleness, had no place in his rugged nature. 1 Conse- 
quently the jester or the shrewd politician generally 
was manifest in his presidential intercourse. Neither 
the man nor the statesman predominated at the White 
House or in the intercourse of bureaus. The great man 
was a poor executive. Sagacious and sincere within, he 

1 Cf. infra, p. 46. 



xx INTRODUCTION 

• 

often affected those around him, as if he were a trifling 
clown. Average citizens, good patriots, could not com- 
prehend how pearls could irradiate so rough a shell. 
Nor was this action mere modest merit languishing 
within the man. As John Hay shows, 1 he was ambi- 
tious to the core ; conscious of large ability, and seeking 
its exercise within such limits as his own lack of taste 
and breeding prescribed. Meanwhile, such self-seeking 
competitors as Chase — strong in conscious power and 
culture — were disgruntled and affronted by enforced 
contact with the Rail-splitter. Seward got his lesson 
early and learned the power of his master. Stanton, a 
disparaging critic at first, had no presidential ambition, 2 
and was educated into loyal confidence by Lincoln's 
magnanimous treatment. These mighty men cooperated 
sincerely, though the restless ambition of Chase never 
could submit to Lincoln's dominating personality, while 
his intriguing spirit finally went to the verge of personal 
treachery. 3 

All history loses when cast into topical form, but that 
form was inevitable here. Narrative proper would have 
included all events of the struggle, and in its mass must 
have obscured the main principles of this treatise. While 
the topics cannot follow a strict chronology, and more 
or less entangle necessary narrative, I trust that the main 
purposes of the work will become apparent. 

There would have been advantages, if I could have 
included all the States in this study. But so much 
detail would have incumbered the main topic, which 
consists in the actual relations of a State — as such — 

1 Cf. infra, p. 46. 2 Boutwell, Sixty Years, vol. ii, 89. 

3 Cf. infra, p. 331. 



INTRODUCTION xxi 

to the central organ of all the States. In the communi- 
ties chosen, Morton, Andrew, and Curtin held con- 
tinuous service throughout the war, Perhaps Morton 
had the most difficult post among all the Union patriots. 
His legislature sometimes was absolutely hostile and 
violent ; to keep the State not only in line, but actually 
moving forward, participating in all important move- 
ments, was a triumph in executive experience. 

New York, the Empire State, likewise affords instruc- 
tive lessons. The city has been always a disturbing 
factor in national politics. Great commercial centres pro- 
duce much socially ; but they do not comprehend and 
cheerfully embrace the largest political issues. Com- 
merce is an immense factor in civilization, but it is not 
superior or even coequal to civilization. Commerce was 
made for man. As we may not consider the Church in 
this connection, the development of the State is the 
greatest mundane interest of man. The great city, with 
its benumbing influence, brought the overwhelming 
numbers to Seymour which effected his election. Its 
backward tendencies confirmed him in his silly wander- 
ing after State-independence, and in his quasi-opposition 
to the national administration. 

Although this study is limited to four States, and 
those Northern, my purpose is national in making it. 
The individual unionists and secessionists of 1861 are 
fast passing away. All of us should try to record and 
interpret the large and controlling principles of the 
tremendous struggle, as they worked out in the actual 
operations of the time. The secessionists of 1861 be- 
came after bloody trial and sacrifice renewed American 
citizens. By thorough patriotism and heroic effort they 



xxii INTRODUCTION 

and their descendants have shown in these latter years 
that the United States has no better citizens than those 
dwelling in the Southern States. The dogmas of State- 
Rights and Secession have passed into the constitutional 
museum, which preserves all the wondrous structures 
now developed into the modern organism of liberty and 
law. However these dogmas were born and bred, — 
whatever their basis in legal evolution, — they were 
maintained by brave men and true women. No people 
ever fought more faithfully, or spent their substance 
more fully, than the people of the Southern Confederacy. 

North and South must preserve the record and study 
the issues developed. The essential point, as well as the 
difficulty in historic treatment, is to view and estimate 
the facts in just proportion for all time. Now, the 
imperial Union is established in all minds, North and 
South ; then, when the facts occurred, they were passing 
through minds not judicially bent, but struggling for 
life or death. 

In summing up my own impressions, I see, first, the 
personality of Abraham Lincoln, towering high above 
his time. The man was cast in heroic mould, and the 
circumstances shaping him to his work were the largest 
in history since Napoleon : perhaps larger than Napo- 
leon's, for the soldier-emperor worked upon institutions 
which had been gradually losing their popular birth- 
mark and character ; while Lincoln came with his en- 
vironment directly from the people. Out of the very 
bosom and heart of humanity came this man, a daily 
offering to the caprices and humors of popular govern- 
ment, a final sacrifice to an assassin — the fruit of 
treason and rebellion. 



INTRODUCTION xxiii 

Secondly, I recognize that the leaders and generals 
of the Confederacy played a great part in this failure 
of disunion and the victorious ascendency of the Union. 
There has been much criticism of Jefferson Davis ; and 
doubtless his prejudices and pedantry were liable to 
censure. Yet it is pretty certain that no one could have 
accomplished more. The fall of the Southern idea as 
embodied in the Confederacy was fated ; its descent to 
the nadir of defeat and dissolution could not have been 
affected much by any individual living within its bor- 
ders. Davis's necessary policy was inevitably aggressive 
as well as creative. He could not wait, as Lincoln could 
and did, for governmental powers latent in the people 
to spring forth and reestablish the Union. Davis had 
to make and break. 

Lee was a great moral force at all times. As a soldier 
he was masterly in defense, provided his opponent did 
not exceed the scholastic traditions of decorous offense. 
He created opportunity out of the calculated weakness 
of his antagonists. Yet this master of defensive strategy 
fell short whenever attempting a serious offensive to 
crush his enemy. The gallant sons of the South could 
assault vigorously and win battles. They could not 
overcome their opponent intrenched in all the powers 
of representation, inclosed by all the works of civiliza- 
tion. To attain success, they must not only attack but 
destroy, demolish not only the men in arms, but the 
solid institutions which encompassed the Union soldier, 
protecting him whether in victory or defeat. 

There is a third division, once citizens then state 
participants in the turmoil of the Civil War. It is not 
a class, for the individuals composing it cannot be clas- 



xxiv INTRODUCTION 

sified. It is composed of disunionists at the North. It 
is significant that, while Copperheads sought office per- 
sistently, the whole country never accepted a disunion- 
ist. It was not until Grover Cleveland brought new 
issues to the front that the Union gave control to the 
Democracy. Now we are coming into the third genera- 
tion, which is disposed to forgive and even to forget. 
The Union is restored both North and South, and pa- 
triots everywhere prevail. No one cares to remember 
when he meets a patriot that his father struck against 
the flag. Those differences were adjusted. But what of 
secret betrayers, traitors at heart, who did not breast the 
battle openly ? 

The great historic facts cannot be traversed or ob- 
scured. The outlines of the struggle for the Union 
must deepen, must become more manifest, as history 
records salient events and brings into relief the true 
meaning of men's acts in those days. If we depict Lin- 
coln in massive form and drape him in heroic lines ; if 
we grant to Davis and Lee the epical grandeur belong- 
ing to a great cause sincerely lost — what next? How 
shall we define those abortive and mischievous creatures, 
who belonged neither to the Union nor to the Confed- 
eracy ? 

" Men like these on earth he shall not find 
In all the miscreant race of human kind." 

It is not agreeable to portray these individuals. It mat- 
ters not that they might have been good fathers or 
neighbors — worshiping in due form and living pro- 
perly. The State is over all and in all. Domestic life is 
important ; but in the great revolutionary crucibles the 
State must renovate or throw off every kind of matter 



INTRODUCTION xxv 

hostile to itself. Or, changing our view, the body poli- 
tic must nourish itself, rejecting all waste-product, 
which, being rejected, becomes offal, hardly to be dis- 
tinguished from treason and disloyalty. Verily, the lot 
of the Northern disunionist was hard. It will become 
harder, as time reveals more fully the discordant ele- 
ments of that time in the clear white light of a restored 
and greater Union. 



WAR GOVERNMENT 
FEDERAL AND STATE 

CHAPTER I 

THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 

IN the winter of 1860-61, the United States was 
vexed by one of the greatest problems in civil gov- 
ernment ever set forth in the history of the world. A 
great commonwealth comprising many differing commu- 
nities had subdued the earth from ocean to ocean. These 
communities during some forty years had struggled for 
or against the system of labor that enslaved the Afri- 
can negro. All the powers of a brilliant branch of the 
Anglo-Saxon race, apt in political life, had been devoted 
to the pursuit and the extension of domestic slavery. 
According with this masterful passion and contingent to 
it, local self-government had developed vigorously in 
these slaveholding communities, devoting and attaching 
their citizens to a solid governing force known as State- 
Rights. 1 The inevitable principle that the whole must 
control the parts, 2 — in event of political difference, — 

1 W. H. Russell, cited by Rhodes, vol. iii, 433. " State rights meant 
protection to Slavery, extension of slave territory, and free trade in slave 
produce with the outer world." 

2 Webster held, according to Merriam, American Political Theories, 
p. 284, that the Union was established by the people of the United States, 
and not by the people of the several States. It was as all the people that 
they established the Constitution. 



2 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

though embodied in the framework of the Constitution, 
had never worked itself out in our American experience. 

The idea of Union — one out of many, not essentially 
acting against a part, but including the whole 1 even to 
the suppression of an offending part — worked itself 
slowly into the convictions of the American people, and 
through severe agony became the controlling purpose 
of their lives. Yet, a nebulous consciousness of this 
hovering force inhered in the political sentiment of the 
United States ; it strove for expression in the Northern 
States, and finally overcame the resisting forces, active 
in the Southern communities, latent in Europe. 

To sketch the progress and to trace the interplay of 
these great governing principles — the overwhelming 
power of the Union, on the one hand, and the quicken- 
ing force of home-communities, on the other — will be 
the purpose of this study. 

A prevailing Union was a magnificent creation out 
of the progress of government. Perhaps the feeblest 
conception of this transcending idea that ever animated 
a practical Executive existed in the person and office of 
James Buchanan ; yet, such as it was, it prevailed. In 
that dark and trying winter, when the President, halting 
between many opinions, sustained the government after 
his fashion, there was only one positive idea that ani- 
mated his muddled consciousness. It was true that he 

1 Mr. Merriam shows, American Political Theories, p. 281, that the 
Union was not a treaty between sovereign States, as Calhoun argued, nor 
a contract between States by which their sovereignty was diminished, as 
Madison argued ; but it was based on law. This is obvious from the fact 
that after the tremendous issues of the Civil War, no changes were made 
in the fundamental law of the Union. The Union now exists by virtue 
of the original law. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 3 

drifted into some countervailing action — when im- 
pelled by Black, Holt, and Stanton — toward the sal- 
vation of his threatened administration. But his one 
controlling idea was the non-secession of a member of 
the Union. Conscientious, timid, credulous, employing 
precious time and exhausting his strength in feeble 
prayers or maudlin tears, he did see the tremendous 
fact that a State could not go. Weak as he was, he 
was more powerful than the passionate Greeley crying 
out, " We shall resist all coercive measures." 1 For he 
did hold in a certain way that the whole was greater 
than any part, or than all the parts operating through 
their separate functions ; though he might fail when 
attempting to put this conception into executive prac- 
tice. With absurd inconsistency, he could not coerce 
a State to stay in the Union, while he could rind no 
prerogative or authority for her outgoing. Yet his- 
tory should give him his due, in that he did hold to- 
gether — though feebly and in the worst manner — the 
functions of his office, and did deliver over his trun- 
cheon to a wiser and firmer hand on the 4th of March, 
1861. 

This idea, painfully elaborated in 1861-65, does not 
appear to be simple and absolute in comprehension 
to-day. We should hardly expect that historical writers 
of the ability and varied experience of Goldwin Smith 
and H. C. Lodge would maintain now that the Union of 
1789 was according to the former "a compact dissoluble 
at will," or as the latter says, involved "the right of 
practicable withdrawal from a mere experiment." 2 

i Tribune, November 9, 1860. 

2 Cited by D. H. C, Proc. M. H. S., Series II, vol. xvi, 151-164. 



4 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

This modern heresy has been sufficiently exploded in 
a long and thorough argument by D. H. Chamberlain. 1 
One or two sentences kill the vagary. 

No new fundamental theory of the relation of the States 
to the Union, or of the nature of the Union itself — whether 
a compact, or league, or confederacy on the one hand, or a 
perpetual, indefeasible nation or union on the other — has 
been enacted by law or constitution since 1789. In this re- 
spect the rights of the States, the rights and powers of the 
Union, are in law the same as they were one hundred and 
thirteen years ago. 2 

Mr. Chamberlain directly refutes the views attributed 
by Mr. Lodge to Webster, when he makes the latter 
appeal to the popular conception of the Union pre- 
vailing at the time of the Webster-Hayne controversy. 
Webster argued that " the Constitution originally cre- 
ated and was intended to create a perpetual and indissol- 
uble Union." Webster further said, "a constitution 
is a fundamental law," 3 not a compact. 

1 Mr. Goldwin Smith replies courteously to Chamberlain in The Sun, 
August 9, 1903. He cites Madison, The Federalist, No. 43 : " Should it 
unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justifica- 
tion for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution 
of the Federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult 
task to answer the multiplied and important infractions with which they 
may be confronted ? The time has been when it was incumbent on us 
all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now 
changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate." Mr. 
Smith says : " It is difficult to construe this. What I make of it is that 
the writer would fain have treated the Union as indissoluble, but feared 
to do it. . . . However, the difference between Mr. Chamberlain and me 
is historical, not practical. The practical question was settled by the war. 
The rupture was not at bottom either secession or rebellion. It was the 
natural breach between the free and the slave States." 

2 Proc. M. H. S., Series II, vol. xvi, 153. 

3 Ibid., p. 155. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 5 

Mr. Chamberlain proves also that the same theory in 
substance was held by the Virginians in 1789. 1 

To reach the origins of a theory of government 
which could so penetrate and saturate the powerful 
intellect of Daniel Webster, we must go back to the 
springs of colonial history. The most important political 
action, developing public spirit and communal feeling in 
early New England, manifested itself in the attack upon 
Louisburg, and in the victory wrested from the power 
of France. When the Grand Battery was evacuated, 
General William Pepperell reported to Governor Shir- 
ley, May 17, 1745, "I immediately ordered a Regiment 
there, the Union Flag to be hoisted." 2 

Another phase of this communal feeling declared in 
the word Union appears in a report from General Wins- 
low, near Albany, to Governor Hopkins, July 27, 1756. 
"No junction Can be Admitted off, Unless the Provincial 
Officers hold their Proper Rank (according with British 
regulars) as we look upon our Selves only as Executors 
in Trust for the Provinces have sent you the Result and 
Protest." 3 Not the tea or sugar taxes, not the Stamp 
Act or taxation without representation, so affronted the 
colonies, as this insular arrogance of British officers, 
generally incompetent for their duties. Winslow and 
his companions, holding this deep feeling in trust for 
their brethren, are a significant proof of union sentiment. 
Similar instances might be cited from other parts of the 
colonial domain. 

A " brief plan and scheme " for union was pub- 

1 Proc. M. H. S., vol. xvi, 164. 

2 Correspondence of the Colonial Governors of Rhode Island, vol. i, 337 

3 Ibid., ii, 227. 



6 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

lished in Pennsylvania in 1698. 1 Franklin's congress 
at Albany resolved unanimously " that a union of the 
colonies is absolutely necessary for their preserva- 
tion." 2 

This immanent perception was a continental force 
possessing the nascent American consciousness, and it 
was simply revealed in the action of Pepperell, when he 
planted not a British or Massachusetts, but a Union 
symbol of conquest. It became a governmental function 
after Concord, Bunker Hill, and Yorktown. Washing- 
ton, probably, did not forecast the Union of Marshall, 
but the familiar idiom became an urgent call for patri- 
otism, as in his farewell words, " Your Union ought 
to be considered as a main prop of your Liberty." 3 
Whether the fathers of the republic builded better 
than they knew, or whether they only set up the Union 
planks existing and falling ready to their hand, the 
result was the same as it worked itself out in the for- 
mation of the commonwealth, and in the growth of 
empire. Theories of state-building yielded to the gla- 
cial pressure of events; and differing political desires 
became one purpose in the inevitable prerogatives of a 
government, as it concentrated itself in the congress of 
representatives and in the delegated hand of the Execu- 
tive, who finally held all the powers emanating from 
the people. 

John Marshall did not create, he formulated 4 this 
magnificent idea, and, through judicial interpretation, 

1 Frothingham, Rise of the Republic, p. 110. 

2 Franklin's Works, Sparks' ed., vol. iii, 26. 

3 Memorial Tablet in Independence Hall, Philadelphia. 

4 Cf. infra, 35 n. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 7 

put into the common operation of constitutional law 
powers hardly apprehended by the deliberative Jeffer- 
son. This profound Union sentiment pervaded the North 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, and strug- 
gled in the Southern mind against the encroaching 
spirit of slavery. Very slowly, the disciples of Marshall 
and Jefferson yielded to the dominating logic of Cal- 
houn 1 and the " fire-eating " constituency bred out of 
his loins. Though Jackson was not an ideal ruler, ac- 
cording to the canons of Aristotle or of Montesquieu, 
he was a sovereign out of the people, comprehending 
their aspirations and executing their will with rare 
integrity. Along with this old-fashioned kingly func- 
tion went the persuasive energy of Henry Clay, sin- 
cerely amiable, ready to compromise all the coercive 
elements of government into any scheme for quieting 
the passion of the hour and for preservation of the 
Union. Patriotism, then, meant any concession, any 
sacrifice of a part, out of love for the Union or the 
whole ; forgetting that this whole was gradually being 
invaded by that alien despot Slavery. 

Beyond and above all these men, the Jovian intellect 
of Daniel Webster was lifted into the clearer atmos- 
phere where John C. Calhoun sought to subject the 
Union to revolving States, attracted by the federal 

1 Calhoun swept away some prevalent notions of social contract as 
applied by the Virginian Tucker (Commentaries on Blackstone, 1803, vol. i, 
187), holding that state sovereignty was indivisible ; but he would pro- 
tect the individual States from a threatened tyranny of the majority, by 
a curious analogy wrought out from the rights of property under the 
common law. " The federal government may have possession ; the states 
have ownership; and they may at any time evict their tenant, or any one 
of the states may claim its share of the estate." Cf. Merriam, American 
Political Theories, pp. 266, 268, 283. 



8 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

mass, but possessed and directed by slavery. 1 In his 
prime, Webster comprehended the inevitable destruc- 
tive tendencies of the political philosophy of Calhoun. 
In his declining days, when love of the Union drove 
him toward compromise, and the anaemic influence of 
presidential ambition enfeebled his reason, that Olym- 
pian man wavered and finally died, overcome by the 
demons of the hour. But let it not be forgotten that 
he most of all maintained the Union spirit in the sec- 
ond quarter of the nineteenth century. Even the half- 
developed endogenous statesmen of the type of James 
Buchanan were formed on the models which the 
mighty hand of Webster shaped to their political con- 
sciousness. The Constitution interpreted by Marshall 2 
was carried into the working process of government by 
the genius of Webster; 3 and his eloquent voice pro- 
claimed the music of the Union to the farmer and the 
schoolboy. 

If we would comprehend the political forces domi- 
nating the United States, — whether before or during 
the Civil War, — we must study the principles and prac- 
tice of party organization with its functions, as repre- 

i W H. Russell, cited by Rhodes, vol. iii, 431, thus stated the Southern 
idea, when he was at Montgomery, May 6, 1861: « We hold that slavery 
is essential to our existence as producers of what Europe requires; nay, 
more, we maintain it is in the abstract right in principle; and some of us 
go so far as to maintain that the only proper form of society, according 
to the law of God and the exigencies of man, is that which has slavery as 
its basis." 

2 Cf . infra, p. 34 n. 

8 Webster sought out and in the clearest terms placed the final power 
of the federal government; not in the mosaic of States, but in the com- 
mingling elements of union. Not "by the people of the several states; 
it is as all the people of the United States, that they establish the consti- 
tution." 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 9 

sentative government was developed. Much could be 
learned from the course of parties in the South, while 
slavery was subduing and moulding them into the uni- 
fied body which seceded and warred upon the Union. 
But our inquiry lies mainly in the North, and we must 
trace there the whole scheme of party organization — 
in principle and practice — as it gradually acquired 
control of political action in the early nineteenth cen- 
tury. 

Burke denned party to be " a body of men united, 
for promoting by their joint endeavors the national 
interest upon some particular principle on which they 
are all agreed." Perhaps this dictum was never more 
fully manifested than in the political action of slavery 
in the Southern States. It finally possessed itself of 
the whole community, politically, economically, and 
socially. 

While party organization is inevitable, and is most 
active in democratic politics, it prevails more or less in 
every form of political society. As Bryce 1 indicates, 
the individual man puts himself forth, gets his will, and 
satisfies his political desires most completely in that asso- 
ciation with his fellows known as a party. While gov- 
ernment and even administration of any sort — despotic 
or representative — unifies and enforces the common will, 
party divides, and gives its individual members the only 
practicable means of setting forth the ideas of each one 

1 Ostrogorski, Democracy and Political Parlies, vol. i, xl. Introduction 
by Bryce : " How did democracies get on without party ? Popular gov- 
ernments have within the last hundred years entered on a new phase 
marked by two remarkable facts. The number of participants in the 
business of government is immensely greater, and the method of partici- 
pation is much more pacific." 



10 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

in some form of action. 1 More elastic than any possible 
law or statute, the organization of party has been com- 
pared 2 to a tissue bringing the various powers of gov- 
ernment into articulation with the action of popular 
sovereignty. It matters not that the new divisible spirit 
coalesces rapidly and gravitates toward a pressure only 
less compulsory than that of the State itself ; yet there 
inheres the divisibility of the many, which differs essen- 
tially from the unity of all. 

In this new development of the citizen the old methods 
of edifying and developing the individual man all had 
to be made available. State and Church, either or both, 
had struggled for the control of the individual, while 
rulers were striving always to get both sources of power 
into their own hands. There were some lines of religious 
and political division in the times when the English 
colonies were growing into future states. The doctrine 
of Roger Williams, entirely releasing religious opinion 
from state control, had made little headway before the 
American Revolution. But the most ardent Catholic 
in Europe, the sternest Puritan or fiercest Calvinist in 
America, would have claimed that the dogmas of his 
faith were his own within his church relation, and were 
not to be prescribed by any prerogative of the State. 
Parish and congregational meetings were crude methods 
of representation, but they were potentially democratic, 

1 " The autonomous individual is finally proclaimed (by universal suf- 
frage) sovereign in the State. Left to himself in the political sphere by 
the emancipating process of individualism, and powerless in his atomis- 
tic isolation, he fastens on the old party groove. ... A prejudice grew 
which attributed a sort of mystic virtue to the elective principle." — Ostro- 
gorski, Democracy and Political Parties, vol. ii, 607. 

2 Ford, American Politics, p. 215. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 11 

and more effective than feudal survivals or burgher func- 
tions. Hence it was natural that the new privileges of 
the citizen should take on the forms of a higher law. 
There is reason for calling the party system in the 
United States especially an extra-constitutional function. 
Modern students * agree that the old obligations of creed 
and dogma, as enforced by ecclesiastical systems, were 
very like the new political faith, prescribed by the firm 
lines of party control. 

Like all profound and gradual social movements, this 
greatest manifestation of popular force did not show 
itself immediately to the keenest observers in the United 
States. After the skirmishing between the Federal and 
Republican parties, the principle of organization mar- 
shaled its hosts in the discussions on slavery in 1820. 
Yet the sagacious Tocqueville was hardly conscious of 
this potential force in 1834. The highest form of party 
efficiency appeared in the presidential convention. 
American statesmen readily perceived the latent forces 
quickening this palpitating organism, fresh from the 
heart of the people. John Quincy Adams said, 2 " Here 
is a revolution in the habits and manners of the people. 
These meetings cannot be multiplied in number and 
frequency without resulting in deep tragedies. Their 
manifest tendency is to civil war." 

Nothing could demonstrate more clearly the potential 
influence of these novel expressions of popular opinion. 
Calhoun thought the corruption of parties would drive 
people to force, i. e. war. But Mr. Ford 3 shows very well 

1 Von Hoist, Constitutional Hist. U. S., 1828-46, p. 691, aud Ostrogor- 
ski, Democracy and Political Parties, vol. ii, 615. 

2 Memoirs, vol. x, 352. 

8 A merican Politics, p. 303. 



12 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

that the organization of parties became a conserving 
force, and long repressed the tendency of slavery toward 
its logical ultimate in civil war. 

In 1831 and 1832 the caucus had grown into the 
convention, and before 1840 all elections were virtually 
initiated by party action. The South adhered longer to 
the English system of self-nomination by candidates, 
but it gradually fell into the American way of conven- 
ing and representing the peoj3le through parties. 

It is necessary to recognize the basis and the organic 
principles of American parties, to get at the true history 
of the Civil War. At intervals of patriotic enthusiasm 
citizens knew only one political motive, and parties dele- 
gated their individual members to a resumption of their 
higher and more direct allegiance to state and federal 
governments. These acts were momentary. As soon as 
the pressing occasion passed, individuals went back to 
their old political functions, as when they supported 
or opposed the administration of Lincoln through the 
customary efforts of organized parties. 

Whether slavery produced abolition, or whether the 
hostility induced by the ethical nature of the institu- 
tion begat a more positive and creative desire for its 
encouragement and extension, is hardly a political ques- 
tion. In fact, abolition never became a political issue. 
The abolitionists of 1830-40 did a great work in 
inciting the conscience of the nation to look within and 
set its political house in order. But Isaiah or Jeremiah 
never founded and maintained a kingdom. Garrison 
struggled as fiercely against the impregnation of Amer- 
ica through the Union noted herein, as Yancey and his 
fellows. If there was no potent Union in those days, — 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 13 

as Southern apologists assert, — why did he rebel against 
the Constitution as " a compact with Hell " ? 

The process of development was a breeding and an 
education on both sides. The economic and social 
growths were coming constantly into the political atmos- 
phere, when fierce germs planted themselves in politi- 
cians, or sought larger and higher life in the great 
work of statesmen. Gradually the moral conviction of 
the North broke into political action, which was then 
repelled by the South as an unpardonable innovation. 
The South held the fortified positions — whether Whig 
or Democratic — and hence embodied the conservative 
spirit in politics. 

Joshua R. Giddings, born in Pennsylvania in 1795, 
in 1842 offered a resolution in Congress that the Con- 
stitution did not authorize the recovery of slaves. The 
House of Representatives not only rejected this, but 
censured the mover by a vote of 135 to 69. The act 
was repudiated, and the motive of the actor was con- 
demned ; practical politics were beginning. His con- 
stituents reelected and returned him triumphant. David 
Wilmot, born also in Pennsylvania nineteen years later, 
in 1846 carried through the House his famous Proviso, 
though it failed in the Senate. This bill for purchasing 
Mexican territory would have prohibited slavery therein. 
The would-be compromises of 1850 tended to bring 
slavery into immediate political action controlled by the 
individual voter. In like direction were the movements 
of Stephen A. Douglas for " squatter sovereignty," in 
1854, culminating in the Lecompton constitution of 
Kansas. When actual control was usurped by " border 
ruffians," Douglas finally remonstrated against this form 



14 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

of a plebiscite, saying, " All men must vote for the con- 
stitution, whether they like it or not, in order to be 
permitted to vote for or against slavery." 1 In theory, 
this superficial dogma of popular sovereignty appealed 
strongly to the people of the middle and northwest, 
accustomed as they were to frontier occupation and the 
ready formation of institutions at the will of the settler. 
It would have determined and disposed anew the func- 
tions of the United States government by giving the 
territorial citizens a prerogative not yet agreed upon 
either by the Union or the States. In practice, whether 
manipulated by the men of the Missouri border or by 
the followers of John Brown, it became a mere eddy in 
the great current of Slavery Extension. 

Early in I860, 2 representative men defined their posi- 
tions in terms which the whole country could not fail 
to understand. 3 Douglas was especially significant, and 
parted company with his Southern friends, whom he 
had served so well by his great ability and his popular 
arts. " In the event of your making a platform that 
I could not conscientiously execute in good faith if I 
were elected, I will not stand upon it and be a can- 
didate. ... I have no grievances, but I have no con- 
cessions." 

i Rhodes, U. S., vol. ii, 283. 

2 Woodrow Wilson, American People, vol. iv, 200. In forming the 
Confederacy, Southern men "assumed that since each of their States 
had entered the Union of its own accord, as into a free partnership, and 
might have decided not to enter it, it was clearly within its privilege to 
withdraw when just cause for withdrawal seemed to exist." 

Mr. Wilson's hereditary opportunity gives additional interest to his 
statements. The Southern case — as it then stood — is urged forcibly by 
him. Ibid., pp. 188-198. 

8 Ibid., pp. 429-433. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 15 

Abraham Lincoln, in a great speech in the Cooper 
Institute at New York, proved that Congress had power 
to prohibit slavery in the Territories. Confronting the 
open threats of disunion, he said : " Your purpose, then, 
plainly stated, is that you will destroy the government 
unless you be allowed to construe and enforce the Con- 
stitution as you please, on all points in dispute between 
you and us. You will rule or ruin in all events." 

William H. Seward made a firm but conserving and 
conciliatory 1 speech in the Senate, declaring : " Did 
ever the annals of any government show a more rapid 
or more complete departure from the wisdom and vir- 
tue of its founders ? . . . I remain now in the opinion 
that these hasty threats of disunion are so unnatural 
that they will find no hand to execute them." 

Lincoln and Seward spoke to a definite point. Jef- 
ferson Davis, February 2, had introduced resolutions in 
Congress to define the ground of the Southern Demo- 
crats. They contained the bald statement that " nei- 
ther Congress nor a territorial legislature, by direct or 
indirect and unfriendly legislation, had the power to 
annul the constitutional right of citizens to take slaves 
into the common territories." Davis indicated also in 
guarded language that the Union would be dissolved 
in event of the election of a straight Republican to the 
presidency. 2 

1 The abolitionists severely condemned this attitude of the leader of 
the Republican party. See in Rhodes, U. S., vol. ii, 434, 435, a good 
account of the actual political performance of the abolitionists at this 
juncture. 

2 Southern men of advanced views had moved far away from the doc- 
trines of Clay, or of Calhoun even. Gaulden of Georgia, a delegate in the 
Charleston convention, speaking there, was approved as a representative 



16 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Issues were becoming plain. Conventions put into 
effective form the various opinions North and South by 
nominating John C. Breckinridge, grandson of an au- 
thor of the Kentucky resolutions of 1798 ; Stephen A. 
Douglas, a Democrat advocating popular sovereignty ; 
Abraham Lincoln, a Republican out of the loins of the 
Western people. Finally, John Bell and Edward Everett, 
of Tennessee and Massachusetts, brought in the con- 
serving Whig element and the fag-end of the Know- 
Nothing party, toward avoiding the danger of disunion. 
Lincoln was elected in November by a minority of 
the votes cast. As registered, 1 there were for Lincoln 
1,857,610 ; for Douglas, 1,291,574 ; for Breckinridge, 
850,082 ; for Bell, 646,124. The opponents combined 
had a majority of 930,170 over Lincoln. But these 
terms majority and minority were merely technical and 
formal. Under the constitutional system of electors, 
never lawfully disputed, he was chosen to the office 
of President, and was subject only to impeachment 
in event that he exceeded the prerogatives of that 
office. 

The States we are considering particularly gave a 

planter. " I am a Southern States-rights man ; I am an African slave- 
trader. I am one of those Southern men who believe that slavery is right, 
morally, religiously, socially, and politically. I believe that the institution 
of slavery has done more for this country, more for civilization, than all 
other interests put together. I believe that this doctrine of protection to 
slavery in the territories is a mere theory, a mere abstraction. We have 
no slaves to carry to these territories. ... I will show some darkies that 
I bought in Virginia [etc.], . . . and I will also show you the pure African, 
the noblest Roman of them all." This speech was circulated freely at the 
North, and convinced many — whom the abolitionists never had been able 
to touch — that there was a literal impending conflict. Rhodes, U. S., vol. 
ii, 481. 

i Ibid., p. 500. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 17 

majority to Lincoln, but the opposition was heavy, as 
the following figures show : ! — 





Lincoln 


Douglas 


Breckinridge 


BeU 


Massachusetts, 


106,533 


34,372 


5,939 


22,331 


New York, 


362,646 


312,310 * 






Pennsylvania, 


268,030 


16,765 


178,871 


12,776 


Indiana, 


139,033 


115,509 


12,295 


5,306 



* By fusion of the opposition. 

There was no lack of vigilance or prompt action on 
the part of South Carolina. Her Governor Gist on the 
12th of October, immediately after Pennsylvania and 
Indiana had indicated the probable outcome of the 
presidential contest, called the customary session of her 
legislature to appoint presidential electors. But he gave 
new exegesis to this function of a state government, 
conveyed in the unusual intimation that some action 
might be necessary " for the safety and protection of 
the State." 2 The legislature met November 5, the day 
before the national election, and Governor Gist recom- 
mended that if Lincoln be elected, provision should be 
made for an immediate convention to sever the connec- 
tion of South Carolina with the federal Union. 

We cite these passionate acts, not to condemn the 
actors, but to show the inevitable doom hanging over 
the American States. If ever fates of the Grecian 
type dominated mankind, it was in these crucial days 
of 1860-61. The long, deep and subtile process of 
educating an imperial Union — we have tried to set 
forth — did not affect the political consciousness of 
generations bred in the torrid airs of cotton increase 
and slavery extension. The judicial Marshalls, the 

1 McClure, Our Presidents, p. 175. 

2 Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 115 et seq. 



18 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

executive Jacksons, the constitutional Websters, had 
passed away ; the political exemplars of the South had 
come to be another sort of guides and chieftains, whom 
Calhoun's spirit led along paths unknown historically, 
and even more uncertain in their political tendencies. 
The dogma of State-Rights was meeting the growing 
conviction of the opponents of the extension of slavery. 
The fatal transit of these political bodies bent the stars 
of destiny to new courses, which were to immolate 
hundreds of thousands of lives, and to carry destitution 
and misery to almost all the homes of the Southern 
States. 

This atmosphere of opinion and feeling was essential 
to the time. If Northern-bred Americans like Henry 
Cabot Lodge do not know now that there has been a 
Union for more than a century, it was not strange that 
Davis or Stephens, Yancey or Pickens, ignored the fact 
in 1860-61. Brave to a fault, patriotic according to 
their inherited tendencies, they had come into one idea 
possessing all and overshadowing all the ordinary life 
of a citizen. As they viewed it, all the economic with 
the prevailing social forces of the time united to induce 
one political motive in the citizen, and it was directed 
by slavery. If their social and political institutions 
could not rule a federal Union, then the seceding and 
confederated States would make and mould not only a 
new government, but a new country, where master and 
slave should develop a civilization all their own. The 
occasional talk about tariffs or free trade was unsub- 
stantial, for the Confederacy enacted the tariff of 1857 
at once. 

The terms conspiracy, treason, traitor, which so 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 19 

affected the North in these days, have been gradually 
discarded by sober historians, in setting forth the idea 
of secession. Mr. Rhodes 1 shows clearly that the move- 
ment was too large and organic to be embraced in the 
functions of an ordinary conspiracy. Though the honor 
of each individual officer of the United States may be 
fairly questioned while he was virtually playing into 
the hands of the incipient Confederacy, there was not a 
mere conspiracy for revolt in the ordinary sense. There 
was a great upheaval of the foundations of society, po- 
litical and social ; individuals were agitated and hurried 
along by it, until each became another citizen, with a 
new impulse to loyalty. 

Like all idealists, the men of the Confederacy con- 
ceived their own position to be superior in elevation, 
and their principles to be absolute and not assailable. 
The abolitionists and "fanatics" of the North might err 
and pervert a political opportunity, but the South must 
be single-minded in pursuing its rights, and it alone 
could suffer grievance under the pressure of a consoli- 
dated government. This absolute passion revealed itself 
during the manoeuvres for compromise in the winter. 
The South was entirely sincere in this increasing isola- 
tion of political conviction. 2 It mattered not what the 
outside world wanted ; it wanted this, and asked only to 
be let alone. 3 South Carolina led but did not create 
this controlling passion. It spread, devouring as it 
went, until it touched the boundaries of Maryland and 

1 See the arguments of Alexander H. Stephens, cited by Rhodes, U. S., 
vol. iii, 210. 

2 Ibid., p. 278. 

3 Cf. Burgess, Civil War and the Constitution, vol. i, 76, 77, on Rights 
of Sovereignty and of Revolution. 



20 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Kentucky ; nor did the border States escape the political 
effects of the contagion. 1 

A book might be devoted to the strange, misdirected, 
and contrary love of union 2 which was manifest in the 
Northern cities during the winter of 1860-61. The 
party of secession, with deadly purpose, wasting neither 
time nor effort, went straight to the heart of the matter. 3 
The conduct of the leaders of opinion in the North 
was quite different. I have described the positive over- 
whelming force of Union sentiment prevailing in the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century, as it affected 
men like Andrew Jackson and the early, self-possessed 
Daniel Webster. This latent force, as it showed itself 
after the election of Lincoln, worked in a different way. 
The savers of the Union then seemed to believe that it 
could be preserved only by allowing its destroyers any 
license possible in a modern government. It will be 
interesting to discuss several types of these men, both 
for the effects of their immediate action and in view of 
the fact that the most of them afterward became ardent 
supporters of the administration when war actually 
broke out. 



1 If Bell and his followers in Tennessee and North Carolina could have 
imitated the loyal men in Kentucky, and could have remained firm in the 
cause of the Union, which they fancied they held preeminent, the results 
would have been great and far reaching. Whatever the outcome of 
secession, the peculiar power of a united Confederacy would have pre- 
vailed only in the " Cotton States." 

2 Even in the cool afterthought, when he wrote his American Conflict, 
Greeley said the Southern Confederacy had no alternative to an attack 
on Fort Sumter " except its own dissolution." Fortunately, the intuition 
of the Northern people as a whole proved to be a better interpreter of 
constitutional law than was the disputatious pen of Greeley. 

3 Burgess, Civil War and the Constitution, vol. i, 135. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 21 

Daniel E. Sickles was a good example of a politician 
and soldier of fortune. He said on the floor of Con- 
gress, December 10, 1860 : " In the event of secession 
in the South, New York city would free herself from 
the hated Republican Government of New York and 
throw open her ports to free commerce." * 

Perhaps no man better represented the Democracy 
of the North in intellect and character than Charles 
O'Conor, who was beloved by all his fellow-citizens. 
He said at a great Union meeting in New York, De- 
cember 19, 1859 : " Involving the fate of our Union, 
is negro slavery unjust ? . . . I insist that negro slavery 
is not only not unjust, but it is wise and beneficent." 2 

James S. Thayer, a most respected Old Line Whig, 
at a meeting for peace at New York in the winter we 
are discussing, said : " If the National Administration 
shall attempt the line of policy that has been fore- 
shadowed [i. e. enforcing laws in the seceded ( States '], 
we will reverse the order of the French Revolution, 
... by making those who would inaugurate a reign 
of terror, the first victims of a national guillotine." 3 

Similar utterances were made in other cities, espe- 
cially in Boston and Philadelphia. 

The old-time saver of the Union was moved by pas- 
sion rather than by reason, in this emergency ; but the 
angry trouble oppressed all classes of citizens and in- 
volved every shade of opinion. The question forced on 
every citizen of the United States in the critical months 
following the election was, Shall the seceding States be 

1 Cited by Burgess, Civil War and Constitution, vol. i, 147. 

2 Von Hoist, Constitutional Hist. U. S. 1859-61, p. 56. 

3 Burgess, vol. i, 148. 



22 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

allowed to go, or compelled to stay? This puzzle was 
embodied in the word coercion. Few persons in the 
South actually believed that the substantial power of 
the North would be brought to bear in compelling the 
seceding States back to their allegiance. As we have 
indicated, officers and trustees of the Union, like James 
Buchanan, could see only that States could not go, 
but must not be made to stay. Before the minds or 
the conscience of the Northern people — whether Re- 
publicans or Democrats — could be cleared and crys- 
tallized for action, immense effort had to be made. 

Northern Democrats or old Whigs, who had been 
carried like Seward, Chase, Trumbull, and Lincoln into 
the Republican party, — as against the extension of 
slavery, — now underwent a separating process that 
we may call political polarity. The Union-savers of 
this critical winter seemed to themselves to be animated 
by one political purpose, as they scanned the hori- 
zon line of the United States in those days. As they 
looked across the dark sea of this constitutional Union, 
lighted as it was by flashes of insurrection, and shaken 
as it was by the far-reaching thunders of rebellion, they 
perceived, as they fancied, one visible, sensible horizon. 
But there is a deep, compelling force in political 
polarity. The limits of a political horizon are not the 
same for the positive and negative political poles 
which subsist in every statesman. One set of positive 
conditions affecting the statesman ascends to a zenith 
and culminating point of political conviction, where 
the forces of order fuse all concentrating elements into 
one spring of government — into the essence of fidelity 
and loyalty. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 23 

The other set of conditions — negative and disinte- 
grating — descends to a nadir of rebellion and revo- 
lution. It matters not how good the intentions of a 
self-conscious patriot may be when he starts on this 
descending path. The course of disorder polarizes him, 
converting his doubtful, embracing limitations into 
constraining bands, which warp his movement, until 
his course ends at the nadir of the rebel and revolu- 
tionist. Such was the implacable current of rebellion, 
as it drove the Northern sympathizers from their shifting 
stools of old party allegiance and conservative Unionism, 
to the encouragement and support of a formidable re- 
bellion in the Southern States. James Buchanan, as we 
have indicated, was only half evolved when he handed 
over the bedraggled Union to his successor in office; 
while his hinder parts had been wabbling towards 
Yancey, Toombs, and the fire-eating promoters of re- 
bellion. 

It is the merit of Edwin M. Stanton that his fierce 
intuition saw the issue and recognized the point of 
polarity, thus perceiving the political necessity for 
separating the elements ; one stream of which should 
fight for the Union, while the other must end in 
cooperate support of the rebellion. He was Attorney- 
General, and the crisis was precipitated in the cabinet, 
December 29, 1860, when Floyd * the secret rebel and 
Buchanan the maudlin sympathizer would have ordered 
Anderson from Fort Sumter, which was the new posi- 
tion of the aggressive Union, back into Fort Moultrie, 

1 The Secretary of War, who posted United States troops to accord 
with rebel strategy and placed arms convenient for seizure. This genera- 
tion can hardly comprehend that this peaceful negative posed in the 
cabinet as a Union-saver in the early months of the rebellion. 



24 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

which was the insecure post of old constitutional 
Unionism. 

The last Facing-Both-Ways was sloughed off when 
Black * left his maze of constitutional quibbles, while 
Stanton and Dix rallied to the front. In Stanton's own 
words to his brother-in-law when Floyd resigned, " One 
by one the secessionists have been worked out. We are 
now a unit. Who will come into the present vacancies 
is uncertain." 2 The path thus opened carried Douglas, 
Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Logan, with thousands of the 
best fighting Democrats of the North, to the zenith of 
the Union. This irresistible polar current turned an- 
other set downward, carrying Vallandigham, Seymour, 
Fernando Wood, the Sons of Liberty, and other halt- 
ing doubters to the depths of revolutionary discord, 
in spirit, though their pusillanimous bodies skulked 
under the American flao\ 

In this winter of discontent two great movements 
— one in the course of legislative action, the other in 
the form of an informal representation of States, known 
as the Peace Convention — were initiated to stem the 
tide of disunion. The Congressional movement toward 
definite legislation for compromise was led by Critten- 
den of Kentucky, well fitted for the task by experi- 
ence and by his life-long political connections. A 
committee of thirteen was appointed in the Senate to 

1 Black put forth the extraordinary doctrine that " the Union must 
utterly perish at the moment when Congress shall arm one part of the 
people against another for any purpose beyond that of merely protecting 
the general government in the exercise of its proper constitutional func- 
tions." He evolved a positive constitutionalism, which could end only 
in the negation of the Union — born long before the Constitution was 
conceived. 

2 Cited by Gorham, Stanton, vol. i, 159. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 25 

facilitate the passage of the Kentucky statesman's 
measure, consisting of Powell of Kentucky, Hunter 
of Virginia, Crittenden of Kentucky, Seward of New 
York, Toombs of Georgia, Douglas of Illinois, Collamer 
of Vermont, Davis of Mississippi, Wade of Ohio, Bigler 
of Pennsylvania, Rice of Minnesota, Doolittle of Wis- 
consin, and Grimes of Iowa. The formation of the com- 
mittee shows all the American skill in organization ; it 
was representative, able, and patriotic ; its deliberations 
and endeavors 1 reveal the springs of the whole trouble, 
and exhibit the inevitable nature of the conflict. The 
committee met December 21, when the news came that 
South Carolina had passed her ordinance of secession 
unanimously on the 20th. 

If compromise had been possible, the movement of 
Crittenden would have accomplished it. Moderate men 
of all parties at the North desired to avoid war by any 
means. Commercial derangement had induced severe 
financial pressure, and the trading classes desired any 
settlement which would bring peace out of the political 
agitation. But the main body of the Republicans 2 felt 
that no practicable concession would turn back the tide 
of rebellion. Lincoln was disposed to yield largely, 
until it came to the further extension of slavery in the 
Territories, which he resisted absolutely. He wrote, 
December 11 : — 

Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to 
the extension of slavery. The instant you do, they have us 

1 Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 151-155. 

2 C. F. Adams wrote, February 11, 1861 : "My apprehension has been 
that the Crittenden measure would find favor among our friends. At one 
time there was a little danger of it. There is little or none now." — Cited 
by Rhodes, ibid., p. 288. 



26 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

under again ; all our labor is lost, and sooner or later must 
be done over. . . . The tug has to come, and better now than 
later. You know I think the Fugitive Slave clause of the 
Constitution ought to be enforced — to put it in its mildest 
form, ought not to be resisted. 1 

The Crittenden compromise failed. The other great 
attempt to avoid war was initiated by Virginia, the fos- 
ter mother of the Union, and the eldest child in the 
family of the States. Her general assembly invited 
the other States, whether slaveholding or not, to send 
commissioners to meet in convention at Washington, 
February 4, 1861, to try "to adjust the present unhappy 
controversies." Virginia gave formal notice that she 
would accept the Crittenden compromise. Twenty-one 
States were represented, leaving out the seven cotton 
States, Arkansas, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Cal- 
ifornia, and Oregon. 

On the same day, at the call of South Carolina, six 
cotton States, by delegates, met at Montgomery, Ala- 
bama, and formed the Southern Confederacy. Jefferson 
Davis was elected President, and Alexander H. Stephens 
Vice-President, of the new government. 

The Peace Convention was composed of men of high 
character and fine ability, and was presided over by ex- 
President Tyler. Its debates and action were along the 
lines of the Crittenden compromise. On the morning of 
March 4, Crittenden offered in the Senate the project 
of the Peace Conference; which received in the vote 
only seven yeas, including Crittenden, Douglas, 2 and 

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii, 259. 

2 Douglas's appeal for peace, made in Congress January 3, was elo- 
quent, though his arguments were hardly sound: "I do not, however, 
believe the rights of the South will materially suffer under the adminis- 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 27 

two Republicans. Zachariak Chandler of Michigan per- 
haps expressed the conviction of positive minds North 
and South. " The whole thing [i. e., the convention] 
was gotten up against my judgment and advice, and will 
end in thin smoke." * 

The compromise and peace movements were the well- 
meant misdoings of a type of excellent people, who 
never can comprehend a crisis or act with decision in 
grave affairs. They have their say, and do not have 
their way. On this occasion, their peaceful intentions 
had full weight, while stronger men vainly tried to 
secure representation for their ideas. Not only did the 
Northern supporters of Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell 
labor for compromise ; the veteran political manager 
of New York, Thurlow Weed, matured a plan which 
would restore the Missouri line in territorial extension. 
He urged it in December " with cogent reasoning, the 
result of profound reflection irradiated by his long 
public experience. It was a bold step for a partisan 
Republican to take." 2 William H. Seward at this time 
was the most popular member of the Republican party, 
and he appeared to favor compromise, however he may 
have voted. 3 Henry Ward Beecher had a large follow- 
ing, and with characteristic flippancy he answered the 

tration of Mr. Lincoln. But this apprehension has become wide-spread 
and deep-seated in the Southern people. ... In my opinion, South Caro- 
lina bad no right to secede; but she has done it. Are we prepared for toar 1 
I do not mean that kind of preparation which consists of armies and 
navies and supplies and munitions of war; but are we prepared in our 
hearts for war with our own brethren and kindred ? I confess I am not. 
I prefer compromise to war. I prefer concession to a dissolution of the 
Union." — Congressional Globe, Appendix, p. 38. 

i Cited by Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 307. 3 Ibid., p. 145. 

3 Ibid., pp. 157, 164, 174, 288. 



28 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

prevailing question, about the end of November, as to 
whether the South would secede, " I don't believe they 
will; and I don't care if they do." * 

But this careless optimism did not represent the 
American people. There were deep forces, impelling 
large principles beneath the surface ; and these cur- 
rents swayed thinking men, whether North or South, as 
the tide swept on. We may well study two utterances, 
which interpret the signs of the time, as revealed to the 
two sections of our country. Jefferson Davis said in the 
Senate, December 10, 1860 : — 

Say so, if your people are not hostile ; if they have the 
fraternity with which their fathers came to form this Union ; 
if they are prepared to do justice ; to abandon their opposition 
to the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Give 
us that declaration . . . then we may hopefully look for 
remedies which may suffice ; not by organizing armies, not so 
much by enacting laws, as by repressing the spirit of hostility 
and lawlessness, and seeking to live up to the obligations of 
good neighbors and friendly States united for the common 
welfare. 2 

James Russell Lowell wrote and published in Jan- 
uary, 1861 : — 

The fault of the free States in the eyes of the South is 
not one that can be atoned for by any yielding of special 
points here and there. Their offence is that they are free, and 
that their habits and prepossessions are those of freedom. 
. . . Our very thoughts are a menace. It is not the North, 
but the South that forever agitates the question of slavery. 
The seeming prosperity of the cotton-growing States is based 
on a great mistake and a great wrong ; and it is no wonder 
that they are irritable and scent accusation in the very air. 

1 Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 139. 2 Congressional Globe, p. 29. 






THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 29 

It is the stars in their courses that fight against their system, 
and there are those who propose to make everything comfort- 
able by act of Congress. 1 

Statesmen and preachers, jurists and politicians, jour- 
nalists and men of affairs, — all wrought with might 
and main through this winter, to bring the North to 
accept any result, rather than a stern decree of war. 
Although not apparent at the time, the greatest influ- 
ence in all this seething turmoil of national forces was 
in and through the personality of Abraham Lincoln. 
Taken as candidate for the presidency because he could 
most surely carry the elections, 2 and moreover because 
some friends of Seward, in their secret consciousness, 
feared his jaunty good nature in administration, even if 
elected, Lincoln was little known by most of his sup- 
porters throughout the North. But gradually, after the 
election, the nature of this man of destiny asserted 
itself, and began to affect the more thoughtful citizens 
of the North. Politicians, who expected a neutral chief- 
tain, to be moulded and handled by the old leaders like 
Seward or Chase, were soon disappointed by the large 
qualities they discovered in the man himself. Certainly, 
Thurlow Weed was a competent judge of American 
statesmen, and he very early recorded his impression 3 

1 Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 149. 

2 McClure, Our Presidents, p. 155. 

3 December 22, 1860. " An interview with Mr. Lincoln [at Springfield] 
has confirmed and strengthened our confidence in his fitness for the high 
position he is to occupy. . . . The American people will not have cause, 
so far as the head and heart of Abraham Lincoln are concerned, to regret 
the confidence they have reposed in him. He is not only honest and true, 
but he is capable — capable in the largest sense of the term. He has read 
much and thought much of government. His mind is at once philosophical 
and practical. He sees all who go there, hears all they have to say, talks 



30 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

that the true ruler of the future Union was then in the 
humble homestead at Illinois. 

Popular government has been a constant and fertile 
theme for statesmen, as well as demagogues. Yet few 
men have actually grasped the principles which reach 
from the deep sources of popular conviction to the 
heights of executive control and administrative action. 
It is true that the people are the source as well as the 
instrument of power ; and in a government like ours, 
no leader can carry them forward unless he is actuated 
by principles large enough to comprehend the whole 
trend of popular conviction and action. Weed indicated 
the method of Lincoln, which was to saturate himself 
with information direct from the representatives, if not 
the agents, of the people. Douglas, with all his politi- 
cal tact, did not comprehend the governing force of 
the people as clearly and completely as did Abraham 
Lincoln, born and bred in the great middle West. Mr. 
Seward was a statesman of considerable force and of 
the largest experience. He was writing home early in 
December, " No one has any system, few any courage 
or confidence in the Union in this emergency." 1 

The lucid idea which should dissipate the fogs and 
clarify the political atmosphere was lacking in all the 
varied efforts of the varying men who tried to compro- 
mise between South and North during the winter. The 
house was divided against itself already ; how was it to 
stand without reverting to the original foundations? 
And those foundations, as has been shown, were in the 

freely with everybody, reads whatever is written to him, but thinks and 
acts by himself and for himself." — Cited by Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 305. 
1 Ibid., p. 157. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 31 

Union, which even Mr. Seward could hardly discern in 
this doubtful moment. 

It took but one idea to penetrate this mass of hesi- 
tancy and contradiction ; and that one must be unifying 
and controlling. Lincoln, shut away in an upper room 
of a shop in Springfield, perceived that something had 
happened in November. After forty years of debating 
by Webster and Calhoun, by Clay and Douglas, the 
question had been submitted to the people. All shades 
of opinion had been represented at the polls, by Breck- 
inridge or Bell, by Douglas or Lincoln. The verdict 
was given, and slavery was found wanting. This was 
politics and history in one action. The technical Union- 
savers forgot that the people had spoken. Lincoln never 
forgot it ; and the people, in all the trials of the Civil 
War, remembered him, their chosen agent. All theo- 
retical exposition of law and constitution, privilege of 
secession, power of coercion, right of appeal to arms, 
gradually faded away in the white light of union, 
where alone could a solid and capable government be 
conceived of or maintained. 

Communicating with Kellogg and Washburne in 
Congress, Lincoln spoke 1 in the clear tones of a states- 
man. To the latter he said, December 11 : " Let that 
be done [restoration of the Missouri line], and imme- 
diately filibustering and extending slavery recommences. 
On that point hold firm as a chain of steel." Even 
more significant was his language to John A. Gilmer of 
North Carolina, when he was trying to bring him into 
the cabinet as projected, in a sincere effort to draw the 
latent Southern-Union sentiment — not yet overwhelmed 

i Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 161. 



32 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

by secession — to the support of his future administra- 
tion. December 15 Lincoln wrote : — 

On the territorial question I am inflexible. On that there 
is a difference between you and us ; and it is the only sub- 
stantial difference. You think slavery is right and ought to 
be extended ; we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted. 
For this neither has any just occasion to be angry with the 
other. 1 

Mark the words " only substantial difference." All 
past rights of holding slaves, whether at home in South 
Carolina, or fugitive in Massachusetts/ Lincoln pledged 
himself to maintain with all the executive power, and 
he besought the legislature through the winter to make 
those rights in every way secure. Here was no threat 
against the institutions of the States of the South. 
Every pretense of wrong and spoliation, on which the 
Southern statesmen were building up secession, was 
swept away, in so far as it affected the accrued rights 
and privileges of those States. But the extension of 
those rights had been cut off positively, by vote of the 
whole people. As he signified in many forms of expres- 
sion, it was useless to go over that ground again, 
whether in peace or war. I am not rehearsing these 
arguments merely to rebuke secession, but to bring out 
the historic sources and the genesis of the Union. 

No one inheriting the potent logic of Calhoun or the 
persuasive suavity of. Clay could perceive more clearly 

i Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 161. 

2 Woodrow Wilson, of competent authority, born in Virginia, says : 
" The Republican party had indeed always and with all proper emphasis 
disavowed any wish or intention to lay any hand of molestation or change 
upon the domestic institutions of the South itself." — American People, 
vol. iv, 190. 



THE GENESIS OF THE UNION 33 

than Mr. Lincoln that this sublime difference must be 
met, even if the issue were in blood. 1 We are not argu- 
ing the main point with the South. The question is too 
large for a paragraph. But the position of Lincoln at 
this instant was significant and momentous. This prin- 
ciple of non-extension of slavery, adopted by the people, 
was one of the staying props which went down to the 
bed-rock of the Union. It was such power in the man 
Lincoln, of grasping these mastering principles and 
holding them through victory or defeat, which distin- 
guished him among politicians and leaders of the nine- 
teenth century, and will make him one of the chosen 
men of all time. 

1 Lincoln said simply in his inaugural : " No State of its own mere 
motion could get out of the Union." Davis had said in his inaugural that 
secession was based on " the American idea that governments rest on the 
consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or 
abolish them at will, whenever they become destructive of the ends for 
which they were established." Let us define the sources of this proposi- 
tion, according to disinterested authorities. W. K. Clifford says of duty 
in the public sense: " Duty to one's countrymen and fellow-citizens, which 
is the social instinct guided by reason, is in all healthy communities the 
one thing §acred and supreme." Probably the Southern statesmen, in 
their sober moments, would have absolutely repudiated the Jacobin idea 
in all government. Yet they were complete Jacobins in their acts of 
secession. "It is precisely this idea of divinely appointed, all-pervading 
obligation, as the paramount law of life, that contemporary Jacobinism 
holds in the greatest abhorrence, and burns to destroy." 



CHAPTER II 

THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 

WE have traced the growth of Union sentiment 
through its first adumbrations and symbolic 
images in colonial time to its inevitable manifestation in 
welding- the differing States into a coherent whole after 
the revolutionary contests. The half century or more 
ensuing was dominated, in this higher region of popular 
polity, more by sentiment than thought, more by feel- 
ing than opinion. John Quincy Adams, "the old man 
eloquent," might struggle manfully for the right of peti- 
tion, but the mass of the state — while the sway of Union 
was dormant — was drifting surely toward the new ele- 
ment of control as exercised by slavery. Yet Webster's 
great phrase, " keeping step to the music of the Union," x 

1 Woodrow Wilson says (American People, vol. iv, 201) that in 1860 the 
South had kept " to the first conception of the Union. . . . For a majority 
of the nation no conception of the Union was now possible but tl^,t which 
Mr. Webster had seemed to create and bring once for all to their con- 
sciousness." Mr. Wilson's statements are always fair, and entitled to 
consideration ; but this expression indicates the mental condition prevail- 
ing at the South. That phrase " seemed to create " is a fair example of 
the process undergone by every intellect once befogged by slavery. Could 
any philosopher or jurist, even a Webster, create such an overpowering 
force in government, the resultant sum of all the arts of civilization ? Did 
Webster create the enormous power of Marshall as brought by his tre- 
mendous reasoning force to the elucidation of the inevitable powers of 
government involved in the Union of the Constitution ? " Marshall in- 
cluded not only the powers expressed in the Constitution, but those 
also which should be found as time unfolded to be fairly and clearly im- 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 35 

involved the inheritance of the past and the feeling of 
the moment. The great ground-swell of popular convic- 
tion invoked by this master of expression in his time 
held the consciousness of the American people, even 
while the process of disintegration wrought by slavery 
and cotton was going forward. That phrase of Web- 
ster's was more than a figure of speech, inasmuch as it 
brought the average citizen into accord with a principle 
so profound, so thoroughly in harmony with the crea- 
tive forces of the state. 

Philosophical publicists, foreign observers, or sciolists 
naturally could not comprehend this, the greatest of 
the forces that was building up the American nation. 
They consulted constitutions, adjusted technical points, 
noted lapses and faults, thinking they had set forth the 
American future in the light of past experience. Gen- 
erally they predicted failure for democracy in its Amer- 
ican form. Fortuitous circumstances, as they claimed, 
had enabled an endogenous government to maintain 
itself in the absence of hostility, and consequently 
adverse conditions would bring disaster. The inner 
process we have been sketching, hidden as it was, lay 
beyond and beneath their ken. Prior to 1861-65, who 
could perceive the enormous forces, latent and mighty 
in a popular will, born out of the new conditions of 

plied in the objects for which the federal government was established. 
... It was Marshall's strong constitutional doctrine, explained in detail, 
elaborated, powerfully argued over and over again with unsurpassable ear- 
nestness and force, placed permanently in our judicial records, holding its 
own during the long emergence of a feeble political theory, and showing 
itself in all its majesty when war and civil dissension came, — it was 
largely this that saved the country from succumbing in the great struggle 
of forty years ago, and kept our political fabric from going to pieces." 
— Thayer, Life of Marshall, pp. 58, 59. 



36 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

America and trained by destiny to meet continental 
issues ? 

Much was made of the fact that Lincoln was elected 
by a minority of the votes cast. 1 But such quibbling 
over the terms major and plural can hardly reach the 
actual nature of instituted suffrage. It was the boast 
of America that her instituted privileges so fettered and 
obstructed the individual votes that, in simple majority, 
they never could get at an institution and overthrow it 
without long and tedious legislation by accumulating 
majorities. Checks and controlling balances were essen- 
tial to the system. As well object to much of the past 
legislation, when in the Senate a minority of voters in a 
majority of States brought about change, or in the House 
of Representatives, when the lesser number electing 
Smith, Brown, and Jones outclassed the majority, who 
had elected Robinson and Tompkins. Or object that a 
minority of able-bodied six-foot men had been outvoted 
by five-footers, cripples and sick, who could not muster 
with bullet and bayonet against the stronger men mak- 
ing the minority, and beaten by civic organization. 

The great method of modern government, unknown 
to Greece or Rome, had established the fixed principle 
that representation was more essential than numbers; 
that constituted right went beyond major strength of 
the moment in the everyday work of legislation and of 
government, where the masses could not act directly, but 
must be represented. 

The only possible means of electing a President in this 
republic was by a majority of electoral votes, or if that 
failed, by a vote of the House of Representatives under 

1 Wilson, American People, vol. iv, 190. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 37 

prescribed conditions. To say that a man elected might 
transgress and infringe on a State or citizen, thus viti- 
ating an election which was past, was to beg the question 
beyond all historic experience. In the campaign of 1860, 
roughly speaking, 1 one vote was thrown for Bell, one 
and one third for Breckinridge, two for Douglas, and 
three for Lincoln. Would the principle of representa- 
tion have been changed essentially if one half of Doug- 
las's votes, or all of Bell's and a few more, had gone 
over to Lincoln ? It was the Breckinridge minority 
which like Aaron's rod absorbed the whole South, 2 and 
deflected a portion of the North to support the Southern 
Confederacy in war. It did not require a majority to 
cause civil war, such purists should remember, if they 
must have a popular majority for President. As Lin- 
coln put it at the Cooper Institute in the winter, these 
gentlemen were bound to rule or ruin. The party which 
could not muster any technical majority for making 
slavery the main function of the American Union 
could drag the country into a war that shocked all 
humanity. Does any sane student of history imagine 
that the course of events would have been changed 
substantially, if Bell's old constitutional Whigs or some 
of Douglas's squatters had thrown their votes for Lin- 
coln in November, 1860 ? 

Whatever grievances on account of the restricted and 
confined institution of slavery the Confederate States 
had cherished against the people of the North, they 
did not seek redress in the world's tribunal. They did 
not ask more of the civilized world than overwhelming' 
majorities at the North had offered them again and 

1 Cf. ante, p. 17. 2 Wilson, American People, vol. iv, 208. 



38 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

again. Jefferson Davis in his inaugural address said: 
'"Asa necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to the 
remedy of separation.' With remarkable astuteness he 
made not the slightest allusion to slavery. By a section 
of the provisional constitution, the African slave-trade 
had been prohibited. Thus did the cotton States and 
their president show that the public opinion of Christen- 
dom must be taken into account." * For better or 
for worse, the people of the South had thrown aside 
their inherited share of the American Union, and had 
attempted through secession to establish a revolution, 
and to place the dogma of State-Rights on the economic 
institution of Slavery, seeking a new political devel- 
opment. In spite of conventions for separation and 
negotiations for peace, the Union existed, and inaugu- 
rated its President on the 4th of March, 1861. The 
politician and representative of the Republican party, 
the statesman of Illinois, now became by right the 
President of the United States ; it was a right seriously 
disputed. In assuming the office, the man appealed to 
this larger constituency and to the world. We must 
consider the man. 2 

Abraham Lincoln came, perhaps, more directly from 
the people than any man who has ever played a great 
part in history. It was not merely that his mother, an 
excellent woman, was of humble birth, and that his 
father was a shiftless settler in Kentucky, descended 
from Pennsylvania Quakers, living in the narrowest 

1 Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 293. 

2 I have read much of Lincoln. The accounts are well summed up by 
Mr. Rhodes, vol. ii, 308-314, with a list of authorities at p. 313. Again, 
vol. v, 144. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 39 

circumstances poverty could provide. His whole cul- 
ture, growing out of the conditions of his life, was popu- 
lar, both in a narrow, material view, and in the largest 
intrinsic and spiritual sense. He drew from the instant 
breath of the people inspiration that lifted him far 
away, while it strengthened the ties binding him to the 
common souls he loved. 

From somewhere back of his father, or more probably 
from his mother, he inherited his massive intellect. Born 
in 1809, after seven years in Kentucky his youth was 
spent in Indiana, and the man of twenty-one removed 
to Illinois. At intervals he had passed one year in 
school. When nineteen years of age he went to New 
Orleans in a flat-boat, and made a second trip in his 
early manhood ; there was no larger school than the 
river voyage in those days. His capacity to lead is 
shown in that he was elected at twenty-three years to 
be captain in the Black Hawk war, freely and without 
solicitation. Drifting from one occupation to another 
with little success, always reading eagerly and studying 
law by the way, he began practice at twenty-eight. 
The Western lawyers then handled the court with one 
hand and politics with either hand. Hundreds of Ameri- 
cans have passed through a similar experience, limited 
by poverty, yet impelled by ambition a to lift their con- 
scious capacity to eminence. Wherein was the charac- 
teristic greatness of Lincoln ? 

1 Lincoln's ambition, never buoyant, subjected bim to severe fits of 
depression, in periods of failure. As when he said to his close friend and 
partner, Herndon: "I have done nothing to make any human being re- 
member that I ever lived. To connect my name with something that will 
redound to the interest of my fellow-men, is all that I desire to live for." 
— Herndon, Life of Lincoln, p. 217. 



40 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Education has been termed " the unfolding of the 
whole human nature." No one ever illustrated this 
truth more fully than our lank and lofty son of Ken- 
tucky. 1 Surveying the land as well as chopping for its 
fences, he was forced into mathematics, where six books 
of Euclid laid the foundations of a logic which could 
grapple with Taney or Douglas, Davis or Seward. Burns 
was the effective poet of that generation, and Lincoln's 
sympathies were touched by the popular lyrist. But the 
very own books of the man were the Bible and Shake- 
speare. While the current religiosity of his Baptist and 
Methodist neighbors repelled him, the humanity of 
Scripture drew out his largest nature. 2 This was not 
common in the Hebraic and Calvinistic atmosphere of 
that region. Eggleston has set forth plainly the reli- 
gious culture of Indiana and Illinois 3 in the time of 
Lincoln's youth. Men like " honest Abe " — as he was 
called at twenty-four years — and Oliver P. Morton, 
gifted with large perceptions, could rise out of the local 
mists and inhale the inspiring, wholesome currents of 
the Christian civilization of the world. 

It was fortunate that beyond Paine and Volney, while 
his mind was testing systems, human and divine, he 
came under the influence of the great iconoclast of New 
England, Theodore Parker. This preacher and publicist 

1 " While Mr. Lincoln was an uneducated man in the college sense, 
he had a singularly perfect education in regard to everything that con- 
cerns the practical affairs of life. His judgment was excellent and his 
information was always accurate. He knew what the thing was. He 
was a man of genius." — C. A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, 
p. 182. 

2 His partner said that he was filled with the spirit of natural religion, 
hut had no faith in forms. Herndon, p. 538. 

8 Cf. infra, p. 142. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 41 

never could have furnished Lincoln the constructive 
faculties to build a new Union, as the breaking timbers 
of the old one were falling around him. But his logical 
force and its influence were profound. In all modern 
dialectic, Lincoln could not have found a more trusty 
Ithuriel spear to puncture and rend the false growths 
Slavery had wrought into the political development of 
the forties and fifties of the nineteenth century. There 
were certain large principles affecting these shifting, 
political tendencies, as Slavery pushed its remorseless 
way through the yielding mass. Webster, even, did not 
grasp these deep-going roots of popular and constitu- 
tional government more firmly, or hold them with a 
stronger hand, than this homely student as he pored 
over his circumscribed learning in the intervals of his 
pleading and story-telling. 

Libraries stimulate, a book educates. Lincoln may 
have lacked in the experience of Greece and Rome and 
in the lessons of European history, though Shakespeare 
in some measure corrected those defects. And we are 
coming to learn, through the statutes of Hamurabai and 
other Babylonian records, that Moses, the Psalmist, and 
Isaiah drew from deeper wells of human wisdom than 
were known to our fathers. 

Object teaching is known to be a positive power. The 
common law taught our student the new out of the old, 
whether he was interpreting it in a formal court-room, 
or to the critical audience of a bar-room. He avoided 
the whiskey and tobacco prevailing everywhere ; yet he 
was ever welcome in this mob, constantly exhaling raw 
wisdom and radiating sagacious humor. Out of this 
restless mass of mankind he formulated a principle that 



42 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

" the great leading law of human nature is motive." 1 
His story-telling is historic ; but his use of story went far 
deeper than the purpose of the most strenuous novelist. 
Douglas recognized the power of the man when about 
to meet him in their great debates. " He is the strong 
man of his party — full of wit, facts, dates, and the 
best stump-speaker, with his droll ways and dry jokes, 
in the West. He is as honest as he is shrewd ; and 
if I beat him, my victory will be hardly won." 2 His 
opponent knew and respected him, while sciolists were 
laughing at the gaunt retailer of aphorisms. 3 

Though Judge Douglas used the word, the mind of 
Lincoln seldom discharged wit. Such a mind did not 
work readily in that unhuman atmosphere where hard 
gleams of truth are stricken forth as from flint or steel or 
diamond or glass. That assemblage of ideas, — whether 
in resemblance or contrast, — the play of intellect, fas- 
cinating the great wits of the world, did not attract 
the Hoosier transferred to Illinois. Wit shocks, humor 
touches our fellows and our kind. Humor penetrates 
the individual and separable, outflowing into those 
humane currents of feeling, mournful or funny, where 
people unite and move onward into larger streams of 

1 Herndon, Life of Lincoln, p. 597. 

2 Forney's Anecdotes, vol. ii, 179. 

3 " Not that there was ever any lack of dignity in the man. Even in 
his freest moments one always felt the presence of a will and of an intel- 
lectual power which maintained the ascendency of his position." — C. A. 
Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, p. 148. 

It is to be remembered that Dana wrote late and after Lincoln's whole 
character had impressed the nation and the time. Such universal dignity 
did not impress all observers. On the contrary, the lack of it often offended. 
Governor Andrew might have been priggish when he sulked after an inter- 
view ; but he had reason to be offended by Lincoln's coarse buffoonery. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 43 

compassion. All true orators have something of this 
power of passion that fuses their individual hearers into 
a " living sea of upturned faces ; " but only statesmen 
who are prophets also can carry this momentary passion 
into the larger personality of their constituents. Emer- 
son said, " What an ornament and safeguard is humor ! 
Far better than wit for a poet and writer. It is a genius 
itself, and so defends from the insanities." 

There is a power in genius, not simply to represent 
or impersonate itself in another, as in the sympathy of 
friendship, but the greater man touches other natures, 
reaching out and collecting from any and all the true 
and large connections of humanity. Honest and kindly 
men are not naturally suspicious or ungrateful ; yet Lin- 
coln, a good neighbor and loyal friend, seldom praised 
another person. While Emerson recommended the his- 
tory of individual men above all reading, our subject 
thought all biographies were lies; seeming to move 
aloof from individual man, while he extracted from 
mankind the secrets of humanity. 

Thousands of dewdrops sparkle like diamonds in the 
morning sunshine. Only one gathers its iridescent rays 
from the opal and sends a fire as of rubies dancing 
through the ambient air. The same light, the same air, 
for each single aggregate of matter ; but by joining the 
triumphant play of atoms in the encompassing air, that 
one simple drop of water glistens with all the hues of 
heaven. The subtle powers of genius have never been 
rendered in common words ; but beyond doubt, it adapts 
its circumstances to new conditions which resemble 
creation in swaying anew the affairs of humanity. 

Nasby, who knew the ways of humor and the meth- 



44 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

ods of jokers, said of Lincoln in 1858 that he had the 
saddest countenance he ever saw ; but we know now 
that there was a tale therein. In the sadness as well as 
in the fun the two-fold nature of the man exhibited itself. 
N. P. Willis, 1 an observer of exj3erience, noted this 
fact very well. This quality or faculty, the obverse of 
duplicity, was highly active in Lincoln, and it carried 
him forward like the double action of the voyager's 
paddle in its one stroke. He was always present, and in 
the same moment he was generally aloof, diving down- 
ward with his Quaker ancestry toward an " inner 
light." 

How far this double nature affected the movement of 
his intellect is a mystery. According to Herndon, 2 his 
perceptions were "slow, cold, clear, and exact," depict- 
ing everything in its precise form and color. Then he 
reasoned by firm, logical process. He read less and 
thought more than any similar man, and was not that 
easy master of language so common among speakers. 
His stories, jokes, and maxims clothed ideas which were 
often beyond his own powers of expression or the ready 
apprehension of his hearers. These ideas were odd and 
original for the reason that the man himself was a pe- 
culiar and original creation. 

1 Cited by Tarbell, Life of Lincoln, vol. ii, 51. Willis, at a flag-raising 
in Washington in the spring of 1861, describes the two-fold working of the 
two-fold nature of the man : " Lincoln, the Westerner, slightly humorous 
but thoroughly practical and sagacious, was measuring the ' chore ' that 
was to be done. . . . Lincoln, the President and statesman, was another 
nature seen in those abstract and serious eyes, which seemed withdrawn to 
an inner sanctuary of thought, sitting in judgment on the scene and feel- 
ing its far-reach into the future. Completely and yet separately, the one 
strange face told both stories, and told them well." 

2 Life of Lincoln, pp. 591-595, 598. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 45 

When this innate conception moved outward, the 
result was uncertain. His judgment, the sum of all the 
faculties, was unerring where justice and the greater 
issues of life brought his ethical power into full play. 
But in the myriad affairs of life he was like an elephant 
picking up pins. His dull sensitivity and want of taste 
left him senseless in the ordinary fitness of life. Mr. 
Herndon was a partner thoroughly trusted, and his close 
relations to our subject make his conclusions important 
as well as interesting. His summary of predominating 
qualities is " first, his great capacity and power of rea- 
son ; second, his conscience and his excellent under- 
standing ; third, an exalted idea of the sense of right 
and equity ; fourth, his intense veneration of the true 
and the good." 

No one knew our hero so well, when we include the 
life before and after his great elevation. 

Lincoln has been compared to Socrates, and there 
is something in the Socratic analogy. But the situa- 
tions of these homely intellects differed essentially. If 
Socrates picked up a gem in the slums of Athens, he 
polished it on Plato's wheel. The prairies and woods 
of Illinois afforded no education like or approaching 
that of the streets of the Grecian city. 

This double energy must have served in purifying 
the inmost soul of Lincoln, and keeping him to his 
best capacity. No matter how rough the shells of the 
crowd around, or how slimy the wit of the Hoosier, 
our hero generally appropriated the pure pearl from 
within and bathed his spirit in its transcendent light. 
It is true both natures were active, and partook more or 
less of the occasion. He was superficially gross in his 



46 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

enlightenment, and sometimes superstitious, 1 when he 
ought to have been inspired by his insight. The potsherd 
and the pearl-shell are near akin. Had the right sort 
of feminine influence affected his life, the results might 
have differed. Taste was beyond and above his simple 
organism. 2 The " sense to discern and the heart to 
love and reverence all beauty " was beyond the ken of 
this excellent Hoosier. 

But in the great business of life, in the exercises be- 
tween man and man, be they monetary or legal or polit- 
ical, our subject was always sound. " As honest as he is 
shrewd," said his clever opponent, Douglas, who was born 
in intellectual New England and trained in all the ready 
opportunity of the West. This masterly fencer recog- 
nized that the man of our sketch was greater than the 
conditions fettering his lofty nature. He had the minor 
defects along with the large attributes of greatness. 3 

A late tribute to Lincoln from one who knew thor- 
oughly Bismarck, Gladstone, and the whole circle of 
European statesmen is worthy of attention. Sir Edward 
Malet, who was secretary to Lord Lyons in those crucial 
days, says that our Hoosier was a " sterling son of 
God." 4 Even more weighty is the testimony of John 

1 According to Lamon, Recollections of Lincoln, the sense of duty over- 
came his tendency to superstition through dreams, etc. — Pages 112, 113, 
115. And his sound sense rested in the affirmation that the best inter- 
preter of dreams was the common people. — Page 120. 

2 " I never cared for flowers ; I seem to have no taste, natural or 
acquired, for such things." — Herndon, Life of Lincoln, p. 509. 

3 Mr. Hay said in 1866 : " It is absurd to call him a modest man. No 
great man was ever modest. It was his intellectual arrogance and uncon- 
scious assumption of superiority that men like Chase and Sumner never 
could forgive." — Ibid., p. 516. 

4 " Abe Lincoln was a great man — one whom the homely and loving 
appellation cannot belittle. Of all the great men I have known, he 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 47 

Hay, uttered recently, and just now published : " Abra- 
ham Lincoln was the greatest man I have ever known 
or shall ever know." L 

How did this man of the country and the time — 
this popular Jackson with the mental scope of a Web- 
ster — become the President of the Union and the leader 
of a nation in this period of agony ? Nominating con- 
ventions are not ideal, but they were the surest means 
then discovered for exhibiting popular energy. At the 
Republican Convention in May, 1860, through and 
beyond the mists of chicanery and political wire-pulling, 
above the noise of hustlers and rail-splitting, we may 
get an occasional true note of conviction and popular 
sympathy, all of which at last culminated in the nomi- 
nation of Lincoln. Politician as he was, the twofold 
nature we have sketched worked singly for the right and 
the true. Aspiring though he was, something larger 
than self entered into every movement of this rustic 
and unique statesman, slowly working his way to the 
inmost heart of the American people. We can now 
comprehend that the largest features of the conflict 
within the United States were first conceived by Lin- 
coln. In June, 1858, in the beginning of the campaign 
with Douglas, he set forth the doctrine, now famous, 
" A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe 

is the one who has left upon me the impression of a sterling son of 
God. Straightforward, unflinching, not loving the work he had to do, 
but facing it with a bold and true heart ; mild whenever he had a chance ; 
stern as iron when the public weal required it, following a bee-line to 
the good which duty set before him. I can still feel the grip of his massive 
hand and the searching look of his kindly eye." — Malet, Shifting Scenes, 
p. 22. 

1 In conversation with Walter Wellman. Review of Reviews, voL 
xxxii, 169. 



48 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

this government cannot endure permanently half slave 
and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dis- 
solved — I do not expect the house to fall — but I do 
expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all 
one thing or all the other." 1 

Whatever the abolitionists, pursuing an abstract ideal 
of humanity, may have said, no practical political doc- 
trine of this sort had been uttered. The speech was 
submitted in advance to all the local leaders of the 
party, and repudiated by every one. Even Herndon, 
partner and abolitionist as he was, asked, " Is it wise ? " 
The author replied : " That expression is a truth of all 
human experience, ' a house divided against itself cannot 
stand.' ... I want some universally known figure 
expressed in simple language as universally well known, 
that may strike home to the minds of men in order to 
raise them up to the peril of the times. I would rather 
be defeated with this expression in the speech, and 
uphold it and discuss it before the people, than be vic- 
torious without it." 

Herndon 2 said at last : " Deliver that speech as read, 
and it will make you President." 

Can history bring forward a finer instance of cautious 
wisdom, or of the high executive courage that proceeds 
from a sense of duty? 

Some four months later, at Rochester, Mr. Seward 
uttered substantially the same thought in a speech more 
famous at the time, and which became the shibboleth 
of the party : " It is an irrepressible conflict between 
opposing and enduring forces." Probably Seward did 
not copy from his Western counterpart, and it matters 

1 Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 1. 2 Life of Lincoln, pp. 398, 400. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 49 

little whether he did or not. Mr. Seward's ideas, power- 
ful and moving as they were, did not affect his own 
being or the consciousness of the nation, as did the con- 
ceptions of the more simple and downright Lincoln. 
This difference of fibre in the two statesmen showed 
itself only too clearly in the subsequent three years. 
Seward could make an excellent phrase ; he could not 
put his whole being into an idea, then meet life or 
death through that one absorbing issue. This con- 
viction of the inevitable contention between the two 
sections — an original, creative impulse — sunk deep 
into Lincoln's heart, as after events proved, and it 
developed a consuming zeal far beyond the ordinary 
workings of statecraft. In defining his radical saying, 
in the debates with Douglas, he went to the sources of 
the whole course of the two systems of civilization. 
This generation can hardly comprehend the satanic 
fascination wielded by squatter sovereignty in the Ter- 
ritories over the Western mind of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. Douglas knew the American people as well as any 
politician could, and the issues in the crisis of 1861 
proved that he was not a mere self-seeking schemer. 
He believed, and probably with sincerity, that he saw a 
way out of the jungles of the fifties by means of the 
Nebraska legislation. Among his constituents, men then 
living had carried the American idea — the fulfillment 
of the eighteenth century — across the Alleghanies, and 
had pioneered the wild West and Southwest for liberty 
and independent government. In their mind the fron- 
tier was literally the front of civilization. The rough 
but intelligent pioneers knew little, and cared less, about 
the defects of this abounding frontier life, instinct with 



50 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Elizabethan courage and Gallic hope. Under the quiet 
of the citizen there lingered the original berserk spirit; 
and to be at once a free squatter and a legal inhabitant 
embraced their whole political ideal. Who can measure 
the force of this buoyant Western impulse of the nine- 
teenth century? More important to them than the 
dogmas for or against African slavery was the over- 
mastering idea of the sovereign will of the individual 
citizen. Trust that for the right and all will be well, 
cried the great advocate of the squatters. These pio- 
neers and their sons desired for their descendants the 
control of the soil forever won from crown and aris- 
tocracy by our Revolutionary forefathers. 

In a healthy condition of the body politic all of this 
might be true ; but Lincoln, the Hoosier of " judicious 
prescience," lanced through this fair semblance of free- 
dom to the slave-wound festering beneath. He argued 
fiercely with his plausible opponent that popular sov- 
ereignty in this form was "the most arrant humbug 
that had ever been attempted on an intelligent com- 
munity." 1 He had been always against slavery, but 
had believed, until the introduction of the Nebraska Act, 
that it was gradually going out. It was the offensive- 
defensive strategy of slavery, introduced by Douglas, 
which had convinced him that the " house divided " 
could not endure ; in other words, that the Union must 
finally prevail in spite of slavery. 

The winter of discontent brought this stalwart son 
of the West into the centre of the national government, 
made him manifest to the eye of the civilized world. 
His executive capacity was to be tested now on the 

1 Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 31. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 51 

largest stage. Those who knew him in the closest 
relations testified to his steadiness in word and act. 
" His sagacity gave him a marked advantage over other 
men in enabling him to forecast probable events." x The 
art of government had been assumed generally to be 
an especial function of culture, though many of the 
greatest rulers in history had been unlearned. Euro- 
peans and Eastern Americans held that a statesman 
must know " all the old and new results of intellectual 
activity in all the departments of knowledge." The 
man of Illinois was a rude scholar and a most informal 
prophet; yet he could "enlighten the present," and 
bore the mark of him who prayed for " seed unto our 
heart and culture to our understanding that there may 
come fruit of it." This son of the people — bred in all 
popular wisdom — came to lead the nation along the 
dark path of Disunion, clouded as it was by uncertain 
counsel and timid statecraft. The national cause had 
widened away from the slave-trading aspirations of 
Gaulden 2 or the classic management of Jefferson Davis, 
on the one hand ; while on the other it was sweeping 
away the halting timidity of the border States, or the 
inconsistent manoeuvres of leaders in the North, like 
Seward. The Genius of the Nation had to face Dis- 
union as against Union. 

The President was inaugurated peacefully on the 4th 
of March ; and his address 3 was a masterly statement 4 

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv, 170. 2 Cf. ante, p. 15 n. 

3 " With the Constitution, Clay's speech of 1850, Jackson's proclama- 
tion against nullification, and Webster's reply to Hayne as authorities, 
he locked himself in a room upstairs over a store (at Springfield) and 
wrote an immortal state-paper." — Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 316. 

4 Ibid., pp. 317, 318. 



52 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

of the appalling issues that possessed the hour. The 
President would not interfere directly or indirectly with 
slavery in the States. 

No state upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out 
of the Union. . . . The power confided to me will be used to 
hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging 
to the government, and collect the duties and imposts ; but 
beyond what may be necessary for these objects there will be 
no invasion. . . . Physically speaking, we cannot separate. 
... In your hands, my dissatisfied countrymen, and not in 
mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. 

The Inaugural met the average sentiment of the North 
as a temperate expression of the issues impending. 
But the South construed it to mean war. Douglas, 
certainly a fair interpreter, spoke of these apprehen- 
sions in the South, March 6, with the comment, "It is 
a peace-offering rather than a war message." 1 

Events for the next six weeks wore the appearance 
of extraordinary calm upon the surface, considering the 
undercurrent of revolution which was bearing- the two 
sections to their great struggle. Men of foresight on 
either side knew and felt that war was inevitable, yet 
they acted as if it might be averted by some diplomatic 
exercise of statecraft. Both Davis and Stephens, re- 
presenting the potent and also the most conservative 
parts of the Confederacy, had stated to their friends in 
February that there would be a long and severe war. 2 

Those elements in the North which were being- be- 
wildered by any possibility of peace were best repre- 
sented by Seward, in so far as his capricious course 

1 Congressional Globe, p. 1436. 

2 Rhodes, vol. iii, 299. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 53 

could be representative. His self-intoxicating vanity 
occasioned curious misconceptions of events as they oc- 
curred. 1 The pregnancy of the issues amid the whirling 
impulses of the times seemed to excite him and delude 
him into a peculiar exaggeration of his own powers and 
opportunities. 2 As he belittled the son of the prairies 
adapting lonely habits to new social constraint, so he 
magnified the graduate of Union College and the rheto- 
rician who could charm the Senate. This moral auto- 
crat, perched on his own pinnacle of superior under- 
standing, forgot that truly great men construe events 
by merging themselves into the larger action compelled 
by the occasion. They shape the form of the deed, but 
its motive 3 comes out of a larger purpose, inspired by 
the occasion itself. In the same trend of events the 
appearance of things hid the essence of things from 
Seward, fancying himself a dictator ; while Lincoln, the 
man of the people, controlled by the actual, lifted him- 
self into the lead of affairs as they were coming to be. 

History does not yield such an example of the power 
of genius, basing itself on popular intuitions and the 
strict popular conscience, as Lincoln manifested. Every 
thought of the man, every throb of his heart brought 

1 January 13, 1861, be wrote home : " I have assumed a sort of dicta- 
torship for defense." — Seward at Washington, 1846-61, p. 491. 

2 February 15, 1861, he wrote again : "We have passed the 13th [the 
counting of votes and proclamation of the election of Lincoln] safely; 
and although there is still feverish anxiety, and unrest, it is satisfactory 
to me that each day brings the people apparently nearer to the tone and 
temper, and even to the policy I have indicated. ... I am at last out of 
direct responsibility. I have brought the ship off the sands, and am ready 
to resign the helm into the hands of the Captain whom the people have 
chosen." — Ibid., p. 505. 

3 Cf. ante, p. 42, Lincoln's discovery of " motive." 



54 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

him into closer contact with the people, whose child he 
was. Contrariwise, Seward and Chase, learned in the 
schools, cultured by experience, worked from within 
outward. While they grew through the marvelous 
opportunity of the Civil War, they were not relatively 
as large at the end as at the beginning of it. 

Probably the possible fantasy of a statesman's brain 
was never revealed more completely than it was in the 
detailed proposition and scheme of public policy made 
by Seward after a month's experience as Secretary of 
State, and submitted to the President for his adoption. 
At the time his vagaries astonished his peers ; for Sum- 
ner said, " Seward is infatuated." But it was not until 
both President and secretary were dead that we knew 
how far the ingenious theories of Seward had carried 
him in an amiable attempt to invent a policy and con- 
trol the great issues of state, thus in his own mind 
virtually superseding Mr. Lincoln in the proper func- 
tions of his office. 

The President never showed this document to any 
one, and acknowledged it kindly, although he made it 
clear that he would be the master in his own political 
household. Mr. Seward a said, " We are at the end of a 
month's administration, and yet without a policy, do- 
mestic or foreign." In domestic affairs he would change 
from " slavery to a question upon union or disunion, 
evacuate Fort Sumter and defend and reinforce all the 
forts in the Gulf." Abroad " I would demand explana- 
tions from Spain and France categorically at once, I 
would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia. 
... If satisfactory explanations are not received from 

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iii, 445. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 55 

Spain and France, would convene Congress and declare 
war against them. Whatever policy we adopt . . . 
either the President must do it himself ... or devolve 
it on some member of his cabinet. ... It is not in 
my especial province. But I neither seek to evade nor 
assume responsibility." 

It was not a mere whim, capricious as it seems now. 
For the sagacious Russell drew from the statesman 
himself impressions which impelled him to say, " Was 
it consciousness of the strength of a great people, who 
would be united by the first apprehension of foreign 
interference, or was it the peculiar emptiness of a 
bombast which is called buncombe? In all sincerity 
I think Mr. Seward meant [his dispatches] as it was 
written." l 

To construe Seward properly, we must refer to his 
own inmost conception of his peculiar functions. He 
wrote home in January and February 2 that he held a 
" sort of dictatorship " that " each day brings the peo- 
ple apparently nearer to the tone and temper and even 
to the policy I have indicated. ... I have brought 
the ship off the sands, and am ready to resign the helm 
into the hands of the Captain whom the people have 
chosen." 

It is true that Mr. Seward's colaborers thought he 
had " no systematic ideas of administration." 3 But 
there is something more involved than executive pro- 
portion, or that personal egotism which fills all objects 
with one's self. We see in Seward the converse of the 
large principles of education we have tried to bring 

1 Diary cited by Rhodes, vol. iii, 342. 2 Cf. ante, p. 53 n. 

8 Lincoln and Seward, Welles, p. 11. 



56 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

out in Lincoln's experience. Lowell 1 said, " There has 
been nothing of Cleon, still less of Strepsiades striving 
to underbid him in demagogism, to be found in the 
public utterances of Mr. Lincoln." 

Lincoln led the people often, and more frequently 
was led by them. Seward exalted his own conceptions, 
until his swelling vanity overwhelmed the people, and 
would have morally usurped the presidential office. 
Jefferson said, " The people are the only censors of 
their governors ; and even their errors will tend to keep 
these to the true principles of their institution." 

Lincoln could learn, where Seward fancied himself to 
be capable of teaching ; and thus advanced himself 
through the progressive changes of the time into a 
larger growth. As we have set forth, only the large- 
ness of the Union could have so inspired any man. 

Early in April, the anomalous condition of the na- 
tional affairs was working toward determination. Either 
the President's inaugural assertion that he " would 
hold, occupy, and possess the property and places be- 
longing to the government " was a transparent lie, or 
it must advance from words into deeds. The North 
had strongly backed this positive watchword, evincing 
the power behind the Union. A few still hoped for 
compromise, as the words of Mr. Seward have shown ; 
but the mind of the North was gravitating slowly 
toward the necessary conclusion. 

Meanwhile, the condition of Fort Sumter enforced 
action of some sort. Anderson, the commandant, was 
very popular at the North — loyal as he had been, where 
so many officers were wanting, and skillful in the trans- 

i Study Windows, p. 176. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 57 

fer from Moultrie to Sumter. The President decided 
to send supplies to Fort Sumter, which was nearing 
rapidly the point of starvation. The Confederate au- 
thorities at Montgomery, learning of this intention, 
determined to attack the fort. Toombs saw the issue 
with prescient eye, saying to Davis, " You will wantonly 
strike a hornet's nest which extends from mountain to 
ocean, and legions now quiet will swarm out and sting 
us to death." 1 

The expedition for supply was mismanaged, and, 
encountering storms, it failed; which were fortunate 
circumstances for the loyal cause. Anderson, when sum- 
moned, refused to surrender, but answered through 
Beauregard's aides and messengers on the 12th that 
he would evacuate, compelled by necessity, on the 15th. 
The cool heads on both sides were manceuvrino- for 
the wind, and were carefully avoiding collision ; not so 
the Hotspurs eager for contest. Three of these aides 
were of South Carolina, and the fourth was Roger A. 
Pryor, a Virginian, who had said publicly two days 
before, " I will tell your governor what will put Vir- 
ginia in the Southern Confederacy in less than an hour 
by Shrewsbury clock. Strike a blow ! " 2 

The aides did not waste time or purpose, even by 
reporting to the general in command. The answer was 
a technical refusal of immediate surrender, though a 
virtual compromise, situated as the assailed garrison 
was. They went immediately to Fort Johnson in the 
early morning and ordered the firing to begin ; and 
thus the fateful die was cast. And yet, when years 

i Cited by Rhodes, vol. iii, 347. 
2 Ibid., p. 349. 



58 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

had passed, leading men of the South could maintain l 
that this attack was in self-defense. Like every action 
of Slavery, it was an offensive-defensive. 

If the Union could have been saved so easily by the 
Crittenden or other compromise, as Douglas, Greeley, 
Horatio Seymour, " Richmond Whig," and thousands 
like them asserted, why was it not saved ? Let us agree 
with Lowell, that the Providence of history holds in the 
imminent thunderbolt some power to solve social evils 
which neither prudent citizen nor peaceful moralist can 
comprehend, much less administer. It is true there are 
not many conditions or states of society worse than war ; 
yet, like the mighty poisons which enter into a diseased, 
unsound human frame, there contend with the alien 
destroyers and convert their warring functions to pro- 
cesses of health, so war, the final reason, the clarifying 
and purifying master, rends the shams of politics and 
amends the faulty ways of decadent civilization. 

We have treated the United States, after its forma- 
tion in 1789, as one great entity, permeated and con- 
trolled by the Union. Into this orderly procedure of 
civilized government comes African Slavery, which had 
existed as a latent political force in the original polity. 
Slavery was an enormous accident in the development 
of the United States. The effect of its progress and 
conversion into a political factor that sought a division 
of the country, and the tremendous structural changes 
wrought thereby, was fairly stated by Alexander H. 
Stephens, March 21, 1861 : — 

Our new government is founded upon exactly the oppo- 
site idea ; its foundations are laid ; its corner-stone rests upon 
1 Rhodes, vol. iii, 351, 352 n. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 59 

the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man ; 
that slavery — subordination to the superior race — is his 
natural and normal condition. This our new government is 
the first in the history of the world based upon this great 
physical, philosophical, and moral truth. 1 

Yet the political action of the South had not set forth 
these principles in all the agitation and negotiation 
since Lincoln's election. The social convictions under- 
lying had come from slavery; the political action on 
the surface had grounded itself on State-rights and had 
talked of individual freedom. But " words are women, 
deeds are men," said saintly Herbert. The attack on 
Sumter changed substantially the attitude, and even 
more the feeling, of every man, North or South. Mr. 
Woodrow Wilson shows clearly that "the thrill of a 
new purpose and passion shot through the country " 2 
as Beauregard's guns echoed from Maine to Texas and 
California. This new purpose went deeper than Union- 
saving, slavery-extension, or abolition. It took hold of 
those deep sources of feeling and innate conviction 
we call "the rights of man," — always vaguely inter- 
preted and never formulated. " What his heart thinks 
his tongue speaks," said the great master of English 
expression. The cotton States, and soon the border 
States, — now in April, — believed that the right of 
each citizen extended to the soil of Fort Sumter and to 
the symbolic use of the flag thereon, representing a na- 
tional principle — government in short. This was some- 
thing more than a constitutional conviction inherited 
from Calhoun or Webster ; it was a flaming passion. 
The North, on the other hand, found itself and its 

1 Cited, Rhodes, vol. iii, 324. 2 American People, vol. iv, 208. 



60 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

heart most speedily. The "New York Herald," 1 a deli- 
cate weathercock in a weather-breeding centre, in one 
day changed from the mildest peace to a front of grim- 
visaged war. That greater fealty, the loyalty which 
rounds out from the organic whole of a country and 
nation, was sundered unavoidably into a patriotism of 
parts. The Union was the larger, — ultimately and of 
necessity it became the only whole ; but while it was 
in abeyance, the sense of right appealed to any and 
every man according to his inmost conviction. 

This passionate emotion infuriated the men of the 
North, causing them in their suffering to denounce 
opponents as "traitors" 2 betraying the public interest. 
John Doe, whose affairs were shrinking and whose son 
was volunteering bravely to hard service or possible 
death, saw in the traitor a scoundrel injuring him in 
his own person. Contrariwise, the South defined all those 
opposing, or even wavering, as traitors. Even Lee was 
called a traitor to his State while he was hesitating. 

Beneath, over, beyond this passion was an energy 
new in history ; for such expression of a whole people 
had never manifested itself in human experience. " Man 

1 April 15, it said : " The people of this metropolis owe it to themselves 
... to make a solemn and imposing effort in behalf of peace." April 16, 
it thundered : " The time has passed for such public peace meetings as 
was advocated and might have effected some beneficial result a few weeks 
since. War will make the Northern people a unit." — Cited, Rhodes, vol. 
iii, 371. 

The atmosphere of the great city, according to Russell, a most com- 
petent observer, was totally changed between two of his visits. 

2 Even Douglas — far from radical in his views — denned this position 
severely : " There are only two sides to the question. Every man must 
be for the United States or against it. There can be no neutrals in this 
war-, only patriots or traitors. — Speech, April 26, cited, Rhodes, vol. iii, 414. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 61 

being not only the noblest creature in the world, but 
even a very world in himself." The men and women 
of the North unconsciously entered into this sublime 
state of being, until each individual sunk himself in 
that great patriotic movement 1 which has affected the 
world even to this day. The more intense the feeling 
of each man and woman, the more force accumulated 
in the mass, — not in mere weight and numbers, but in 
its quality of enthusiasm. 

The Southron was brave, devoted, great in himself. 
But the world-power, the might of the Union embodied 
in a free people, was not with him ; it was against his 
chivalrous doing, and it pursued him to the destruc- 
tion of his social system painfully nurtured for a half 
century. 

On Sunday the President made and signed his pro- 
clamation 2 calling for 75,000 militia to suppress com- 
binations resisting the laws in seven of the Southern 
States. It was issued on Monday, April 15. The re- 
sponse was instantaneous and marvelous. All sorts and 
conditions of men volunteered eagerly for this need of 
their country. Intelligent, educated, well-placed men 
took commissions, or just as cheerfully went into the 
ranks. The period of service specified was ninety days ; 
for under the act of 1795 the term of militia called out 
by the Executive was limited to thirty days after con- 
vening the next Congress. The President called an 
extra session of Congress for the 4th of July, and ordered 

1 " The war was an eye-opener, and showed the men of all parties and 
opinions the values of those primary forces that lie beneath all political 
action. Every one was taken by surprise, and the more he knew probably 
the greater was his surprise." — Cabot's Emerson, vol. ii, 604. 

2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv, 77. 



62 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

all combinations opposing the laws to disperse within 
twenty days. 1 A call for three-years' volunteers was 
received with equal enthusiasm, and by the first of 
July 310,000 men were in the field under arms. 

Such unanimity prevailed throughout the North that 
we wonder how apathy could have come about subse- 
quently, and how it could have worked into positive op- 
position to the administration before a year had passed 
away. We shall see that the burden carried by true 
patriots was multiplied many fold by a potential disloy- 
alty in Northern recreants, which damaged the cause 
of order more than false allegiance. 

The energies of the Northern people, so far as exerted 
through the administration or the collateral governing 
forces at Washington, had been devoted to a painful 
exposition of constitutional law and to negotiations for 
peaceful compromise. 2 Meanwhile the new Confeder- 
ate government had been preparing steadily for war. 
Throughout the South threats were loud and urgent 
that Washington would be seized immediately. The 
North was aroused and thoroughly alarmed for the 
safety of the capital, 3 the seat of the nation. The first 
troops to reach the threatened centre were a small band 
from Pennsylvania. Massachusetts, though distant, was 
the most ready, and dispatched the 6th regiment armed 
and equipped on Wednesday the 17th of April. On 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 67. 

2 Burgess, The Civil War and the Constitution, vol. i, 135. 

3 " The people of the North are very apprehensive lest the capital 
should be taken, which they determine, however, shall not take place if 
men and money can prevent it. They can submit to no terms whatever 
without the South submits unconditionally." — New York, April 23, 1861, 
John E. Wool, Major-General, 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 106. 



THE EXECUTIVE CRISIS 63 

the 19th, it was attacked by a mob in Baltimore and 
fired on by the assailants. Four soldiers, besides some 
of the mob, were killed ; but the command soon reached 
Washington. Direct communication with the capital by 
rail and telegraph was cut off ; leaving the 8th Massa- 
chusetts, 7th New York, and 1st Rhode Island regi- 
ments en route. This force, of necessity delayed, went 
by Chesapeake Bay, landing at Annapolis, against the 
remonstrances of Governor Hicks of Maryland. Bridges 
had been broken, rails torn up, locomotives wrecked, 
but the ready skill of New England repaired damages 
instantly, and the troops reached their destination on 
the 25th. The power and energy manifested in this 
reinstated connection of the loyal States with their 
centre was most dramatic, and it forecast the charac- 
teristics of the coming struggle. 

At the isolated capital they could know nothing of 
this excellent doing, and the suspense was an agony al- 
most passing endurance. Lincoln, the great protagonist 
of the republic, in the name of order had summoned 
the spirits of liberty from a vasty deep whose hidden 
possibilities were unknown : he now in his inmost heart 
bent under this responsibility new in political affairs, 
though he was calm in outward demeanor. Mr. Hay's 
diary 1 reveals him on the 23d, looking out toward the 
dark horizon and ejaculating, " Why don't they come ! 
Why don't they come ! " 

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv, 152. 



CHAPTER III 

ADMINISTRATION 

THE uprising of the Northern people, after the attack 
on Fort Sumter, ought to be one of the most 
instructive, as it was perhaps the most surprising and 
impressive, scenes in the whole history of representative 
government. The South had the harder part, in that it 
had to do, — to act on a conviction inbred for two gen- 
erations ; and its act would break in pieces a system of 
government which had been the hope and the admira- 
tion of the civilized world. 

On the other hand, the action of the North must pro- 
ceed from a belief in the indissoluble substance of the 
Union, — a Websterian conception rendered into the 
consciousness of the least citizen, — a belief that must 
issue in action, of necessity sacrificing life and property. 
The South knew what it would have — the right to hold 
slaves at all hazards. The North felt that the Union 
must be preserved — but how and when ? * 

1 " Slavery was undoubtedly the immediate fomenting cause of the 
woful American conflict. . . . But slavery was far from being the sole 
cause of the prolonged conflict. Neither its destruction on the one hand, 
nor its defense on the other, was the energizing force that held the con- 
tending armies to four years of bloody work. If all living Union soldiers 
were summoned to the witness-stand, every one of them would testify that 
it was the preservation of the American Union and not the destruction of 
Southern slavery that induced him to volunteer at the call of his coun- 
try." — Confederate General John B. Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil 
War, p. 19. 



ADMINISTRATION 65 

There was a virtual interregnum from March 4 to 
April 15. The North was not deliberating, "it was hesi- 
tating its opinion." During this pause of the storm, 
while war and peace pervaded the whole threatening 
atmosphere, the new government was held potentially, 
in a negative way, to an impossible standard of excel- 
lence. The same hesitating persons who were expecting 
wonderful deeds and achievement in the administration 
that succeeded to the weak and execrated Buchanan, — 
these persons would have disclaimed and condemned 
any excess of prerogative in an executive, though the 
excess might be compelled by the furies of secession 
and rebellion opposed to it. 

The very fact that the conciliating and temporizing 
Seward would improvise a foreign war and threaten all 
the nations of the earth, in order that the administra- 
tion might check domestic rebellion in the South, — 
this scheme, though it was fantastic, shows the desperate 
condition of the internal affairs of the United States. 
Something must be done — what, how ? Across the 
table, and almost equal iu the councils of the cabinet, 
sat the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase of 
Ohio, who always made " an impression of strength, 
readiness, and power." While the representative of the 
Empire State stood for the old Whig political cult, 
Chase was Democratic, — a brand plucked early from 
the burning, — and now become the most conspicuous 
moral as well as political exponent of the abolition ele- 
ment in the North. What was his proposed solution of 
the enigma fronting and ensnaring the President ? In 
his own words we have it, to recognize the " organiza- 
tion of actual government by the seven seceded States 



66 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

as an accomplished revolution, accomplished through 
the complicity of the late administration, and to let 
that Confederacy try its experiment of separation." 1 

Beauregard's guns crashing through the flag of the 
Union at Sumter solved and precipitated these skeptical 
doubts and faltering purposes. As above said, 2 New 
York city, pulsating with the life of all the North, in 
one day changed from peaceful indifference to the most 
positive spirit of war. The greedy tradesman, the dilet- 
tante " impartial in his inertia of mind " and incapable 
of action, the common man-of-all-work, each in the 
twinkling of an eye became an American citizen throb- 
bing and thrilling with the blood of the Union. The 
occasion was a very instructive episode in the capacity 
of government founded on popular representation, and 
it issued in enormous power poured into the hands of 
the administration at Washington. 3 For more than a year 
the whole possible force of the Northern States might 
be used, it being drawn from all sources of supply, — 
Republican, Democratic, Whig, or Abolition, — and it 
might be devoted to the suppression of the rebellion. 
These powers could be exercised by any means the 
President might choose to exert, with Congress back- 
ing him, though it was frequently anticipated by the 
Executive. 

1 Hart, Salmon Portland Chase, p. 209. 2 Ante, p. 60. 

s Cf. Burgess, Civil War and Constitution, vol. i, 229, 232, 236. A full 
discussion of the reserved powers of the President. " It is perhaps best 
that the Constitution should recognize the power as belonging to the Pre- 
sident in so general and vague a manner as to make him feel the great 
weight of the responsibility which he assumes in its exercise." — Page 229. 

" The development of constitutional law on the side of the temporary 
dictatorial powers of the President is still an unsolved problem in our 
system." — Page 236. 



ADMINISTRATION 67 

Mankind cannot afford to lose any instituted force, 
once established out of its experience. The Homeric 
leader was a " king of men." The traveler of the four- 
teenth century found a " Kyng nought for to do Justice 
to every man, for he schalle fynde no forfete amonge us, 
but for to kepe noblesse, and for to schewe that wee ben 
obeyssant, wee have a Kyng" The new world shed off 
the trappings of the office, but in the single-hearted 
man from Illinois it kept a royal chieftain, whose manly 
force prevailed until the assassin's bullet ended his 
career. 1 

According to Hamilton, administration in a large 
sense comprehended all operations of the body politic, 
whether legislative, executive, or judicial, but " in its 
most usual and perhaps its most precise significance it is 
limited to executive details." Never was concise definition 
more clearly justified by the stern marshaling of events. 
The conscientious and patient Lincoln was scrupulous 
in using these powers and the resources of the country, 
but he might have had them all for the country's good. 
Never did a whole people work more thoroughly toward 
a single end. In a certain sense the South did the 
same, in bringing its resources into the conflict ; but it 
had not an equal constituency in its people. Though 
democratic in form, its institutions were essentially aris- 
tocratic, and worked toward limited rather than popular 
ends. The historical student, whatever his theoretical 
convictions, must wonder and ask why this outpouring, 
popular effort of the North, in doing so much, did not 

1 " The illimited power exercised by the government, Mr. Lincoln is, 
in that respect, the equal, if not the superior, of Louis Napoleon." — 
Schleiden to Sumner, cited by Rhodes, vol. iii, 442. 



68 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

accomplish more, and accomplish it more rapidly. Why 
did the North, excelling in numbers and wealth, require 
four years of agony to subdue the weaker party work- 
ing for the poorer cause ? We must study the adminis- 
tration of affairs in 1861 and early in 1862, to get at 
some factors in this interesting problem. If we cannot 
solve the whole question, we can reach and comprehend 
some of the causes underlying it. 

One cause, possibly the most potent of all, consisted 
in the inadequate conception of the immediate business 
in hand that prevailed at Washington, especially in the 
early stages of the war. After every allowance for 
depreciation of the President, personal jealousies among 
the statesmen of the cabinet, and inevitable individual 
petulance, there was a greater disturbance tending to 
inefficiency in the powers which ought to have been. 
Mr. Lincoln, great as he was, had some serious defects 
in executive action. He could not execute in the largest 
sense by care that "foresees, provides, administers" 
affairs. Great as his motive might be, his interference 
in the bureaus became petty and pernicious. Any 
woman weeping in the White House could get an order 
pardoning a sentinel for sleeping on post. But that 
order would cost hundreds or thousands of lives. 
When checked at times by the vigorous Stanton, the 
man of great heart was forced to answer, "he is always 
right." But this interference, careful in an individual, 
petty in principle, produced mischief in the bureaus of 
the departments. The bigness of the executive multi- 
plied the littleness of smaller men who followed his 
dicta. 

The immense forces agitating the people and seeking 



ADMINISTRATION 69 

opportunity to act through the executive power of the 
administration seemed to transcend the capacity of that 
administration to handle, to grasp, even to comprehend. 
We shall see these tremendous defects, made more 
defective by their own operation, cropping out as the 
events of the passing struggle became dire exigencies 
of the State. 

We may note, by the way, the great assistance ren- 
dered by prominent citizens in various parts of the 
Union, — holding no office but serving constantly in 
the immediate needs of the State. Among- these no 
one was more distinguished or effective than John M. 
Forbes of Massachusetts, a civilian of immense exjDeri- 
ence, who combined the force and ready tact of the 
great merchant with the native insight of a strategist. 
These great civilians were not mere sporadic individuals. 
As they were the highest outgrowth of American life 
and Northern culture, they brought to the unpaid service 
of their country powers trained in the affairs of life, 
which contributed immensely to our political develop- 
ment and to the final restoration of the Union. 

Forbes was in. Washington as early as the 19th of 
April, suggesting to Governor Andrew * a confiden- 
tial dispatch to General Scott. But he fears treachery 
among telegraph operators. " Ought to have a confi- 
dential agent there with mercantile key." Perhaps 
Sumner or Wilson might be employed, but he would 
prefer a less prominent man. "It needs a man of sense 
and secretiveness." We shall see much of his force and 
ingenious activity. 

One of the first means of communication between 

1 Massachusetts Executive Files, vol. 169, April 19, 1861. 



70 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

administration and people was afforded in the prompt 
action of Governor Andrew and o£ Massachusetts in 
sending George S. Boutwell, " with full general author- 
ity to represent me," * to Washington. A Democratic 
Republican, beginning life in a country store, passing 
through all the varied work of statesmen to high rank 
as a constitutional lawyer, he was a typical citizen of 
New England. Sent by the governor of Massachusetts 
on the recommendation of John M. Forbes, no layman 
could have brought a more weighty embassy or more 
forcible suggestions to the men in power. Andrew had 
written to Governor Boutwell on the 19th of April, at 
the moment regular communication with Washington 
was being broken off, asking him to accept the mis- 
sion, for " we need your information, influence, and 
acquaintance with the cabinet and knowledge of Eastern 
public sentiment." 2 He arrived on the 27th, two days 
after the column of troops which went by Annapolis, 
having spent those two days between Philadelphia and 
Washington. His first word of information to his prin- 
cipal was, " You may easily understand the mighty 
public sentiment of the free States is* not fully appre- 
ciated here." 3 The next day he wrote, " The President 
and cabinet are gaining confidence," and martial law 
was to be proclaimed on the morrow. He talked freely 
with General Scott and admired the old soldier's national 
sense of duty, but the general was no longer in condi- 
tion to organize, much less to lead armies. He arose 
with difficulty from a sofa, and limping across the 
room, complained in consequence of a wound received 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 99. 2 Boutwell, Sixty Years, vol. i, 284. 

3 Ibid., p. 286 et seq. 



ADMINISTRATION 71 

at Lundy's Lane. From New York Mr. Boutwell wrote 
Governor Andrew, May 2, 1 that all the members of the 
administration, — with whom he had been in free con- 
verse, — excepting perhaps Mr. Seward, favored the 
vigorous prosecution of the war. Seward repeated, 
" The crisis is over." 

J. H. Martindale, graduated from West Point, then 
a lawyer and afterward general of brigade in the Army 
of the Potomac, wrote from Rochester, N. Y., April 25, 
to Montgomery Blair, Postmaster-General : — 

The high, painful excitement which is stirring- the hearts 
of all men must have expression in action. Clear the road to 
the capital and keep it cleared. . . . For God's sake and our 
country's, let us take hold of the military spirit of our people 
and direct it aright now, when we can. We can have a long 
and exhausting war, or we can conquer a peace before the 
end of another winter if we will only organize and use our 
power promptly. 2 

Galusha A. Grow, Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, had been to New York and wrote from his 
home in Pennsylvania to Secretary Cameron, May 5, 
something of his interesting observations: — 

You have no conception of the depth of feeling universal 
in the Northern mind. . . . The people in New York and the 
cities are very impatient for Baltimore to be opened, and on 
the rumor that the government would not invade Virginia 
they were perfectly indignant, and I wish to say that if the 
government adopts that policy there will be a universal 
execration go up from the North, and you will be as powerless 
in thirty days as you are now powerful. I saw many of the 
solid men in New York, and they have embarked their all in 

1 Boutwell, Sixty Years, vol. i, 289, 290. 

2 O.R., Series III, vol. i, 110. 



72 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

this contest, provided the administration will prosecute it to the 
bitter end, if need be, to quell insurrection and hang traitors, 
so that no madcaps will ever try the experiment again. 1 

From far-away Maine W. P. Fessenden wrote, May 9, 
to the Secretary of War : — 

. . . Put down at once and forever this monstrous re- 
bellion. The masses are far ahead of the politicians in this 
feeling. I have been surprised as well as gratified that our 
most cautious and money-loving men say that now is the 
time to establish our government upon a permanent basis 
. . . until the cause of government is vindicated and the trai- 
tors doomed. While mere invasion is to be avoided, I hold 
that wherever the public property has been seized it must 
be repossessed, and wherever rebels appear in arms to resist 
the laws they should be dispersed. 2 

Oliver P. Morton said, April 28, " Indiana is loyal to 
the core, and will expend her best blood and treasure with- 
out limit for the successful prosecution of this war." 

These participating observers 4 were not speculative 
theorists, but American politicians. As a class they 
were the readiest exponents of popular will ever known ; 
and catching the instant beating of the heart of the 
people, they would have girded themselves with prompt 
skill to build up an ascendant administration of the 
United States. Not only must rebellion and treason be 
subdued, but the Union must be strengthened and lifted 
above all perils of the future. 

The changed popular attitude toward coercion will 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 160. 

2 Ibid. p. 182. 8 Ibid. p. 126. 

4 The well-known Joshua Leavitt of New York wrote to Governor 
Andrew, April 24, abusing the administration severely, " imbecile . . . 
we must have leaders." — Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 168, 6. 



ADMINISTRATION 73 

indicate sufficiently the increase in national scope and 
force wrought by two short months in the every-day 
feeling and conviction of the people. The secessionists, 
sympathizers, and apologists — South and North — chose 
their ground well in the winter now passed, when they 
made coercion of a State a main bugaboo. To genera- 
tions trained in the buoyant atmosphere of the Western 
world, all idea of any curbing restraint on the indi- 
vidual freeman was abominable and repugnant to the 
spirit of the American Revolution. The essence of 
America was freedom ; and they fancied that freemen 
once in possession would want and therefore could seek 
nothing: wrong;. This American function had become 
politically a virtual category; an inherited, innate con- 
dition of the understanding, and moreover a subcon- 
scious exercise of the highest faculties of reflection. 
The average American of the middle nineteenth century 
not only knew, he felt that his country was right ; and 
in some way he believed the Union would be saved, 
because it ought to be saved. On this class and on this 
condition of dreaming the secessionists struck a rude 
blow at Sumter, which not only sounded the hour by 
Shrewsbury clock through Virginia, according to Roger 
A. Pryor, 1 but which vibrated through every nerve 
of the Northern people. Instantly, passive dislike of 
coercion changed into the firm category of the seven- 
teenth century, when " governments had coercion and 
animadversion upon such as neglect their duty." On 
the rumor that " the government would not invade 
Virginia, they were perfectly indignant," 2 said Speaker 
Grow. This observation was in New York city, the 

1 Cf. ante, p. 57. 2 Cf. supra, p. 71. 



74 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

home of conservative life, and one of the last places to 
put forth its patriotic energy. 

We have said that the interpretation of popular feel- 
ing was through politicians ; in this light let us consider 
Abraham Lincoln, the greatest politician of them all. 

There was great contrast between Lincoln and Oliver 
P. Morton, bred from similar stocks in Kentucky and 
Indiana, and called to two of the most powerful and 
influential positions in the conduct of the Civil War. 
The governors of the great commonwealths were in one 
sense even greater executives than the national presi- 
dent in the first two years of the Civil War, or until 
after the draft was thoroughly enforced. It ought not 
to have been so, but it was ; the governor's furnished 
the raw material for the new fabric that was weaving 
imperial textures. The lawyer-politician from Illinois 
gradually grew into the statesman, who marshaled the 
largest armies since Napoleon, freed millions of slaves, 
and finally wielded the powers concentrating in the 
general government so justly that they rested in the 
hands of a necessary dictator. But the President of 
the Republic in 1861-62 exhibited no such executive 
force as Andrew, Curtin, and Morton constantly exer- 
cised, until the power of their States was mustered into 
the field. Especially, in the first year, they were the 
only war-ministers the country had or could have, until 
the pressure of affairs developed Stanton. Mr. Lincoln 
was worrying himself into exhaustion, when he was 
running from one department to another — followed 
by troops of office-seekers — and meddling conscien- 
tiously with details which should have been determined 
for better or worse by each master of his own bureau. 



ADMINISTRATION 75 

This need not apply even by inference to his enforced 
supervision of generals in the field. There was no ac- 
tual leader of the armies until Grant was evolved. The 
President honestly tried many, and found them want- 
ing. Mere force of circumstance carried Lincoln to 
military headship ; and history reveals more and more 
that he was in that respect a good leader — inevitable 
limitations being fairly admitted. 

But the officious intermeddling in the bureaus at 
Washington at first experienced is almost beyond be- 
lief. The printed record cannot show its whole extent, 
— though plenty is revealed, — but occasionally we get 
a stray document which displays the " inwardness " of 
the circumlocution office in a great capital. We must 
go forward to September 10, to a little scrawled note of 
Governor Andrew's, if we would recall a significant pic- 
ture of those times. Bear in mind, this occurrence was 
half a year after the organization of the administration, 
when the bureaus were working smoothly after their 
fashion ; this was not a hurried mistake of the early 
confusion. 

The expedition against Wilmington, N. C, finally 
conducted so brilliantly by General Burnside, was pro- 
jected for General T. W. Sherman, one of the older offi- 
cers whom the war gradually displaced. Massachusetts 
was much interested, and the governor had promised 
his effective assistance. Meanwhile McClellan was pre- 
paring to play the part of General-in-Chief at Washing- 
ton, and from his influential post was naturally absorb- 
ing the best troops into the Army of the Potomac, as 
far as he could. Major-General Butler — of varied and 
varying fame — was recruiting in New England for his 



76 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

expedition to New Orleans, — of which more anon, a — 
through struggles and bitter quarrels with the execu- 
tive of Massachusetts. Hence the course and the pecul- 
iar interest, local and national, of these incidents we are 
relating. 

Mr. Seward, now to appear, was so great a political 
manipulator that he could hardly play a second fiddle 2 
without some discord. But it is fair to say that he was 
trying to do the best that Seward was capable of doing. 
It was the President's misfortune that so capable an 
intriguer — generally out of work — was at hand, and 
ready to help the President in matters which should 
never have been. All this applies inversely to the fol- 
lowing incident, where Mr. Seward probably helped 
Andrew to prod Cameron. I am only trying to show 
the general course of intrigue at Washington by hold- 
ing up these transactions to the light. 

This note, very unlike the most of the governor's 
communications, was brief, scrawled on the executive 
note-paper addressed only to " My Dear Sir." 3 "We 
are raising five new regiments, all of which I mean 
Sherman shall have, if you will get an order from 

1 Cf. infra, p. 197 et seq. 

2 He writes to his wife, May 17, 1861, a complete exposition of this 
whole administrative business : " I am a chief reduced to a subordinate 
position and surrounded with a guard, to see that I do not do too much 
for my couutry, lest some advantage may revert indirectly to my own 
fame. ... It is due to the President to say that his magnanimity is 
almost superhuman." — Seward at Washington, 18^6-61, p. 575. The 
artist's portrait by " his own hand " has an interest altogether its own. 
Here a second-class man vainly tries to comprehend the " superhuman " 
nature of one of the first class. A self-seeking politician could not enter 
into the conceptions of a truly great man. Far less, could he do as the 
hero did. 

3 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 143, 7. 



ADMINISTRATION 77 

the War Department.'''' Returned indorsed, " Respect- 
fully submitted to the War Department. A. Lincoln." 
" Sept. 10, 1861. Let this be done. Simon Cameron, 
Secretary of War." Again, "I send the order you de- 
sire. Wm. H. Seward." By every inference the note 
must have been addressed to the President, but the 
" chief reduced to a subordinate position " returned it 
as if it were his own affair. These three masterly poli- 
ticians, when they conferred in the grim old bureau of 
the War Department, — like the Roman augurs behind 
the altar, — must have smiled — 

As if he mocked himself and scorned his spirit, 
That could be moved to smile at anything. 

I dwell on this curious incident, not only for its fasci- 
nating historical detail, but for the significance of the 
picture ; as its scenes bring out the course of early ad- 
ministration at Washington. Each man reveals himself 
in a flash : the restless, tactful executive, Andrew, free- 
ing his shifty arm from the incumbering red tape ; the 
President, cool, sagacious, unselfish — sending the arch- 
plotter and "subordinate chief" on an office-boy's 
errand ; Cameron, the artless, 1 simple-minded public 
servant, dashing off a straightforward order. Finally, 
something was done ; and, as sometimes happened, in 
this case it was done right. But great affairs cannot 
be greatly conducted by too constant indirection. 

Lincoln's personality has not been sufficiently or fairly 
studied as a factor in the first direction and early man- 
agement of the national resources. As shown, it was 
not known in the beginning by Seward, Chase, or any 
of the coordinate officials, that Lincoln in himself was 

1 Cf. infra, p. 199. 



78 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

to be the master and ruling influence of the future. 1 
These officials were representative and necessary func- 
tionaries of the government, however they might appear 
to themselves or their leader. 

But the great aims and objects of the state had to 
pass through Lincoln's nature, and to be transmuted by 
him into common political methods, and into the man- 
agement of ordinary political agents. The President, 
according to all authorities, — especially Herndon, his 
bosom friend, 2 — obeyed implicitly his own sense of right, 
never subordinated to any personal or selfish end. It is a 
trite saying that evil communications corrupt good man- 
ners. Notwithstanding the dignity of the man, the 
President had not taste, 3 and therefore no manners of his 
own. In the gravest crisis of the whole period, treated as 
statecraft, — in the deliberations preceding the issue of 
the Emancipation Proclamation, — at the formal meet- 
ing of the cabinet for definite action, he read with high 
glee a chapter out of Artemus Ward. 4 Did ever such 
text precede such a sermon ? As Lincoln knew, the 
ministers of state were far from being his own equals in 
personal capacity. But they in themselves did not know 
this, and they were among the very best men the coun- 
try possessed. Did they not perceive that the politician 
Lincoln was toying with their judgment and their respon- 
sibility, while he joked by the way with Artemus Ward? 

We may say that the weary Lincoln needed such re- 
laxation to carry him through the oppressive mental 

1 " There can be no doubt of it any longer, this man from Illinois is 
not in the hands of Mr. Seward." — Diary of a Public Man, cited, Tarbell, 
Lincoln, vol. ii, 27. 

2 Cf. ante, p. 45. 3 Cf. ante, p. 46. 
4 Hart, Salmon P. Chase, p. 266. , 



ADMINISTRATION 79 

crises of the time. But this occasion was not for ease- 
ment of his own spirit ; it was the entrance of the presi- 
dential protagonist, — an entrance which became his 
fall, when he entertained the subordinate actors with 
the diversions of a clown. Better breeding would have 
carried the man in his true greatness into proper accord 
with the occasion. This occasion was big with fate, — 
greater even than Gettysburg became with its obsequies 
of services and love, when the President's memorable 
words charmed the whole world. 

High political morals, out of his own pure conscience, 
became the poorest political manners when rendered into 
the common arts of a politician. This incident in the 
progress of emancipation was not a casual accident. The 
President knew that he was a larger man than his asso- 
ciates ; but a finer sense of the fitness of actual life 
would have brought better manners and a better presi- 
dential action than a comic rehearsal. We dwell on 
these minor details of history, for they foreshadow some 
of the underlying causes of events. The political arts 
of the man in the executive chair were often most use- 
ful in overcoming momentary obstacles ; but in a large 
sense they were not of the best. A better master of the 
situation in the first year would not have required politi- 
cal arts to piece out a reelection four years later. We 
are now treating these personal characteristics as they 
affected the inevitable course of affairs, and would apply 
the lesson to the immediate failure of the executive — 
both President and Cabinet — in concentratinof theener- 
gies of the people, and in putting forth the power of 
the government through administration, for subduing 
the rebellion. 



80 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

This criticism is inspired by methods ; in that the 
method of the time did not proceed according to well- 
established principles. Lincoln, in the closest revelation 
we have of his thought and purposes, — the diary of 
John Hay, May 1, 1861, — saw then the proportions of 
the problem as it hovered in the dim distance. " There 
exists in our case an instance of a vast and far-reaching 
disturbing element which the history of no other free 
nation will probably ever present." * 

Yet Lincoln and those around him could not perceive 
how far the people had advanced in putting the powers 
of administration into dictatorial form. Washington was 
saying that Jefferson Davis was a virtual dictator, and 
"understood the crushing, fusing, welding power of 
military rule." 2 But competent critics now perceive that 
Lincoln was " practically in position of a military dicta- 
tor, which was good political science, and good public 
policy." 3 We shall see the demonstration of this in the 
message of the President, July 4, and in the action of 
Congress thereon. 

There is a certain atmospheric power influencing the 
American statesman, embodied in the term responsibil- 
ity. This, according to Hamilton, in order to be reason- 
able, " must be limited to objects within the power of 
the responsible party." Though Jackson almost traves- 
tied this term, it has never ceased to be potent in all 
our councils of state. The men responsible for the im- 
mediate administration of affairs in these great emer- 
gencies were human, and they might not have been 
able to render full service in heroic measure at every 

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv, 258. 2 Ibid., p. 265. 

3 Burgess, Civil War and the Constitution, vol. i, 232. 



ADMINISTRATION 81 

need of their embarrassed country. Their petty defects 
and corresponding shortcomings, however, must be re- 
cognized, because these unconsidered trifles produced 
far-reaching" results that hindered and sometimes ob- 
structed the cause of the Union. But these minor 
defects in the rulers of the time have been illumined 
and properly overborne by the large positive service 
rendered by the same men. 

It will be more agreeable to study the great move- 
ments which ultimately subdued the hydra of secession. 
Let us turn to the message sent by the President to 
Congress on the 4th of July, 1861. However our man 
of the people might fail in treatment of his associates 
and fellows, toward the whole people, his constituency 
proper, his manners were perfect. This message ren- 
dered account of deeds done by means of a kingly pre- 
rogative, — exercised for nearly three months, — and 
the masterly statement was worthy of the leader of such 
a people. 

The President soon comes to the first great question, 
the projected relief and consequent assault on Fort 
Sumter. 

It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of 
Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the 
part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in 
the fort could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. 
They knew — they were expressly notified — that the giving 
of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison 
was all which would on that occasion be attempted unless 
themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. 1 

With consummate wisdom he lays broadly on these 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 313. 



82 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

simple facts a proposition which involves the whole basis 
and structure of popular government. " Is there in all 
republics this inherent and fatal weakness? Must a 
government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties 
of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own exist- 
ence ? So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to 
call out the war power of the government." 1 

He does not reply directly to these reasoned queries, 
but in substance invokes the voice of millions, as he 
reports quietly, as mere business, the marvelous response 
of the people to the administration in its appeal to the 
country in its need. And in sum, " no compromise by 
public servants could, in this case, be a cure ; not that 
compromises are not often proper, but that no popular 
government can long survive a marked precedent, that 
those who carry an election can only save the govern- 
ment from immediate destruction by giving up the main 
point upon which the people gave the election. The 
people themselves, and not their servants, can safely 
reverse their own deliberate decisions." 2 

This was the firm ground on which he rested in No- 
vember, 1860, and which he held serenely when he was 
in the midst of all the bogs and morasses of Congress 
and peace conventions throughout the winter. There 
was one pilot who could lay a course. 

In a similar large way he tramples over petty argu- 
ments and distinctions between secession and rebellion, 
arriving at State-Rights and clenching with a giant's 
grasp the main idea, " the Union is older than any of 
the States." 3 Border state neutrality is shattered by 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 314. 2 Ibid., p. 230. 

8 Ibid., p. 318. 



ADMINISTRATION 83 

the same mighty hand. Douglas, whose untimely death 
Greeley had termed " a national calamity," had rein- 
forced the President in April and May in this direction as 
only so great a popular leader could have done. " There 
can be no neutrals in this war ; only patriots or trai- 
tors." ! Beauregard, bombastic as Orlando, had informed 
Virginia by proclamation that " a reckless and unprin- 
cipled tyrant has invaded your soil." 2 The President 
quietly shows that the great whole must be considered 
and not the parts. " The people of Virginia have thus 
allowed this giant insurrection to make its nest within 
her borders, and this government has no choice left but 
to deal with it where it finds it." 3 

The first 75,000 troops called out were militia. Under 
the Act of 1795, May 3, a call was made for 42,034 
volunteers to serve for three years, with an increase of 
the regular army and navy. These measures, " whether 
strictly legal or not," responded to popular demand and 
public necessity, and it was believed nothing had been 
done beyond the " constitutional competency of Con- 
gress." 4 After much consideration the administration 
had appointed regimental commanders for the militia 
and volunteers, one half from the regular army and one 
half from civil life. 5 

While awarding "great honor" to those officers of 
the army and navy who remained true to the Union, 
the President does not forget his inborn, democratic prin- 
ciples when he comes to praise the common soldiers and 

1 Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 414. 

2 Ibid., p. 435. The same document declares " their war-cry is ' Beauty 
and booty.' " 

3 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 314. 4 Ibid., p. 315. 
6 Ibid., Rep. War Dept., p. 305. 



84 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

sailors. " To the last man, so far as known, they have 
successfully resisted the traitorous efforts of those whose 
commands but an hour before they obeyed as absolute 
law. This is the patriotic instinct of plain peoj)le." * 

Yet more intimately does he come into the heart of the 
people with massive common sense and a never-failing 
grasp of principles, when he discusses the suspension of 
the law of habeas corpus. No constitutional casuist 
nor any demagogue could ever break this charmed inter- 
course between the ruler and the main body of the peo- 
ple. Although it was done under a military necessity, 
he admits that " one who is sworn to ' take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed ' should not himself vio- 
late them. . . . But to state the question more directly, 
are all the laws but one to go unexecuted and the gov- 
ernment itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?" 2 

In effect, he confutes many Southern contentions by 
his simple account of the condition of our foreign rela- 
tions. Through the " extraordinary forbearance " of 
our government the opinion had obtained abroad that 
destruction of the Union was probable. Now our sov- 
ereignty and rights are respected throughout the world. 

The administration was then in full swing, and the 
petty depreciation of Lincoln that had prevailed more 
or less since his election was passing by. Seward even 
wrote his family, " Executive skill and vigor are rare 
qualities ; the President is the best of us." 3 A signifi- 
cant admission for the egotist who thought in February 
that he had saved the state from the people, and in 
March was ready to save it from the President. 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 320. a iud., p. 315. 

3 Seward at Washington, 184-6-61, June 5, 1861, p. 590. 



ADMINISTRATION 85 

Congress met the emergency at this first session with 
ample patriotism and a ready political adaptability, im- 
manent only in Americans. 1 The power pertaining to an 
absolute ruler had been exercised virtually by the plain 
President, and it never was abused. More extraordinary 
even than this comprehensive specific legislative sup- 
port was the executive action, which was sustained and 
legitimated by the general action of Congress. These 
incidental actions could not be recorded always in detail. 
April 30, 1862, the House of Representatives passed a 
resolution censuring Secretary Cameron for authorizing 
Alexander Cummings to control money, purchase arms, 
etc. This drew from the President a special message, 
May 26, 1862, 2 which recited at length the methods of 
carrying forward executive action, immediately after the 
assault on Sumter. The bureaus were so honeycombed by 
treason that the business initiated at a secret conference 
of the heads of all the departments could be transmitted 
in orders only by " private messengers in circuitous 
ways." " I believe that by these and other similar mea- 
sures taken in that crisis, some of which were without 
any authority of law, the government was saved from 
overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of the public 
funds thus confided without authority of law to unoffi- 
cial persons was either lost or wasted." 3 Large discre- 
tion was given to Governor Morgan, Evarts, Cummings, 
and others. The Secretary of the Treasury was directed 
to advance without security to Dix, Opdyke, and Blatch- 

1 In the opinion of Speaker Grow, " No Congress of the United States 
was ever confronted with questions of national concern more momentous 
and far-reaching." — Egle, Life of Curtin, p. 484. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 73. 3 Ibid., p. 74. 



86 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

ford $2,000,000 of public money. The President said 
that Secretary Cameron, though approving, did not 
initiate these measures ; that he in his office with all 
the heads of departments was equally responsible. We 
may cite this as an immense lesson in the experience of 
government. Though the habitually jealous legislative 
branch of the government had been encroached upon, 
there was hardly a murmur of dissent. Congress author- 
ized the President to accept 500,000 volunteers where he 
asked for 400,000. It provided for a loan of $250,000,- 
000 for a new tariff and taxes including one on incomes, 
hoping thereby for a revenue of $75,000,000 per annum. 
Under the lead of McClernand, a Democrat, the House 
of Representatives pledged itself to vote " any amount 
of money and any number of men " to suppress the 
rebellion. There were only five negatives, one cast by 
Vallandigham, the future Copperhead. 

Some political elements were more eloquent in their 
absence from this important message than they would 
have been if proclaimed and treated at length. The 
Confederacy had not alluded to domestic slavery in the 
operations founding its government. No more did Lin- 
coln speak of this, the most dangerous and disturbing 
element of the whole contest. State-Rights and Anti- 
Rebellion were the categories and rallying-cries of the 
two parties. In the end, slavery became the one absorb- 
ing factor. 

The administration failed in all its early estimates of 
the size and force of the rebellion. A mighty conse- 
quence of these inadequate conceptions of the tumult 
agitating the body politic opened out in the methods 
and the progress made in recruiting troops. More 



ADMINISTRATION 87 

damaging even than these faulty methods was the lack 
of forecast that failed to discern the mischievous result- 
ant of popular energies turned awry and misdirected. 1 
These latent yet potent moral forces, underlying the 
popular will, had been indicated already by patriotic and 
interested observers. 2 

The President and Secretary of War both seemed to 
plume themselves in having checked the torrent of 
troops offering from all quarters. Secretary Cameron 
reported July 1 : " The government presents the strik- 
ing anomaly of being embarrassed by the generous 
outpouring of volunteers. . . . One of its main dif- 
ficulties is to keep down the proportions of the army." 3 
And the President supported him by telling Congress : 
" One of the greatest perplexities of the government is 
to avoid receiving troops faster than it can provide for 
them." 4 

Many men saw the weak attitude of the rulers at 
Washington. Pennsylvania has claimed always to be 
the Keystone of the Union. Its forest-acres — imbued 
with the gentle spirit of its founder, holding massive 
stores of coal and iron between most fertile valleys — 
in the very name put forth the embodiment of both 
peace and power. Its people, greatly intermingled in 
stocks of English, German, Swedish, Dutch, and Irish 

1 In May, 1861, when expecting a call for volunteers for the war, all 
classes, young and old, were eager to follow the drill-sergeant's stick. 
The writer remembers a conscious perception, when drilling then, that 
all capable of bearing arms should be enrolled ; and that each and every 
one should be habituated to the idea that the Union might need his 
particular services. We did not comprehend the power of German 
methods then, but we had a better basis for a conscription. 

2 Cf. ante, pp. 71, 72. 3 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 303. 4 Ibid., p. 316. 



88 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

blood, were slow of action. Yet they had been educated 
opportunely to the significant import of the present 
crisis. By their location on the border and the affilia- 
tions of trade, they had been inclined to sympathize with 
the South in the middle of the century ; but the politi- 
cal campaigns of 1860 — wherein Republicans did not 
dare to appear, but a People's Party sought the votes — 
stirred the community to its depths and informed them 
of the crisis. Old political elements were fused into a 
new compound, ready to resist rebellion. 

The man Andrew Gregg Curtin fitted the occasion 
which made him governor. Born in the State and de- 
scended from excellent Irish stock, according to his inti- 
mate associate, Colonel A. K. McClure, " he had every 
quality for aggressive leadership. Of imposing person, 
impressive manner, capable of forceful logic mingled 
with the keenest wit and sarcasm, and unsurpassed in 
wit and eloquence, he was just the man to lead in a great 
revolution." * An old Whig, he could bring into line 
" Free-Soilers " and " Know-Nothings." Though a 
lawyer, he readily touched farmers and iron-men, as well 
as the merchants and manufacturers of Philadelphia. 2 
In his inaugural address, delivered two months before 
Lincoln's inauguration, he sounded the clear note, "The 
people mean to preserve the integrity of the national 
Union at every hazard." 3 

Possibly the position of his native State on the border 
inspired Curtin to a keener sense of responsibility and 
impelled him to forcible, independent action ; certainly 
there was no sympathy with his fellow-citizen at the 

» Egle, Life of Curtin, p. 103. 2 Ibid., pp. 36, 37. 

3 Ibid., p. 40. 



ADMINISTRATION 89 

head of the War Department. According" to Colonel 
McClure, the secretary and governor were not friends; 
old political " wounds were yet fresh and inspired the 
bitterest hostility." 1 

Governor Curtin called an extra session of the legis- 
lature on April 30, proclaiming in his message " the 
time is passed for temporizing or forbearing with this 
rebellion." 2 General Patterson, in command of the De- 
partment of Washington, with headquarters at Phila- 
delphia, had made requisition on him, April 26, for 
twenty-five regiments of three months' men in addition 
to the twenty -three already mustered into the service of 
the United States. Iu his message, the governor recom- 
mended that fifteen additional regiments be raised. 
May 3, Secretary Cameron disavowed the action of 
General Patterson, who "had no authority to make any 
requisition on you," 3 eliciting the spicy rejoinder, May 
6, " It would be well for me to understand how author- 
ity is divided, so that we can move with certainty, and 
the ardor of the people of this State should not be again 
cooled by changes." 4 May 13, the secretary, among 
other queries, inquired how many regiments of three 
months' men were willing to be mustered for three 
years. 5 And on the 14th he issued to many States, in- 
cluding Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Indiana, his 
plan for organizing the volunteers for three years' ser- 
vice ; G and with ten regiments assigned to Pennsylvania. 
In all these orders, it was urged constantly, " It is im- 
portant to reduce rather than enlarge this number, and 

1 Egle, Life of Curtin, p. 103. 2 Ibid., p. 259. 

3 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 151. 4 Ibid., p. 167. 5 Ibid., p. 192. 

6 Ibid., pp. 202, 203, and Gen. Orders No. 15, 151. 



90 AVAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

in no event to exceed it." May 16, the governor f in- 
formed the War Department that the bill creating the 
Pennsylvania Reserve Corps had been passed, and asked 
that the men be mustered, which was granted. Evidently 
some time was spent in negotiating, for Curtin did not 
answer the telegrams of the 13th and 14th until May 
20, when he discussed at length the actual and possible 
questions of muster. Of the probable action of those 
not yet mustered he says that " 8 or 10 regiments are 
organized and 300 companies pressing for admission, 
eager to serve for any period." 2 Of the whole question 
he says, " I have been thus explicit, because I regard 
this question of vital importance to the service, and 
upon the decision of which by the War Department 
much of its efficiency will depend." 3 

June 25, Colonel John A. Wright, aide to the gov- 
ernor, called on the President and secretary, pressing 
acceptance of the reserve corps with a major-general 
and brigadiers. The secretary declined, thinking he 
had " taken responsibility enough and will await action 
of Congress." 4 He refused positively to commission the 
generals ; and we should consider in this connection that 
the difficulty was not local or peculiar. Many of the 
States were assiduously pressing general officers for 
commission, while tendering their troops. To concede 
these appointments generally would have been to take 
virtual control of the army away from the Commander- 
in-Chief and the War Department. 

A historical illustration of official astigmatism, that 
might be reinforced hundreds of times, is afforded in 

1 Egle, Life of Curtin, p. 266. 2 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 218. 

3 Ibid., p. 219. 4 Ibid., p. 297. 



ADMINISTRATION 91 

the casual remark of the secretary to Colonel Wright: 
" If three months' men go home, they will in a short 
time, when another call is made, be the more anxious 
to reenlist." 1 A fine example of " cooling the ardor," 
as Curtin 2 puts it. This was a touch of the bureaucratic 
obscurantism of Washington that cost the American 
people thousands of lives and seasons of agony. It was 
not the common form of " red tape " inevitably possess- 
ing the great business of governments. Cameron was 
not a dawdler of the Circumlocution Office ; he was a man 
bred to large affairs. He was enwrapt in the deadly 
atmosphere of a capital ; immersed in the centripetal 
influences of political opportunism; "Happy-go-lucky ;" 
send off your volunteers, and they may come back with 
yet more eager enthusiasm. 

Colonel Wright was in Washington again July 13, and 
submitted the secretary's offer to accept fifteen regi- 
ments of infantry and one of cavalry, and " to appoint 
the general a brigadier-general in volunteer force." 3 
George A. McCall declined this tender with the sup- 
port of Governor Curtin. 4 July 17, when McDowell 
had started for Bull Run, the department accepted the 
Pennsylvania Reserves. 5 July 22, in the excitement 
after Bull Run, and with the interposition of Secretary 
Chase, General McCall " under the circumstances accepts 
the commission of brigadier-general." 6 

We dwell on these incidents of the raisins: of the 
Pennsylvania Reserves, not only to show the splendid 
energy of the governor and his people, but to indicate 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, p. 297. 2 Cf. ante, p. 89. 

3 Egle, Life Curtin, p. 269. 4 Ibid., p. 270. 

6 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 336. 6 Egle, Life of Curtin, p. 273. 



92 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

the historic significance of the popular enthusiasm of 
the time, and the failure of the administration at Wash- 
ington to comprehend and direct it. One may rejoin 
that the authorities were doing all they could in raising 
troops as they did. In fact, Curtin did this much more 
as other people would have done, and without an effort 
from Washington, excepting a nod of acceptance. Be- 
fore the first military movement of Scott and McDowell 
was completed, the administration was trembling like 
an aspen leaf, every member save Lincoln * — " who was 
imperturbable " — quaking, if not shrieking for more 
troops, for anything to save Washington. This capacity 
of scare, this propensity to centre every weakness of 
the Union in Washington, was supreme. Whatever else 
failed — troops, money, or wisdom — here was enough ; 
this emotion of fear was infinite in quantity, in quality 
it was despicable. 

Before treating the movement to Bull Run, naturally 
suggested by the history of the Pennsylvania Reserves, 
we must refer to a few points especially interesting, 
both at home and abroad. One of these is the gradual 
subsidence of the impassioned hatred of treason at the 
North. May 27, the fiery " New York Tribune " had 
specified by name numerous civilians and soldiers who 
must succeed, or die as traitors. April 29, the sedate 
Suffolk Bar of Massachusetts, in resolutions bearing the 
signature of Benjamin F. Thomas, as chairman, 2 pro- 
claimed that the rebellion was "treason without even 
forms of law." These lawyers expressed the heartiest 
sympathy for the government, with pride that the Chief 

i I have this from a trustworthy eye-witness. 
2 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 69, 23. 



ADMINISTRATION 93 

Magistrate of the Nation, and the Chief Magistrate of 
" our " Commonwealth were members of their own 
profession. They tendered professional service free of 
cost to families of soldiers, and advocated measures for 
" more thorough training of the militia." 

Legally, the Confederates were held to be traitors 
in December, 1862, by the Supreme Court. 1 But Chief 
Justice Chase in 1868 affirmed that " very soon after 
the war began " the rights of belligerency canceled 
the odium of treason. 2 The rebellion was too large to 
be formulated in treason. The musket-volley and rifled 
shell do not pertain to those whom " faith unfaithful 
keeps falsely true." 

This change of sentiment was recorded unconsciously 
by one of the most passionate as well as magnanimous 
of our patriots, John A. Andrew. He was attending 
Commencement in June at Cambridge, where they sang 
Psalm 78. On the sheet he penciled, " Gen 1 Scott, You 
have to-day given him a degree at the North — he will 
presently take several degrees to the South — where, as 
a Doctor of Laws, he will teach rebels (& traitors) obe- 
dience." 3 The sentiment is pathetic in that it embodies 
the child-like confidence of the day, reposed in General 
Scott. Scratching and bracketing " traitors " marks the 
passing of personal hatred into the calm responsibility 
of a public officer. 

The President, as we saw in his message, felt assured 
of virtual neutrality in Europe, resting on the belliger- 
ent rights of the Confederacy. In July, this assurance 

1 Miller, Decisions, vol. iv, 876. 

2 Wallace, Reports, December, 1868, p. 10. 

3 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 166, 88. 



94 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

was proved by flippant manifestations from various re- 
presentatives of public opinion. In England, especially, 
Palmerston — whether a great or a lesser statesman — 
was English to the core. He told Belmont, "We do not 
like slavery, but we want cotton, and we dislike very 
much your Morrill tariff." " Punch," whose politics are 
more comprehensible always than its fun, said : — 

Though with the North we sympathize, 
It must not be forgotten 
That with the South we 've stronger ties 
Which are composed of cotton. 

May 27, the " New York Tribune " printed Butler's 
phrase, " The negro must now be regarded as contra- 
band." 1 Literally a happy thought. The poor Afro- 
American, whose wrongs had brought vengeance on 
both North and South, — hitherto ignored both in Con- 
federate rebellion and Federal reaction, — was hovering 
about the camps, intuitively seeking war's desperate 
but absolute remedies. The great protagonist of jury- 
box and of political artifice deftly placed the negro in 
that category of goods, " which a neutral cannot send 
into either of the countries at war, without wrong to 
the other." 

The mercurial " New York Tribune " voiced a restless 
public sentiment when, as early as June 26, it shrieked, 
" Forward to Richmond." On July 21, this movement 
opened a fated though not fatal scene in the Civil War, 
which at evening widened out into a tragical issue. 
Those living who participated with me in the battle of 
Bull Run will accept General Sherman's dictum of a 
" best planned and worst fought action." 

1 Cf. infra, p. 196. 



ADMINISTRATION 95 

Most of the causes leading to these results were in- 
evitable ; yet we can discern certain elements more 
pregnant and effective in the Federal than in the Con- 
federate operations. The Confederacy had a new field, 
and so far as it could know, it put forward its most 
efficient men. The Union sent to the front what it 
could and must. Chief among Federal defects was the 
lack of an efficient general staff. And in all ways the 
Federal cause was incumbered by a line of brave and 
patriotic officers whom some good fairy ought to 
have knocked in the head. War is action incarnate ; 
but these worthy gentlemen were drifting down into 
" set gray and apathetic " life. Beyond all delineation 
through the reason, there was something indescribable in 
their condition ; and no one has defined it more saga- 
ciously than Governor Andrew. Of a fine old regular 
officer he said, November 4, 1861, to Mr. Blair, 1 he has 
"not much realizing sense of the work in hand." In the 
postscript, he enlarges in the direction we are discuss- 
ing ; he would " not seem officious. But nearly all our 
mishaps from the first have been due to the sleeping 
confidence that all was well of the old army officers." 
They were so long used to " being protected by peace- 
officers, rather than guarding and defending us by their 
arms." Cannot this generation recall the perspective of 
that time, and recognize the deadly somnolence " dul in 
body and in soule " that could imagine itself awake. 

In a large sense, perhaps, Bull Run affected Europe 
more than it did any portion of the United States. 
August 8, Adams wrote Seward 2 that the division of the 

1 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 107, pp. 172, 173. 

2 MS. cited by Rhodes, vol. iii, 457. 



96 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Union was now held to be an accomplished fact. But 
Europe continued in its Platonic indifference, and 
would not yield the recognition sought by Confederate 
agents after their victory. 

The people of the South exulted for the moment, but 
the Confederate government agreed with A. H. Stephens 
concerning the North, that " their defeat will increase 
their energy." Lincoln spent a sleepless night in mak- 
ing definite plans to remedy disaster. 1 

The shock to the complacent assurance of the North- 
ern people, imparted by the casualties of Bull Run, was 
soon transformed into renewed activities in support of the 
administration. August 22, Governor Andrew speaks 
cheerily : " I think I perceive a reviving of the spirit of 
our people, and that encouragement and zealous effort 
from all in power, with the cooperation of private indi- 
viduals, will render it general and successful, but we 
must strike immediately." 2 September 10, Governor E. 
D. Morgan of New York corroborates " an evident and 
favorable reaction manifest in all parts of the State." 3 
The governors had been begging constantly for "reg- 
ular " instructed officers to command the new organi- 
zations of volunteers. The " set gray " bureaucrats had 
clung to a myth, that in some impossible way the regular 
army would be secluded as a superior machine, and not 
become an influence radiating through its officers and 
permeating the great mass of the volunteers. General 
McClellan was more sagacious and tractable. August 24, 
he responded to Governor Andrew's appeal, " I do not 
think it possible to employ our army officers to more 

» O.R., Series III, vol. i, 425, 426. 

2 Ibid., p. 443. 8 Ibid., p. 497. 



ADMINISTRATION 97 

advantage than in commanding divisions, brigades, and 
regiments of new troops." 1 

One of the few new military appointees at first and 
always successful was Montgomery C. Meigs, the quarter- 
master-general. Whether under the dilatory McClellan, 
the ferocious Stanton, or the imperturbable Grant, he 
was a great administrator. That he comprehended affairs 
with the grasp of a statesman appears in that Mr. Lin- 
coln soon sent him to Missouri with Montgomery Blair 
of the cabinet, to aid in the very delicate task of ousting 
John C. Fremont. 2 A Georgian engineer of West Point, 
engaged in planning and accomplishing the great ex- 
tensions of the Capitol from 1852, he may then have 
comprehended that the massive dome embraced the 
Union and not districts of States. He was made quar- 
termaster-general in May, 1861. The "gret travayle 
and bysynes " of war in our army is rendered through 
the quartermaster's department into the common life of 
a fighting-machine. A modern army is the servant of 
communication as well as supply, and the quartermaster 
holds all these vital threads in his ready hand. The 
opinions of such a master in this direction have more 
than mere technical interest. 

The wiseacres had nearly pushed through Congress 
a severe act constraining every officer in the quarter- 
master's department to " prevent frauds " by officers 
making contracts. August 2, General Meigs wrote to 
Senator Wilson 3 a manly remonstrance, saying such 
" red tape " would insure the success of the Southern 

> 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 444. 

2 Rhodes, U. S., vol. iii, 477. 

3 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 378, 379. 



98 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

rebels ; " they are directed by one mind, prompt, deter- 
mined, bold. They are not distracted by divided coun- 
sels, are not restrained by rules, laws, customs, prece- 
dents." Officers in his department were enormously 
strained, physically and mentally, to provide means for 
moving the army — wagons, animals, forage — as well 
as tents, clothing, etc., for thousands who were suffering 
for supplies. If, in addition, these officers must put " in 
writing every verbal contract on printed paper of a cer- 
tain shape, take a certain oath before a magistrate," etc., 
etc., then our defeat would be assured. " The greater 
the fraud, the more perfect the papers. The law of 
1861, chapter 84, section 10, in regard to making con- 
tracts, contains all that is really needed to secure the 
public." An admirable exposition of the inevitable 
opposition between the feeble civic checks of common 
life and the tyrannous necessity of war. 

General Meigs was obliged to meet the tremendous 
exigencies of supply in this summer and autumn with 
forecast and energy equal to the strategic efforts of 
a great general. He was soon confronted by the im- 
mediate and pressing demands of the hour; having 
promised through his subordinates what the Treasury 
could not pay. His correspondence is characteristic and 
interesting. October 3, he writes Governor Morgan of 
New York: — 

While all agree that men are necessary, and to make 
these effective, equipments, wagons, and horses, yet the 
Treasury finds it difficult to meet the great calls which, at 
this time, when every soldier is to be provided with complete 
outfit, when every army is purchasing the means of transpor- 
tation, are much heavier than they will be when the expendi- 



ADMINISTRATION 99 

ture is confined to keeping up a stock of animals, wagons, 
clothing, arms, and ammunition once provided and paid for. 
There may be delay in payment, though I have full confidence 
that the people will support the government to the last 
extremity. . . . No nation probably ever so quickly and so 
thoroughly organized and equipped so large an army and so 
nearly paid its way as we have done. 1 

November 16, he said to Colonel D. H. Vinton, 2 in 
charge at New York, and feeling the pressure at that 
great commercial centre : — 

I know that injustice is done to all deserving contractors, 
who had the right to expect cash. I have asked for the re- 
mittance ; I cannot make it, as I am not the banks, the capi- 
talists, the people, nor the Secretary of the Treasury. Many 
other injustices are the result of this war, and great as this is, 
it is one of the least ; so long as there are found merchants, 
manufacturers, or capitalists who will take the risk of sup- 
plying this department with clothing or other indispensable 
stores for the defense of the country, we must continue to 
exert ourselves to obtain them. 

We cite these glowing phrases, not for their historic 
interest alone, but to reveal the citizen reciprocally 
bound with his fellows, and doing his whole duty to 
the state. Here was not a mere soldier or bureaucrat, 
but the man bent to the work in hand ; just as Curtin 
raised the Pennsylvania Reserves. 

We do not intend to set forth a financial any more 
than a military history of the Civil War. But certain 
facts must be entertained in this connection, for they 
are features of the time. It has been affirmed of Sec- 
retary Chase that, unlike Hamilton and financiers of 

i 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 559. 
2 Ibid., p. 649. 

LOFC. 



100 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

genius, he sought " the easiest instead of the best way." 1 
He succeeded to a treasury exhausted either by neces- 
sity or design, and a government credit ten per cent 
below par in the open market. We would not under- 
rate the great work of the secretary in conducting the 
Treasury ; for in fact he pulled through the heaviest 
financial burden as yet recorded in history. But no- 
where in the business of administration did the inade- 
quate conception of the rebellion prevailing at Wash- 
ington 2 produce more evil consequence than it did in 
forecasting the energies needed to secure the sinews of 
war. 

Governor Boutwell, who worked with him in the 
closest relations of finance, said : " Mr. Chase's mental 
processes were slow, but time being given, he had the 
capacity to form sound opinions." 3 The financier 
" needs must " work quickly at times, when thorns of 
judgment should yield place to action which is " the 
perfection of thought." He was often "penny wise 
and pound foolish " in his measures, because the ad- 
ministration as a working body could not perceive that 
the wish — the active desire — for a speedy reduction 
of rebellion could become accomplished fact only by 
creating a force, unreasonable, tremendous, overwhelm- 
ing in itself. 

I remember some caricatures in the press, before we 
went out to Bull Run. A lusty boy extended his naked 
arm to the surgeon shrinking back with his lancet, 

1 Hepburn, Sound Money, p. 182. 

2 " In his report in December, 1861, Chase, still hopeful of an early ces- 
sation of the war, discussed two plans for the currency." — Ibid., p. 179. 

3 Boutwell, Sixty Years, vol. i, 304. 



ADMINISTRATION 101 

and cried out, " Dr. Chase, we want to be taxed ! " 
Taxes were applied sparingly * and did not yield largely 
at once, though the receipts became enormous during 
the progress of the war and after industrial life had 
expanded. 

Chase was hampered greatly by the subtreasury 
system imposed by Jackson and Van Buren ; a mili- 
tary chieftain's strong box hung round the neck of the 
most enterprising nation the world had known. To 
separate a nation's currency from the daily and nat- 
ural working of its credits was a mediaeval device 
worthy of weak politicians. Chase did not construe the 
system and use it liberally by depositing his funds in 
banks properly secured, as we have been obliged to do 
latterly ; but he required the lenders and bankers taking 
his loans to carry their specie over to Cisco's vaults, 
there to be sequestered from the needy community that 
thirsted for it, as the hart pants after the water-brooks. 
Although banks and subtreasury were overflowing 
relatively with specie, both were obliged to suspend its 
payment 2 in December, 1861, in a semi-panic at the 
time of the surrender of Mason and Slidell. A mere 
accident of fate stopped the flow of specie ; not inev- 
itable to finance, but a disaster which cost the nation 
ultimately millions on millions. The expenditure of the 
United States— $60,000,000 in 1860 — mounted to 
$1,217,000,000 in 1865. A large fraction of this 
swollen increase was due to petty mistakes, far-reach- 
ing in their consequence. 

January 13, 1862, Edwin M. Stanton became Secre- 

1 Hepburn, Sound Money, p. 182, confirmed by Adams in Public Debts. 

2 Ibid., pp. 183, 184, and citing White, Money and Banking. 



102 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

tary of War. The original cabinet was a result and 
consequence of the struggles against the extension of 
slavery. Now a Jackson Democrat and opponent of 
the Republicans, but one who had signalized his ardent 
devotion to the Union, was brought into the presi- 
dential family. This excellent statecraft emphasized 
Lincoln's purpose, and informed the people in the most 
direct manner that he would bring every possible ele- 
ment in the North to crush rebellion and restore 
order. 

The political exigency was important, but the per- 
sonality of the new secretary was even more weighty, 
as he brought his tremendous energy to the conduct 
of affairs snarled and confused by Cameron's faulty 
management. There was a seething vortex of patriot- 
ism and plunder encompassing the department of war. 
Cameron had proved incapable of organizing the one 
or controlling the other. 1 Descended from Quakers, 
Stanton's family was of New England stock transported 
into North Carolina. His mother was Virginian, and 
our subject was born in Ohio in 1814, a fair type of 
the middle West. 

The boy was self-reliant and with immense energy, 
" somewhat imperious, never combative or abusive." 2 
Distinguished at the bar, he was noted for exact know- 
ledge of law and fact, and for unwearied labor in the 
preparation of his cases. Eloquent, his speeches had 
the stability of elaborate study, though unwritten, and 
the fervor of the living voice, though they were care- 
fully prepared. 

1 Piatt, Union Memories, p. 59. 

2 Gorham, Stanton, vol. i, 9. 



ADMINISTRATION 103 

After Stanton's brief but very effective service as 
attorney-general in Buchanan's cabinet, lie had little 
to do with national affairs until he was called to the 
War Department. This pregnant appointment was a 
romance such as seldom arises in public affairs. When 
both were young, Stanton, much the superior in leo-al 
position, abused Lincoln shamefully when they were 
employed in the same cause. At Washington he felt 
and openly expressed his contempt for Lincoln. 1 When 
Lincoln, serenely magnanimous, appointed his former 
presumptuous rival to such honorable service, Stanton 
could hardly believe the news. With the deepest emo- 
tion he promised his own friends absolute allegiance to 
the President. If the men had varied their paths and 
swerved apart in their development, the mature patriots 
agreed in every fibre, and their intercourse became the 
ideal of heroes and friends. John Hay said to Stanton 
in 1865, " Not every one knows as I do how close you 
stood to our lost leader; how he loved you and trusted 
you, and how vain were all the efforts to shake that 
trust and confidence, not lightly given and never with- 
drawn." 2 

Like all great men who master passing events and 
control those that are coming, Stanton was dominated 
by his imagination. Judge Holt said his loyalty to the 
Union was "a passion." 3 And this was not of the 
hasty sort, but an ardent, forceful intuition, which con- 
verted the least occasion into matter for forwarding the 
great cause in the largest way. 

This tendency affected his faults, while it inspired 

1 Piatt, p. 56, and Gorham, vol. i, 224. 

2 Cited by Gorham, vol. i, 4. 3 Ibid., p. 159. 



104 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

his forceful enterprise. It gave him power to infuse 
Congress with an energy much needed, and to project 
great armies into the field. But the same tendency at 
times prostrated the man in despair, when the minister 
needed every atom of courage to sustain immediate and 
necessary work. Adverse affairs not only " deepened 
the gloomy spells to which he was addicted, but made 
him so irritable and impatient that official business with 
subordinates got to be insult." * Passionate impulses 
also deflected his judgment sometimes. He lacked Lin- 
coln's triumphant hope and serene courage, nor did he 
possess Grant's calm indifference to adverse circum- 
stance. When on his gaining tack, he could inspire 
others very happily. His many bouts with Governor 
Andrew are suggestive, and he always appealed to the 
best motives in the impulsive Yankee. He had noble 
intercourse with Morton of Indiana. They seemed to 
play on each other, as one touches the strings of a 
responsive instrument. April 13, 1864, Stanton says, 
" Come, gird yourself up, and once more to the field, 
old chief, with every horse and man." 2 

The Puritan spirit was highly developed in Stanton, 
and in his youth he had written on the." Poetry of the 
Bible." When the victories at Forts Henry and Donel- 
son and at Roanoke electrified the country, Greeley pub- 
lished, " But it is by the impassioned soul, the sleepless 
will, and the great practical talents of the Secretary of 
War that the vast power of the United States," etc. 
Stanton addressed the editor directly, repudiating such 
" undue merit." He claimed that " organizing victory " 
originated in infidel France and ended in Waterloo. 

1 Piatt, p. 62. 2 0. R., Series III, vol. iv, 229. 



ADMINISTRATION 105 

" We owe our recent victories to the spirit of the 
Lord." J 

Incorruptible, disregarding self and reputation, he 
lived only for the nation, as he conceived it. Charles 
A. Dana said, "He loved the American democracy, its 
ideas, its unity, its form of government, its mission 
among mankind, with a passion whose depth, constancy, 
and energy partook of fanaticism. This was the inspi- 
ration of his career and the source of his extraordinary 
capacity for the transaction of public business." 2 

As E. R. Hoar affirmed in the critical winter of 
1860-61, he stood " between the living and the dead." 
Speaking of his faults, "He was said to be despotic 
and overbearing, and he may have been sometimes un- 
just ; but his work was done in a time when there was 
little chance for deliberation. . . . But the American 
people knew that he was honest, able, and faithful.' He 
never stopped for explanation or condescended to ex- 
culpate himself." 3 

A problem, political in effect, military in its working 
causes, was suddenly precipitated by General John C. 
Fremont. He was a type of the speculative adven- 
turers, common in all ages, who demonstrate that the 
popular imagination cannot distinguish between what 
is notable and what ought to be famous. Superficial in 
every essential quality, excepting a pioneer's energy, 
he filled a great space in the public eye from 1856 to 
1862. Apparently he had imposed the fiction on his 
wife, the daughter of Thomas H. Benton, virago as she 
was, that he was a great man. That such a woman 

1 Gorham, vol. i, 285. 2 Cited ibid., vol. ii, 467. 

3 Ibid., p. 482. 



106 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

could dare to tell Abraham Lincoln, more than once in 
an interview at midnight, that if such a man " should 
decide to try conclusions with me, he could set up for 
himself," 1 is a marvel of history — greater than any 
myth or story. 

Nebulous dictators were impending in those days. 
The modest McClellan revealed in confidence to his 
wife his constant readiness to o'erleap himself at any 
favorable opportunity. This sadly incompetent general 
and amateur statesman, Fremont, was another possible 
recipient of potential, Napoleonic responsibility. Om- 
niscient as they were, none of them were sagacious 
enough to perceive that the patient Lincoln already 
grasped in his knotted knuckles the substance of 
arbitrary power, in so far as possible under the forms 
of representative government. 

The contraband question, initiated by Butler, was 
fast bringing the mastering influence of slavery into 
the domain of practical politics. The whole matter, 
vastly important as it was, constantly occupied President, 
cabinet, and Congress, being handled in a tentative 
way. Congress passed an Act of Confiscation, which 
was approved August 6. 

This act and the instructions of the War Depart- 
ment provided, as far as possible, for maintaining rights 
of loyal masters, as they had existed. August 30, Fre- 
mont suddenly issued a proclamation for Missouri, 
confiscating their property and declaring their slaves to 
be free, and " set up a bureau of abolition." Septem- 
ber 2, the President, in a kindly letter, begged his 
subordinate general to modify " of his own motion " 

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. iv, 415. 



ADMINISTRATION 107 

the proclamation to conform to the Confiscation Act of 
Congress. The President stated that " liberating slaves 
of traitorous owners " would alarm Southern Union 
friends and precipitate disaster in Kentucky, and possi- 
bly in Maryland. Fremont declined to retract unless 
directly ordered, and the President, September 11, ac- 
cordingly directed a change of the clause " in relation 
to the confiscation of property and the liberation of 
slaves " to conform to Act of Congress. 

The mischief done by the rash and meddling Fremont 
— though he was promptly removed and replaced by a 
more competent soldier — was literally incalculable. It 
is true the radical Republicans and a few Northern 
Democrats supported the inchoate scheme. Sumner, im- 
practicable as always when in actual contact with affairs, 
would have exalted Fremont. He wrote Lieber, "our 
President is now dictator, imperator — which you will ; 
but how vain to have the power of a god and not to 
use it godlike ! " 1 

Whether, if all had been put at hazard on one cast 
of the die, the North might have rallied to a propa- 
ganda of emancipation at this period, is a proposition 
belonging to an order of speculation not pertaining to 
history. The most significant sign of statesmanship, 
after Lincoln's own careful discerning and wise action, 
was in the course of Secretary Chase. No one was 
more judiciously ardent to destroy slavery, and no one 
was in closer touch with formative public sentiment, 
both in the West and in the East. McLean, of the 
" Cincinnati Enquirer," wrote Chase that in spite of 
the momentary clamor against slavery, nine tenths of the 

1 Pierce, Sumner, vol. iv, 42. 



108 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Democrats wanted peace. William Gray, a Boston Re- 
publican of the highest type, affirmed the same. Chase's 
massive judgment upheld the President fully in his 
judicious treatment of this delicate and difficult matter. 
But the mischief was done, nevertheless. A rift was 
opened between radicals and conservatives in the Re- 
publican organization. The Democrats were conciliated 
for the time by the moderation of the administration ; 
so that the elections generally favored it in the autumn 
of 1861. 1 

A principle, potential in the conduct of the war as a 
business, was asserted and maintained by a committee 
of eminent Boston merchants, October 18, 1861. More 
or less clothing and supplies, as well as arms, were being 
imported from Europe. The committee proved that 
these goods could be made here as quickly as abroad ; 
that foreign purchase would deprive our people of 
needed employment and our bankers of the specie 
destined to pay for the bonds of the United States 
issued by the Treasury ; that bad economy and bad 
finance would induce bad patriotism. " It is the entire 
oneness of feeling and of interest between the govern- 
ment and the people of the loyal States, and entire 
confidence each in the other, that has induced the vast 
army now in the field to spring as one man to the 
defense of the nation." 2 These principles encouraged 
the patriotic energies of the people, and promoted the 
marvelous industrial development which, by organized 
manufacture and agricultural implements in the field, 

1 Cf. the thorough and temperate discussion of this engrossing episode, 
Rhodes, vol. iii, 468^87. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 583. 



ADMINISTRATION 109 

produced both crops and commodities to support the 
nation. 

Our small navy, now increased by the strenuous effort 
of Secretary Welles and his assistant, G. V. Fox, was 
becoming an important factor in the reduction of the 
rebellion. An efficient blockade was established, which 
virtually isolated the South, and threw it on its own 
resources. 

General McClellan was drilling the Army of the 
Potomac thoroughly, and organizing for the victories 
hoped for, which never came. He was supported mag- 
nificently by public sentiment. General Scott was retired 
courteously, October 31, that nothing might conflict 
with McClellan's boundless and singular superiority. 
The enigmatic Cameron had been replaced at the turn 
of the year by Edwin M. Stanton, whose fierce energy 
became an essential element in the three years of war 
following. 

Though General Scott was piqued and sore, he said 
nobly that his " ambitious junior " had " unquestionably 
very high qualifications for military command." 1 This 
candid and sagacious judgment impels us to wonder 
why the hero did not qualify even to success. In- 
structed as he was, beloved by his soldiers as he was, 
why did not " Little Mac " win ? He was immersed not 
in swelling vanity, but in a sublime egotism which was 
worse, and that filled all objects with himself. Per- 
sonally brave, he had not that comprehensive and exten- 
sive courage that incites whole armies to victory. The 
mechanical perception of the engineer was ever dis- 
possessing the dynamic idea of the soldier, incarnate in 
i 0. R., vol. xi, Pt. Ill, 6. 



110 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

action. He had not the big heart that trusts a well- 
made plan to fellow-hearts in action ; but cautiously he 
curled his legs beneath the table at headquarters, when 
he ought to have embraced the centaur-horse, neighing 
for the battle. We saw this too plainly in the field ; 
and the revelations of his " Own Story " prove that the 
performance was not casual but constitutional and vital. 
His mind was filled with vague illusions of his own des- 
tiny, mystic dreams of a possible providence that should 
exalt him over the whole country when those " greatest 
geese of the cabinet" 1 should be out of his heroic way. 
This was not mere vanity, but a constant lack of that 
force, ever rare, which must not only plan but compel 
victory. When he was dodging the anxious President 
in October and November, he ought to have practically 
contrived to beat or at least injure severely Johnston, 
and to cut him off from Manassas Gap. Nothing is 
finer in Lincoln's whole conduct than his patient endur- 
ance at this time and his support of McClellan again, 
when the bombastic and beaten Pope made him about 
the only safe reliance of the administration. Again he 
lost at Antietam his opportunity, that to " those who 
doubt or hesitate, I answer not, and I return no more ! " 
There he forgot that the business of a " reserve " is 
not to rest, but to serve powerfully in an exigency. 

A thorough trial of McClellan by the administration 
was unavoidable ; for such as he was, the country had 
to prove and endure him. 2 He formed the Army of the 

i Own Story, pp. 167-169. 

2 " The designation of General McClellan is, therefore, in considerable 
degree the selection of the country, as well as of the Executive." — 
President's Message, December 3, 1861, 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 719. 



ADMINISTRATION 111 

Potomac, a great work in itself. Our business now is 
to consider his operations in this autumn and early 
winter. The present writer spent the winter in com- 
mand of a field battery in Porter's Division, near Falls 
Church, Va. He is convinced the army might well 
have moved early in November. The weather was good 
until the 25th of November. McClellan was not quite 
ready ; but he never would have been absolutely ready. 
He multiplied his enemy two or threefold ; but that 
tendency was innate and chronic. Actually, he had two 
or three times the force * opposed to him, and his com- 
mand was composed of as good half-seasoned troops 
as ever mustered under a battle-flasr. Johnston was an 
excellent general, but the Army of Virginia was not 
then the trusty instrument it became under Lee. In 
drill and discipline it was certainly no better than the 
Army of the Potomac, which was nearer its base, and 
better supplied and equipped, especially in artillery. 

It was an immense misfortune that he did not initiate 
a campaign, instead of being pushed forward by the 
President's direct order, 2 occasioned by Johnston's evacu- 
ation of Manassas, March 7. The hampering necessity 
— which afterward neutralized about one third of his 
force to protect a shivering cabinet in Washington — 
would not have been present and operative in an earlier 

1 Rhodes, vol. iii, 497. 

2 The War Order No. 3, March 11, 1862, was one of the President's 
" most far-reaching acts of military authority." (Nicolay and Hay, vol. 
v, 315.) This order removed McClellan from the chief command and 
sent him to the field for his campaign against Richmond. It made pos- 
sible changes in the West affecting these departments under Halleck, 
and resulted in the battle of Pittsburg Landing or Shiloh. The victory 
here was felt through the war, though it was due to the troops and not 
to " Halleck or his subordinate commanders." 



112 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

movement toward Manassas. Probably he would have 
been half whipped, as he generally was. The coming 
victories in Tennessee and at New Orleans would have 
been reinforced largely by stiff fighting in Virginia. 
Possibly the severe conflict and victory at Shiloh, half 
wasted as it was by Halleck's inertia, might not have 
been needed. Certainly action, even of McClellan's 
temperate sort, would have sapped the Confederate 
resources. The hammer of the Franks changed the fate 
of Europe at Tours. The hammer of Ulysses S. Grant 
broke the Confederacy. It would have shortened our 
war at least one half, conditions being as they were, 
if pounding with the Union's best instrument had 
begun in the melancholy days of autumn, instead of 
waiting for a late spring on the peninsula of Yorktown. 
In comprehensive conduct of the war the adminis- 
tration was now adrift and only half conscious in its 
aims. 1 General Sherman was saying that 200,000 men 
would be required to open and control the Mississippi 
valley, and people called him crazy. Secretary Cameron 
— whatever his gifts or defects — was a masterly poli- 
tician. His report of doings, showing affairs as re- 
garded by politicians then, gives back a facetious note 
not even imagined by the humorous Lincoln in those 
days. The volunteers numbered 500,000. "So thor- 
oughly roused was the national heart that I have no 
doubt this force would have been swollen to a million 
had not the department felt compelled to restrict it." 2 
Then, like Jack Horner gloating over his plum, he 

1 Seward to Adams, about July 22, 1861: " The policy of the United 
States is not a creature of the government but an inspiration of the peo- 
ple." — Seward at Washington, 1846-61, p. 600. 

2 Report War Dept., December 1, 1861, O. R., Series III, vol. i, 700. 



ADMINISTRATION 113 

cites Jomini and Napoleon, contrasting these results of 
the " wonderful strength of our institutions, without 
conscriptions, levies, or drafts." 1 Cameron could not 
perceive the humor of the situation then, and it be- 
came tragic for us in the drafts and riots of 1863. 

Reverting to our view of the military necessities of 
slavery,' 2 it might be said that we are debarred from 
speculative argument respecting what might have been 
done with the aroused strength of the nation. There 
is no parallel in the two cases. The administration, as 
Lincoln and Chase wisely decided, had no business with 
slavery in 1861 ; but the military situation demanded 
every possible effort strained to the uttermost. Cam- 
eron's revelation that they smothered " the national 
heart " was a criminal confession. If other States had 
been encouraged to emulate Pennsylvania in May, there 
would have been a million men — double the force 
afield — in the autumn, and they would have been 
efficiently organized like the Pennsylvania Reserves. 
Glacier-like, such an overwhelming power would have 
pushed even McClellan forward, and would have over- 
come the Confederacy before it could have rallied every 
available man, as it did in 1864. 3 

Resources were ample for every present emergency 
or possible endeavor. The President, in his temperate 

1 Report War Dept., December 1, 1861, 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 700. 

2 Cf. ante, p. 107. 

8 " Had the government been prepared to meet promptly with the 
overwhelming force which the loyal States could have supplied the first 
rebel armies, the rebellion might have been crushed without a long and 
desolating war, and without disturbance of the relations between the two 
races in the South." — November 18, 1862, Report, M. C. Meigs, Q.- 
G., 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 809. 



114 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

and judicious message, expressed the fullest confidence 
in the financial outlook and in the patriotic spirit of 
the people 1 — not yet differentiated into party action. 
Prudence, the art of securing present well-being, is a 
great virtue in small affairs. But statesmen must, un- 
avoidably they must look into future time "er I was in 
the snare. Koude I not sen, that causeth now my care." 
The " national heart " knew what it was about in tender- 
ing a million men, while it was animated by one purpose 
and driven by one impulse — to put down rebellion. 

The military conditions in the summer of 1862 were 
bringing out the tremendous powers immanent in the 
will of the two peoples, and now evolved by the con- 
flict. The greater the forces elicited, the greater became 
the effect of individual mistakes. Stanton succumbed 
to bureau-miasma, even as Cameron had done. Deluded 
by incomplete success in the West, he stopped recruiting 
April 3, 1862. That this was most imprudent appeared 
to General Sherman at the time, as shown in confiden- 
tial criticism to his brother. He did not believe the war 
ended, " or even fairly begun." 2 In three months the 
President was begging for instant dispatch of new re- 
cruits 3 in the ordinary course of the campaigns. 

1 " It is gratifying to know that the expenditures made necessary hy 
the rebellion are not beyond the resources of the loyal people, and to 
believe that the same patriotism which has thus far sustained the govern- 
ment will continue to sustain it till peace and union shall again bless the 
land. . . . The number of troops tendered greatly exceeds the force which 
Congress authorized." — President's Message, December 3, 1861, O. R., 
Series III, vol. i, 712. 

2 Cited by Rhodes, vol. iii, 637. 

3 July 3, 1862 : "I should not want the half of 300,000 new troops, 
if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops here now, 
I believe I could substantially close the war in two weeks." — A. Lincoln, 
confidential to the loyal governors, O. /?., Series III, vol. ii, 200. And 



ADMINISTRATION 115 

McClellan went to the Chickahominy with more 
than 100,000 men, — fighting gallantly, when circum- 
stances compelled, — then marched back again. Pope 
in action fraught with disaster, where McClellan's inac- 
tion only entailed repulse, carried a fine army to the 
verge of destruction. McClellan, little again even in his 
greatest acts, half- won at Antietam and lost the fruits 
of that desperate battle. 

The immense importance of these operations in the 
field, a physical demonstration, was outweighed by the 
moral issues impending and now gathering to break 
out in storms which were to elevate the national sover- 
eignty ultimately. This growing ascendency of an hon- 
est executive was evolving an opposition of discordant 
elements which was to array parties against this natural 
and inevitable result of governing principles, and was 
to neutralize by one half the powerful action of some 
of the great Northern States. 

These moral issues, involving puzzling questions of 
government, uprooting property and social prestige 
hardly less potent, clustered about the enslavement of 
the African race. Such issues, immanent hitherto, were 
precipitated now into defined political action ; that sort 
of achievement which is " the perfection and publication 
of thought." The emancipation of the negroes was 
virtually decided in two months of the early summer. 
The actual process and practical accomplishment of this 
social revolution involved some of the highest functions 

yet in the next month the enthusiasm was being checked again. Thurlow 
Weed wrote to Stanton, August 15, 1862: "The popular feeling is at 
high war heat. It has cost much to get this steam up. Pray, do not 
require the governor ' to blow it off.' " — Ibid., p. 393. 



116 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

of executive power, which were hardly comprehended 
at the moment. 

Sumner and Wade were blustering in Congress that 
the legislative power they fancied inherent in them- 
selves, 1 and those like them, would be tyranny in a 
president; yet it is more than doubtful if the slaves 
could have been freed at any time by act of Congress. 
Mr. Lincoln's invincible sagacity divined that he might 
freely order armies and fleets, use public funds, conduct 
immediate affairs toward the execution of a popular 
will not yet expressed in legislation or formulated in 
representative action. That was a " military neces- 
sity " easily comprehended in the lurid light of war. To 
flippantly forestall the popular will, to avail of its half- 
formed impulses toward destroying institutions inter- 
twined with the country's life, that would be executive 
action of another sort. Such contingency must proceed 
not from accidental defeat in the field ; it would require 
a "strong necessitee fast tyde to Jove's eternall seat." 
The survivals of the kingly power, so often and happily 
exercised in this contest, 2 can never be formulated 
into acts of parliament or congress. Though quickly 
entertained by an intelligent people in what we call 
"the popular heart," they are beyond the perception 
and practical grasp of pragmatical statesmen like Charles 
Sumner. 

The moral issue, the action through perfection of 
thought, was working itself out painfully, in the dark 

1 Seward wrote his wife : " Congress is occupied with great responsi- 
bilities, . . . especially the conduct of the war. In this they are repre- 
sentatives of the press, which they mistake for the people." — Seward at 
Washington, 1861-72, p. 23. 

2 Cf. ante, pp. xvi, 67. 



ADMINISTRATION 117 

days after McClellan's retreat. Facts and deeds had been 
forcing the issue. May 9, Major-General David Hunter, 
by an order, proclaimed the slaves free in his depart- 
ment of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina. May 
19, the President nullified this action not perfected in 
thought, proclaiming that the freeing of slaves would 
be his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief, questions 
" which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision 
of commanders in the field. These are totally different 
questions from those of police regulations in armies 
and camps." 1 

The military necessity proceeding from the Olympian 
seat of Jove did not run through Generals Fremont 
and Hunter, any more than it supernaturally inspired 
the violent debates of Sumner and Wade. The deli- 
cate nature of these transactions can be appreciated 
best if we study the varying expression of the friends 
of emancipation and of a radical policy. The warm and 
impulsive Andrew answered a call for troops, May 19, 
" I think they (our people) will feel that the draft is 
heavy on their patriotism. But if the President will 
sustain General Hunter, recognize all men, even black 
men, as legally capable of that loyalty the blacks are 
waiting to manifest, the roads will swarm, if need be, 
with multitudes whom New England would pour out to 
obey your call." 2 The calm and discreet Secretary 
Chase said to General Butler, June 24, " In my judg- 
ment, the military order of Hunter should have been 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 43. 

2 Ibid., p. 45. This momentary chill did not long affect Governor 
Andrew nor prevent prompt action. May 23, he wired, " Am making all 
preparations possible in advance of your directions. Make any requisition 
on me you desire, and we will do our utmost." — Ibid., p. 66. 



118 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

sustained. The President, who is as sound in head as 
he is excellent in heart, thought otherwise, and I, as in 
duty bound, submit my judgment to his." 1 On the 
other hand, Richard H. Dana wrote Sumner, June 7, 2 
that the voters of Massachusetts would place themselves, 
three to one, in favor of the President in this action. 

Nothing could exceed the wise and patient delibera- 
tion of Mr. Lincoln, as he took steps for his own action, 
perfecting his thought. June 18, 3 he read to Vice- 
President Hamlin a draft of a proclamation for eman- 
cipation. July 22, 4 he read to the whole cabinet the 
definite proclamation, which would emancipate the slaves 
January 1, 1863. All the members gave it complete or 
qualified support excepting Blair. But Seward, while 
fully approving, asked for delay, holding that it should 
be issued after a victory and not in the midst of defeat. 
This decided the President, who accordingly postponed 
action until after the battle of Antietam. 

Knowing, as we now know, the earnest efforts of 
Lincoln to direct and manage slavery, — the disturbing 
cause of the conflict, — the radical opposition at the time 
seems almost incomprehensible. In July, Hill, the cor- 
respondent of the " Tribune," notes a disheartening 
conversation with General Wadsworth, 5 who had been 
in close converse with the President at the War Depart- 
ment many hours every day for several months. He 
regarded Lincoln as wholly " without anti-slavery in- 
stincts," as talking frequently of the " nigger question," 
on the wrong side. Much of this false impression was 

1 0. R., Ill, vol. ii, p. 173. 2 Rhodes, vol. iv, 66 n. 

3 Ibid., p. 71. 4 Ibid., p. 69 n. 

5 MS. Papers, Rhodes, vol. iv, 64 n. 



ADMINISTRATION 119 

due to Lincoln's manner ; not the morals of manners, 
but the " air and manner" more expressive than words. 
While he was grappling in his very soul with one of 
the largest moral questions ever treated practically by 
a ruler of men, his clownish exterior could disport it- 
self before statesmen in buffoonery about the " nigger," 
adapted to the crowd in a tavern or grocery. 

The radical hostility culminated in the famous Prayer 
of Twenty Millions, printed in the " Tribune " August 
20, in which Horace Greeley posed for the whole peo- 
ple. " We require of you as the first servant of the 
republic, charged especially and preeminently with this 
duty, that you execute the laws. . . . We complain 
that the Union cause has suffered and is now suffering 
immensely from your mistaken deference to rebel 
slavery." ! The true emancipator now appeared. The 
clownish child of nature quit his motley, and the man 
— in proper proportions of largest manhood — seized 
that opportunity he always loved to speak direct to the 
whole people. He answered the letter directly, not 
stopping to combat errors, or its " impatient and dicta- 
torial tone." The President " would save the Union. 
If there be those who would not save the Union unless 
they could at the same time save slavery, I do not 
agree with them. If there be those who would not save 
the Union unless they could at the same time destroy 
slavery, I do not agree with them. If I could save the 
Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if 
I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it." 2 

That universal logic that underlies constitutional law 
was rendered here for the plain comprehension of any and 

1 Rhodes, vol. iv, 73. 2 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 433. 



120 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

every citizen, — an easy lesson in political science. The 
impossible ethics of the abolitionist, craving to include 
character and conduct in one individual action, were re- 
placed here by the plain duty of any citizen. "Every sub- 
ject's duty is the king's, but every subject's soul is his 
own." The moral universality of the Union overwhelms 
all else, while the accidental relation of master and slave 
is relegated to a new political category, preeminence of 
the Union, all things to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Lincoln, the man, struck home and touched the popular 
heart. This was proved by the refrain, in answer to a 
call for more troops, which rang through the Northern 
States like a soft Angelus bell, " We are coming, Father 
Abraham, three hundred thousand more." 

September 23 the proclamation of emancipation — an 
experiment in government by decree, rare for us, but 
common in continental Europe 1 — was issued, to be- 
come the law of the land January 1, 1863. The conse- 
quences of this act, executive in the fullest sense, were 
far-reaching. When we consider the course of events 
as set forth in these pages, in that the whole power of 
the slave-masters had been arrayed in rebellion through 
the lapses of the Northern administration in the first 
year, it may be asserted safely that no other course than 
an emancipation of the slaves was possible now for a 
practical conduct of the war. 

i " To an American, accustomed to see in the law the expression of the 
people's will, it must seem strange that the only distinction which may 
be made in Russia between a law and an administrative order is the fact 
of its passing through the deliberations of the council of state. In this 
way the same act which in France, for instance, would be considered as 
a proclamation, in the sense in which the word was used in the time of 
the Tudors and Stuarts, possesses in Russia the character of law." — 
Kovalesky, Russian Political Institutions, p. 170. 



ADMINISTRATION 121 

Ignored hitherto as a political factor in this absorbing 
drama, whether at Montgomery or at Washington, the 
negro had become a military force of the first impor- 
tance. Experts agreed that these poor waifs, an errant 
factor in civilization, must be taken now from the 
ciphers dormant before the decimal, and be put into 
the working columns of figures which represented men. 
" The labor of the colored man supports the rebel sol- 
dier, enables him to leave his plantation to meet our 
armies, builds his fortifications, cooks his food, and 
sometimes aids him on picket by rare skill with the 
rifle," said General Meigs on November 18. 1 " By strik- 
ing down this system of compulsory labor, which en- 
ables the leaders of the rebellion to control the resources 
of the people, the rebellion would die of itself," said 
Secretary Stanton, December l. 2 

The immediate results were very disheartening to the 
President. " The North responds to the proclamation 
sufficiently in breath ; but breath alone kills no rebels." 3 
The radical Republicans welcomed it, but their constit- 
uents did not send out in recruits that strong adult 
element, the lusty thews and sinews from which the 
working military strength of a nation must be drawn. 
These constituents were brave and loyal, and were fairly 
well represented in the field, in proportion to the num- 
bers at home. But in a military sense the radicals em- 
bodied the nervous force of the North, rather than the 
robust spirit and brawny muscle which should subdue 
the solid enforced strength of the Southern people. 

From England the rejoining utterances are most inter- 

i 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 809. 2 Ibid., p. 912. 

8 Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii, 242. 



122 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

estino-. The overwhelming unfriendly majority spoke 
through the "Times." "The death of slavery must 
follow upon the success of the Confederates in this 
war." But Mr. Lincoln's emancipation " can only be 
effected by massacre and utter destruction." * Another 
sapient critic called the proclamation " the most unpar- 
alleled last card ever issued by a reckless gambler." 
Did ever wish and will so commingle in the thought ? 
Our friends even did not comprehend the motives of 
the act, or recognize its constitutional scope. John 
Bright, addressing his own constituents, December 18, 
did not allude to it. Mill, however, spoke clearly in 
appreciation, as early as October. We cite these details 
from the world at large for their inherent interest, and 
for the reason that they throw light on the mind of 
alien elements at home, as will appear. 

President Lincoln, after mature reflection, could say 
in his message, December 1 : 2 " The dogmas of the quiet 
past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion 
is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the 
occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew 
and act anew." For better, for worse, four millions of 
tribal Africans, chatteled in body and soul, were to be 
transformed into citizens of the greatest civilized state. 

Secretary Stanton brought in a truly great account 
of military performance, whether in victory or defeat. 
But all his eloquence could not surpass these silent 
figures. December l, 3 800,000 men were under arms, 
and existing quotas would soon make this force one 
million. The same number of patriots that was thrust 

i Cited, Rhodes, vol. iv, 344. 

2 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 897. . 3 Ibid., p. 897. 



ADMINISTRATION 123 

forward by the eager loyal governors the preceding 
year, then discarded 1 to depress "the national heart" 
by bureaucratic Washington, now stood ready to enforce 
the national will. The million now was not enough, as 
the half of it had been far inadequate previously. 

We began this chapter with a salient question : Why 
did not the loyal North quicker accomplish its great 
task, its comparative resources surpassing those of its 
weaker opponent as they did? We have brought for- 
ward some of the facts which obtained in the results as 
queried. Most historians and critics have blamed this or 
that immediate policy or general, or have praised General 
Lee for our delays and our losses. The President was 
often censured for interfering with generals and cam- 
paigns. Larger information proves that he was obliged 
to do this. In the extraordinary circumstances of the 
occasion he had to be literally Commander-in-Chief at 
times. 

A much larger compelling cause than any of these 
factors is found in the inconstant purpose of the ad- 
ministration 2 when it mustered the force of the nation, 

1 Cf. ante, p. 114. 

2 John A. Andrew was not a model, but he had some of the large 
qualities of a statesman. Not from intellectual perception alone, but 
from his deep sympathies, he sometimes struck into the heart of a matter. 
He wrote to Bird in that complete harmony of intercourse that often 
brings out more than one man alone is capable of expressing : " The truth 
is, I never found in many men in Washington what I call realizing sense, 
practical sagacity, and victorious faith. . . . Where is the union of noble 
spirits, where the few noble and unselfish hearts ? . . . We have very 
able men in Washington, but they have very little idea of what God 
made them for." — Cited, Browne, Andrew, p. 139. His estimate of Lin- 
coln was radically wrong, as he finally saw for himself. Lincoln moved 
on heights and saw into depths which were quite beyond Andrew's scope. 
But we perceive in the above wanderings of an intense nature that An- 
drew comprehended Washington as a whole. 



124 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

either military or financial. The fatal hesitancy in 
recruiting, constantly rebuked by loyal governors and 
patriotic leaders, entailed a draft and caused the 
slaughter of thousands. 

President Lincoln, great in administering principles, 
petty in working out affairs, by his interference with 
business, rather increased than lessened the bureaucratic 
inertia incident to the process of government. The 
harness of routine enables little men to live respectably, 
but it compels larger ones into a lessening course of 
energy. 

More comprehensive administration in 1861 would 
have suppressed the rebellion while that was the single 
issue of government. When the great issues involved 
emancipation, and parties divided for and against the 
administration in being, then new problems were insti- 
tuted. Thomas H. Benton said : 1 " The government 
of the United States is a limited government, instituted 
for great national purposes, and for those only." Beyond 
question he represented deep convictions in our country. 
The course of events had at this time compelled us 
to define limits, not alone by legislative debate and 
judicial decision, but through action corresponding to 
Bismarck's "blood and iron." The action of political 
states and social communities, compelled, if not devel- 
oped, by this force of arms, will afford the matter for 
our further studies. 

1 Thirty Years, vol. i, 25. 



CHAPTER IV 

STATE SUPPORT 

IN the story of administration we alluded to political 
states and social communities within the northern 
portion of the Union. Maine said : " In every inde- 
pendent political community the power of using or 
directing the irresistible force stored up in the society 
resides in some person or combination of persons who 
belong to the society themselves." 

Calhoun affirmed long before : " Although society 
and government are thus intimately connected with and 
dependent on each other, of the two society is the 
greater." 

It is needless to say that in April, 1861, neither 
statesmen nor politicians at Washington took into 
account these great truths, adumbrated but hardly 
operative hitherto, in any form of political action. 
Society as a whole, — the large principles of association 
based on political conditions, on industry and the dis- 
tribution of wealth, swayed by the forces of heredity 
and the ways of fashion, — that aggregate and resultant 
of the powers of civilization, has seldom been compre- 
hended fully in the United States. 1 The rude assault on 

1 It may be said in passing that the chief power of President Roosevelt 
lies in his ready comprehension of this large truth. Generally he has 
appealed to large principles underlying political association, overlooking 
technical partisan organization. The whole people have quickly responded 
to this stalwart idea. 



126 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

the body politic had affected these social institutions in 
their essential action ; for government and society act 
and react, as the logical master of political science indi- 
cated. Certain sagacious men at the North, social leaders 
in the largest sense, saw at once that these prodigious 
forces must be economized and used in the new direc- 
tions prescribed for government by the issues of the 
rebellion, or government itself would suffer. There was 
not only the question of helping forward necessary 
work, but the yet larger necessity of preventing im- 
pending harm by providing immediate and adequate 
outlets for the enormous floods of popular sympathy. 
The strength and courageous ardor of young men could 
be concentrated in bullet and bayonet. How should the 
passionate vehemence of the sympathizing sex, so 
powerful in America, be formulated and converted from 
social means to political ends? 

Let us turn to the every-day occurrences of those 
times. 1 On the 15th of April, women of Bridgeport, 
Conn., of Charlestown, Mass., and a few days later some 
in Lowell, Mass., formed associations to strengthen the 
government and to assist it, if possible. The immediate 
questions, what is the best material for lint, how scrape 
and prepare it, could hardly absorb the gathering social 
energies of the country. In the last days of April, 
ninety-two ladies of New York city called a meeting at 
the Cooper Institute, in which Rev. Dr. Bellows and Dr. 
Elisha Harris participated, " their minds preoccupied 
with the necessity for some great exertion to preserve 
the health of the army now gathering." 

Rev. Dr. Bellows with Doctors Van Buren, Harris, 

1 Stilld, Sanitary Commission, pp. 44, 47, 53, 58, 59, 69. 



STATE SUPPORT 127 

Harsen, went to Washington, in consequence of these 
various social proceedings, to lay the matter before the 
administration. They found all in confusion, respecting 
the immediate care of the troops. They were received 
with the greatest courtesy by the officials, owing to 
their high personal and professional standing, but not 
from any sympathy with their mission. The highest 
officials were rather suspicious or indifferent, the Presi- 
dent himself regarding the movement as a " fifth wheel 
to the coach." The proposed voluntary assistance in 
caring for the health and in nursing the troops, " the 
zeal of the women and the activity of the men assisting 
them," was regarded by the men of the bureaus as 
likely to be more troublesome than useful. We must 
remark that this characteristic lethargy was manifested 
but a very few years after the necessary labors of 
Florence Nightingale in the Crimea astonished the whole 
world. Finally, Acting Surgeon-General Woods was 
moved and interested enough to approve and allow a 
commission in a modified, advisory relation to the Med- 
ical Department, and to care for the volunteers. General 
Woods reports to the Secretary of War, May 22 : 1 " The 
Medical Bureau would in my judgment derive important 
and useful aid from the counsels and well-directed ef- 
forts of an intelligent and scientific commission, acting 
in cooperation," etc. 

He recommended Henry W. Bellows, D. D., Professor 
A. Bache, Professor Wolcott Gibbs, Doctors Jeffries 
Wyman and W. H. Van Buren to constitute the com- 
mission, with power to fill vacancies and to appoint a 
competent secretary. Secretary Cameron approved and 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 224. 



128 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

confirmed the appointments June 7: 1 the commission 
to " direct its inquiries to the principles and practices 
connected with the inspection of recruits and enlisted 
men, the sanitary condition of the volunteers, to the 
means of preserving and restoring the health and of 
securing the general comfort and efficiency of troops, 
to the proper provision of cooks, nurses, and hospitals, 
and to other subjects of like nature." 

Thus was born the United States Sanitary Commis- 
sion, 2 and it was developed out of the direst need of the 
moment. Its work was to be as comprehensive as its 
title : health out of sickness, out of wounds, and the 
order of death : health out of the moral disorder, 
whether present or impending at the North, though 
actual war might be pursuing its dreadful work far 
away. 

Dr. Bellows was unanimously selected and chosen 
for the presidency. He combined the most powerful 
emotional nature with a good intellectual apparatus, 
capable of large views of the state and public policy; 
then a ready insight into the popular mind and feeling 
enabled him to sweep into efficient action all the varying 
currents of popular will. That his practical sagacity in 
action equaled and could re-create his pale cast of 
thought is shown in the fact that his plan of organi- 
zation for this, the greatest ethical engine of the last 
century — struck out in a single morning — was hardly 
changed in all the actual work of the commission. 
Frederick Law Olmsted, the secretary, was the one man 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 258. And cf. ibid., p. 308. 

2 Mr. Rhodes gives a graphic account of the Sanitary Commission, vol. 
v, 244-257. 



STATE SUPPORT 129 

of destiny for such place- It is obvious that the great- 
est president could not have forecasted the work, had it 
not been moulded, fashioned, and driven by an absolute 
master of detail. His self-effacement in his office was as 
remarkable as his masterly conduct of affairs. 

In the enlarged military operations of the second 
year, the commission bore its part. September 17, 1862, 
President Bellows addressed an important letter to 
General Halleck, commander-in-chief. 1 "In perfect 
harmony with the Medical Bureau," the commission 
claimed that many "irregular and eccentric movements" 
used its name and asked for official sanction. The na- 
tion had already contributed $160,000, directly, with 
supplies to the value of $2,000,000 more. Therefore 
the commission asked for the confidence and "full 
moral support of the government." 

Our energetic and comprehensive friend, General M. C. 
Meigs, who urged forward the administration so wisely 
in the previous year, now appeared in a somewhat criti- 
cal letter to Dr. H. I. Bowditch.^ Speaking in defense 
of the Quartermaster's Department he said : — 

There seems to be a desire in some quarters to make the 
Medical Department self-sustaining and independent of all 
aid or assistance from the quartermaster's, and indeed from 
all other departments. This is a mistake. . . . No nation 
has ever made, I believe, such large, such prodigious provision 
for its sick and wounded soldiers. It is the greatest charity on 
earth. It has been the duty of the Quartermaster's Depart- 
ment under my charge to make a part of this provision, and 
I believe it has been faithfully and efficiently done, but the 
nation gets not the credit it deserves. 

Then he pays his respects pretty pungently to the 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 564. 2 Ibid., pp. 697-703. 



130 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Sanitary Commission which had spread its flag over the 
fleet of transports, carrying the sick and wounded away 
from the Peninsula : — 

Probably the Sanitary Commission spent upon this fleet, 
whose honors it carried off, $100 or $200 a day, while the 
niggardly government spent its daily thousands. Now, all 
this was well meant. There was no intention on the part of 
the gentlemen of the Sanitary Commission to claim for them- 
selves undeserved credit, but the impression on the public is 
that detailed above ; and it was most unjust and most injurious, 
though it doubtless swelled the contributions which they, I 
believe, faithfully disburse for the benefit of the soldier. Yet 
it did great injustice to the department and to the govern- 
ment whose large lump of dough their little leaven leavened. 1 

In the pregnant figure of the dough and leaven, the 
vigorous man of affairs confirms the motives and result- 
ant action of the men who initiated and established the 
Sanitary Commission. They meant to project the fer- 
menting force of the religious spirit of the North into 
the tented fields ; to carry love with fury ; to embrace 
tenderly, even when obliged to destroy ruthlessly in the 
strife of war. Secretary Stanton amplified this befitting 
theme in his report of December 1 : — 

The services of the medical profession have been volun- 
tarily and gratuitously offered on every occasion. Relief 
associations in every State have done much to comfort and 
assist the sick and wounded in camps and hospitals, and their 
vigilant superintendence has perhaps operated to check the 
negligence, abuse, and fraud that too often prevail, even in 
such institutions. Religious congregations and societies have 
also tendered to the government their church buildings for 
hospitals, while their pastors have ministered to the patients. 2 

i O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 702. 2 Ibid., p. 910. 



STATE SUPPORT 131 

In Indiana ! there was some clashing of functions, 
because the local relief-societies would confine expendi- 
ture for the benefit of men of their own State. This was 
criticised by the Sanitary Commission as counteracting 
the larger national spirit and influence needed for the 
times. The appointment of a Western Sanitary Com- 
mission under the direction of Surgeon-General Woods, 
December 16, 1862, 2 met this difficulty. 

Certain worthy persons, patriotic but limited in the 
scope of their vision, conceived that naked charity 
aided by science was not sufficiently clothed in a Chris- 
tian garb. Hooker said, " There are in men operations, 
some natural, some supernatural, some politic, some 
finally ecclesiastical." It was thought that theological 
exegesis might reinforce and repair the lack of dogmatic 
domination in scientific benevolence and plain works of 
charity. The ways of love are various, but its issues are 
certain. The whole movement resulted in the formation 
of the U. S. Christian Commission, 3 an institution very 
useful in alleviatinp; distress. 

At the outbreak of rebellion, the women of the North 
in their self-consecration rivaled the men who offered 
their lives to their country. They required immediate 
work. April 23, 1861, the administration was glad to 
avail itself of the ability and experience of the life- 

1 The Indiana Sanitary Commission, "to care for Indiana troops first, 
then others," was rebuked by the U. S. Sanitary Commission. " Another 
development of state sovereignty ; . . . against this stateish spirit, the San- 
itary Commission set its face at all times." — Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 153. 

2 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 947. 

3 War Department to George H. Stuart, Chairman, O. R., Series III, 
vol. i, 742 : " This department is deeply interested in the ' spiritual good 
of the soldiers in our army,' as well as in their intellectual improvement 
and social and ' physical comfort.' " 



132 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

long philanthropist, Miss Dorothea Dix. She was given 
charge of hospital methods by the War Department, 1 
as recommended by the Medical Bureau ; " also the 
regulations and routine through which the services of 
patriotic women are rendered available as nurses." It 
was necessary to specify by general order, June 9, that 
"women nurses should not reside in camps nor accom- 
pany regiments." 2 

Philosophers have conceived an " aggregate societary 
movement " carrying forward the work of civilization 
and including the varied issues of modern social living. 
It was certainly the spirit of this largest social life 
which Calhoun embodied in his counterpoised statement, 
where he placed society acting in correspondence with 
political government, and in a close encounter prevail- 
ing over it. 

The great social functions initiated by the Sanitary 
Commission, as indicated by General Meigs and empha- 
sized by Secretary Stanton, 3 penetrated the ways of 
practical government and brought into action higher 
civilizing forces than war had known before that day. 
As slavery was semi-barbaric and triumph of the Union 
would become an essential conquest of civilization, so 
the higher social movement, aroused and incurred by 
horrid war, carried the government with it and by it 
to a higher level of civilization. 

Our political facility in America is so prominent and 
the work accomplished through it is so eminent that 
we often forget by what devious ways political develop- 
ment has come to its distinction. We must remember 

i O. R., Series III, vol. i, 107, 139, 217, 308. 
2 Ibid., p. 262. 3 Cf. ante, p. 130. 



STATE SUPPORT 133 

social principles, constantly inhering, productive in them- 
selves and still larger through their influence over prac- 
tical government — according to Calhoun. The Northern 
States, as we shall perceive, 1 put forth their political 
functions in strangely eccentric ways ; beginning with 
the autumnal election of New York in 1862, and end- 
ing in the defeat of McClellan in the national campaign 
of 1864. Meanwhile the great agencies of society, 2 em- 
bodied in charitable associations stimulated by fashion, 
in church connections 3 inspired by religion, 4 in intellec- 
tual exercise enforced by science, conveyed the people 
and finally the government impelled by the people into 
political expression, enabling it to win victory over re- 
bellion and to reestablish the Union. 

We must search more carefully into the nature of the 
societies which became States in our country. The Eng- 
lish colonies painfully wrenched themselves away from 
the mother country and the stability of crown govern- 
ent. From colonists, tillers of the soil and planters, 
they were to become creators of new communities and 

i Infra, p. 258. 

2 In the 'large cities, where the old-fashioned clubs were often in- 
clined to sympathize with the South, new and powerful social clubs were 
formed to counteract the tendency. These became great social pivots on 
which Union sentiment could rally. 

8 The Methodist Church was a strong support of the administration, 
especially in the Western States. It was said of Bishop Simpson that he 
commanded his " corps " as vigorously as any general in the field. 

4 "lam greatly pleased at the determination so emphatically expressed 
by the United Presbyterian Church to ' uphold the government in all its 
lawful efforts to preserve the integrity of these States,' and with the 
earnestness of its appeal to all under its care ' to do what they can to 
support, defend, and perpetuate the free institutions bequeathed to us by 
our fathers.'" — July 16, Secretary Cameron, 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 
333. 



134 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

founders of sovereign States. Of the several States ! we 
are considering, Pennsylvania has been mentioned al- 
ready in the general course of administration. 2 She was 
neither Eastern nor Western in character. Greatly di- 
versified in racial stocks, animated by the humane Quaker 
element, settled on lands rich in minerals, — and more 
immediately affluent in fertile fields, — she was a great 
conserving element of the time. As between Northeast, 
Northwest, and South, in the mid-nineteenth century, 
before the Mississippi had embraced and the Pacific 
slope had affected the old States, she was a literal key- 
stone of the Union. 

New York was a factor of another sort — a great re- 
ducing crucible of colonial and early state immigration. 
Bred in Europe or passing over from New England, her 
citizens partook of the intense Dutch temperament — 
powerful rather than expansive. Overflowing Eastern 
limits, these peoples swarmed through the Mohawk val- 
ley, growing larger through the opportunity of the 
beautiful interior lakes. 

The Cumberland Road was a great and influential 
arterial communication through the Alleghanies ; but 
the current of travel and intercommunication, resulting 
at last in the Erie Canal, was greater in effect. This 
migrating stream in and out of New York was a true 
American solvent as it spread over the prairies of the 

1 " Since the national administration had been from the first dependent 
on the State machinery for furnishing troops and to some extent for their 
equipment, the governors of the Northern States were larger factors in 
the conduct of the war than is easily made to appear in a history where 
the aim is to secure unity in the narration of crowded events." — Rhodes, 
U. S., vol. iv, 182. 

2 Cf. ante, pp. 90, 92. 



STATE SUPPORT 135 

West. The "York State Yankee" was a well-recog- 
nized type in Ohio, Michigan, and the neighboring 
States in the fifties of the last century. And he was a 
most influential factor in amalgamating races and in 
shaping the destinies of these potent communities. Less 
incisive intellectually than his Yankee progenitor, he 
was broader socially and industrially. Animated by his 
Eastern culture, strengthened by his larger opportunity, 
he assimilated Western life on a scale more ample than 
his quicker-minded kinsman could comprehend. Every- 
thing cannot be produced and included in one cult and 
community. The intense local patriotism generally pre- 
vailing in American communities was not altogether 
apparent here. The cosmopolitan is not always the most 
effective citizen. Each of our other three commonwealths 
went through the Civil War with one governor, and 
practically with one purpose. New York lost relatively, 
by too much counsel and too many counselors. 

Just now, studying the East and the West separately, 
we must look more precisely into the comparative struc- 
ture of Massachusetts and Indiana. These are not ex- 
clusive types, but they are sufficient examples of the old 
and new tendencies of our life, as they prevailed in the 
sixties. 

The historian of the Bay says, " The Massachusetts 
may be considered the parent of all the other colonies 
of New England." 1 This is strictly true. Roger Wil- 
liams developed an idea larger than his little plantation 
and too large for the New England of his time. Con- 
veyed in the mould of William Coddington's laws, it 
established itself against the opposition of Massachu- 

1 Hutchinson, Mass. Bay, vol. i, iii. 



136 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

setts, and finally made a State. But the soul-liberty of 
Williams in the seventeenth century did not much affect 
New England. Massachusetts had the separatist 1 or radi- 
cal element, as well as the larger Puritan constituent 
within her people. After the Antinomian controversy 
in the early days, the clergy were whipped into the 
Orthodox fold. There was a large liberal faction among 
the people, but it was generally outside the regular com- 



munion. 2 



It is not generally recognized that Connecticut was a 
much better developed Puritan community than Massa- 
chusetts. Thomas Hooker led an emigration into the 
Connecticut valley which both departed and differed 
from its parent colony in that it was a thoroughly ho- 
mogeneous people. Hooker had conceived and worked 
out a system of civil government more advanced and 
more tenable than the average Puritan of the Bay could 
entertain. Hooker's polity as embodied in the charter, 
furnishing an even prosperity to an orderly community 
for a century and a half, proves the proposition. These 
settled Puritan characteristics went up the valley and 
possessed Vermont. The Bible was the basis and guide 
of Puritan 3 culture. Hooker so far separated his theory 
of the Bible and the practice of a state that his descend- 
ants could live under a representative government. He 
did not actually separate church and state in his Church 

1 Barry, Mass., vol. i, 149, 150. 

2 Brooks Adams, Emancipation of Mass., p. 79. 

8 " The Bible was to the Puritan what it had never been to any class 
or community of Christians. . . . Their love of liberty, their fidelity 
to conscience, their stern and heroic constancy in self-sacrifice, the pene- 
trating intelligence in their institutions in their generous thoughtfulness 
for their posterity, ... all were under the inspiration and guidance of 
the Bible." — Ellis, Puritan Age in Mass.,]). 125. 



STATE SUPPORT 137 

Discipline ; but he so far established the functions of a 
state that a fiery priest could not go into town-meeting 
and put down John Doe and Richard Roe by " inspira- 
tion." 

Institutions conveying the experience of the Old 
World did much in forming New England ; the ingrained 
character of its people did more. The men and women 
of these communities began with certain innate quali- 
ties which went to the making of the future citizen of 
America. It is important to study the racial stock and 
social partitions which pervaded Massachusetts from 
the beginning. There are more lines of departure than 
are commonly comprehended. Every one knows the 
great Puritan features of organization — pastor and 
congregation, teachers, elders, and laity — which in- 
duced and supported family culture. But underlying 
and preceding these social institutions were the heredity 
and condition of the individual, which influenced every 
turn of affairs. An accurate observer has detailed these 
matters in a close study of an old town — Braintree, 
now Quincy. 

The Crown always addresses representative Britain 
as " My Lords and Gentlemen." Lord Fairfax accom- 
plished little in Virginia ; Lords Say and Brook did less 
in New England. The English gentry, as well as that 
of other countries, was a great factor in the colonies. 
The Washingtons were conspicuously first ; but there 
were many good seconds in all the colonies. Persons 
like Edmund and Judith Quincy were " the legitimate 
offspring of the old English landowners." * Of their 
kindred, Joanna Hoar has distinguished her descent 

C. F. Adams, Three Episodes, vol. ii, 699. 



138 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

through many generations of patriots, including Evarts 
and other illustrious families. 1 Following closely and 
intermingling were the farmers, whom John Adams 
described in his own vigorous expression. 2 These farm- 
ers descended from yeomen of the feudal guard, and 
became " the yeomen or common people who have some 
lands of their own." Springing from these new yeomen 
came the mechanics, — a class increasing fast in New 
England, and represented in Quincy in the eighteenth 
century by John Marshall, 3 a mason, at sixty-seven cents 
per day. Milton's man and woman, a created essence, 
stand forth in the phrase, " labour still to dress this 
garden our pleasant task enjoined." Marshall labored, 
and his way of living is manifest in his comment at 
the death of Rev. Samuel Willard : " A person of excel- 
ent accomplishments, natural and acquired : an hard 
student, a powerful preacher of the word of God, an 
exemplary Christian: a mirror of all that is good." 4 
Holinshed's " gentlemen be those whom their race and 
bloud, or at the least their vertues, do make noble and 
knowne." Not every gentlewoman was distinguished 
like Joanna Hoar, not every mechanic could express 
himself like John Marshall ; but many have been those 
noble and known by their " vertue," and thick as leaves 
in Vallombrosa have been those modest men, stout- 

1 C. F. Adams, Three Episodes, vol. ii, p. 705. 

2 " Descent from a line of virtuous and independent New England 
farmers for a hundred and sixty years was a better foundation for (pride) 
than a descent through royal or noble scoundrels ever since the flood." 
— Ibid., p. 712. 

3 His diary records " being at a great losse whether any true grace be 
wrought in my soul or no : corruption in me is very powerful ; grace (if 
any) very weak and languid." — Ibid., p. 718. 

4 Ibid., p. 720. 



STATE SUPPORT 139 

hearted as any yeomen of the guard. Old Braintree 
was one town ; but most early townships in New Eng- 
land were like it. These three orders of citizens were 
indissolubly combined in the fabric of the state. 

Massachusetts, inspired by Cotton and governed by 
Winthrop, held more varied forces than Connecticut, 
and included more and more possibilities of civilization 
within the actual scope of her daily life as time went 
on. Her political exegesis was in abnormal form, for 
she was constantly trying to bring heaven and earth 
into one kind of political action. She was rid of Roger 
Williams, and more moderate statesmen, like Codding- 
ton, but soul-liberty was not annihilated or annulled; 
agony of spirit still possessed her. " The heroic strug- 
gle to break down the sacerdotal barrier, to popularize 
knowledge, and to liberate the mind began ages before 
the crucifixion upon Calvary ; it still goes on. . . . In 
that drama Massachusetts has played her part; it may 
be said to have made her intellectual life." 1 

Such growth, such life of the mind and of the soul, 
naturally produced Garrison, as it entertained Webster 
and Everett. The culture of the community clung to 
the old ways in Webster's pupils and in Everett, but its 
passionate feeling shook the Commonwealth from Plym- 
outh to Berkshire, when the people arose as one man 
to subdue the rebellion, and to reestablish that order 
which is heaven's first law. 

Crossing the mountain chain which divided East and 
West in those days, and descending the Ohio valley, we 
find another country and a different people. The States 
along the Ohio were the first American States as dis- 

1 Brooks Adams, Emancipation of Mass., p. 42. 



140 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

tinguished from European colonies. As Walker has 
shown, they were the first national product, — the spawn 
of the Union, so to speak. Moreover, they were settled 
by a population more thoroughly amalgamated than the 
Atlantic communities. The victories of George Rogers 
Clark over the Indians had opened the country both for 
political organization and for racial mixture. The ordi- 
nance of 1787 had limited the territory of slavery, and 
it had founded the educational system of the North- 
west ; or briefly, it had insured a triumphant civiliza- 
tion, animated by the spirit of the new Western world. 
Kentucky and Ohio preceded, while Indiana was 
almost contemporary with the nineteenth century, 
drawing its population chiefly from Pennsylvania, the 
Carolinas, and Virginia, especially in the southern dis- 
trict. 1 With these immigrants from older communities 
was a large infusion of the essentially American and 
migratory population of frontiersmen from Kentucky 
and Tennessee. The northern district 2 was settled by 
people from the Middle States and from New England. 
There was more genius in the southern counties. 
Through all was scattered a strong element of Presby- 
terian Irish, which was to form the cutting edge of our 

1 I have drawn many social characteristics from Nicholson's The Hoo- 
siers, and have used his authorities freely. 

2 . . . " prevented the self-denying missionaries of New England from 
making any considerable impression on the country south of the belt peo- 
pled by the current of migration from New England. The civilization 
of the broad wedge-shaped region on the north side of the Ohio River, 
which was settled by the Southern and Middle State people, and which 
is the great land of the Indian corn, has been evolved out of the healthier 
elements of its own native constitution." — Eggleston, The Graysons, 
p. 76. He says the latter region was indebted to New England in the 
early days for teachers, grammar, and arithmetic. 



STATE SUPPORT 141 

new American citizenship. Some were reckless adven- 
turers, but they were mostly thrifty and full of energy. 
Andrew Jackson and Samuel Houston merely suggest 
the many names that adorn our fighting-list. Likewise 
in principle, race was much more intermingled in our 
early history than is generally supposed. The Eggle- 
stons found nineteen Swiss-descended names in the 
little town of Vevay alone. 1 

Lincoln's boyhood was spent in this State, and his 
early life in Illinois was not different. The picture of 
his surroundings 2 is very interesting, and may be ap- 
plied in studying the beginnings of Indiana. As late 
as 1835, it was not dreamed that the great prairies 
would become settled communities ; but they were 
viewed as extensive grazing plains for stock. The iron 
horse and the rail changed all that. The people were 
simple, living in a plain home, generally a log-cabin. 
A householder who squared his logs was known as 
Split-Log Mitchell. The folk wore homespun clothing, 
dyed with the butternut. The men made buttons, and 
the women dug roots for a decoction called tea. But 
there was plenty of game, bacon, and hoecake. There 
was no luxury while the life had its own stringent wants. 
When the axe was lost, there was panic in the family. 
There were many superstitions, and witchcraft tinged 
by African voodoo or magic was fully entertained. 

Students should abandon the notion that because 
these pioneer communities were rough and rude they 
were essentially clownish or brutal. The Egglestons 
had good blood, and excellent opportunities for substan- 

1 The First of the Hoosiers, p. 69. 

2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. i, 39, 50, 52. 



142 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

tial culture. 1 Abraham Lincoln inherited the strong 
traits of Nancy Hanks, though the family drooped for 
a time in squalid poverty. And wherever we find su- 
perior work, there will appear a good strain of blood 
influencing it, whether in New England or elsewhere. 

" Manliness, honesty, and industry among men, 2 and 
a proud self-respect among women, were strongly marked 
in this typically Western backwoods community." : The 
Methodist preacher, hardly educated but very earnest, 
an effective agent in migratory civilization, " rode cir- 
cuit." He prayed with the family, lectured the children 
gently, and was the shining light of a " local society " 
invited to meet him. There were many petty super- 
stitions, and scriptural interpretation was absolutely lit- 
eral. 4 Sternly Protestant, the people feared and hated 
Catholics. 

Edward Eggleston makes merry over the " yellow " 
aspect of Indianapolis in 1840 . 5 Clothes, soil, and floors, 
alkaline biscuit and fried middling, all were modulated 
in one hue and color. The culture if strong was rough. 
All America before the war was crude, but the Protestant 
Episcopal Bishop Upfold in 1863 was very harsh when 
he refused to " visit or officiate in any parish " G where 
flowers might be displayed in the service. It was con- 
sidered that Indiana was profoundly moved by the Civil 
War, perhaps more than her neighbors. 7 

1 Cf. The Hoosiers, Nicholson, p. 89 ; Eggleston, The First of the Hoo- 
siers, pp. 59, 61. 

2 " The Broad Run people entertained a contempt for the law. A per- 
son mean enough to ' take the law onto ' his neighbor was accounted 
' too triflin' to be respectable." — Eggleston, The Graysons, p. 134. 

3 Ibid., p. 88. 4 Ibid., pp. 94, 95, 117. 

5 Cited, Nicholson, p. 18. 

6 Ibid., p. G3. 7 Ibid., p. 265. 



STATE SUPPORT 143 

Ohio and Illinois on either side were like, but in less 
degree. Kentucky was modified by slavery. Indiana 
was the most thorough amalgam produced by the first 
state migrations. The State did not touch the Allegha- 
nies on the one side, nor the Mississippi on the other. 

Oliver P. Morton, inaugurated governor in January, 
1861, was a typical child of this community we have 
been sketching. Brought up by old-fashioned Scotch 
Presbyterian aunts until fifteen years old, his heredity 
marked his early development. Strong, earnest, logical, 
reading widely and devouring the Bible by the way, 
he revolted from the narrow religious cult prevailing, 
and became independent, as indicated by the well-known 
term " non-professor." At some sacrifice, being intensely 
studious, he obtained regular legal education; even at- 
tending school after his marriage. He was eloquent by 
strength, a powerful and successful advocate. Leaving 
the Democracy in 1854, he helped to organize the Re- 
publican party. Of unflinching courage and energy, 
skillful in handling men, 1 and above all clearly perceiv- 
ing the impending issues, he became at thirty-eight 
years of age the natural chieftain of this crisis. 

The marked and interesting contrast between Oliver 
P. Morton and Abraham Lincoln may be noted here. 
Lincoln learned by heart six books, 2 and these included 
Euclid, who furnished his penetrating and overwhelming 
logic. No one, not even Webster, excelled him in the 

1 " Morton was a great party leader. He had in this respect no su- 
perior in his time, save Lincoln alone." — Hoar, Autobiography, vol. ii, 75. 
" Tom " Reed, whose pungent sayings are not forgotten, said a states- 
man is a politician who is dead. Morton was more than a politician in 
his life. 

2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. i, 299. 



144 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

grasp of a perplexed question and lucid power of state- 
ment. Morton, 1 on the other hand, had the advantage 
of schools, substantially good, and of the culture pre- 
vailing among intelligent and simply educated people. 
The minds of the men differed, and Morton's method 
was cyclopean. A voracious reader, he was fully armed, 
and could shatter his opponent's position with a single 
stroke. His own argument was not so succinct. He 
gathered materials in heaps, and did not build up a case 
in architectural development. Though the matter was 
exhausted when he had finished an argument, he did 
not leave the hearer entertaining a new and positive 
thing, an actual creation in place of the antecedent 
matter. 

This engrossment in his subject reveals a strong 
phase of his character. He was not self-conscious, 
but was absorbed in the work of the moment, in the 
doing, and not standing without and exploiting the 
matter, for statement or otherwise. This faculty made 
him the great executive he was ; and if Abraham 
Lincoln had had something more of the same Napoleonic 
power of action, it would have been a great boon to 
the American executive. President Lincoln, instead of 
doing the matter simply, generally stood outside and 
was making a case, which was handled before the 
American people in a masterly manner. Sincere in 
patriotic intent, he hardly ever lost himself in the force 
of creative action, whether manoeuvring for a con- 
vention or laying plans for congressional legislation. 
In the largest executive sense the creative spirit, the 
eminent force of the immanent crises, did not enter 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. ii, 507, 508. 



STATE SUPPORT 145 

into him and mould him to the work. Morton said to 
an immense multitude, January 22, "I am not here 
to argue questions of state equality, but to denounce 
treason and uphold the cause of the Union." * Such a 
speech naturally cleared the air. 

Indiana was a mighty pivot between the elder East 
and the expanded Northwest, and Morton was a fit 
diamond point bearing the governmental structure. 
The disordered finances of the State were mended by a 
loan of $50,000, February 20. On March 8, a bill or- 
ganizing the militia passed, notwithstanding a threat- 
ened bolt of the Democrats. After Sumter, the fire of 
patriotism blazed through people and parties, and for 
the time burned away everything poorer than itself. 
We who are to the manner born seldom — foreigners 
perhaps never — comprehend the marvelous civic ges- 
tation of those days. In political conditions where all 
people have opinions, and most express them freely, 
where the constable's badge is rare and an armed sol- 
diery almost mythical, government strong and speedy 
had to be forged anew for the occasion. Three days 
before, the "Indianapolis Sentinel" had said, "Gov- 
ernor Morton could not make good his promises to the 
President of 6000 volunteers; the people of Indiana 
did not intend to engage in a crusade against the 
South." 2 Morton had to guard the office of the news- 
paper now in the cause of public order. The " Cincinnati 
Enquirer " in February had laughed at Morton, " His 
sword at his side, fe-fi-fo-fum." 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 102. I have drawn freely from this excellent 
biography. 

2 Cited, Foulke, vol. i, 115. 



146 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

It is strange that Lincoln and Morton, bred in vir- 
tually the same way, — though Morton was more favored 
in early education, — should have differed so much in 
their conceptions of the constant power required to 
subdue the rebellion. Morton was in himself, by his 
own superior foresight and tremendous executive en- 
ergy, the power needed for the occasion. Enough al- 
ways meant for him the overwhelming heap which no 
bounding circumstance could render inadequate. The 
modicum of sense and quiet living can never be a 
revolutionary sufficiency. This appears in the swift 
recurring facts of the record, even more positively than 
can be stated now in sober words. That this overflowing 
patriotism did not exceed the limits of judgment is 
proved by the fact that he maintained himself in the 
governor's seat throughout the most fiery opposition 
ever known under constitutional forms. Morton was the 
embodiment of state support, federate government in- 
carnate in the immediate local representative of the 
people ; not merely an instituted executive, 1 but a think- 
ing, acting head, whom John Doe and Richard Roe 
recognized as their own essential chieftain and leader. 

Morton had visited Washington in March and advised 
a vigorous policy against the rebellion as it then existed. 
He was engaged on the morning of April 15, and before 
the President's call for troops arrived he wired, " On 
behalf of the State of Indiana, I tender you for the 
defense of the nation and to uphold the authority of 
the government 10,000 men." 1 The quota under the 
proclamation calling for 75,000 was 4683 men for three 
months. The governor knew this to be inadequate, and 

i O. R., Series III, vol. i, 70. 



STATE SUPPORT 147 

on the 16th called out six regiments. The legislature, 
on receiving his message, promptly appropriated two 
millions, provided bonds for a loan, arranged a militia 
system, denned treason, etc. The military condition was 
the worst possible, 1 there being thirteen muskets and 
two rusty horse-pistols in the arsenal, and not five hun- 
dred stand of arms in the whole commonwealth. 

Going back to our representative Eastern community, 
we must remember that Indiana was opposed to the 
extension of slavery, being turned from sympathy with 
the South by the aggressive Southern propaganda of 
1854. Moreover, she had not experienced the thorough 
intellectual unrest of a Puritan community in the early 
nineteenth century. " Non-professors " like Morton were 
few and were misunderstood. Massachusetts, on the 
other hand, had been immersed in the constant " strug- 
gle to liberate the mind," already noted. 2 Her inherited 
tendencies from the seventeenth century were an active 
and never-ceasing factor in her enlargement. Though 
the " Unspotted Lambs of the World " have been mat- 
ter for satirical censure on many occasions, they have 
been on the whole powerful opponents of wrong, 
whether political or ethical. While the West was against 
the extension of slavery, the great Puritan common- 
wealths were literally anti-slavery. It is true, Massachu- 
setts bore Webster to exalt the Union, and furnished 
forth Everett in a forlorn hope to save it. Her mass 
was conservative, but her rising spirit was radical in the 
new agitations of the middle century. Her governor, 
John A. Andrew, inaugurated January 1, 1861, fairly 
represented the new wine which was bursting the old 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 110. 2 Cf. ante, p. 139. 



148 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

bottles. I shall detail his personal characteristics in 
another connection. 1 In 1858 he had said, while argu- 
ing against the Dred Scott decision in the General 
Court, " The sun of a new morning begins to dawn. I 
see its foreshine already on the mountain-tops, when 
these opinions will be accepted and justified by the 
great heart and intellect of America." 2 

In a great meeting at the Tremont Temple he had 
said, " Whether the enterprise itself was one or the 
other, John Brown himself is right." In the vigorous 
words of "Warrington," Andrew was a " regular-built 
anti-slavery man for governor." 

"Since they will have it so, — in the name of God, — 
Amen ! Now let all the governors and chief men of the 
people see to it that war shall not cease until emanci- 
pation is secure." These were the words of Samuel 
G. Howe, April 13. Garrison, Howe, Phillips were of 
Massachusetts — all great names, but varying enormously 
in their individual powers, and in their practical effect 
on the Civil War. We have treated the abolitionists as 
a political element elsewhere ; it is only necessary to 
mention Wendell Phillips as an individual. April 9, at 
New Bedford, he had argued long against coercion of 
the South 3 as being both wrong and unwise. He was a 

1 Cf. infra, p. 192. 2 Pearson, Andrew, vol. i, 79. 

8 Phillips was reported, "You cannot go through Massachusetts and 
recruit men to bombard Charleston or New Orleans. The Northern mind 
will not bear it. The first onset may be borne, . . . but the sober second 
thought of Massachusetts will be, 'wasteful, unchristian, guilty.' ... If 
the administration provokes bloodshed, it is a trick — nothing else. It is 
the masterly cunning of the devil of compromise, the Secretary of State." 
— Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, p. 45. 

April 21, Phillips reversed his position in a rather clumsy manner, at 
Boston, but his final attitude was correct. " It is sublime to see the 



STATE SUPPORT 149 

marvel among men, in any time. A man of the highest 
intellectual calibre, of the purest ethical insight, and 
with inflexible sincerity of purpose from his own point 
of view, he was a political imbecile of the worst sort. 
No one better illustrated the strange fact that the 
thorough orator must speak ; he cannot act. His great 
speech at New Bedford was not an accidental word ; it 
was the typical, captious abortion of a gigantic scold. 
When all was over, he could not see, like Garrison, that 
the enormous forces of the Civil War had chans:ed the 
inmost issues of American life, totally and forever. He 
went on even after the war, sounding his magnificent 
periods 1 and building up his climaxes in antediluvian 
speech. He lived in a sublimated, vitriolic atmosphere 
that common patriots could not breathe and assimilate. 
It showed the volcanic heat of the crisis, the Civil War, 
that Phillips, the abolition " come-outer," the old Massa- 
chusetts Whigs, the Indiana Calvinists and Methodist 
exhorters, — all these variously formed citizens were 
fused into one patriotic current that impelled each in 
his own community. 

Fortunately, Andrew, though inspired for freedom, 
was not a " conscientiously rigid doctrinaire," for the 
statesman's forecasting insight animated his restless 
enthusiasm. Guided by Charles Francis Adams, the 
statesman, and John M. Forbes, the enlarged man of 
affairs, no one could have better handled the immense 
resources of Massachusetts in this instant need. In 

rallying of a great people to the defense of the national honor." — Ibid., 
p. 113. 

1 I saw a private letter from George William Curtis, at the time of 
the Phillips Phi Beta Kappa oration. He said it was not surpassed by 
Pericles. 



150 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

e very-day management he was assisted forcibly by 
Colonel Henry Lee, not to mention others. He had 
visited Washington in December and discovered that 
the South meant to fight. Conventions and resolutions 
would not stop a bullet. February 6, the governor 
persuaded his council to buy overcoats 1 and other 
equipments needed to mobilize the militia. For two 
months Boston jeered at this sagacious preparation, 
just as Morton's critics in Indiana laughed at him. 2 
Seward had said that the new administration would be 
so embarrassed by the empty treasury that it might be 
necessary for Massachusetts to indorse the United States 
bonds. 3 In fact, individuals and corporations loaned 
liberally to the United States Treasury. The loyal States 
provided indiscriminately for the wants of the adminis- 
tration or their own. April 15, the Boston banks offered 
to the State $3,600,000, assuming that the General 
Court would legalize the obligations when it should 
meet. New York responded, also, in the most liberal 
manner. 

Beyond all was the outpouring of popular feeling and 
enthusiasm. On Sunday, Fletcher Webster, from the 
rear of the Old State House, at a street meeting, offered 
to raise a regiment. When we remember his valiant 
death on the field, it is pathetic to read his request to 
Andrew a few days after for an interview " on matter 
of some delicacy for one moment." 4 On the 27th, at a 
vast meeting in Chester Square, Edward Everett spoke 
to the disciplined, conserving mind of the old Whigs : 

1 Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, p. 35. 

2 Cf. ante, p. 145. 
8 Schouler, p. 37. 

4 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 171, May 3, 1861. 



STATE SUPPORT 151 

"All former differences of opinion are swept away. 
We forget that we ever had heen partisans. We re- 
member only that we are Americans and that our 
country is in peril." * 

Equally significant was the utterance of Benjamin 
F. Hallet, a consistent, life-long Democrat, at the same 
meeting. And from a flag-raising, May 1, he indorsed 
on the circular to Governor Andrew : " With Mr. Hal- 
let's respects for the great administrative talent you 
have shown in this terrible crisis to our country, which 
God grant may pass over us, with the purification, 
without the desolation of the tempest." 

The spirit of the old Puritans now animated their 
descendants, and it blazed forth in the fiercest heat. 

We may cite from the governor's rough draft of a 
statement issued Sunday noon, April 20, to the friends 
of the Fourth Regiment, apprising them of its safe 
arrival at Fortress Monroe : — 

The welfare of our gallant and patriotic citizen-soldiers, 
for whom every possible provision has been made or antici- 
pated, will be carefully watched over, and friends and relatives 
they have left behind shall constantly read around their 
hearthstones the earliest reliable intelligence concerning the 
progress and achievements of these noble and patriotic regi- 
ments of Massachusetts volunteers, for whom the country has 
already one of the fairest pages in her history. 3 

This is a type of the constant energy and abounding 
sentiment of Andrew, seeking every opportunity to 
reach the heart of the people, out of his own earnest 
and overpowering devotion. 

1 Schouler, p. 115. 

2 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 169, 43. 3 Ibid., vol. 129, 155. 



152 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

In this connection we may note the pressure bearing 
on the government, before the Sanitary Commission 
was organized, to afford aid and comfort to the soldiers 
in every possible way — wise and unwise. Forbes, sen- 
sible as always, struck home ; ! the government had to 
allow individuals as such to contribute their efforts, to 
satisfy both the sentiment and practical views of the 
people. 

A powerful union defense committee was formed in 
the city of New York, and the Committee of Correspond- 
ence, Hamilton Fish, W. M. Evarts, James T. Brady, 
John J. Cisco, Edwards Pierrepont, opened communi- 
cation with Governor Andrew, April 24. 2 

An interesting phase of these mighty affairs is re- 
vealed through the action of Caleb dishing, one of the 
most complex, capable, and, entertaining characters in 
all our history. When an upheaval of patriotic spirit 
brings all and every one to the surface, common policy 
and tact fail. The representative state must use all forces 
and avail of every individual within its limits — but 
how? Mr. Cushing offered his services to the governor, 
April 25, in an urgent note desiring " to discharge my 

1 To the governor, May 2, on ice, fresh meats, etc. : " I fear we have 
weeks and months of dull, hard work to keep our men in the necessaries 
of a soldier's life, in daily food, shelter, and clothes — and until we have 
fully cared for these, I want to have all the fancy work come in on the 
responsibility of individual good-will. By turning the Ice voyage to 
account for Hospital service and fresh rations, I hope we shall hit both 
the sentimental and practical views of the people." — Mass. Exec. Files, 
vol. 168, 168. 

Dr. S. G. Howe reported on luxuries the same date: "Their principal 
value (and that is priceless) is in testimony of the patriotism of men and 
women who must do something for their country and for humanity." 
— Schouler, p. 154. 

2 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 168, 157. 



STATE SUPPORT 153 

duty to our common country." * We must call attention 
to the consequent correspondence cited, 2 for it shows 
the inner situation, and exhibits the nature of the task 
of those governing the country. 3 

The inmost convictions of Massachusetts were 
wounded severely by the action of General Butler in 
Maryland, when he offered her troops on his way to 
Washington, to subdue a hypothetical insurrection of 
the negro slaves. Andrew took ground very sagaciously 
— as the ultimate negro problem was to prove — that 
the affair was a military matter, not to be embarrassed 
by political or even sentimental action. The citizens at 
home were moved to anxiety. Lewis Tappan, the famous 
abolitionist, remonstrated from New York. S. E. Sewall 
and others 4 wrote Governor Andrew ; but perhaps the 
clearest voice was that of A. Henry Harlow of Worces- 
ter County, April 30, speaking for others as well as 
himself : " Can you assure us that if we enlist in the 

1 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 169, 192. 

2 The Boston Herald cautious Governor Andrew, " Massachusetts wants 
no traitors to command troops." 

O. C. B., Greencastle, Pa., April 22, advises the governor, knowing 
from Union men that C. Cushing, late President of the Charleston Con- 
vention, " spent yesterday, Sunday, at Hagerstown, Md., with well-known 
secessionists." 

April 29, an anonymous correspondent at Worcester has seen Cushing's 
Union speech, but yet protests against him. About May 1, " Admirer of 
her Present Governor " says of Cushing: " Now in the name of the ' Triune 
God,' let me respectfully entreat that no son of my Native State ever 
be required to serve with, still less under, so vile and black a traitor." — 
Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 168, Nos. 146, 71, 20, 155. 

8 Cf. Pearson, Andrew, vol. i, 196-199, Andrew's refusal of Cush- 
ing, and Forbes's comment approving. It was a nice question between 
Butler and Cushing. Perhaps an uncertain statesman would have been 
better than a certain demagogue. 

4 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 168, 92 ; vol. 169, 56. 



154 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

war to put down treason, we shall not in any possible 
contingency be compelled to assist in quelling negro 
insurrection ?"* 

We may read between the lines symptoms of the 
grave troubles which were to come to the surface and 
vex the country in the year 1863. And the women — 
blessed creatures — they clung to the wheels of gov- 
ernment at every precipitate turn, and they drove the 
governors to distraction. A commander-in-chief and 
father-of-his-people might expect all sorts of personal 
woes and complaints. The Files are full of these mur- 
murs, as of fathers enlisting without knowledge of their 
families, etc. All of which agony Andrew soothed as 
best he could, in the most conscientious and faithful 
manner. But what should he say to the female Puritan 
when she came in the formal Protest of the Mothers 
and Sisters of Reading, 2 against " desecration of the 
Sabbath in camps," etc., and in moving troops so they 
must break the Sabbath, asking " to have the Laws 
of God obeyed," — a large contract for either mascu- 
line or feminine Puritan. 

In this weltering tangle of agony and passion An- 
drew did not go mad, as might have been. 3 He had 
strong men and nimble workers to help him. It is 

1 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 169, 17. 

2 Ibid., vol. 172, August, 1861. 

3 In the midst of these troubles Andrew struck right and left at de- 
tractors and critics. October 31, 1863, he printed a circular to Hon. M. 
M. Fisher, Medway, concerning recruiting, and refuting certain stories 
about " shoddy " overcoats. " So false as to be strange and extraordinary, 
even if the atmosphere produced lies without human agency." 

He protested to Generals Meigs and Banks: " If there is anything about 
which my conscience is clear, both before God and man, it is in regard 
to my earnest efforts to serve and protect the soldiers of Massachusetts. 



STATE SUPPORT 155 

cheering to read at every turn John M. Forbes's prac- 
tical and eminently sensible sayings in words from his 
own elastic pen, before mechanical typewriters and 
bulky stub-pens marred the delicacy of personal inter- 
course. May 21, about many affairs ; then " Nota Bene, 
I shall come to-morrow with a Fast horse, in hopes to 
carry you off beyond reach of your immediate perse- 
cutors." * 

Massachusetts was liberating her mind. From the 
days of the Antinomian controversy, through the Half- 
way Covenant and the American Revolution, the Unita- 
rian dispute and the abolition agitation, to the uprising 
of the Civil War, she grew in strength as she wrestled 
in her agony. Her quiet was unstable equilibrium. 
Other communities, especially in New England, were 
more or less similar ; none excelled her in these vigor- 
ous attributes, and she used her whole strength to sub- 
due the rebellion. 

In his day, Charles Dickens was a great humorist, and 
he accented " red tape," the excessive attention to for- 
mality and routine, and made it immortal, when he 
festooned it around the Circumlocution Office of all 
governments. The government of the United States 
was not constructed to carry on war chiefly, and least of 
all carry it on among its own citizens. But whatever 
might fail the men in bureaus at Washington, their sup- 
ply of red tape was ample in every contingency. Such 
energetic administrators as Andrew and Morton were 
constantly meshed in its entangling twists and knots. 

And in respect to those duties I have never had a petition or a favorite, 
nor a disfavored nor a neglected corps." — Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 64, 
61 D. 

1 Ibid., vol. 170, 90. 



156 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Andrew let himself out in his own characteristic manner 
when he wrote the President 1 that his chief business was 
to act as if it were not. His apt phrase "took up the 
war " embodies the action of the loyal North. We have 
heretofore indicated 2 the deadly influence of this subtle 
administrative principle, as it often prevailed in the 
general government. The prevention and emendation 
of red tape was one of the largest functions of the loyal 
governors in the first two years of the war. No part of 
these studies is more important or more interesting, in 
the light thrown on the working of federal government, 
arising in the States and centring at Washington, or 
vice versa. 

New York responded amply to the calls of the admin- 
istration after the attack on Sumter. Governor Edwin 
D. Morgan could say truly in his message, "Her bank- 
ers, and particularly those of the city of New York, with 
a patriotism and an enlightened confidence which is a 
wonder to Europe and a marvel to ourselves, have fur- 
nished a most important element to the government." 3 

The United States Treasury in its turn placed $2,000,- 
000 in the control of the Union Defense Committee, 
and Messrs. Dix, Blatchford, and Opdyke obtained in- 
structions for expending it. 4 As illustrating the prompt 
support afforded by the great industrial corporations 
throughout the North, we may note the action of the 

1 " I beg leave to add, that, immediately upon receiving your pro- 
clamation we took up the war, and have carried on our part of it in the 
spirit in which we believe the Administration and the American People 
intend to act ; namely, as if there was not an inch of red tape in the world." 
— May 3, 1861, Schouler, p. 130. 

2 Cf. ante, p. 75. 

3 Message, January 7, 1862, p. 2. 

4 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 136. 



STATE SUPPORT 157 

Illinois Central Railroad Company 1 directed from New 
York, in keeping an "open highway." On the 24th the 
governor reported 2 eight thousand militia dispatched 
and several other regiments " perfectly impatient to 
start." July 26, the resources of the State were " nearly 
spent," but the executive of the great State went for- 
ward cheerfully, 3 in no fear of red tape. He tendered 
Parrott guns 4 to the War Department, but they were 
not needed. 

The first actual assistance for the administration 
came from Pennsylvania on the evening of April 18. 
A body of five hundred and thirty men 5 without arms 
reached Washington, and Major McDowell took com- 
mand. This was two days before the arrival of the 
Massachusetts Sixth, and the House of Representatives 
recorded its thanks July 22, 1861. The most powerful 
and far-reaching support of the government, in any one 
act by a single State, was in the levying of the Reserves 
by Curtin in Pennsylvania, which has been treated pre- 
viously. 6 The governor and the arch-politician, Simon 

1 "Have in their control 110 engines and 2600 freight cars, and about 
3500 men employed ; that the regular business of the company shall be 
set aside at any moment, and every facility which the utmost energy and 
an earnest desire to sustain the government can bring to bear shall be 
afforded." — O. R., Series III, vol. i, 121. 

2 Ibid., p. 108. 

3 To Secretary Seward : " I have no time to call the legislature, and 
there will be no doubt of the sanction of all proper acts done by me and 
no question save that of money. Ours is nearly spent, but if the General 
Government will make payment on account of past expenditures incurred 
all will go smoothly. I infer the government will make such payment 
and am acting accordingly." — Ibid., p. 354. 

4 Ibid., p. 347. 

5 Bates, Pennsylvania, vol. v, 7, 8. 

6 Ante, p. 90. 



158 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Cameron, 1 were far from friendly, but the patriotic 
spirit of the executive bursts forth in every line April 
17, and the dispatch is typical of his energetic life dur- 
ing the whole war. " Volunteers are arriving, many of 
them without arms, and most of those in use unfit for 
active service. We have no ammunition. I wish to march 
them in large bodies and prepared to defend themselves. 
Shall I order the Philadelphia regiments to start ? " 2 

Every possible faculty of an executive was needed in 
those days. The community was rich, but the state 
credit had been shattered by the onset of war. To these 
delicate problems of finance 3 the governor addressed 
himself with excellent sense. The cares of great expend- 
ing and disbursing officers show in the appointment 
of a committee to supervise supplies and investigate 
frauds. 4 Curtin cared incessantly and in every way for 
the soldiers in the field, and his especial delegate, Dr. 
Robert K. Smith, 5 major, made himself felt throughout 
the hospitals. 

Before discussing the particular action of the States 
in raising volunteers, we may glance at the message of 

1 A lady, who had every opportunity of knowing what the best men in 
Pennsylvania thought, told me that Cameron was a tremendous load for 
the administration in 1861. His appointment proceeded from the only 
bargain made before nomination, and it was not Lincoln's fault that he was 
in the War Department. She said when he left the War Department the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad telegraphed, " The devil is loose, thank 
Heaven ! " What was the matter with Cameron ? " His devotion to his 
own interests. Once, Pennsylvania wanted a regiment accepted. He re- 
plied that ' it could be taken, if sent by Harrisburg to come by Northern 
Central Railroad, which he controlled. He was a great politician, able, 
and never forgot his friends, nor his enemies." 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 82. 3 Egle, Curtin, p. 154. 
4 Pennsylvania Exec. Files, Letter Book No. 12, June 1, 1861. 

6 Ibid., p. 99. 



STATE SUPPORT 159 

the President, July 4, where he defined the true condi- 
tion of the States, and their basis as a portion of the 
whole country : — 

The States have their status in the Union, and they have 
no other legal status. If they break from this, they can only 
do so against law and by revolution. The Union, and not 
themselves separately, procured their independence and their 
liberty. By conquest or purchase the Union gave each of 
them whatever of independence and liberty it has. The Union 
is older than any of the States, and in fact created them as 
States. 1 

We must dwell on this masterly statement, for its true 
significance and overpowering weight were not fully 
comprehended, North or South, until four years later. 
As suggested heretofore, 2 the greatest mistake pos- 
sible for any administration was committed by ours at 
this time. 3 It consisted in laying the Washington extin- 
guisher, the quenching, benumbing influence of a great 
capital, on the energies of a whole people ; instead of 
opening out all the possibilities of state support, — as 
developed by Governor Curtin 4 in the hard fact of 
15,000 Pennsylvania Reserves, — and rallying that sup- 
port in an overwhelming force before the rebel Con- 
federacy could marshal its lesser people in its desperate 
struggles, 1862-65. 

In spite of adverse influences, — Virginia, Kentucky, 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 317. " Our adversaries omit ' We the people,' 
and substitute ' We the deputies of the sovereign and independent States.' 
Why?"— Ibid., p. 319. 

2 Cf. ante, p. 87. 

3 " One of the greatest perplexities of the government is to avoid re- 
ceiving troops faster than it can provide for them." — President's Message, 
O. R., Series III, vol. i, 316. 

4 Cf. ibid., p. 218. 



160 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

and Missouri refusing peremptorily to send the first 
quota of militia, and the executive of Delaware not 
cooperating, — these particular States furnished regi- 
ments. Maryland was prevented by the outbreak at 
Baltimore. All the other States in the loyal district 1 
promptly sent their quotas toward the first 75,000 men. 
In the present view of the lamentable inefficiency shown 
by all the departments the first year at Washington, it 
is exquisitely funny to read Secretary Cameron's cita- 
tions, with comments, from ex-Secretary Floyd's report. 
"Adequate preparations and a prompt advance of the 
army was an act of mercy and humanity to those de- 
luded people of the Mormons at Utah, for it prevented 
the effusion of blood. I recommend the same vigorous 
and merciful policy now." 2 

In the beginning, very interesting complications had 
arisen, under some of the state laws, for handling the 
first quotas of militia ; these will receive attention 
in another connection. 3 May 4, General Order No. 15 4 
called for 42,034 men for three years — the nucleus 
of the actual army as distinguished from the militia, 
which had done such good service, who were minute 
men hurrying to the front. The powerful work of 
the great States is indicated in the stirring report of 
Governor E. D. Morgan to the War Department, though 
the same spirit prevailed everywhere. 

1 Red tape had not then arrived at waterproof caps and blankets in 
campaigning. " Some of the States of New England have sent their 
quotas forward equipped most admirably in this respect. I would re- 
commend that this subject be commended to Congress for its favorable 
consideration." — O. R., Series III, vol. i, 307. 

2 Ibid., pp. 303-306. 

3 Cf. infra, p. 180 et seq. 

4 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 151. 



STATE SUPPORT 161 

For our previous organization of troops we had a state 
law and funds. Both are now exhausted. I do not propose 
calling- the legislature if it can be avoided, for that would 
produce delay ; but I require specific directions as to the 
mode of organization, 1 and money or Treasury notes placed 
at my command now, as I wish to get out a general order, 
for which the people all over the State are anxiously waiting, 
and I have not information whether this 25,000 men are to 
be enrolled accoixling to Orders No. 15, or under some law of 
the present Congress. That no time, however, shall be lost, I 
have already contracted. ... I have unusual facilities now 
in getting supplies. With such [orders and funds] there is 
nothing I would not do for the government, and in the most 
prompt and effective manner which the exigencies require. I 
have no doubt of getting the troops. 2 

All kinds of management were used by the vigorous 
governors to stimulate the adminstration, — which was 
to move without punching or prodding after the coming 
battle of Bull Run, — and to induce the acceptance of 
more troops. We have seen that New York 3 was steadily 
putting forth its energies in filling its large quotas. 
June 12, Massachusetts had ready its six regiments 
called out, and Governor Andrew begged General Hiram 
Walbridge of New York to "procure a further requi- 
sition for ten regiments, thoroughly armed, equipped, 
clothed, and provided with tents, baggage train, rations, 
and subsistence stores; these advances will be made by 
this State." 4 

1 Communicated August 3. 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 386. 

2 Ibid., p. 361. 

a The powerful Union Defense Committee telegraphed to the gov- 
ernors of thirteen States and received replies, stating the number and 
preparation of their forces. Messrs. Draper, Wetmore, and Evarts com- 
municated this information to the War Department. — Ibid., p. 148. 

* Ibid., pp. 268, 275, 282. 



162 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

"Were there ever such little kingdoms, within a great 
kingdom, in the history of government ? At the same 
time Fletcher Webster had raised his regiment above 
mentioned, "which Hon. Daniel Webster's old friends 
very much wish to get into the service," 1 in the words 
of President Lincoln, who took a hand with Senator 
Wilson in forcing it on the War Department. The whole 
matter issued in directly accepting the ten regiments, 
which included Webster's. 

Some States 2 — as Ohio — had proposed to enlist 
their three months' men by regiments, having been led 
to expect a " unanimous " response. Only a portion of 
the men enlisted. Then Ohio proposed to disband them 
altogether after paying off. The President declined, to 
General McClellan, as "this would not only be to dis- 
appoint too rudely the patriotic order of these gallant 
volunteers, but it would be a breach of the public faith." : 

While the Atlantic States thus flamed with excite- 
ment, what was the great West doing in these opening 
scenes of the tremendous drama? Never did clarion 
to "all the sensual world proclaim" more clearly than 
the voice of Oliver P. Morton as it sounded across the 
prairies of Indiana and echoed through the bureaus at 
Washington, which were busy, but not always opera- 
tive. To the Secretary of War, April 19 : " Twenty-four 
hundred men in camp and less than half of them armed. 
Why has there been so much delay in sending arms ? 
We have received none, and cannot learn that they 
have ever been shipped. . . . Allow me to ask what is 
the cause of all this ? " 4 

" O. R., Series III, vol. i, 269, 271. 

2 For Pennsylvania, ci. ibid., p. 178. 3 Ibid., p. 266. 4 Ibid., p. 89. 



STATE SUPPORT 163 

Again, 1 April 28 : — 

The organization of the six regiments required of Indiana 
has this clay been completed. ... I regret to add that great 
dissatisfaction prevails in the army with regard to the quality 
of the arms furnished, and the delay and uncertainty in the 
reception of stores and accoutrements. I hazard nothing in 
saying that a finer body of men has never been assembled 
on the continent. . . . This State is one of the four exposed 
by its geographical position to the immediate evils of civil 
war. ... I trust that at least 20,000 stand of arms will be 
promptly shipped to this State. 2 

The transactions with the wavering State of Kentucky 
at this period are very interesting. Morton's ample 
energies overflowed, as it were, and did much to keep 
that State from drifting into the Confederacy. With 
Governor Dennison, he tried to get Governor Magoffin 
to attend a meeting at Cincinnati. The vacillating se- 
cessionist would not come, but sent his representative. 
Colonel Crittenden, to persuade Morton and Dennison to 
unite with him in a chimerical effort to bring about a 
truce between the general government and the seceded 
States until a meeting of Congress could be called in 
extraordinary session. Morton rebuked him severely 
and taught constitutional exposition in the briefest 
terms : " I hold that Indiana and Kentucky are but in- 
tegral parts of the nation, bound to obey the requisitions 
of the President." 11 These peculiar conditions induced 
a close relationship between the loyal people of Ken- 

1 The enthusiastic Cincinnati Commercial said, as the troops passed 
through, " The governor of Indiana has out-generaled the governor of 
Ohio. The former has sent four admirahly equipped regiments, and has 
two more ready to march. The governor of Ohio has not a single regi- 
ment." — Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 126. 

2 Ibid., p. 125. s JMd^ p# 137> 



164 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

tucky and Morton, who was like a foster-nurse to the 
half -orphaned State. After the battle of Shiloh, the om- 
nipresent governor had chartered boats to bring home 
his own wounded. A Kentucky major tried to get a 
score on board those reserved boats. "But damn it, 
sir ! is n't Morton governor of Kentucky ? If he can 
care for our State, he certainly can protect you." * 

In this summer the executives of the several States 
were straining every nerve to bring out the power of 
their peoples, and to muster every possible force, phy- 
sical and moral, for effort in the great struggle. Gov- 
ernor Andrew, in accepting a resignation and granting 
honorable discharge, where there had been a misunder- 
standing, said, very well, in his abounding rhetoric: 
" Every citizen must yield everything to his country 
save Truth and Honor." 2 Governor Andrew received 
many petitions from the towns direct, 3 asking him to 
use the state credit and to push affairs in every way 
toward the suppression of the rebellion. Petty local 
jealousies creep in to stain the best work in the best 
times. Some expatriated Yankee was worried by West- 
ern newspapers, which clamored that New England, 
New York, and Pennsylvania were behind in filling 
their quotas, while Indiana was ahead. Andrew's most 
vigorous scrawl emphasizes on the report : " Will Mr. 
Drew see to this ? Hurry up the statistics on this sub- 
ject. I want to write a letter immediately to satisfy 
this class of . . ." 4 

The^ large States imported arms from Europe, and 
Massachusetts could say, October 11, 1861, that she 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 165. 2 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 2, 53. 

3 Ibid., vol. 168. 4 Ibid., vol. 173, October 7, 1861. 



STATE SUPPORT 165 

had "taken pride in permitting none of her three years 
regiments to appear in Washington until fully equipped. 
This is the first instance in which she has asked the 
federal government to assist." * There was inevitable 
conflict in purchasing military supplies abroad between 
the federal and state governments. The national mis- 
fortune was that there was not more of it. If the ad- 
ministration could not grasp the rebellion in total, it 
would have been far better had it allowed the States 
which were parts, each to attack its own part in sup- 
port, and thus to render the parts into the national 
whole. The small loss through competition abroad 
would have been recompensed a hundred fold by the 
large muster of well-equipped troops rendered abso- 
lutely necessary at each turn of the struggle. The 
strange somnolence of the administration is completely 
illustrated in letters of Governor Morgan 2 to the War 
Department, November 30, 1861. To the order stop- 
ping purchase of arms : " I beg to say that in view of 
the inability of the General Government to supply all 
the volunteers with arms the government of this* State 
authorized the purchase of Enfield arms in England, 
some of which are still to arrive. No other purchase 
has been or will be made." To the order stopping re- 
cruiting : " I will, of course, comply with the wishes 
of the War Department in the respect named, but I 
beg to add that, unless the rebellion is crushed out by 
the 1st of February next, I shall ask the acceptance 
by the government of at least 25,000 additional volun- 
teers from this State." The contrast is stupendous : 
existence in a bureau and the doing of the work, the 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 571. 2 Ibid., p. 698. 



166 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

account-maker and the actor, one gasping in a vacuum, 
the other breathing the free air of all the sky. There 
might be deficiency of money, powder, and ball in the 
War Department, but there was ample time and op- 
portunity for politician's palaver. Secretary Cameron 
" thanks for the prompt and satisfactory manner in 
which you have responded to the call of the President " 
in a hundred forms throughout these records. 

December 3, the War Department issued Order 105, 1 
based on the fact that the 500,000 volunteers author- 
ized had been raised. It overhauled the whole business 
of recruiting, and especially stopped the raising of more 
troops except on special requisition of the department. 
A better conceived plan for constraining and repress- 
ing the energies of the loyal people could not have 
been invented by a Circumlocution Office. One point 
desired was to restrain volunteer enlistment and encour- 
age that of regulars. Governor Morgan, in mild but 
pungent irony, showed that the services were different, 
and that people volunteered " to defend their institu- 
tions rather than a desire to find employment." 2 He 
justly said that the spirit of the order would " touch 
the pride of the State." Secretary Cameron, with his 
eternally bland smile, "fully appreciates the ability and 
energy displayed by the authorities of the State of 
New York," 3 but he does not modify the paralyzing 
influence of the order. 

The reader must pardon these returns to an oft-told 
tale, for similar events, oft repeated, compel the record. 
And these events contain the essential history of the 
Civil War. The more one studies these movements 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 722. 2 Ibid., p. 758. 3 Ibid., p. 761. 



STATE SUPPORT 167 

of the departments, the more incomprehensible appear 
these violent and repeated interruptions of the recruit- 
ing service. No sooner were all the varied energies of 
local government stimulated and set at work than the 
national heart began to beat slower and strove to lessen 
all the vigorous efforts of the members. Or, as if 
a captain, having just replaced his storm-blown sails, 
should say, " Stop sewing and fitting, for we are head- 
ing into port with never a chance of another squall of 
wind." 

Moving forward to the spring of 1862, the scene 
changes, and the men, while the country suffers from 
disabilities of another sort. Stanton had succeeded 
Cameron in the War Department, and brought in great 
energy. But Stanton, like many eminent men, great 
as he was in moving cabinets, misconceived when he 
imagined himself a strategist. McClellan was conducting 
his campaign on the Peninsula with a splendid army. 
Stonewall Jackson began the first of his large enter- 
prises in the Shenandoah Valley, and struck terror into 
the bureaus at Washington. A portion of McDowell's 
right wing of the Peninsular army was diverted too late 
to save Banks from disastrous defeat. This " great 
scare " was memorable, even in that capital of scares. 
No strength was expended now in stopping off States 
from raising troops without "special" instructions. The 
electric wires burned May 19 under the force of the 
excitement. Secretary Stanton shrieks to all the loyal 
governors, 1 — Curtin, Morgan, and the rest, — "How 
soon can you raise six or more regiments?" or "one 
or more," as the case might be. 

] 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 44. 



168 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Andrew made one of his worst mistakes in respond- 
ing : " A call so sudden and unforewarned finds me 
without materials for an intelligent reply. ... If our 
people must fight rebels, who use their slaves against 
them, I think they will feel that the draft is heavy 
on their patriotism. But if the President will sustain 
General Hunter, recognize all men, even black men, as 
legally capable of that loyalty," 1 etc. 

Such temporizing allegiance could not survive long 
in the resilient atmosphere of Massachusetts, nor was it 
the thorough feeling of her loyal governor. His true 
self speaks out May 23 : "I am making all prepara- 
tions possible in advance of your directions. Please 
make any requisition on me you desire, and we will do 
our utmost." 2 Morton was on deck, as usual, with five 
regiments, in " from four to six weeks." 3 

In view of the above-mentioned correspondence in 
December with Governor Morgan, there is ghastly satire 
in the dispatch, May 21, less than six months later : 
" Raise one regiment immediately. Raise as many there- 
after as you can." 4 The governor answers with the 
dignity due from the principality which he directed : 
" It is essential that I fully understand in what manner 
the expenses attending this duty shall be met. The 
legislature of this State has made no appropriation 
applicable to the organization of additional volunteers. 
... I now ask that the General Government at once 
assumes the payment of all necessary expenses, and that 
all needful authority, therefore, be formally issued to 
me by return mail." 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 45. 2 Ibid., p. 66. 

8 Ibid., p. 46. 4 Ibid., p. 62. 



STATE SUPPORT 169 

Only stating the massive facts of the impending situ- 
ation, he works on as patiently as if he had not been 
repeatedly snubbed in proffered service by the rumi- 
nating officials at Washington. Such were the burdens 
of the loyal States in the Civil War. 

The sapient strategists at Washington had not yet 
exhausted the nervous energy devoted to mischief. May 
25, 1 the telegraph flashes forth to Curtin, Andrew, 
and Sprague of Rhode Island : " Send all the troops 
forward that you can immediately. Banks is completely 
routed. The enemy are in large force, advancing on 
Harper's Ferry." 2 At the same time the secretary calls 
for the dispatch of the Seventh Regiment from New 
York. Governor Curtin was justly alarmed also, being 
threatened with the invasion of the Cumberland Valley. 
Then follows the secretary's report, the same day, that 
Banks had arrived near the Potomac, " having saved 
his trains and the chief part of his command." 3 

The Devil, convalescent, no longer a monk would be. 
The Seventh New York was on the march May 27, 
when the old chills for the recruiting in the great State 
returned. " We shall be able to procure promptly enough 
three years' men to serve. You will please accept no 
more for less term without special order." 4 

Congress also excelled at times in the evolution of 
how not to do it. It took upon itself to pursue Cameron 
after his retirement, for misfeasance in buying supplies 
and appointing agents without proper red tape. In the 
midst of this fearful excitement the President was 

i Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 126, 101. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 70. 

3 Ibid., p. 72. * Ibid., p. 86. 



170 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

obliged to send a special message to Congress, wherein, 
as an example, he recited the necessary doings of the 
Union Defense Committee of New York to save the 
capital a year previous. He assumed full responsibility 
for the acts in question. " It is due Mr. Cameron to 
say that, although he fully approved the proceedings, 
they were not moved or suggested by himself, and that 
not only the President, but all the other heads of 
departments, were at least equally responsible with him 
for whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed in 
the premises." 1 

Friction often occurred, even when the best inten- 
tions prevailed. Secretary Stanton takes up a dispatch 
of Governor Curtin's to a third party : "I would be glad 
to have you specify what ' want of support from Wash- 
ington has retarded your efforts,' in order that it may 
be corrected. It has been the desire of the department 
to act harmoniously with the state executives." 2 

At the same time, he grants the immediate want, the 
detail of one Captain Dodge. The same day the re- 
sponsive Curtin wires, " Your dispatch relieves me. 
. . . Rest assured that there is no want of harmony in 
our intercourse. I only wish authority and assistance, 
and Pennsylvania shall far exceed all the previous 
efforts to crush the rebellion." 

The secretary's personality was one of the most 
powerful and interesting developed during the war. 
McClellan and his friends misunderstood him, and 
slighted his efforts to sustain operations, suffering ac- 
cordingly. The President as Commander-in-Chief was 
forced to interfere with inadequate generals, and Stan- 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 74. 2 Ibid., pp. 79, 80. 



STATE SUPPORT 171 

ton sometimes clashed with the Commander-in-Chief. 
He was without tact, and accordingly made things as 
hard as possible for every one. But his energy was 
unbounded ; and it was inspired by a patriotism never 
surpassed in the history of our country or any other. 

Governor Morton saw the great mistake made in 
stopping recruiting at this time in Indiana and pro- 
tested against it. He was very anxious about Kentucky 
in June, and was reinforced by Robert Dale Owen 1 
in his applications for arms which might be used in 
Kentucky. Governors Morgan 2 and Sprague had re- 
ceived commissions from the national government, and 
Morton desired a military command. 3 

After McClellan's " change of base " to the James 
River, the administration changed tone and purpose 
again, in respect of recruiting in the States. July 1, 
Secretary Seward 4 arranged with the Union Defense 
Committee in New York, and in consequence the loyal 
governors addressed a letter to the President advising 
a call for 300,000 or more troops. Mr. Lincoln con- 
curred in the " views expressed to me in so patriotic a 
manner " and issued the call. 

The Sanitary Commission, — that novel instrument 
acting between the throbbing heart of the many, the 
enlightened knowledge of a few, and the practiced 
routine of the executive, — that remarkable American 
organization, had been at work for fifteen months. July 
21, on the occasion of these movements for recruiting 
the army, it attempted to bring the fruits of its obser- 
vation and critical experience to bear on the action of 

1 O.R., Series III, vol. ii, 109, 110. 2 Ibid., vol. i, 547. 

3 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 180. 4 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 187. 



172 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

the administration. The studies pursued by this in- 
telligent and far-sighted body of experts were about 
the first regular effort to investigate the science of war 
other than as an art for manoeuvring troops against 
an enemy. How to get the men there, how to care for 
and keep them efficient, had received little attention, 
even from the masters like Frederick and Napoleon. In 
view of 300,000 more " raw recruits," the Commission 
addressed an elaborate and grave letter 1 of advice to 
the President. The " careless and superficial medical 
inspection " had made at least one quarter of the pre- 
vious volunteers worse than useless ; for the weak 
portion had filled the hospitals and disheartened the 
country. Some regiments left ten per cent in hospital 
before reaching the seat of war. " No national crisis 
can excuse the recruiting of such material." The Com- 
mission respectfully submitted that no new recruits 
should be accepted until examined by regular and ex- 
perienced medical officers " entirely without personal 
interest in the filling up of any regiment." The " wan 
and wasted forms " carried North were teaching the 
people that our soldiers were " in far greater danger 
from disease than from the violence of their enemies." 
Sanitary practices had been constantly urged and the 
life of the camps greatly improved. The Commission 
begged that the new men be sent forward not by regi- 
ments, but as fast as they -were collected and "digested 
into the body of the army, without sensibly diluting 
its discipline." It claimed that it suggested the plan 
on purely sanitary grounds, but it could be shown 
that " military and political wisdom are in exact har- 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 235. 



STATE SUPPORT 173 

mony with sanitary requirements." August 5, when 
the draft was impending, the Commission referred to 
the above letter and addressed another, 1 even more 
pregnant in weighty suggestions. It asked that the 
militia be thoroughly organized under the inspection of 
federal officers, medical and military, and that the States 
should maintain in camps of instruction " a constant 
force of at least a million." " In the theory of our 
government every citizen is a soldier at the command 
of the President." They recite sanitary principles and 
affirm that nothing projected for the new recruiting 
will reach the soldier's difficulties and " restore the 
needed confidence." The actual and the largest trouble 
had been that our unseasoned men, worn by disease 
and battle, had been further depressed by necessary 
guard and fatigue duty, until their nervous exhaustion 
had extended to their friends at home and the whole 
country. The remedy must be large and deep going. 

In the beginning of the war many hundred thousand men, 
not then able or disposed to volunteer at once, formed them- 
selves into squads for military drill, thus recognizing the 
necessity for large reserves to be put in training. Govern- 
ment, however, did not avail itself in any manner of the 
great strength and security offered in this disposition of the 
people. . . . The disposition, however, still exists. 2 

. . . Suppose that a million men had thus been in a great 
measure detached in advance from their ordinary business 
entanglements and obligations, and each man accustomed, 
under training however imperfect, to act with others. When 
the sudden and urgent call for 300,000 volunteers was made 
a month ago, is it likely there would have been a month's 
delay in meeting it ? . . . The number we have named as 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, p. 297. 2 Ibid., p. 299. 



174 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

proper to be kept in reserve will not be thought excessive 
when it is considered that, according to experience thus far 
in the war, 123,000 men must be annually recruited to main- 
tain a force of 500,000 in the field in full strength. 

And H. W. Bellows, W. H. Van Buren, C. R. Agnew, 
Wolcott Gibbs, George F. Strong, Frederick Law Olm- 
sted, conclude in these words : " We finally beg to 
observe that the effective military force which a nation 
is able to sustain in the field, not that which it can raise 
under the spasmodic excitement of emergencies, is the 
measure of the respect and consideration it is likely to 
receive abroad as well as at home." 1 

It would be interesting to follow in further detail the 
operations of this great social and beneficent institution, 
did our limits and the larger functions of our work allow 
it. Figures can only show the bare facts involved. There 
was contributed to the work as reported May 1, 1866, 
$4,962,014.26. 2 The value of supplies in addition was 
estimated at fifteen millions of dollars. The attitude of 
the War Department was never avowedly hostile ; it 
was rather negligent and indifferent. The Commission 
necessarily irritated certain high officials, but that irri- 
tation was a healthy stimulant. 3 " Nothing can be 
clearer than that the great reforms in the Medical Ser- 
vice of the Army would never have originated in official 
quarters." It afforded the greatest opportunity then 
known for woman to bring her great moral influence 
to bear directly on the issues of modern life. War can 
never be the field for love ; but the inevitable horrors 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 300. 

2 Hist. U. S. Sanitary Commission, p. 488. 
s Ibid., pp. 510, 513, 514. 



STATE SUPPORT 175 

of war may be somewhat mitigated by the mission and 
ministrations of woman. 

The present writer has referred to his own experi- 
ence in the field, especially in the sickening winter of 
McClellan's preparation and inaction ; then in the 
weary, nugatory campaign on the Peninsula, including 
the vaulting over White Oak Bottom to the James River. 
Forty-three years of varied experience have not changed 
the impression derived from the plain facts so graphically 
set forth in these old records. The vivid sayings of the 
Commission prove that the main difficulties of the situ- 
ation were comprehended by a few men then, just as 
clearly as they are perceived now, after the generations 
responsible for these awful lapses in government rest in 
death. The capital could not comprehend the people. 
Lincoln with all his political acumen seemed to falter 
when these great exigencies, these critical occasions, 
called for his executive action — for the exercise of his 
kingly prerogative. As we shall see, one or two years 
later 1 friends and foes in the parties called him tyrant 
and military despot when he had put forth the executive 
arm in the necessary work of freeing the slaves. At 
the moment we are considering, the Emancipation Pro- 
clamation was incubating in his portfolio, was gathering 
vital force in the minds of the cabinet for its final 
exposition. But the main perception, the leadership of 
the whole people, the incisive courage which would have 
prostrated the Seymours, Hendrickses, and their kind, 
under the tramp of the regularly drilled legions of the 
North, — this initiative was lacking in the politicians 
who were trimming ship at Washington. 

1 Infra, p. 233. 



176 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Andrew and Curtin, the steady Morgan and the 
invincible Morton, with their fellows, labored at their 
posts, while their vigorous counsel to the administration 
passed unheeded and was ineffective. The great social 
as well as political forces, indicated rather than described 
in this chapter, — family, church, and local State, — the 
enlightened benevolence and energy embodied in the 
Sanitary Commission, and the like, — all these corporate 
forces and institutions kept steadily at work, and at last 
they prevailed. What a saving of blood and treasure, 
of agony and endurance in these struggling peoples, 
both North and South, would have been made if the 
resources of the Northern States as States could have 
been a little better applied in the years 1861 and 1862 ! 



CHAPTER V 

FEDERAL AND STATE INTEREFERNCE 

IT was inevitable in the whirlwind of secession that 
the great States directed by the governors — who 
became inversely satraps of the people — should clash 
and conflict more or less with the national authority 
concentrated in Washington. This central administra- 
tion was conducting a nation, not yet developed in its 
governmental functions, through the operations of a 
great war, occasioned by the threatened disruption of 
the central government itself. New methods were to be 
forged out which must be sustained and concurred in 
by the people, until through their representatives in 
Congress they could place the executive on a firm legis- 
lative basis. Meanwhile some conflicts between the ex- 
ecutive of the whole and the various executives of the 
parts are exceedingly interesting. There are so many 
possible scions of governmental stock springing from 
an Anglo-Saxon community, developed by American 
life, that these features of the contest, especially in the 
first years, are worthy of attention. Independent state 
action by the record begins early ; and there was much 
accomplished in this direction which never could be 
set down formally. In the instance we shall cite, the 
interference was of the most wholesome kind. 

Governor Yates of Illinois reported to the War De- 
partment 1 that arrangements had been made at Cincin- 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 113. 



178 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

nati and in Indiana to stop supplying provisions and 
articles of commerce to the South. The commerce of 
the river passing Cairo was even more important, and 
there being as yet no United States muster of the Illi- 
nois troops, the governor was obliged to direct his own 
officer " to seize munitions of war passing that point," 
though he did not assume the responsibility of stopping 
commercial intercourse. 

President Lincoln declared commercial intercourse 
with the Confederacy unlawful under the authority of 
Congress, and the merchandise subject to confiscation ; 
but there was considerable smuggling: throughout the 
war, 1 and the commanding generals on both sides some- 
times blinked at it for various reasons. 

May 4, Morton, in a vigorous letter to the President," 
opened a new issue in this direction, which might have 
induced large consequences for good or ill if the ad- 
ministration had ventured so far in a stringent policy 
against the doubtful States. The suggestion would have 

1 Cf. Rhodes, vol. iii, 546-552, for the internal condition of the Con- 
federacy caused by the general suspension of commerce. 

2 " Many of the citizens of Indiana have large supplies of provisions, 
hay, etc., which they desire to sell and ship to the South, and many of 
them are now carrying on a brisk trade with Kentucky, from whence 
these articles are sent South. The mass of our people are greatly opposed 
to this trade, and in many instances have interfered and prevented it, 
partly by force. It is possible, may be probable, that Kentucky will main- 
tain substantially a neutral position, which is the most that their so-called 
Union men pretend to hope for. For all purposes of trade, that is as fatal 
to us as though we were at war with them, more especially as the sym- 
pathies of Kentucky are all with the South. While I am very anxious 
not to unnecessarily multiply our enemies, will it not be well to cut off 
all trade with the States which refuse to fill your call for volunteers ? 
The true Union men of those States will not object, I am sure, and the 
traitors cannot. I desire your attention to this matter that you may cause 
such advice and instructions." — 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 158. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 179 

cut off all trade with the States refusing their quotas of 
volunteers. Probably the particular action suggested 
and its general influence on the whole policy of the 
administration were alike distasteful to the President at 
this time. His mind did not run in that direction, and 
his executive ideas did not naturally force any one to 
the ringbolt. Whether the more forcible policy agree- 
able to the Mortons and Stevenses would have been 
more successful at this stage of the revolt is mere specu- 
lation. 

I dilate on this theme, partly to indicate the line of 
separation in my criticism between the things that might 
have been done and the things which should have been 
done. Matters of administration, and those of great 
governmental policy, which would change the whole 
direction of the nation, are for distinct an'd separate 
treatment, as I regard them. The widening of the gulf, 
as by compulsion of the border States, or by emancipa- 
tion, are topics differing in kind and absolutely from 
the conduct of campaigns, or the greater conduct which 
marshaled, or ought to have marshaled, the enormous 
resources of the North to immediate victory. 

Among the powerful social agencies I have treated 
elsewhere, which directly supported the cause of the 
Union, none was more influential and effective than the 
Union Defense Committee of the city of New York. It 
furnished a nucleus for local patriotism and a ready 
pivot for national action, before the work of the depart- 
ments and the State could be arranged and adjusted. 
When the bankers promptly loaned to the United States, 
and the Treasury immediately placed two millions at the 
disposal of the committee, the city was taking money 



180 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

from one friendly pocket and putting it into the other. 
Forces so productive of governmental energy could not 
operate for long without conflicting with the regular 
and established functions of the body politic, whether 
at Washington or at Albany. 

Accordingly conflict soon began. April 22, Major- 
General Wool, commanding the Department of the East, 
after consulting the governor, had been to New York 
and had lent himself to the plan of the committee " to 
save the capital." May 9, 1 he reported to the War De- 
partment all his operations, as they had been miscon- 
ceived and censured, clearing himself from misfeasance. 
" It is due to myself to say that I made no contract of 
any kind whatever for the committee or in behalf of the 
government." 

Mr. Bryce said that it was not necessary to discuss 
any of our systems of administration on their own merits, 
for the Americans had such facility they could succeed 
with the worst method. The above is a fair illustration. 
Here were at least three great powers working on the 
same problem, drawing succor from the same sources, 
and in competition more or less with each other. The 
War Department was over all ; the State of New York 
possessed the men needed for the occasion. Major- 
General Wool, detailed from the War Department, virtu- 
ally represented the national administration and half 
clothed the Union Defense Committee with authority to 
work outside and even beyond the legitimate preroga- 
tive of the State of New York. 

May 15, the trouble culminated, for Secretary Cam- 
eron wired Governor Morgan that there is "misunder- 

i 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 79. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 181 

standing" and he could accept only twenty-eight regi- 
ments instead of thirty-eight. In reply Governor Mor- 
gan ably stated the position of the State as a power, 
which is invincible. The legislature had authorized the 
enlistment and equipment of the thirty-eight regiments, 
and the governor had obtained actual acceptance of 
them from the War Department through the attorney- 
general of the State. The present ruling of the depart- 
ment would oblige the State to lose the expense of 
equipping ten regiments or break its faith in contracts, 
but the State did not propose to acquiesce in the beat- 
ing administered to it, and now the inward and moving 
impulses came to the surface. 1 

I beg further to suggest that although the voluntary ex- 
ertions of unofficial persons and bodies may evince commend- 
able patriotism, yet their intervention between constituted 
authorities leads to irregularity, uncertainty, and inextricable 
confusion. The interference of private and unofficial persons, 
claiming to act under some kind of order from the General 
Government, with the movement of troops of this State has 
already been productive of mischief, and the offer by like per- 
sons of troops from this State to the General Government has, 
I presume, been the source of misunderstanding. This State 
will insist upon the regiments raised by its legally constituted 
authorities being received by the General Government, without 
regard to any you may receive tendered by individuals claim- 
ing to come from this State, some of whose offers are reported 
to have been accepted by the United States. 

He sent his Judge-Advocate-General, Anthon, May 17, 2 
to the War Department and to General Scott to adjust 
the matter. 

Now appeared the representative of another element 

i 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 204-206. 2 Ibid., p. 211. 



182 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

in the people, neither military nor legitimately civic in 
character ; and this element in other places and in vari- 
ous forms will bring much interest to this division of 
our studies. In the new order being established, a por- 
tion of society was thrown out of its old political rela- 
tions and found it difficult to catch the new movement, 
whether directed from Washington or controlled by the 
Republican officials of the States, more or less partisan 
in their inclinations. There was an immense force in 
the process of volunteer-enlistment which was Demo- 
cratic and " worldly," as distinguished from the Puri- 
tanic idea of righteousness that had entered so largely 
into the Anti-slavery and Republican agitation. Where 
there was sufficient tact in the Republican officials this 
element was duly welcomed and utilized, but it was not 
always so. 

Daniel E. Sickles was a type of these patriots who 
had changed heart suddenly and properly, as the guns 
sounded in the attack on Sumter. His previous position 
had been well understood ; his open sympathy with the 
South had been only too apparent. 1 He was a brave 
soldier of fortune — in a good sense — and a man of 
great force of character and power of will who was to 
play a prominent part as general, even commanding our 
left wing at Gettysburg. He had represented the tur- 
bulent Democracy of New York city in Congress. The 
President — excellent in such manoeuvres — naturally 
opened himself to a citizen so potent and representing 

1 December 10, 1860, he said on the floor of Congress: " Iu the event 
of secession in the South, New York city would free herself from the 
hated Republican government of New York, and throw open her ports to 
free commerce." — Cited, Burgess, Civil War and the Constitution, vol. i, 
147. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 183 

political forces that had not acted hitherto with the 
neighboring Republican officials. May 18, 1 Secretary 
Cameron, by direction of the President, wired both Gov- 
ernor Morgan and Chairman Hamilton Fish of the Union 
Defense Committee that General Sickles's brigade of 
five regiments would be accepted and included in the 
fourteen regiments coming from the committee. On 
the same day Simeon Draper wired 2 for the committee 
that there is no such brigade known as that of "Mr. 
Sickles. Probably the action of the department is based 
upon some future organization of a brigade." May 21, 
Sickles wired : " All right with U. D. Committee and 
Governor." 3 May 22, Acting Brigadier-General Sickles 
wired General Scott: "My brigade awaits his orders." 4 
The politician-general evidently confided, with Mr. Mi- 
cawber, in things " to turn up," for on the 26th Colonel 
Franklin, representing the War Department in New 
York, thought the few men gathered ought to be dis- 
banded. "He [Sickles] requires two or three days' 
notice to bring his men together. I have no idea he 
can raise them." 5 June 27, Secretary Cameron wired 
curtly, "If the five regiments [of Sickles] are not ready 
within three days they cannot be received." 6 But the 
irrepressible " Mr. Sickles " could stretch three days 
into a month, and probably Bull Run had extended the 
patience of the department. For July 23, 7 one regiment 
was off actually, with two more to follow next day. 

Returning to the larger difficulty between the State 
and the powerful association of the Union Defense 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 215. 2 Ibid. 

» Ibid., p. 223. 4 Ibid., p. 227. 5 Ibid., p. 236. 

« Ibid., p. 299. 7 Ibid., p. 344. 



184 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Committee, Colonel Franklin had been busy in nego- 
tiating an accommodation. May 27, by agreement, he 
had reduced by six the whole thirty-eight regiments 
proffered from the State, but reported, 1 " nevertheless, 
much confusion and clashing caused by the adverse 
opinions and interests of those engaged in raising and 
equipping these regiments." He thought the whole 
difficulty would have been avoided by the presence of 
a capable representative of high rank from the War 
Department, and he recommended Colonel (afterward 
General) Keyes, for future service in the post. In 
another dispatch of the same date " the difficulty be- 
tween the governor and the Defense Committee is 
only partially healed ; " 2 but on the 28th he reported, 
" Things are now harmonious between them." Such 
were some of the amenities of recruiting in a great 
war. 

A much more serious matter must now be enter- 
tained, for it affected the organization of the Union 
in its vital parts. It may be best to approach the main 
question in the order of events which led up to the 
difference, which might have been a conflict, between 
the powers of the general government and those of 
the States. May 21, 3 Governor Morgan wrote Secre- 
tary Cameron, reiterating that Major-Gen erals Dix and 
Wadsworth had been appointed to command the first 
seventeen regiments of volunteers called out for three 
years. He asked for authority to appoint two additional 
major-generals and four brigadiers. May 24, 4 Secretary 
Cameron replied : — 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 237. 2 Ibid., pp. 238, 241. 

3 Ibid., p. 223. 4 Ibid., p. 233. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 185 

This Department does not at this time desire the appoint- 
ment of additional major or brigadier generals by governors 
of States. I inclose a copy of Orders No. 15, by reference 
to which you will perceive that these officers are appointed by 
the President to command the second quota of your troops. 

None are so blind as those who will not see, for on 
the 28th the governor reiterated his appointment of 
Generals Dix and Wadsworth : — 

Of the character of these two gentlemen it is quite need- 
less for me to speak. They are too well known to you to 
require that. . . . For reasons which I trust are without foun- 
dation, Generals Dix and Wadsworth are somewhat appre- 
hensive that they may not be recognized at Washington. 
But believing as I do that they will render eminent service 
to the country, that their acceptance would be in strict con- 
formity with the requisition already referred to from your 
department, and in conformity with the expectations of the 
people of this State, who have furnished forty-six regiments 
to the war, beside eleven sent in April to defend Washington, 
I confidently expect a favorable acknowledgment. 1 

Secretary Cameron acknowledged, June 3, inclosing 
Order 15 again, and highly complimenting Messrs. 
Dix and Wadsw r orth. " Yet to have suspended the 
order in this case would have required the President to 
surrender the appointments to the state authorities in 
nearly or quite every other case." 2 

The personal difficulty was abrogated and recon- 
ciled afterward by the appointment of Messrs. Dix and 
Wadsworth to be major-generals. But the principle 
involved was too large to be yielded up by the admin- 
istration, and New York struggled hard before she 
gave up the control of her militia that it might be 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 241. 2 Ibid., p. 246. 



186 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

amalgamated with the volunteers in an army. 1 The 
variance between the military powers or organization 
of the State and of the national government now had 
to be adjusted and accommodated. May 25, Governor 
Morgan requested Lieutenant-Governor Campbell to visit 
Washington and lay the matter formally before the 
Secretary of War, bearing the claim of the Board of 
State Officers " to have the proportionate number of 
general officers appointed or elected by the state au- 
thorities of this State." 2 After due interviews, on the 
4th of June the lieutenant-governor addressed the sec- 
retary that the negotiations might be recorded. After 
reciting the circumstances, he stated : — 

You announced the irrevocable determination of the United 
States to appoint the general officers for the forces furnished 
by the government of New York, and to refuse to receive 
those forces in the event that such determination should not 
be acceded to. I deem it my duty respectfully but firmly to 
protest against this determination. It imposes on the Board 
of State Officers, unless they submit to it, the necessity of 
violating the laws and constitution of the State of New York, 
which have been framed in conformity to the Constitution of 
the United States. It destroys and dishonors the distinctive 
character of the militia of the States, which is adapted to the 
habits and endeared to the minds of the people. 3 

The New York militia law, submitted together with 
the Board's report and the protest, made all the officers 
elective : captains, subalterns, and non-commissioned by 
ballot of the privates ; field and general officers by bal- 

1 " The essential characteristics of an army, by which it is distinguished 
from other assemblages of armed men, are its national character — that 
is, its representing more or less the will and the power of the nation or 
its rulers, and its organization." — Encyc. Brit. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 235. 3 Ibid., p. 249. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 187 

lot of the commissioned officers. 1 This instance of " par- 
ticularism " was stoutly contested, and the case of New 
York was ably and amply argued by its officials. The 
Board set forth to Governor Morgan the " extraor- 
dinary collision between the general and state govern- 
ments," 2 stating that the President had called out the 
militia — 

under a specific grant of power in the Constitution . . . 
Congress shall have power to " provide for organizing, arm- 
ing, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part 
of them as may be employed in the service of the United 
States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment 
of the officers." . . . There was deep and prophetic jealousy 
of military power which was embodied in these provisions of 
the Constitution. The military arm was subjected to the para- 
mount direction of the national authority, but the right arm, 
whose million sinews are strung in the militia alone, was 
guarded by rooting it in the local pride and spirit and sub- 
ordinate sovereignty of the States. ... It will not do to 
say that the President has only taken the responsibility of a 
series of acts without authority of law, trusting for his justi- 
fication to the public exigencies and peril, and to the sanc- 
tion of Congress, by public law, when it shall assemble in 
July. 3 . . . We call on the Executive Council of this State 
to persevere in a firm and respectful maintenance of its right- 
ful authority over its militia, and on our members of Con- 
gress to unite in holding the national administration to a 
strict conformity in this regard to the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution. 

" Subordinate sovereignty " of the States sounds like 
special pleading ; and probably the law officers of the 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 251. 2 Ibid., pp. 252-254. 

3 By Acts July 22, 25, the President was authorized to call out vol- 
unteers and to appoint their general officers, with the consent of the 
Senate. 



188 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

United States properly distinguished between militia 
called out on an emergency and volunteers for three 
years, in a tremendous war involving the national exist- 
ence. But the state officials on the whole argued well for 
their conviction ; there being some ground for their 
technical case from the state-militia point of view. Yet 
it was an absurd proposition in essential government. A 
great army commanded by major-generals elected by bal- 
lots of soldiers or others would be an incomprehensible 
machine. The methods of military and political proced- 
ure differ absolutely. General Meade, when command- 
ing the Fifth Corps A. P., prohibited some gathering 
of privates initiated by circulars from home. Properly, 
he would have no " town meetings " in the field. 

New York was a great commonwealth, but not being 
large enough to discern this overwhelming principle of 
government*, she was deprived of her ideas of military 
organization as a curb gathering or town meeting would 
have been. I have criticised the President for many de- 
fects in administration, 1 and ought to emphasize this 
wise and energetic use of his reserved prerogatives on 
a very important occasion. It was in the ' littles mak- 
ing a mickle ' wherein he often erred. But practically, 
he never failed when the mickle reaching; downward to 
the people was presented to him in due proportion. 
Bear in mind that this vigorous procedure with a coop- 
erating yet subordinate state as large as a European 

1 Petty manoeuvres sometimes occupied the President too much. In 
the large features of executive action, where his prerogative would act 
effectively upon the people, he was a great ruler. In his free revelations 
to Svvett, he said, " I may not have made as good a President as some 
other men, but I believe I have kept these discordant elements together 
as well as any one could." — Herndon, Life of Lincoln, vol. iii, 533. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 189 

principality was early in the struggle. The substantial 
though informal powers of a dictator were not conferred 
upon him until through the Acts of Congress * in the 
following July and August. According to the constitu- 
tional lawyers of New York, he was using dictatorial 
powers in May, when they were disputing " subordinate 
sovereignty " with him. The inevitable pressure of the 
rebellion compelled an early use of dictatorial functions ; 
their wise use by the President was recognized immedi- 
ately by the people, and through Congress they granted 
him the largest power of the kingly function admis- 
sible under the forms of representative government. 
The incident adduced from the State of New York in 
itself justifies the selection of topics indicated in the title 
of this chapter ; for the wise and far-seeing action of 
President Lincoln in such matters kept the wheels 
of administration in motion, and finally established the 
full power of the Union. 

In the main matter of practical interference, between 
the Federal head, the chief of the Department of War, 
and the governors of the several States, there was no 
possible check so long as the nature of the men occu- 
pying the positions at Washington remained the same. 
For Governor Andrew read Governor Curtin's letter to 
the President exposing the interference of the War De- 
partment with regular state-recruiting. Massachusetts 
had suffered in the same way. Secretary Cameron assured 
Governor Andrew that the trouble should be stopped. 
Andrew congratulated Curtin that " this source of 
trouble is dried up at the fountain head." 2 

1 Burgess, The Constitution in the Civil War, vol. i, 230, 232. 

2 Schouler, Mass., p. 229. 



190 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

The following: events in Indiana involve considerable 
discord as well as interference in state government. 
May 21, 1861, Schuyler Colfax wired Secretary Cameron, 
" Shall be in Washington Thursday night with offer of 
our six regiments of three-months' soldiers for the whole 
war." * The six colonels wired directly to the President, 
who, in his indorsement, would be " greatly gratified " 
if the secretary would accept them. May 22, Governor 
Morton wired Hon. David Kilgore, " By an agreement 
gotten up with two or three colonels, Colfax has gone 
on to tender the six regiments of three-months' men for 
three years. This should only be done properly by the 
governor. The attempt is to supersede me with the men 
and the officers. He will be there to-morrow morning. 
Push the matter." 2 

May 23, Secretary Cameron wired Governor Morton 
that the three-years' quota was four regiments and no 
more. " You can select. The whole matter is in your 
hands." Considering the secretary's facile ways, we 
may suppose that he had exchanged winks with the 
President, and that the compliments went to Colfax, 
while the executive authority went to Morton. This was 
one of the President's " littles " which go to a mickle. 
Morton reinforced himself on the main question by get- 
ting the support of the governors of Ohio and Illinois 
with General McClellan, — then at Cincinnati, — who 
wired advising the acceptance of the six regiments, as 
they were " in fine condition." 4 The President directly 
ordered the acceptance of the regiments, June ll. 5 

» 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 219, 220. 

2 Ibid., p. 226. 3 Ibid., p. 229. 

4 Ibid., p. 232. s find., p. 263. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 191 

The facile ways combined of the President and secretary 
are revealed in a dispatch to Governor Morton, June 19, 
when additional regiments are accepted : " It is, how- 
ever, the desire of the President that these regiments 
Shall be made up and taken from the first, second, and 
third congressional districts of the State, and this order 
is given with that expectation." 1 

This dispatch, based on an order from the President 
to the secretary, June 17, 2 where he explains that the 
districts named include " my own old boyhood home," 
reveals much of the story we are studying and interpret- 
ing. 3 In those days, the executive of a great republic, 
in the midst of rebellion, should have had something 
more important to do than carefully patronizing con- 
gressional districts, in his boyhood home or anywhere 
else. 

We may well consider in this connection the serious 
controversy between Major-General B. F. Butler and 
Governor Andrew. The active " war governor " of 
Massachusetts always rode into the lists of controversy 
with his visor up. Careless of himself in every way, if 
he could strike for the right and the true, as he con- 

1 0. R., Series III, vol i, p. 279. 2 Ibid., p. 274. 

3 Morton to Cameron, June 22 : "I am embarrassed by the appoint- 
ment by the President of colonels for three regiments. It has a bad 
effect, and is regarded as the work of politicians at Washington and as 
an indignity to the executive of the State, who has all the responsibility 
of raising the regiments." — Ibid., p. 290. 

Again, July 25, Morton was obliged to wire Secretary Cameron, " I 
hope the War Department will accept of regiments only through me." — 
Ibid., p. 350. 

November 25, Curtin remonstrated to Cameron, " I was no little sur- 
prised when I heard of your verbal order changing my written order, 
and have no doubt you did it on impressions made on you by parties in 
interest." — Ibid., p. 647. 



192 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

ceived it, ardently and vehemently, he laid himself 
open to any covert attack and any captious misconcep- 
tion. While his eager and restless conscientiousness en- 
deared him to the inmost heart of the people, it severed 
him more or less from certain constant and constituent 
elements in the mass of the people, as this mass surged 
up to sustain and impel the state. The state is a body 
politic, both actual and moral ; its executive must bear 
all and forbear all. 

As the military historian of Massachusetts shows, 1 
Andrew was frank and candid to a fault. Concealing- 
nothing himself, he was impatient of reserve in others. 
Over-conscientious, he was thin-skinned and could not 
bear an adverse criticism, however unscrupulous its 
motive. 

Francis W. Bird, a capable man of affairs, member 
of the executive council, and close worker with Andrew, 
says that he was always his own master, and while yield- 
ing to men " superior to himself in practical capacity," 2 
in general policy he was original and was himself. Yet 
he was diffuse, and amplified much in both thought 
and word, wasting energy and the precious moments of 
that crucial time. His great power in impromptu speak- 
ing tempted, while it aided, him in an utterance too free 
for incisive or intense expression. Higginson says that 
he made the worst mistakes in the selection of officers, 
" these arising almost wholly from his virtues." 8 He 
could " not despise a man, poor, ignorant, or black," but 
sometimes forgot that this sublime sentiment was not 

1 Higginson, Massachusetts in the Army and Navy, p. 5. 

2 Browne, Sketch of Andrew, p. 78. 

3 Massachusetts in the Army and Navy. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 193 

transferable in the act of government to some applicant 
for office, and might put the wrong man into place. 

In amplifying the state and the circumstance of those 
trying occasions, it was inevitable that a man of exuber- 
ant nature should amplify himself officially. 1 One who 
knew him thoroughly said that while very democratic 
and absolutely sympathetic with the people, he enjoyed, 
not the conscious pomp, but the external parade incident 
to official life. When he sported the military cloak and 
white kid gloves' at a Berkshire review, he carried all 
official functions of the executive into the gratification 
of the moment. His wife — excellent partner of his 
constant toil — with true feminine instinct went even 
farther in appreciating official elevation. Although of 
redundant circulation, and conscious of the consequent 
debility that ended at last in death, he was cheerful 
from day to day. His humor and merry sense of fun 
made every opportunity more lively for himself and all 
around. 

In these minor details we must consider the times of 
the commonwealth. Charles Sumner was taboo in the 
higher circles of society in Boston. Early in his official 
career Governor Andrew with his wife was invited out, 
by some people of fashion, with the explanation, " For 
you know, you are about the only people who are will- 
ing to meet Mr. Sumner." These trifles throw light on 
the situation as it was when our unfortunate altercation 
occurred. 

Benjamin F. Butler was an extraordinary man, pos- 

1 Lee was appointed on the staff early in January, 1861. " If I, a 
radical, regarded Governor Andrew with distrust, what was the horror 
and indignation excited in the hearts of conservatives at his accession to 
office. — Morse, Henry Lee, p. 228. 



194 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

sessed of intelligence and acumen equal to any question 
that could be solved by that order of faculties. What- 
ever his knowledge of a matter, he could so marshal the 
information he had that he impressed himself upon the 
occasion. When examined for the bar his reading of 
text-books was inadequate and the judge doubted his 
admission, but discussed the grounds of a case he was 
then trying, and Butler's sagacity impressed him. Next 
day he said, " Mr. Clerk, Mr. Butler was examined by 
me for admission to the bar, and you can administer the 
oath and enter his name. It is due to him to say that 
the matter of my ruling came up in the course of his 
examination, and his suggestions led me to examine the 
matter further, and change my ruling." ! 

His audacity was never surpassed, but that faculty 
makes an uncertain foundation. Milton says : — 

" In a cloudy chair ascending rides 
Audacious, but that chair soon failing, meets 
A vast vacuitie." 

In certain rare contingencies audacity counts in a 
soldier, but it is not the equivalent of courage. His 
historian and panegyrist, Partem, 2 said, " Courage, will, 
firmness, nerve, - — call it what you will, — Gen. Butler 
has it." Was it so ? Courage is a moral energy which 
braves danger or endures evil with constancy. In the 
collision of those grinding forces that lifted Grant to 
higher effort, mere will collapses as the hollow bark 
crumbles in the shock of icebergs. And while courage 
is born in the deepest action of the intellect, it is not 
nourished by mere acumen or quickness of mind. A 
soldier should know men and things, but the arts of the 

i Butler's Book, vol. i, 77. 2 Butler at New Orleans, p. 627. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 195 

forum are nowhere more obtrusive than in the applica- 
tion of tactics or the higher combinations of strategy. 
Perhaps Butler's chief defect as a soldier was in the ex- 
cess of administrative faculties. Tremendous energy, 
capacious memory, meddlesome instinct invaded every 
department under him and emasculated the general who 
should have been above all while in all. 

A French poet says, " Audacity and contempt are 
treacherous guides." If Butler believed in himself, he 
certainly despised the convictions and motives of most 
honorable men. The philosophers say that moral evil 
originates in the will of man, who could not have been 
otherwise capable of moral good ; a power to do right 
being, of necessity, a power to do wrong. If the two- 
blade-of-grass altruist be a great benefactor, surely 
Butler promoted that good which proceeds from evil. 

After all, it is not easy to comprehend such a char- 
acter. When one has leveled the view to observe the 
course of such fertile intelligence and headlong ambi- 
tion, the conclusion is not absolute and the view is not 
clear ; a turn of the kaleidoscope reveals a man affec- 
tionate, gracious in intercourse, most loyal to his friends 
and to the common duties of life. Verily, the conditions 
surrounding all of us are more generous than any one 
of us, and humanity carries the individual to humane 
results, whatever be that individual's immediate notion. 

General Butler's military aspirations and their results 
are well known. A statement in Nicolay and Hay's Life 
of Lincoln * is significant : " His [Butler's] high admin- 
istrative abilities soon demonstrated their usefulness in 
his new field at Fortress Monroe, though one of his 

1 Vol. iv, 309. 



196 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

early military expeditions met a discouraging defeat." 
This conveys the truth by what it says, and even more 
by what it leaves unsaid. Perhaps his early victories in 
substituting aptness for knowledge — as in his admis- 
sion to the bar — had somewhat confused his estimate 
of the military art. He says of volunteers, " Of course 
we were not as good as regulars in the opinion of the 
United States officers ; that was impossible. Their mili- 
tary movements were mechanical ; ours were voluntary. 
We went through our drill because we loved it ; they 
went through theirs because they were made to do it." ' 
And he never forgot that he was for a few days en- 
camped at Concord in 1860, with six thousand men, " a 
larger body of troops than even General Scott had seen 
together." 2 He seemed to lose his robust sagacity in 
imagining that there was a peculiar essence in success- 
ful legal and political art which might move armies 
and win battles. On his way to relieve the agony of the 
nation in the isolation of the capital, he could play 
politics with a possible slave insurrection in Maryland, 
— an erratic plunge which stirred the moral sense of 
Massachusetts to its inmost depths. 

At Fortress Monroe he made perhaps the greatest 
hit of his remarkable career, in his epigram of " con- 
traband " applied to escaping slaves. 3 But a trained 
soldier was soon appointed to succeed him, and he went 
home recognized if not appreciated ; for he says with 
customary naivete, " I think I at last came to know 
what hero worship meant." 4 He was seeking oppor- 

1 Butler's Book, vol. i, 124. 2 Ibid., p. 127. 

3 Ibid., vol. ii, 263. Letter, M. R. Casey, March 9, 1891. 

4 Butler's Book, vol. i, 294. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 197 

tunity for his restless energies, and he found it, as he 
states, in the insufficient condition of the recruiting ser- 
vice. " Republican governors enlisted their Republican 
neighbors and associates, and then, to eke out their 
companies so that they could be put at the head of them, 
they recruited all the scallawags there were in the neigh- 
borhood." l 

This melancholy view of the early volunteers and the 
loyal governors does not correspond with the utterance 
of other distinguished Democrats. Benjamin F. Hallett 
made a patriotic speech at a flag-raising and indorsed 
it, May 1, 1861, to Governor Andrew, " With Mr. Hal- 
lett's respects for the great administrative talent you 
have shown in this terrible crisis to our country."' 

Major-General Butler impressed himself as usual upon 
the administration at Washington, and obtained from 
Secretary Cameron the following order, September 10, 
1861: "M. G. B. F. Butler is hereby authorized to 
raise, organize, arm, uniform, and equip a volunteer 
force for the war, in the New England States, not ex- 
ceeding six regiments." 3 

Complaints against direct recruiting by the War De- 
partment had been made previously in other States. The 
Massachusetts State agent at Washington, C. H. Dalton, 
had wired Governor Andrew, August 28, in the case of 
Wardwell, that he was " authorized to raise a regiment. 
Cameron orders him to report to you, obeying your 
instructions. Secretary promises no more such irregu- 
larities." 4 Governor Andrew had sent two officers to 
Washington to represent to the President the embar- 

i Butler's Book, vol. i, 295. 2 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 169, 43. 

^ 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 815. « Ibid., p. 812. 



198 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

rassment of these proceedings. Secretary Cameron ex- 
pressed, as reported, September 6, 1 his great obligations 
to Massachusetts and to the governor, "for the energy, 
economy, and honesty with which military affairs had 
been conducted." On the 5th, the President had con- 
curred in the promise that no more independent permis- 
sions for recruiting should be issued. He said : — 

Such independent permissions as had hitherto been issued 
had been extorted by the pressure of certain persons, who, if 
if they had been refused, would have accused the government 
of rejecting the services of so many thousands of imaginary 
men — a pressure, of the persistency of which no person not 
subjected to it could conceive. He said that perhaps he had 
been in error in granting such independent permissions at all, 
even under this pressure, but that certainly it had not been 
intended to do any person or any State a wrong. 2 

These affairs were especially complicated in Massa- 
chusetts at this moment by the engagements, both of 
the War Department 3 and of Governor Andrew, to fur- 
nish troops for the command of General T. W. Sherman, 
afterward transferred to General Burnside and con- 
ducted into North Carolina. Great pressure was applied 
from Washington to get off the regiments for Sherman. 
In course came this letter from Andrew to the Presi- 
dent, which is an evidence of those troublous times and 
embodies incidents of the kind that made them more 
troublous. Unlike most of the governor's communica- 
tions, it was brief, scrawled on the executive note paper, 
addressed only to " My Dear Sir." 4 It stated, " We are 
raising five new regiments, all of which I mean Sher- 

1 O. R. Series, III, vol. i, 813, 814. 2 Ibid., pp. 814. 

3 Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, pp. 254-260. 

4 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 143, 7. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 199 

man shall have, if you will get an order from the War 
Departments Returned, indorsed, " Respectfully sub- 
mitted to the War Department. A. Lincoln." " Sept. 
10, 1861. Let this be done. Simon Cameron, Secretary 
of War." "I send the order you desire. Wm. H. 
Seward." Here were three great departments of the 
government speeding work, which the government was 
embarrassing in other directions by interfering with 
recruiting and the movement of organized regiments. 

On September 16, the War Department issued Order 
No. 78, " All persons having received authority from 
the War Department to raise volunteer regiments, bat- 
teries, or companies in the loyal States are, with their 
commands, hereby placed under the orders of the gov- 
ernors of those States." 1 There was much telegraphing 
and complimenting from Secretary Cameron, and on the 
23d he wired Andrew, " Select the regiments yourself 
for Sherman and supply him first." 2 Andrew writes 
the secretary on the 24th, that he is much perplexed by 
"contradictory orders and assurances issuing from your 
department respecting the disposition of regiments now 
organizing in this State. . . . Notwithstanding (Order 
No. 78), Colonel Wilson (with the 22d Massachusetts) 
has to-day received orders from you to report to Gen- 
eral Butler." But General Butler, it is evident " to me, 
desires naturally to secure to his own command, accord- 
ing as best he may, all the force he can, even to the 
prejudice of what General Sherman has a positive right 
to expect from Massachusetts." 3 Secretary Cameron 
wrote fully on the 27th, 4 accepting Andrew's proposi- 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 817. 2 Ibid., p. 819. 

3 Ibid., p. 820. " Ibid., p. 821. 



200 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

tions, promising to carry them out and complimenting 
him highly. As General Schouler 1 says, " Explicit 
enough ; and yet the same system of cross purposes 
was kej3t up for some time at Washington to the insuf- 
ferable annoyance of the governor, complicating and 
retarding recruiting, and delaying the completion of 
the regiments." 

October 1, the War Department designated a sepa- 
rate military department of the six New England States, 
" Headquarters, Boston, Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler, U. S. 
Volunteer Service, while engaged in recruiting his divi- 
sion will command." 2 

General Butler had two important interviews with 
Governor Andrew. These closed their personal inter- 
course, and their import bears on all subsequent nego- 
tiation. The precise dates are not given, but they were 
previous to October 5. There was an amicable confer- 
ence concerning the assignment of Colonel Jones's and 
an Irish regiment. The general says : — 

" As soon as I got my camp established I called upon Gov- 
ernor Andrew again, and informed him that upon reflection 
I preferred not to have the second regiment made up of re- 
cruits as they would he recruited by the state officials ; that 
I preferred a regiment of Democrats, every officer to be a 
Democrat, and especially the colonel. . . . Jonas H. French 
will make as good an officer as any one I know." " Why," said 
the governor, "French helped break up a John Brown meet- 
ing." "Do you know anything against him?" "That is 
enough ; I do not want anybody to enter the war for the 
Union who holds such sentiments." 3 

Some consequences of these events will appear later on. 

1 Massachusetts in the Civil War, p. 259. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 822. 8 Butler's Book, vol. i, 307. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 201 

October 5, General Butler addressed a long letter to 
Andrew, " Commander-in-Chief," 2 reciting his position, 
to which he affirmed, "your assent was given." Com- 
plained that " the recruiting officers have been making 
publications injurious to me and the recruiting service, 
so that it becomes necessary to know what exactly is 
understood between us." Asked for a general order 
confirming his (Butler's) authority. Concluding : — 

I trust these suggestions and this course, which will allow 
those patriotic persons who have done me the honor to inform 
me of their desire to enlist in the service of their country, to 
serve under my command in preference to another, the oppor- 
tunity of so enlisting, while others of different preferences 
will have an opportunity to gratify their desires, and both 
classes will thus be brought at once into the field where they 
are so much needed. 

Aside from any differences incident to the peculiar 
conditions imposed from Washington, Andrew differed 
absolutely from Butler in his view of the state of the 
recruiting service. He thought it was being overdone, 
and according to the general instructions of the War 
Department he was still in control of recruiting. 

At 9.30 p. m., October 5, after the governor had 
spent the day in camp at Readville, he begins a letter 2 
of more than fifteen hundred words to General Butler 
in reply to that cited above : — 

I did not at any time say that while we were already rais- 
ing so many regiments in Massachusetts I could consent to an 
embarrassment of the service by additional competition for 
recruits. . . . Now, with the utmost respect for the Depart- 
ment of War, and for yourself personally, and with the most 
loyal sentiment of obedience, I mean to continue to do just 
1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 823. 2 Ibid., p. 825. 



202 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

what I have from the first persistently done, and that is, to 
hold with an iron hand and an unswerving purpose all the 
powers which, by the laws, pertain to me officially in my own 
grasp, yielding the most implicit obedience in all things to 
those having the right to direct me. . . . Nor is it permitted 
by law, to the President himself, even were he disposed, to 
interfere in the premises. ... I shall, therefore, do exactly 
by you as I haye done by General Sherman and General 
Burnside. . . . Nor can I permit, so far as it lies with me to 
decide, any officers of the United States to raise troops as 
Massachusetts volunteers within this Commonwealth except 
for recruitment of existing regiments, or subject to the condi- 
tions indicated. 

This correspondence did not change Butler's action, 
for he opened camps for independent recruiting at Pitts- 
field and Lowell. He asked for a personal interview on 
the 8th. 1 The governor, through Colonel Browne, re- 
plied, declining " for no reason whatsoever personal to 
yourself," but that he is engaged, " Therefore, unless 
the subject upon which an interview is desired is of 
such a character as to absolutely require immediate at- 
tention, he would prefer at this moment that it should 
be placed in writing, 2 especially in view of the fact 
that there appears by your letter of 5th instant to be a 
difference of memory respecting the oral conversa- 
tion referred to." 3 We must consider these statements 
concerning: recruiting: and the enlistment of " those 
patriotic persons desiring to serve under my [Butler's] 
command," concerning refusal to appoint a disturber of 
a John Brown meeting and differences of memory — 
all together. We must not forget that General Butler 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 829. 2 Italics are mine. 

3 O. K., Series III, vol. i, 830. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 203 

deliberately called Governor Andrew a " one-idea'd Abo- 
litionist." * 

The general nursed his grievances without replying 
directly to Andrew's broad statement, October 5, of 
his position until the 12th, when he broke out in an 
extraordinary communication of some eight hundred 
words. Both contestants might have learned of General 
Grant the art of expression in time of war. We can 
imagine the sharp-eyed attorney in the place of a general, 
buckling up his uniform and girding himself, to harass 
the patriotic and ardent, the confiding Andrew. 

This letter 2 begins, " Will ' His Excellency ' assign 
. . . the officers to be selected by General Butler, but 
commissioned by ' His Excellency,' with, of course, a 
veto power upon what may be deemed an improper 
selection ? As these officers are to go with General But- 
ler, would ' His Excellency '" — continuing until " His 
Excellency " is repeated fourteen times with similar em- 
phasis. The apologist, Parton, denies the general's re- 
sponsibility for the quotation marks over " His Excel- 
lency." He claims, on the authority of Colonel Strong, 3 
that a subordinate affixed these, thus transmuting the 
general's amiable purpose into " an intentional and 
elaborate affront." This conflicts with the general's 
own statement made December 28 : 4 "In the matter of 
address in quotation I but copied the address assumed 
by one of the numerous military secretaries. . . . After 
using it once in the letter alluded to, I carefully used 
the title of the constitution, and marked it in quotation 

1 Butler's Book, vol. i, 318. 2 0. R. t Series III, vol. i, 831. 

3 Parton, Butler in New Orleans, p. 184. 
* 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 853. 



204 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

to call attention to the difference." These explanations 
stand for what they are worth in considering the merits 
of this controversy. Such a letter should not have 
troubled any one outside the court of the Old Bailey, 
but it did trouble Andrew, and the trouble rankled. 
At this period, 1 the dispute seems to have carried the 
pettifogging spirit into the depths of bureaucracy. 

Attorney-General Foster declared that Butler's irreg- 
ular recruits could not receive " State-aid." December 
19 and 20, a sharp correspondence 2 issued between 
George C. Strong, chief of staff, and Governor Andrew. 
The former claimed General Butler to be " Your Excel- 
lency's coordinate ; " the governor replied, " With the 
single exception of the President of the United States, 
no officer or person, whether State or national, civil or 
military, . . . can be recognized as the ' coordinate ' of 
the Governor of the Commonwealth in official dignity or 
rank." In the same letter Andrew, through Secretary 
Browne, refers to Butler's communication of October 
12, as " a studious, indirect, insinuating, but not less 
significant, intentional act of impoliteness toward a 
magistrate whose only offense was fidelity to his duty." 

The heaviest club in the altercation, on the whole, 
was in Andrew's hand, and it worried his antagonist 
exceedingly. The governor alone could commission regi- 
mental officers, and he simply would not. In answer to 
the President's personal appeal toward the last, he stated 
his willingness to act, but claims " To that end Major- 
General Butler should be directed to report in accord- 
ance with the General Orders, No. 78, and otherwise to 

1 Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, pp. 266-270. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 847-849. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 205 

comply with the provisions of that order, which as yet 
he has entirely neglected and disobeyed." * 

As to methods of obtaining the best officers, whether 
Democratic or Republican, a diametrical difference of 
opinion prevailed between Governor Andrew and Gen- 
eral Butler. In submitting the whole correspondence to 
Senators Sumner and Wilson, the governor stated offi- 
cially, " The whole course of proceeding under Major- 
General Butler in this Commonwealth seems to have been 
designed and adapted simply to afford means to persons 
of bad character to make money unscrupulously, and to 
encourage men whose unfitness had excluded them from 
any appointment by me to the voluntary military ser- 
vice." 2 

General Schouler's 3 summary is : — 

General Butler continued independent recruiting until two 
regiments of infantry, three companies of cavalry, and a com- 
pany of light artillery were raised by him in Massachusetts, 
notwithstanding the law gave to the governor the exclusive 
right to organize regiments, and to commission the officers. 
The controversy lasted four months. . . . The troops were 
sent from the State without commissioned officers, without 
rolls being deposited in the Adjutant-General's office, and 
without the knowledge of the Executive. 

War consists in deeds, and this recruiting was a small 
result, regarded purely from General Butler's point of 
view. The governor expressed to Secretary Cameron 4 
the conditions forced upon him : " Why is power given 
to him [Butler] thus to interfere with me and distract 

1 Letter to President, 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 863. 

2 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 865. 

3 Massachusetts in the Civil War, p. 275. 
* O. R., Series III, vol. i, 828, 829. 



206 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

and confuse the system under which iny operations are 
conducted ? . . . I am more troubled by this disturbing 
interposition than I have been by all the toils and re- 
sponsibilities of the year." If the governor clung to his 
personal prerogatives somewhat tenaciously, it is to be 
feared that the noisy patriot, uniformed as a general, 
assimilated very readily the delights of " hero-worship," 1 
described in his memoir. 

On the 11th of January, 1862, A. Lincoln appealed 
to the governor in the following telegram, and shortly 
after the Department of New England was dissolved : " I 
will be greatly obliged if you will arrange somehow with 
General Butler to officer his two unofficered regiments." 2 
We can read between the lines that long-suffering en- 
durance that so endeared the President to our much 
enduring people. 

Governor Andrew arraigned the administration in 
positive terms for allowing General Butler to interfere 
with recruiting in the State of Massachusetts, and the 
allegation was never answered. January 11, 1862, in 
his letter to the President, he said : — 

Major-General Butler's proceedings in Massachusetts in 
respect to recruitment have been altogether lawless, in viola- 
tion, especially of General Orders No. 78, of the War De- 
partment, of the series of 1861, and have been conducted with 
both official and personal contempt toward the government of 
this Commonwealth. This has been permitted by the General 
Government, notwithstanding representations of the facts to 
the Adjutant-General of the Army and to the Secretary of 
War. 3 

1 Butler's Book, vol. i, 294. 2 q. R., Series III, vol. i, 862. 

3 Ibid., p. 862. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 207 

It is well to bring out and consider the larger ele- 
ments, whether of mind or character, in the historical 
personage. Those nearest John A. Andrew, in his try- 
ing experience, esteemed him highly. General Schouler 1 
says of him : " The greatest, the wisest, and noblest of 
Massachusetts governors, he possessed transcendent 
genius as an executive officer, when those qualities 
could best be exercised." 

It is more difficult to put Butler, the great advocate, 
the audacious attorney, into an epigram. He converted 
the fleeing person into contraband property with won- 
drous prescience, and thus helped to solve the most 
critical question of the war. He smote rebellious New 
Orleans with inflexible justice, and brought order out 
of chaos. His military career can be hardly separated 
from the whole patriotic effort of the Northern people, 
that bent every force to the greatest social and political 
problem of modern history. 

The noble Sixth Regiment of Massachusetts precipi- 
tated the North upon the South. The military heart of 
the nation — in awful suspense — did not begin to beat 
until great New York, magnificent Massachusetts, and 
little Rhode Island together marched up Pennsylvania 
Avenue. 

In that splendid column Brigadier-General Benjamin 
F. Butler, though not present, was not absent. His 
name and his services are an integral part of the Union 
of the States. 

This whole controversy, interesting in itself, is yet 
more important as bearing upon the whole conduct of 
the war. It shows the mistaken course of the adminis- 

1 Massachusetts in the Civil War, p. 670. 



208 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

tration in attempting to overdo the business of recruit- 
ing at times and by spasmodic efforts. The national 
authorities interfered with proper official methods in 
the States, generally making mischief thereby. Then 
they capriciously stopped the recruiting of volunteers 
on occasions when it should have proceeded continu- 
ously. 

"Bureau " has a meaning in our country, as including 
" certain subdivisions of some of the executive depart- 
ments," which differs from its meaning in Europe. In 
all these bureaucratic movements and divagations of man- 
agement, nothing is more curious than the action and 
influence of Mr. Seward. " Where the heart is right, 
there is true patriotism," said the philosopher ; and he 
was a patriot, but his heart was a factor which never 
neglected Mr. Seward. We must consider his constant 
attitude in the direction of affairs, if we would see within 
and get at the true nature of the various negotiations 
between the federal and state executives, in which he 
was concerned. In the significant declaration to his wife 
already noted, he chafes under the suspicions and inter- 
ference of those who would prevent his proposed ac- 
tions, and " see that I do not too much for my country, 
lest some advantage may revert indirectly to my own 
fame." 1 This was early in the rebellion ; a year later 
he is saying to his daughter that he is working hard at 
the War Department, and " to aggravate my cares, mis- 
chievous persons got in there and tried to sow the seeds 
of disunion between members of the cabinet and self, 
and I have had to meet and counteract their intrigues." 2 
The first instance was under Cameron, the second under 

1 Seward at Washington, 1846-61, p. 575. 2 Ibid., 1861-72, p. 98. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 209 

Stanton. The Secretary of State occupied a position, 
nominally the leading one, in an executive cabinet 
which knew no prime minister. The leader had the 
direction of foreign affairs, usually the most important 
business of the administration. Now, the War Depart- 
ment was surely the greatest post, followed closely by 
the Treasury. The nominal leader of the cabinet had 
long been the favorite, and finally was the disappointed 
candidate of the party behind the administration. Now 
he was under a chief inclined to over-management of 
executive affairs ; and he was mussing about the de- 
partments, negotiating with the state governments, try- 
ing to help matters, when his own transactions were not 
spoiled by the "intrigues" of others. 1 It was a delicate 
situation. 

September 25, 1861, 2 Governor Morgan writes to 
Hon. William H. Seward: "The great interest mani- 
fested by you in regard to our state quotas induces me 
to ask your attention to the following requests." The 
Secretary of War did not separate the honorable per- 
sonage from the Secretary of State and nominal leader 
of the cabinet. He replies tartly to the indirect com- 
munication : — 

Your letter of the 25th instant, addressed to the Secretary 
of State, was handed to me this morning. Allow me respect- 
fully to suggest that hereafter when your Excellency has 
business to transact, connected with this department, our 
intercourse will be much facilitated if you will address your 
communications directly to me. I am very desirous of meet- 

1 July 27, 1861, W. H. Seward was wiring John C. Frdmont, person- 
ally, " What disposition was made by you of the arms which you pur- 
chased in Europe ? " — 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 355. 

4 Ibid., p. 540. 



210 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

iug the wishes of the governor of the State of New York by 
every means in the power of the department. 1 

What could be more proper functionally ? The sin- 
cere arid straightforward Cameron — as a secretary and 
in his public capacity — abhorred the habits of petty 
intrigue and dissimulation. 

The candid governor of New York, who meant what 
he said, in personal or official correspondence, loses no 
time. 

In reference to my letter to Governor Seward [the honorable 
and the secretary now becomes governor], I beg to say that 
in communicating with him nothing was further from my 
thoughts than an interference with your prerogatives or a dis- 
regard of your just authority. His personal knowledge of 
affairs in this State and his lively interest in all that relates 
to it induced me in this, as on several previous occasions, to 
invite his solicitation in obtaining from the President or your- 
self such authority as seemed to me to be important in carrying 
out the purposes of the government. I fully appreciate the dif- 
ficulties experienced by the government in obtaining suitable 
arms. ... I do not desire, however, to put this in a form of 
complaint, but to urge it as a fact, and to ask that it have your 
favorable consideration when opportunity will permit. 2 

" Influence " was not easily strangled and destroyed. 
Governor Morgan was obliged to wire, October 2, 1861 : 
" It would appear that certain regiments of the State of 
New York expect to obtain their commissions direct 
from the United States. I sincerely trust this will not 
be the case. They can have their commissions from me, 
and have been so notified from time to time." 3 Secre- 
tary Cameron replied promptly that all New York com- 
missions would be referred properly to the governor. 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 544. 2 Ibid., p. 552. 3 Ibid., p. 557. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 211 

Authority was asked from the War Department to raise 
a brigade of Catholics in New York State. This was 
properly referred as under "the exclusive control of 
governors of States." It was probable, however, that 
such a brigade " could be kept together." ' 

The irregularities in mustering and accepting early 
regiments, especially in the Sickles brigade, 2 bred con- 
stant troubles for the state authorities. As late as March 
27, 1862, Governor Morgan, in a very interesting com- 
munication, 3 was obliged to remonstrate to Secretary 
Stanton that " certain regiments " from New York re- 
fused to acknowledge the authority of the governor in 
commissioning and filling vacancies. The matter was 
not confined to the Sickles contingent, and some regi- 
ments claimed militia instead of volunteer commissions. 
But in the Sickles brigade the "commissions for an 
entire regiment were destroyed and not allowed to 
reach" the appointees. The governor cites the authority 
of Congress. " If, then, through the efforts of designing 
officers, this authority is resisted, it is obvious that such 
officers will assume to exercise these functions them- 
selves, and be enabled to elevate improper persons to 
important and responsible positions." He alludes to the 
secretary's " prompt and gratifying " course in correct- 
ing irregularities, and looks forward to his concurrence. 

In the summer of 1862, after the battle of Shiloh 
and McClellan's engagements with Lee before Rich- 
mond, which resulted in changing his base to the James 
River, there was a serious crisis at Washington. The 
President met this with his usual calm judgment, and 

« O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 178. 

2 Cf. ante, p. 183. 3 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 953. 



212 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

called on Mr. Seward for help in the executive manage- 
ment. June 28, he addressed a formal letter to him, 
recounting the situation and closing in these words : — 

I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or until 
I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or 
the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the 
country for this new force were it not that I fear a general 
panic and stampede would follow, so hard is it to have a thing 
understood as it really is. 1 

It was just the occasion for the nimble man of Auburn, 
who wired for Governor Morgan and Thurlow Weed to 
meet him next day at the Astor House. On the 30th 
he sent to Secretary Stanton a sketch of a proposed 
memorial from the loyal governors, asking the privilege 
of furnishing more men ; likewise a form of proclama- 
tion from the President calling for 150,000 men, and 
" fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed 
to me in so patriotic a manner by the governors of the 

States of ." 2 Stanton wired that the President had 

gone " to the country very tired," but that he was send- 
ing the document to him. The President approved, 
suggesting 200,000 men, and the call was finally made 
for 300,000 men. July 1, Mr. Seward wired, " The gov- 
ernors respond, and the Union Committee approve 
earnestly and unanimously." 3 He went over to Boston, 
sending the earnest and " satisfactory response " of 
Governor Andrew. It was his intention to go to Cleve- 
land, but other affairs recalled him to Washington. 

Mr. Lincoln was never at fault in estimating the sen- 
timent of the people in mass ; nor did he err in the best 
ways of reaching it and developing it for national action. 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 180. 2 Ibid., p 182. 3 Ibid., p. 187. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 213 

In bringing the power of his office to bear on individual 
men, he was not always so happy. These negotiations 
through Mr. Seward were conducted very judiciously 
and were entirely wholesome in their effect. The delicate 
nature of such interference with proper departmental 
organization appears in a letter of the adjutant-general 
of Massachusetts to the Secretary of State, July 7 : * 
" We were honored with the visit from yourself and 
General Buckingham." Then desirable changes in re- 
cruiting are recited, to be communicated to tke general ; 
and concluding, " Only give me a little margin and 
keep us as much as possible under state authority." But 
Governor Andrew breaks out, July 26, to the War 
Department, with all his force and fervor,, bewailing the 
jar and creaking of national and state machinery. 

Doing our utmost recruiting the old regiments, but blocked 
constantly by circumlocution. I am powerless, but believed 
by everybody responsible. If I can appoint mustering officers, 
and can do all things needful and allowable under Army Reg- 
ulations to be done by any one, I will strike heavy and quick. 
Do give me plenary powers, and not leave me obliged to call 
on anybody, but enable me to appoint all needful officers for 
carrying on the recruitment. Men from Berkshire can't wait 
for officer in Boston, who assumes that he alone can muster 
for regiments already in service. 

(Also) "So prays Wm. Schouler, A. G." 2 
Secretary Stanton answers in another connection, 
August 28, for poor but very necessary red tape : — 

If all the States were like Massachusetts and all gov- 
ernors like hers, transportation and everything else might be 
left to state authorities. It must be done to all or none. 
Experience of last year produced too many frightful evils to 
1 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 209. 2 Ibid., p. 256. 



214 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

renew the experiment. If the disbursing officers in one State 
trouble you so much, I have eighteen times as much trouble. 
We must both, therefore, patiently endure what we cannot 
remedy. The rules will, however, be changed or modified as 
far as possible to cure the evils you suffer under. 1 

Neither of these stalwart patriots was a model of 
patience. Certainly, such endurance, tempered in the 
heat of those conflicts, is worthy of all praise from the 
generations to come. 

As finally completed in August, this was the last 
great movement for mustering volunteers. While troops 
were easily obtained for short terms on the emergency, 
the enlistments for three years dragged heavily. Many 
of the governors reported the difficulties 2 in responding 
to this call for troops, so carefully arranged and placed 
before the people. The voluntary efforts of States and 
individuals were soon to be replaced by the stern re- 
quisitions of a national draft. The experience of the 
Confederacy was not different. 

The vigorous governor of Indiana often made his 
impress on the War Department ; if not always reason- 
able and considerate, he was at least forcible. July 26, 
he addresses Assistant Secretary Watson : 3 — 

I am painfully surprised by the spirit of your two dis- 
patches received this morning. From the doubts and hesita- 
tion expressed by your inquiries I should infer that the 
requisitions made in behalf of the State are regarded in the 
light of favors, to be strictly scrutinized and granted, if at all, 
with hesitation. I cannot organize artillery companies with- 
out being able to assure them that they will get guns, nor can 
they drill without guns. 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 480. 2 Ibid., pp. 201-206. 

8 Ibid., pp. 253, 254. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 215 
The assistant secretary replies at length and tartly : — 

If you had not misapprehended the spirit of my dis- 
patches, you would have seen no reason for being surprised. 
. . . Indiana and every other State shall have her full dis- 
tributive share. Does this authorize your inference that the 
requisitions made in behalf of the State of Indiana are to be 
regarded in the light of favors, to be strictly scrutinized and 
granted, if at all, with hesitation? 

Governor Morton half recants : " The dispatch in 
regard to artillery was drawn by my secretary, and I do 
not know the precise words. We claim nothing for the 
cannon we let the government have. They were re- 
ferred to to show that none were left in the State." 
At the same time he shows his precarious position 
with the border counties of Kentucky leaning strongly 
toward secession. 

The painful pressure of events is revealed again, 
August 13, 1 in this agonized cry to Stanton : — 

Your dispatch of this date is received. I regret that sug- 
gestions respectfully made in relation to the wants and con- 
ditions of the public service in Indiana should be regarded in 
the light of complaints and dissatisfaction. I give you credit 
for doing what you can for the cause, and claim the same for 
myself in my limited position. If the government under- 
stands the condition of affairs in Indiana, of course informa- 
tion from me is not required. 

As we have seen in the case of New York, many in- 
teresting questions arose respecting the organization 
and first conduct of militia and volunteers, as the 
forces of the States were gradually brought under the 
control and management of the administration. In this 

i 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 376. 



216 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

direction Attorney - General Bates sent an elaborate 
opinion to the War Department, June 16, 1862. The 
governor of Kansas had innocently but illegally re- 
moved Colonel Weer from the command of a regfiment 
of volunteers, in order that it might be consolidated 
with another regiment. Secretary Stanton revoked the 
governor's order, and reinstated Colonel Weer. Attor- 
ney-General Bates confirmed the secretary's action and 
forcibly reviewed the whole question : — 

Giving to the constitutional reservations in favor of the 
States the most liberal construction which can be claimed for 
them, they confer no right on the state authorities to disturb 
the organization of militia or volunteer regiments in the 
national service, or to interfere in any way with the control 
which the President, under the national constitution and laws, 
shall exercise over them. 1 

He disposed of notions sometimes prevailing in those 
days, that any State or official of a State could bring 
the national government under a particular obligation ; 
patriotism was for the whole : — 

The governors of the loyal States have, both personally and 
officially, rendered most valuable and effective service to the 
national government. . . . But these labors are in aid of 
the government and with its approbation. They are per- 
formed not because it is a legal duty imposed by Congress, 
or, in many instances, even by their respective States, but 
under the impulse of a generous humanity and patriotism. 2 

These matters excited much interest in Massachu- 
setts, as is shown by the Executive Files. 3 Governor 
Andrew had managed with scrupulous care in his re- 
lations with the administration. In a case of charges 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 151. 2 Ibid., p. 151. 

3 Vol. 152, p. 48 ; vol. 144, p. 113. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 217 

preferred against Colonel Robert Williams and Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel H. B. Sargent, 1st Mass. Cavalry, his 
attorney-general, Dwight Foster, had reported, " Your 
Excellency has no jurisdiction." ! As early as July 27, 
1861, some seventy men of the Clinton company of the 
15th Mass. had claimed the right to " refuse to serve 
except under officers of their own election," 2 having 
complied with the conditions under which they took 
their oath. Andrew indorsed : " No person any author- 
ity to make any such promise, my behalf. Bound to 
add any refusal to do duty would subject the guilty to 
consequences from which I could not save them." Prac- 
tically, he intended to leave the company to its own 
officers, having no objection to them. 

This interaction of federal and state authority is 
interesting ground, and many incidents bear upon it. 
In disputing over the recruiting in Massachusetts, Gen- 
eral Butler, in reporting to the adjutant-general, tried 
to maintain that the United States should override the 
States absolutely. " Will you recruit your men under 
your own authority, or will you allow the authority to 
be wrested from you by the States ? " 3 Governor 
Andrew, December 20, 1861, brought forward the 
proper distinction between the military functions of the 
President and the civic function of any federal official 
in a State. 

In our federative system, of which system the President is 
the sole head, without any coordinate, and in which the States 
composing it are as essential to its constitutional life as are 
the people themselves, each respective governor being the 

1 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 15, November 22, 1861. 

2 Ibid., p. 11. 8 0. R., Series, III, vol. i, 655. 



218 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

official head of his own State, without any coordinate within 
his jurisdiction saving the President of the United States, 
who is the federal head and official superior of all magis- 
trates and officers. 1 

The President was the supreme military authority in 
a State ; but that authority could not be delegated to 
affect the people of that State. Soldiers were to be en- 
listed by the States and commanded by the President 
as commander-in-chief, or by his subordinate officers. 
But the people of a State were under the control of 
their own elected civic officials. 

When General Pope was defeated in August, some 
enthusiasm for recruiting was created anew, 2 and the 
old spirit was revived, especially in the Eastern States, 
to send forward men to fill the depleted armies. En- 
rollment for the draft had been ordered, but August 8 
Andrew addresses the President directly, begging with 
all his force to be encouraged in recruiting instead of 
being obliged to resort to the dreaded conscription. If 
he might have a call for nine months' militia, " We can 
answer the call in great part without draft by sending 
militia regiments already organized and being filled up 
and by recruiting others. The iron is hot ; strike quick. 
Drafting is mechanical. The impulse of patriotism is 
vital and dynamic." 3 

If the President could not accede to the general 
principle, he tried his best to forward matters in detail 
when Andrew could not get off his regiments, owing 
to the delay of disbursing officers. He wired, August 12 : 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. i, 847. 

2 Benjamin Harrison volunteered this summer. — Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 
184. 

3 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 327. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 219 

Please say to these gentlemen that if they do not work 
quickly I will make quick work with them. In the name of 
all that is reasonable, how long does it take to pay a couple 
of regiments ? We were never more in need of the arrival of 
regiments than now — even to-day. 1 

Andrew was not convinced on the main question, and 
wired Secretary Stanton, August 17 : — 

I wish I could see you, but can't leave. Pray don't think 
of actually drafting. We can raise troops faster than they 
can be provided for. Draft will disturb everything ; raise 
thousand questions ; will make a mere paper army, unorgan- 
ized, ineffectual, discontented, valueless — flocks of green 
men, green officers, conscripts. Call on me for militia quota 
by regiments ; give till October l. 2 

This dispatch reveals the man as clearly and forcibly 
as anything on record. He was heated to the fusing 
point, and everything not absolutely important was 
burned away. He had not even time or thought for his 
beloved rhetoric and amplifying words. If not so good 
an orator as Demosthenes, he was a better actor and 
agent of affairs. As Stanton declared in another con- 
nection, if all the governors and all the States had been 
like Massachusetts, drafts would not have been neces- 
sary. 

While it is easy to scan these particular movements 
for recruiting at this time, we cannot so readily com- 
prehend and explain the larger governmental forces at 
work beneath the surface, and which were gradually 
bringing the administration to a more commanding 
position in its conduct of the war and of the affairs of 
state. It was being forced irresistibly to put forth its 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 363. 2 Ibid., p. 401. 



220 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

whole power and to lay hold of every citizen of the 
loyal States capable of bearing arms. The President 
interested himself eagerly in this movement for filling 
the lists of volunteers. He sent a dispatch to all the 
loyal governors, calling for prompt and accurate infor- 
mation of the most minute character. " About what 
day the first new regiment can move from you, what 
the second, and so on." 1 He sent his secretary, Nicolay, 
to Indianapolis, where he conversed freely with Gov- 
ernor Morton and others connected with the state gov- 
ernment, July 29, 1862. Nicolay reported, " Recruiting 
for the new call is progressing quite satisfactorily." 2 
There were some difficulties of detail. The governor 
wired two days later that recruiting for old and new 
regiments at once clashed. " The two systems come 
in conflict and mutually defeat each other." 3 The War 
Department could only reply that any violent change 
" would be fatal." 

But the storm was gathering which was to nullify 
voluntary enlistment. Governor Wilson of Iowa re- 
ported : — 

Men in this and surrounding counties are daily in the habit 
of denouncing the government, the war, and all engaged in it, 
and are doing all they can to prevent enlistments. This should 
be stopped, so far as relates to enlistments, in some way. The 
government needs men, and that as soon as possible. But 
with an organized determination on the part of a very con- 
siderable number of men in each county, the work of enlist- 
ment must go on slowly. 4 

» 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 265. 2 Ibid., p. 283. 

3 Ibid., p. 287. And Governor Tod of Ohio said, p. 269, " Recruiting 
officers for the new regiments have their commissions to earn; those of 
the old have theirs in their pockets." 

* Ibid., p. 266. 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 221 

As above indicated, there were causes influencing the 
course of recruiting at this time larger than any indi- 
vidual could control or direct, even if that individual 
had been a Caesar or a Napoleon. In the early days of 
July, Governor Curtin had made certain suggestions to 
the President directly, concerning the recruiting for 
this call. Secretary Stanton answered, " It is designed 
to leave the matter as far as possible in the hands of the 
respective governors until the troops are mustered into 
service." 1 This is a fair record. Matters could not be 
more properly directed in an orderly round of govern- 
ment. But Governor Morgan answered the particular 
inquiries of the President, July 28 : — 

1 feel pretty well as to the motion of things in most parts 
of the State. I hope to commence sending you regiments in 
about two weeks. ... I am doing all in my power to forward 
enlistments in the old regiments ; but, as you are aware, 
recruiting for these since January has not been under the 
control of the governors of States. 2 It is not rapid. 3 

Morgan was not a difficult man or rigid official. 

i O.R., Series III, vol. ii, 205. 

2 Subsequent to this, August 24, 1862, Secretary Stanton requested 
John A. Stevens to act as a special commissioner of the War Department 
in filling the old regiments of New York. It was done formally, but it 
was a direct interference. 

" It is the desire of the department in this, as in all other cases, to act 
in concert with the state authorities, and it therefore requests that a 
conference with them be had by you, and report." — 0. R., Series III, 
vol. ii, 452. 

3 Ibid., p. 269. And Thurlow Weed wired the War Department, Au- 
gust 15: "Our people are responding to the call for troops with alacrity 
and enthusiasm. Governor Morgan can organize his whole quota of the 
call for 600,000 even earlier than you can have them by draft, if allowed 
to proceed as indicated in his dispatch of yesterday. The popular feeling 
is at high war heat. It has cost much to get this steam up. Pray do not 
require the governor to ' blow it off.' " — Ibid., p. 393. 



222 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Perhaps he was the best plain executive officer of the 
four we have been treating. He could not govern, in 
the sense that Morton and Andrew could forelay state 
action, or Curtin could carry a whole people through 
his innate energy. But no one better directed the 
legitimate forces of the State by official prerogative 
than did Morgan. He dealt wisely with the great influ- 
ence of Seward, with the power of the Union Defense 
Committee, which generally helped but sometimes em- 
harassed him, and brought out of it all the best results 
of straightforward executive action. His statement — 
not querulous but frank — reveals the difficult situation 
of the loyal governors at that moment. In fact, they 
had been greater as war ministers than as governors of 
their respective States. The tremendous interplay of 
federal and state power had precipitated on these 
heads of States such responsibility as no government 
had ever witnessed. These men were the direct expo- 
nents of the people in the early stages of the rebellion. 
They put into action and accomplished fact the popular 
desire, and registered the popular mandate. 

Now, the inevitable course of great governmental 
business was consolidating the power of the federal 
administration, and was endowing a ministry of its own. 
The war governors, important agents as they con- 
tinued to be in the conduct of these large affairs, were 
now ceasing to be the direct representative ministers 
of the people. Congress also was becoming a larger 
relative factor, as its legislative powers were needed in 
their own sphere, as well as to enlarge and enforce 
executive action. The first legislation of Congress in 
1861 had been a sanction rather than a mandate. The 



FEDERAL AND STATE INTERFERENCE 223 

desperate logic of events had dictated the slow course 
of law. But the proper scope of the legislative branch 
of the government reasserted itself, and moreover 
tended to absorb matters which were properly executive 
in function. Committees on conduct of the war were 
powerful, and the partisans of particular general officers 
were busy at the capitol. 

We are studying these events chiefly as they affect 
federal and state action, and there remains to be noted 
the greatest factor of all in developing our topic at 
this period. The personal character of the Secretary 
of War helped to mould events and to stimulate the 
present inevitable tendencies of administration. Where 
there was a truly great war minister, there could not be 
many war governors, as they entered into federal pro- 
cedure. The greater must include the less, and Edwin 
M. Stanton became a more inclusive and compelling 
force as armies increased and the war complicated itself. 
His personal characteristics * should be considered in 
interpreting these events. 

1 Cf. ante, p. 102. 



CHAPTER VI 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 



AN observer at any time since 1862 would hardly 
believe that the political parties of the United 
States were ever abrogated or fused into one. But 
the acute and experienced Seward said on the passage 
of the act, April 24, 1862, suppressing the African 
slave trade without a dissenting" voice in the Senate: 
" The Democrats have disappeared ! This is the greatest 
act of the administration." 1 Such calm prevailed on 
the political surface of the North at this period, one 
year of rebellion having elapsed and the policy of the 
administration, as described, not yet having been found 
wanting. How superficial was this appearance and the 
observation of the time is revealed in the report of 
Governor Morton of Indiana, June 25, 1862 : — 

There is a secret political organization in Indiana, esti- 
mated and claimed to be 10,000 strong, the leading objects of 
which are to embarrass all efforts to recruit men for the mili- 
tary service of the United States, to embitter public sentiment 
and manufacture public opinion against the levying and col- 
lection of taxes to defray the expenses of the present war, 
and generally to create distrust in and bad feeling toward 
the government and its recognized and legally constituted 
authorities. ... is in operation in every county in the State. 
Its members are bound by oaths, and their meetings are 
guarded by armed men. ... I deem it of vital importance 
1 Pierce, Sumner, vol. iv, 68. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 225 

that immediate, vigorous, ard effective steps be taken to break 
up these unlawful and dangerous combinations, and to correct 
the evils complained of. 1 

The campaigns of the administration during the 
summer failed, or were "drawn" in their effects on 
the war. They miscarried, not through defect of this 
or that general, or council of war, but through lack of 
that administrative strategy which brings a superior 
force against an enemy at every encounter. When a 
general made requisition upon Chatham for a regiment 
he sent two. The Emancipation Proclamation, that 
necessary and profoundly courageous act of Lincoln, 
for the moment had divided the North and further 
alienated the South. The stringent treatment of per- 
sons and limitation of liberty, considered necessary by 
Morton and others struggling with the immediate issues 
raised by disloyal citizens, — these methods administered 
by arrogant officials and urged by violent agitators like 
Thaddeus Stevens had alarmed a certain conservative 
though loyal element in the North. The customary and 
perhaps inevitable corruption in the departments con- 
ducting a great war was severely criticised by those who 
sought disloyal ends through apparently loyal means. 
Not one but all these causes combined to convert inertia 
into action, and to rear a great party of opposition to 
the administration as it was conducting the war for 
the Union. Its most seductive outcry was formulated 
by Horatio Seymour : 2 " The Constitution as it is, the 
Union as it was." 

The administration was severely condemned at the 

« O. R., Series, III, vol. ii, 176. 

2 Cf . Message, January 7, 1863, p. 32. 



226 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

fall elections in 1862. New Ycrk, New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, all Lincoln 
States in 1860, — excepting New Jersey by a small ma- 
jority, — declared against the party in power. The 
Democrats gained largely in the House of Representa- 
tives, and would have controlled it had not New Eng- 
land, Michigan, Iowa, California, and the border slave 
States supported the administration. This revival of 
the Democracy suggests many interesting questions. 

The citizen — the political individual — does not 
choose deliberately and act for himself in most contin- 
gencies of government. He is obliged to fall into some 
of the great categories of representation, under any 
form of government ; to follow, where he would lead, if 
it were possible to bring his active intelligence to bear 
directly on the problems of state. He cannot be his 
own leader, he must be the inevitable victim of success. 1 

New shibboleths directed along the old lines of party 
zeal 2 renewed the allegiance of Democrats, whether loyal 
or disloyal, or even treasonable according to Morton. 
The fierce spirit of the time designated these modified 
Democrats, especially in the West, to be " Copperheads," 
as first described October 1, 1862. 3 The term, a "syno- 
nym of hidden danger and secret hostility," embodied 
both hatred and the suffering of loyal citizens. 

Under the widening modern suffrage, sovereignty had 

1 Emerson says : " They follow success and not skill. Therefore as soon 
as the success stops and the admirable man blunders, they quit him . . . 
and they transfer the repute of judgment to the next prosperous person 
who has not yet blundered." 

2 Cf. ante, p. 9, and Ostrogorski, Democracy and Political Parties, vol. 
ii, 607. 

3 Rhodes, U. S., vol. iv, 224 n. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 227 

become latent in every individual voter ; but he could 
not go alone and act independently, in any new and 
large development of the state. Like a homesick child, 
he fell into the old party grooves, wherever they might 
be tending ; even if toward the destruction of the state 
itself. The mind of the recalcitrant voter of 1862 did 
not carry so far. He was mystified and perplexed by 
the enlarged scope of the citizen, and the multiplied 
duties forced upon him. According to their own avowal, 
the single issue of rebellion appeared to Seymour in the 
East, to Vallandigham and Hendricks in the West, to 
be as malignant as ever. But they forgot that rebellion 
hews its own way and makes its own illegitimate paths. 
The administration had been at fault in not extending 
itself to grapple with the rebellion. But any possible 
administration would have injured the Copperhead, 
waiting to strike at the necessary prosecutor of the 
rebellion as it was. Yet we must keep in mind tbat 
the recalcitrant voter of 1862, as we have termed him, 
was not a conscious traitor. The plain duty of the 
citizen, the spirit of the people — as embodied in the 
career of Abraham Lincoln — was a conception too 
elevated and ethereal for the average follower of a party. 
He lent a willing ear to the Copperhead, and through an 
error of belief he betrayed the cause in actual practice. 
The great States of New York and Pennsylvania, as 
well as the Middle West, had felt the swaying under- 
currents of these hostile forces during this summer. 
The popular mind was moving, influenced by the vari- 
ous motives we have stated, toward the great revival 
of party action, which was to give the Democracy a 
new political foothold in the autumnal elections. Con- 



228 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

tingent to this fermenting agitation, the loyal gov- 
ernors originated a new method of rallying public 
sentiment, through a " conference " held at Altoona, 
Pa., September 24. A close observer and actor in 
many important events of this period, John Russell 
Young, considered this " conference, next to the Procla- 
mation of Emancipation, the most decisive civil event 
of the war. It roused the latent fires of the Union." 1 
This is strictly true, though the larger issue eclipsed 
the smaller one so completely that the momentous 
bearing of the action of the governors cannot be fully 
recognized in the fading light of history. We must 
not be hypercritical in construing the action of such 
patriots as Curtin, Andrew, and Morton, who felt the 
pressure of the discordant elements beneath, and acted 
accordingly. Perhaps the conference was the best po- 
litical means attainable for carrying the loyal state 
organizations through the powerful undercurrents of 
this trying navigation ; nevertheless, it was a dangerous 
undertaking in the development of state government 
within the obligations of the Union. The movement 
was constantly denounced by the opposition, and was 
used in New York especially to carry the people and 
thereby the State into opposition to the Union as a 
whole, and to the true administration of the Union by 
its properly constituted authorities. The story of these 
transactions embodies the title of this chapter and shows 
that the marvelous awakening of 1861 had lapsed into 
a political semi-consciousness of the people, wher^e their 
" altered hearts were estranged." 

Governor Morgan could say in his official report to 

1 Egle, Life of Curtin, p. 329. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 229 

the Empire State, January 7, 1862, 1 " from her im- 
perial resources vast supplies have been drawn for the 
war." One year later the governor of the same State, 
Horatio Seymour, said : 2 " While the War Department 
sets aside the authority of the Judiciary and overrides 
the laws of the States, the governors of States meet to 
shape the policy of the general government." The 
people are the only censors of their governors, said 
Jefferson ; and herein the duly elected governor of the 
largest State in the Union censured the action of the 
partial representatives of the people who had assembled 
at Altoona. 

Governor Curtin first suggested this meeting. The 
first step recorded 3 was in a consultation with Secretary 
Seward at New York. Mr. Seward " brightened at the 
thought," and telegraphed to Lincoln, who approved 
the project. Governor E. D. Morgan, representing New 
York State, declined to act in the matter. According 
to John Russell Young, 4 the warm-hearted son of Penn- 
sylvania " saw that what the government needed even 
more than material aid was the moral reinforcement 
that would come from an expression of confidence on 
the part of the governors of the loyal States." 5 

John A. Andrew was in one of those sulky moods 
when his ebullient patriotism could not comprehend 
the whole governmental problem as President Lincoln 
held it in his larger grasp. He wrote Gurowski on the 
receipt of Curtin's proposal, September 6 : " I am sadly 

1 Message, p. 2. 2 Message, p. 20. 

8 Egle, Life of Curtin, pp. 308, 309. 4 Ibid., p. 306. 

5 The delicate nature of the proceedings may be inferred from the 
fact that no formal record was kept. There was no formal organization 
and no secretary. — Ibid., p. 307. 



230 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

but firmly trying to help organize some movement if 
possible to save the President from the infamy of ruin- 
ing his country." * 

On the 10th, Andrew's close friend, Francis P. 
Blair, wrote him : 2 "If we are victors (in the coming 
conflict between McClellan and Lee) the electric flash 
that announces the fact will strike . . . the fetters off 
every slave on this continent. It is success in the deci- 
sive battle that is to do this, — not proclamations." 

Dates are important, and on the 13th Governor Tod 
of Ohio wired Secretary Stanton, " Governors Curtin 
and Yates have invited a meeting of the loyal gov- 
ernors, to which I have of course assented. Have you 
any suggestions to make ? " 3 Stanton replied that he had 
no suggestions, and hoped "the counsels may be wise 
and productive of good." The recorded events by no 
means convey the whole significance of the vital cur- 
rents moving beneath their surface. The Proclamation 
of Emancipation, issued just before the meeting, Septem- 
ber 24, at Altoona, took away one of the chief causes 
of immediate agitation. The governors conferred, and 
appointed Curtin and Andrew a committee to draft an 
address from the meeting " held to take measures for 
the more active support of the government." The elo- 
quence of these statesmen and politicians could not be 
an " overflow of powerful feelings upon an occasion 
fitted to excite them." They mildly adjusted themselves 
to the new conditions of patriotic action. " In submis- 
sion to the laws which may have been or which may be 
duly enacted, and to the lawful orders- of the President, 

1 Pearson, Life of Andrew, vol. ii, 48. 2 Ibid., p. 50. 

3 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 543, 544. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 231 

cooperating always in our own spheres with the national 
government, we mean," etc. ... "To have continued 
indefinitely the most efficient cause, support and stay of 
the rebellion, would have been in our judgment unjust 
to the loyal people. . . . The decision of the President 
to strike at the root of the rebellion will lend new vigor 
to the efforts and new life and hope to the hearts of 
the people." 1 

The document was signed by twelve governors, in- 
cluding Morton, who acted through a representative. 
The most conspicuous name in absence was that of 
Edwin D. Morgan of New York. It was read by Gov- 
ernor Andrew to President Lincoln at the White House, 
in the presence of the most of the signers. They then 
conferred freely on the situation, and tried to worry the 
President into a dismissal of McClellan. 

We must treat Andrew " tenderly," to use his own 
noble language in speaking of the first victims of the 
war. While this great" war governor" had many of the 
large faculties of judgment, — generally well exercised 
in the public service, — his emotions often controlled 
his action. He opened his heart to his confidential sec- 
retary, Browne, from Philadelphia, on the 22d, in char- 
acteristic manner. " The proclamation by the President 
is out. It is a'poor document, but a mighty act, slow, but 
grand and sublime after all . . . Go in for WAR. . . . 
Tell Claflin, Sumner, Wilson," etc., " now, now, NOW." 2 

Perhaps no situation in these difficult times involved 
more perilous issues, 3 as the elections were to show in 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 583. 2 Browne, Life of Andrew, p. 74. 

3 Mallory of Kentucky said in the House of Representatives that it 
was "a meeting of the factious governors" at Altoona. — Egle, Curtin, 
p. 324. 



232 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

accomplished fact. Yet Alexander H. Stephens, not a 
disinterested but a capable and discriminating observer, 
told Colonel McClure long after that great principles 
were upheld at Altoona. " But for that conference the 
North would have been demoralized by the Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation and the failures of the Union armv, 
and that peace would have come on some compromise." 1 
We have noted how the victorious Seymour 2 used 
the conference as a subtle argument while asserting the 
state sovereignty of New York, or a substantial form 
of disunion. On the other hand, Iowa was one of the 
few Western communities not swept from its Union 
anchorage, and which kept true in the elections. Sen- 
ator Grimes said : " We took the bull by the horns and 
made the proclamation an issue. I traversed the State 
for four weeks, speaking every day, and the more rad- 
ical I was the more acceptable I was. The politicians 
are a vast distance behind the people in sentiment." 3 
This does not account for New York, but it indicates 
what might have been accomplished through a larger 
political faith. Vessels carry ballast to guard against 
the accidents of navigation, not for progressive pur- 
poses. In the old times, steamers had a load on wheels, 
which stalwart sailors dragged back and forth to coun- 
teract the list toward starboard or port. If caught on 
the wrong side they increased the risk, if halting 
in the centre they were nullified. Governor -Morgan 
was a patriot, a large-minded man of affairs, who 
carried New York through the crisis of 1861 by his 
wisdom and energy. He was not at Altoona. The aver- 

1 Pearson, Life of Andrew, vol. ii, 53 n. 

2 Ante, p. 225. " 8 Rhodes, vol iv, 166. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 233 

age citizens whom he represented were caught on the 
conservative centre, while Seymour, with more genius 
and more daring for mischief, precipitated the list of 
the massive State toward that function of sovereignty 
which would end in practical disunion. New York has 
been too often governed by such neutralizing influences 
to avail of her full relative power in the United States. 

That this is a fair estimate of the conditions prevail- 
ing in the mind of the North may be inferred from 
another line of facts. Benjamin R. Curtis, endowed with 
the most serene judicial intellect since John Marshall, 
had been a loyal Republican, vigorously supporting the 
administration. October 26, 1862, he published a pam- 
phlet on " Executive Power." After reciting the facts, 
he pronounced of the President : " He has superadded to 
his rights as commander the powers of a usurper, and 
that is military despotism." ! 

If any one could have persuaded the North that 
Lincoln was a military despot, the cool and patriotic 
Curtis could have done it. The utterance created a mere 
ripple on public opinion. As law it was interesting ; but 
in the moving springs of the time, in the profound 
causes which make law, it had little effect. 

There was partial disintegration of the loyal hosts in 
Pennsylvania, but the culmination of mischief, rendered 
possible by party agitation, was reached in Indiana. 
After the fall elections, the legislature was controlled 
absolutely by the Democratic party, and it almost 
brought about a dissolution of the functions of govern- 
ment in the spring of 1863. Governor Oliver P. Morton 
was left alone virtually, and through his able and adroit 

1 Cited by Rhodes, vol. iv, 170. 



234 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

use of prerogative he kept the State steadily at work 
for the Union. The whole matter was a wonderful epi- 
sode in representative government, where the elements 
of disorder were subjected and forced into an active 
support of order. Morton set forth the tendencies of 
the time when he anathematized to the Secretary of War 
certain newspapers of Indiana and Ohio in the early 
summer of 1862. " They are doing incalculable injury 
to the Union cause, not, it is true, openly and in plain 
terms, but by invidious, malignant, and vituperative at- 
tacks upon Union men, by their continued apologies 
for the crimes committed by the leaders of the rebellion, 
and by their failure to condemn their cause and con- 
duct." x This sort of disputation educated the Copper- 
heads 2 of the time. The imperial aspirations of the 
" great West " — as it was called in the mid-nineteenth 
century — were a constant factor in the growth of the 
republic. The machinations of Aaron Burr, the Louisi- 
ana Purchase, the assimilation of Texas, the conquest 
of California, all pointed one way ; all inspired the con- 
scious Western American at every turn of affairs. The 
control of the Father of Waters, the immense commercial 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 176. 

2 The practical issue embodied in the term is clearly indicated in its 
use after the war by John Sherman in a letter to Secretary Stanton con- 
cerning General Sherman's unfortunate mistake in the surrender of 
Johnston. " I do not wish General Sherman to be unjustly dealt with, 
and I know that you will not permit it, and especially I do not want him 
driven into fellowship with the Copperheads. His military services have 
been too valuable to the country to be stained by any such fellowship." 
— Gorham, Stanton, vol. ii, 196. 

Here was a consummate politician and broad statesman dealing with 
his brother's inmost interests on the one hand and great national interests 
on the other. The innate nature of a Copperhead might include half-de- 
veloped treason, or virtue gone astray. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 235 

future of the Mississippi valley, forecasted the citizen 
and inflamed his civic imagination. In this autumn a 
genuine fear pervaded the Northwest that the South- 
ern Confederacy might succeed and might dominate the 
Mississippi. It affected in kind and according to con- 
viction the patriots of the Union and the partisan 
clients of state sovereignty. Events thickened. A capa- 
ble, patriotic — though mediocre — general like Buell 
inevitably must be crushed, when denounced by the able 
and energetic Morton, backed by the governors of Ohio 
and Illinois. Late in October, Morton urged the Pre- 
sident to counteract the dangerous disaffection prevail- 
ing in the Northwest by a vigorous campaign to drive 
the rebels from the country west of the Mississippi. 1 
His friends claim that his zeal induced the movements 
which resulted in the capture of Vicksburg. 

Thomas A. Hendricks sufficiently indicated the cu- 
rious errancy of the Democrats of Indiana by a tirade 
delivered in their convention : " If the failure and folly 
and wickedness of the party in power render a Union 
impossible, then the mighty Northwest must take care 
of herself." 2 

As above stated, the legislature attempted to ignore 
the governor, and claimed to reject his official message. 
A member moved to adopt the " exalted and patriotic 
sentiments " 3 in the message of Governor Seymour of 
New York. This was not adopted, but it indicates the 
temper of the body. These factious courses by partisans 
were taken after the practical grievances through arbi- 
trary arrest — justly condemned in Ohio, Indiana, and 

1 Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. i, 208. 

2 Ibid., p. 173. 3 Ibid., p. 217. 



236 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Illionis — had been remedied. Despotic power construed 
by Judge Curtis, as against the emancipation of negroes, 
never seriously troubled the Northern mind. Arbitrary 
power, as advocated by Stevens and exercised by Stan- 
ton, to take an old man like Olds of Ohio from his home 
in the night and put him in Fort Lafayette, was some- 
thing nearer home that touched the heart of the Amer- 
ican citizen. But the mistakes of arbitrary arrest were 
atoned for in General Order No. 193, 1 which practically 
released all political prisoners. 

In the spring of 1863, the partial sovereignty of the 
State of Indiana was in being, but it was exercised in a 
strange manner. Maine says : " Sovereignty has the pos- 
session of irresistible force, not necessarily exerted, but 
capable of being exerted." Our States had not complete 
sovereignty, but certain attributes thereof which were 
never lost. These subtle powers, latent in all civilized 
communities, were utilized most skillfully by Governor 
Morton 2 at this time. The legislature had adjourned 
without making appropriations. For two years the gov- 
ernor had carried on the administration of the State 
by his own personal energy, raising money without tax- 
ation, and disbursing it through his own bureaus. If he 
should assemble the legislature again, it would not 
make appropriations except with the passage of a mili- 
tary bill depriving the governor of all control of the 
forces of the State. April 18, 1863, Morton established 
a bureau of finance with his own secretary. He collected 
arsenal and other funds from the general government, 
and borrowed money from the citizens and counties. 

1 0. R., Series II, vol. iv, 746. And cf. Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 223. 

2 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 253-255. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 237 

The debts he had contracted for arms were assumed by 
the general government, which took the arms. For the 
time, Morton was the State. 

All this was a most interesting experiment in scien- 
tific tyranny. Great causes are required for great re- 
sujts. It has been said, a tyrant must really interest and 
interest prodigiously a sufficient number of subordinate 
tyrants in the duration of his power. But Morton repre- 
sented the loyal element of the State of Indiana. The 
nominal tyranny he was exercising in their behalf had 
its objective, not in any desire or profit of governor or 
citizens, but in the salvation of the whole Union. 

It will be remembered that Speaker Grow recorded 
his observations of the temper of the people of the 
State of New York in May, 1861. They feared that the 
administration would not invade Virginia to maintain 
the integrity of the Union. That issue of inadequate ad- 
ministration might be indicative of others to come. Mr. 
Grow said with sagacious forecast, that if the adminis- 
tration proved inefficient " you will be as powerless in 
thirty days as you are now powerful. I saw many of 
the solid men in New York, and they have embarked 
their all in this contest, provided the administration 
will prosecute to the bitter end, if need be." * 

These burning words fitly represent the energies of 
the people, eager to subdue the alien spirit of secession. 
Such potent energies, if turned awry and balked of 
their first purpose, were not to become mere neutrals in 
the contest controlling the whole nation. The spirits of 
health become the demons of disease if perverted in 
the body politic and sickened by a false regimen. Trea- 

1 Ante, p. 71. 



238 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

son was the betrayal of the Union. Any attack on the 
government or any obstruction of its defenses was abso- 
lute treason in the belief of the practical majority of 
the Northern people. The Copperhead was not a traitor ; 
he was worse than the avowed enemies of the republic 
who offered battle against it. This corrupting principle 
was nobly denounced by John A. Dix : — 

Those, therefore, who array themselves against it (the 
enrollment and draft) are obnoxious to a far severer censure 
than the ambitious or misguided men who are striving to sub- 
vert the government, for the latter are acting by color of 
sanction under legislatures and conventions of the people in 
the States they represent. Among us resistance to the law by 
those who claim and enjoy the protection of the government 
has no semblance of justification, and hecomes the very black- 
est of political crimes not only because it is revolt against the 
constituted authorities of the country, but because it would 
be practically striking a blow for treason. 1 

This was addressed directly to Governor Seymour in 
the crucial times of the draft riots. It belongs here, 
for it shows the singular aberration of mind incurred 
by midway patriots of the Seymour type, blundering 
after state sovereignty in the interest of the Democratic 
party. It is a paradox that " striking a practical blow 
for treason " from a safe covert, maintained by loyal 
men against red-handed traitors without, is worse than 
treason itself. Yet popular intuition never errs in such 
contingencies, and the term Copperhead embodies the 
fierce practical hatred which such practices excited. Yet 
the superficial forms of political or diplomatic inter- 
course can never be disregarded, and the worst citizen 
has rights which the pirate loses. 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 653. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 239 

Perhaps the greatest controversial mistake made by 
the loyal Republicans was in the frequent efforts to 
prove that the Democratic opposition was treason in 
essence. Democrats as patriotic and respectable as Au- 
gust Belmont would not commit treason. They were 
deceived and mistook their civic responsibility under the 
conduct of leaders like Seymour and Vallandigham, who 
were attempting to handle the pitchy tools of treason 
under the forms of constitutional opposition. Vallandig- 
ham said in the House of Representatives : " Can this 
war continue? Whence the money to carry it on? 
Where the men ? Can you borrow ? From whom ? Can 
you tax more ? . . . I beg pardon ; but I trust I am 
not ' discouraging enlistments.' If I am, then first arrest 
Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck." * 

Horatio Seymour did not take the same frank and 
outspoken course in opposition. According to the gal- 
lant Dix he did worse virtually. There is no more in- 
comprehensible personality in our history. He was not 
a vulgar partisan. In 1860 it was said of him, " Sey- 
mour is to-day the unquestioned leader of the Democracy 
of the State. Nor is his leadership won by the manage- 
ment of politicians or retained by the packing of con- 
ventions." 2 

And it is assumed by present historians that he was 
cultivated, sincere, and even patriotic. But this does 
not tell the whole story. He was not a traitor, still less 
was he loyal, because he could not render himself wholly 
and solely to the cause of the Union. Nor could he 
speak out like Vallandigham. For his will could not 

1 Cited, Rhodes, vol. iv, 226. 

2 Savage, Living Representative Men, p. 438. 



240 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

determine in the things which he conceived as depend- 
ing or which might depend on his determination. Val- 
landigham's course ended at last in prison. And how- 
ever Mr. Lincoln's crude executive ways might have 
failed in the " arbitrary arrests " of 1862, he made no 
mistake in confining Vallandigham finally. People then 
had come to perceive with Dix that there are things 
worse than treason under a constitutional government. 
In this dilemma Seymour dropped back into a very 
musty and stale state sovereignty. 1 Like a dreamer be- 
fogged by his own creations he passed off into a delusion 
that something better than Union could be made out 
of three or more disunions. 2 

The embers of state sovereignty, smothered in 1861, 
were kindled again by adverse currents emanating from 
the untoward course of public affairs. When charged 
with treason, the Copperhead retorted with Vallandig- 
ham that the radicals of the North had been even more 

1 " The sovereignties of the States, except as they are limited by the 
Constitution, can never be given up. Without them our government can- 
not stand." — Seymour, Message, 1862, p. 21. " We must restore the 
Union as it was before the war. The assertion that this war was the un- 
avoidable result of slavery is not erroneous, but it has led to a disastrous 
policy in its prosecution." — Ibid., p. 32. The logical insight of Morton 
pierced these sophistries as with a needle. A Democrat descended from 
Andrew Jackson, he was an American through and through. He said at 
Cambridge City, July 4, " There are two theories in collision in this 
bloody contest. On one hand it is held that there is no such people as the 
American nation, but that there are thirty-four independent States which 
have made a compact from which they can withdraw at pleasure. The 
other theory is that we are a unit, one and indivisible." — Foulke, Morton, 
vol. i, 249. 

2 " While the North cannot hold the Southern States in subjection with- 
out destroying the principles of our government, the great Central and 
Western States can control the two extremes." — Seymour, Message, 
1862, p. 34. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 241 

treasonable. History, as it reveals the wayward errors 
of those trying times, finds very poor leaders among 
both Republicans and Democrats. Greeley, the child 
of the Northern radicals, openly advocated mediation 
through a European power, and corresponded with Val- 
landigham to that effect. In private he told Raymond 
of the "Times" that he meant to bring the war to a 
close. " You '11 see that I '11 drive Lincoln into it." * 
Greeley was a greater fool than Seymour or Vallandig- 
ham, for he created his " fool's paradise " out of his im- 
mediate surroundings. In this crucial time the folly of 
a feeble leader fraternized with the crime of an ardent 
traitor. We must analyze these warring disputants to 
get at the sources of feeling which impelled the citizens 
and carried them into such mischievous partisan courses. 
The divided public sentiment of the North found expres- 
sion through the Democratic party in political action, 
which was legitimate in form, according to the super- 
ficial aspect of constitutional opposition. But the inev- 
itable effect of this erratic action in the States was to 
waste more and more of their blood and treasure in the 
necessary war for the Union. 

These matters are worth close study, for they reveal 
the springs of government, the sources of the highest 
civilization, the necessary growth of a complex polity. 
The body politic in a modern republic is one stupendous 
whole, organic, articulated, carrying life or death in its 
unified movement into all its parts. In this sense the 
States misled by Seymour were not commonwealths 
holding single communities of interest, but organs of 
one great and stupendous body, impelled by one nerve 

1 Cited, Rhodes, vol. iv, 222. 



242 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

current, nourished by one political circulation, which 
might carry buoyant health through all the parts, or if 
fevered, sickened, and inflamed, might poison any part 
to the destruction of the whole. 

There were arrests which were despotic and those 
which were not. Lincoln and Stanton had atoned for 
their despotic mistakes by releasing the political pris- 
oners after the autumnal elections in 1862. But other 
and necessary arrests were to come. Burke considered 
that to be arbitrary proceeding which might be con- 
ducted " by the private opinions or feeling of the man 
who attempts to regulate." We shall be obliged to 
apply this canon carefully. General Burnside was in 
command of the Department of the Ohio, and April 
13, 1863, 1 he issued the famous General Order No. 
38, proclaiming : " Treason, expressed or implied, will 
not be tolerated in this department." Vallandigham, 
emitting the venom of a Copperhead at a Democratic 
mass meeting, was arrested afterward for violating this 
order. Brought before a military commission, the United 
States Circuit Court refused him a writ of habeas corpus, 
and he could only protest against the proceedings. 
The commission sentenced him to close confinement 
during the war, and President Lincoln commuted this 

1 Cf. Rhodes, vol. iv, 235-237. Congress passed an act March 3, 1863, 
limiting the powers of the Secretaries of State and of War in dealing 
with "state and political prisoners," all proper and wholesome. The 
technical argument leaned toward the Copperheads ; but in the view 
of the present writer the practical outcome of these matters was little 
affected by strict law. The Copperheads must have a licking, and they 
got it. To argue that they erred because some arrests transcended law 
is to misconceive blindly the nature of the Copperhead. The people — 
just judges iu such matters — showed by their vote in the autumn that 
they comprehended the issue in its full force. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 243 

to banishment into the Southern Confederacy. In his 
passage it was necessary to guard him from the fury 
of loyal soldiers, but no guards were needed when he 
invaded the hospitable quarters of the rebels. 

Much learned discussion has been devoted to this 
particular incident, and the matured opinions of the 
courts were declared against this and similar proceed- 
ings. The great and moving necessities of administra- 
tion will endure, nevertheless. Our civic laws may and 
must be imperfect substitutes for eternal laws ; but 
however well adjusted, they will yield to crucial neces- 
sity whenever the moving cause is sufficient. When the 
cause issues from the spirit of a people, it will prevail, 
even if law proper suffers for the time. The rules of 
navigation never steered a ship, nor did internal gravi- 
tation ever move a planet; the cause over and in all 
directed the movement. When the necessity passes, the 
law, not broken, but impaired, will be restored. 1 

The military progress of the summer was excellent, 
and ought to have been overwhelming. Grant swept 
aside scholastic, tactical traditions, swung his base into 
the air, seized Vicksburg, and opened the Mississippi ; 
an immense material victory over the rebels, and a 
prodigious counter-check to the opposition of Peace 

1 This incident is treated by Mr. Rhodes (U. S., vol. iv, 246-253) with 
his usual candor, and with ample material. His view of the President's 
cause, however, seems quite inadequate. 1 was fortunate in getting direct 
testimony from a competent witness — Hon. George S. Boutwell. To the 
question, " Did the Union cause suffer by the blunder in arresting Val- 
landigham?" he answered, " No. Those fellows were cowed somewhat by 
Vallandigham's arrest, and I do not think it was a mistake." And " Was 
not the President's conduct in the affair admirable ? " He said, "Yes, in 
writing he was supreme. He must have been a very successful lawyer. 
Wonderful power of statement." 



s 



244 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Democrats in the Northwest. Under great difficulties, 
Meade, an admirable general of the second class, de- 
feated Lee at Gettysburg. He might have crushed him. 
But the second-class general calls the noxious council 
of war, and Meade's did not fail to spoil the possible 
result. Lee got off, and his army survived for nearly 
two years more of bloody strife. Hardly anything is 
more pathetic than Lincoln's suffering in the agony of 
this crisis. 1 In what he said, and even more in what he 
did not say to Meade, we recognize the majesty of the 
man. The local elections in the fall, especially in Ohio, 
brought to the bar of popular opinion these issues, 
which had been precipitated by Burnside in his brusque 
but useful Order No. 38. Vallandigham, " the pensive 
exile bending with his woe," was unanimously nomi- 
nated for governor. Every possible partisan energy 
was exerted to mislead and carry the populace for this 
wolf clad in the garments of liberty and freedom of 
citizenship. The people in their might arose to meet 
the highest functions of the citizen. Farmers brought 
their wives to the mass meetings, and listened by the 
hour to thorough practical discussions of free govern- 
ment and the needs of the Union. Julian, a vigorous 
agitator, proposed to stop after speaking four hours in 
a drizzling rain. " Go on," said a farmer ; " we '11 hear 
you; it's past milking-time, anyhow." These stalwart 
descendants from 1776 were convinced that whatever 
legal quiddities might exact, their political action would 
cast a vote for or against Jefferson Davis. Never was 
the dictum of Thomas Jefferson more clearly demon- 
strated that the people are the best " censors of their 

1 Diary in Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii, 278. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 245 

own governors." The result amazed both Union men 
and Democrats and was a "testimony of the silent, 
unobtrusive voters who are sure to come out when the 
sentiment of the people is really aroused." 1 Brough 
was elected over Vallandigham by a majority above 
101,000. Rather more than two voters went for the 
administration and continuance of the war to one 
against it. When we consider the tremendous influ- 
ence of party affiliation, which misled many Democrats 
who were not Copperheads, we recognize in the result 
a splendid vindication of representative government. 

The peculiar Copperhead reaction was felt more or 
less in all the States. In Pennsylvania, it was " immea- 
surably strengthened " 2 by the removal of the Pennsyl- 
vanian McClellan, and his supercession by Burnside. 
Even a majority of the Democrats had welcomed eman- 
cipation, but a blow at state pride could not be en- 
dured. 

Doubtless in the assured calm of 1866 the Supreme 
Court could make better law, as in the Milligan case, 
than Lincoln or any president could have made in a 
crisis of the rebellion ; but the best laws have always 
been silent in such crucial times. The angry sore in 
the body politic that the Copperheads had poisoned 
inevitably had to be brought to a head and punctured ; 
if not by the sword, by a kindred surgical operation. 
The surgeon's knife never moves in the course of 
nature. It violently arrests disease in the interest of 
a larger health, which must possess the body politic as 
well as the human body, if life is to prevail over death. 

We have been describing purely political evolution. 

i Rhodes, vol. iv, 414. 2 Repplier, Philadelphia, p. 364. 



246 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

By another process, significant of these times, the 
people of Ohio and Indiana were aroused this summer 
in their patriotic might. Morgan, the rebel chieftain, 
as well as some timid Republicans at home, had been 
led to believe that the Knights of the Golden Circle 
and the Order of American Knights in Ohio and Indi- 
ana would join him, if he actually raised the standard 
of rebellion on loyal soil. Their talk tended that way. 
These secret orders were the resultant of the hidden 
conspiracies of the previous year we have described in 
Governor Morton's words. 1 But when Morgan made 
his raid, the actual present enemy could not impel 
even a Copperhead to fight, and the people arose to 
expel him with the same unanimity manifested when 
they rallied against the attack on Fort Sumter. 2 Con- 
flict and invasion had at last vindicated Morton's lucid 
exposition of the tyrannous necessity of party, pro- 
claimed in his message in the spring of 1861 : " The 
issue is forced upon us and must be accepted. Every 
man must take his position upon the one side or the 
other. In time of war there is no ground upon which a 
third party can stand." 3 

This profound development of public sentiment, 
separating wheat from chaff, as it did this year, was 
closely observed by Mr. Lincoln. No ruler ever knew 
his people more thoroughly, or better adapted his word 
and inevitable act to their mood and varying expres- 
sion. He put himself on record in a remarkable letter, 
addressed to a meeting in Illinois, August 26, 1863. 4 
While the man Lincoln was a Republican, a partisan, 

1 Ante, p. 224. 2 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 284. 

8 Ibid., p. 118. * 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 731-734. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 247 

and most adroit politician, he never forgot that the 
ruler was leader of the whole people, and their necessary 
executive head. In this regard the opening sentences 
are significant. 

The meeting is to be of all those who maintain uncondi- 
tional devotion to the Union ; and I am sure my old political 
friends will thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's 
gratitude to those other noble men, whom no partisan malice, 
or partisan hope, can make false to the nation's life. . . . 
There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I 
would say : you desire peace ; and you blame me that we do 
not have it. But how can we attain it ? There are but three 
conceivable ways. First, to suppress the rebellion by force of 
arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it ? If you are, 
so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is 
to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If 
you are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force, 
nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable 
compromise ... in what way can that compromise be used 
to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania. No paper compro- 
mise, to which the controllers of Lee's army are not agreed, 
can, at all, affect that army. . . . You dislike the Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation ; and perhaps would have it retracted. You 
say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. ... I issued 
the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. 
Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the 
Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an 
apt time, then, for you to declare you will not fight to free 
negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you ; but 
no matter. . . . Why should they do anything for us, if we 
will do nothing for them ? If they stake their lives for us, 
they must be prompted by the strongest motive — even the 
promise of freedom. And the promise being made must be 
kept. . . . Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope 
it will come soon. . . . And then there will be some black 



248 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

men who can remember that, with silent tongue, and clenched 
teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they have 
helped mankind on to this great consummation ; while, I 
fear, there will be some white ones, unable to forget that, 
with malignant heart and deceitful speech, they have strove 
to hinder it. 

We are taught that in the epical days a hero mani- 
fested himself by great and uncommon deeds. Was 
Milton more sublime when portraying his angels and 
devils than this simple American when lifted to the 
presidency and pleading for the poor black man now 
aroused to heroic acts ? Was any demon of Satan's troop 
worse branded than the Copperhead white as he stands 
and soils these lines in contrast with the black freedman 
and soldier? Such simple justice, set forth with pro- 
found and sagacious insight into the ways of humanity, 
struck home to the convictions of the average citizen. 
The great electoral victories in the States we have 
treated above were foreshadowed in these admirable 
statements of Mr. Lincoln. 

I make this long citation for its masterly exposition 
of the immediate situation, for its firm grasp of the 
issues of the summer of 1863, but even more for its 
lucid explanation of the whole vital question in dispute. 
An arbiter goes to see, and having penetrated the ques- 
tion at issue, decision is awarded. War is the greatest 
of arbiters. It brings events to conclusion, to an inevit- 
able decree. 

All this Mr. Lincoln embodies in the simplest and 
most direct form. Revolt, rebellion, slaughter, emanci- 
pation have induced and they exhibit three ways out, 
and only three, — force, to restore Union ; dissolution, to 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 249 

establish secession ; compromise, forcible enough to keep 
Lee's army out of Pennsylvania. Thereto, the compro- 
mise must be not a mere paper promise, but an agree- 
ment convincing and binding the leaders of Lee's army. 
Such compromise was impossible. Emancipation was ir- 
retrievable, for it issued from the great arbiter, war itself, 
being a word not spoken, but acted. 

The tremendous categories embraced the foundations 
of every possible government and included the duty of 
all citizens. Their inevitable logic should have swept 
away the grounds of party difference throughout the 
North. They applied as well to indifferent or recalcitrant 
Eepublicans as to lukewarm Democrats or malignant 
Copperheads. 

As we shall soon treat another sort of partisan dis- 
affection, not occasioned by Copperheads, we may pause 
in the beginning of 1864 and look at the contemporary 
portraits of the President, showing the regard of friendly 
critics from various points of view. In this connection 
we will consider citizens and not politicians. Motley 
said from Vienna : " My respect for the character of 
the President increases every day." 1 Lowell wrote : 2 
" History will rank Mr. Lincoln among the most pru- 
dent of statesmen and the most successful of rulers. If 
we wish to appreciate him, we have only to conceive the 
inevitable chaos in which we should now be weltering 
had a weak man or an unwise one been chosen in his 
stead." The wise and discriminating Asa Gray affirms 
that " homely, honest, ungainly Lincoln is the repre- 
sentative man of the country." 3 

1 Motley, Letters, vol. ii, 146. 

2 North American Review, January, 1864. 3 Gray, Letters, vol. ii, 523. 



250 war government, federal and state 

Richard H. Dana wrote May 4, 1864, from inter- 
views : — 

The cabinet is at sixes and sevens. They (excepting Sew- 
ard) say dreadful things of one another. I cannot describe 
the President, it is impossible. He was sobered in his talk, 
told no extreme stories, said some good things and some help- 
lessly natural and naive things. You can't help feeling an in- 
terest in him, a sympathy and a kind of pity ; feeling, too, 
that he has some qualities of great value, yet fearing that his 
weak points may wreck him or wreck something. His life 
seems a series of wise, sound conclusions, slowly reached, 
oddly worked out, on great questions, with constant failures 
in administration of details and dealings with individuals. 1 

These men fairly represented the culture of our re- 
public, which had been supposed to be least satisfied by 
the elevation of the homely and rugged man of the 
West. We shall investigate directly the kind of men 
within the ranks of the Republican party who opposed 
his renomination and intrigued against his reelection. 
The hidden dangers of Copperhead opposition were to 
be surpassed for the moment in practical consequences 
by the variance of Republican leaders, who from one 
and another cause — as indicated above by Dana — 
embarrassed the political campaign of 1864. 

Meanwhile the "tyrant" Lincoln 2 was only too glad 
to escape the depressing military responsibility which 
had weighed down the commander-in-chief from the day 
of his inauguration. The President had been a soldier 
from necessity ; a better one, as history reveals, than 

1 Adams, Dana, vol. ii, 273, 274. 

2 He followed that he might lead. About this time he wrote, " I claim 
not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have con- 
trolled me." — Complete Works, vol. ii, 509. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 251 

was thought at the time. Scott, McClellan, Halleck, 
Pope, had failed in subduing the rebellion, with the 
commander-in-chief supporting and never interfering 
except in dire emergencies. Congress revived the grade 
of lieutenant-general, expecting the appointment of 
U. S. Grant. The President gladly commissioned him, 
and he took command, March 9, to " fight it out." 

The chief fountain of opposition to the succession of 
Abraham Lincoln sprung from Secretary Chase, who 
had many qualities befitting a leader and a statesman, 
but who lacked greatness. Senator Hendricks of Indiana 
had made a vicious partisan attack on the secretary, 
March 11, for his management of finance, which was 
unmerited, for he had served the country well in this 
regard. In the larger field, his own ambition overleaped 
itself and he thought " a man of differing qualities from 
those the President has will be needed for the next four 
years." 1 The President's faults in administration were 
many, but his conduct of his own self, when there might 
be conflict with other selves, was brilliant and magnani- 
mous beyond all encomium. In no case does this appear 
more vividly than in his whole intercourse with Chase.' 2 

When Mr. Chase, the politician, had satisfied himself 
that he had no chance for himself, he fell into the move- 
ment for renominating Lincoln. The meteoric Greeley, 
an erring comet in every crisis of these times, thought 
Fremont or Butler preferable to Lincoln. 3 But the 
patriotic politician of Massachusetts, Henry Wilson, 
was " most loud and bitter. His open assaults were 
amazing." 4 Thaddeus Stevens, the radical leader of the 

1 Cited, Rhodes, vol. iv, 457. 2 Cf. ibid., pp. 459, 460, 480. 

3 Ibid., p. 461. 4 Ibid., p. 463 n. 



252 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

House of Representatives, a stronger man than these, 
said even after Lincoln's reelection, that a majority of 
the loyal people would have chosen General Butler to 
be President, 1 if allowed. Absurd ; but it was Stevens's 
absurdity. These revelations are melancholy in view of 
subsequent events. Popular government is the best gov- 
ernment ; but popular leaders cannot lead in a crisis ; 
the people lead and the politicians follow. Lincoln's 
invincible confidence in the people and their correspond- 
ing faith in him saved the state. 

Mr. Lincoln was renominated almost unanimously, 
June 7, at Baltimore, four days after the severe reverses 
of the Army of the Potomac at Cold Harbor, Va. A 
great misfortune befell in the nomination, also nearly 
unanimous, of Andrew Johnson, a war Democrat of Ten- 
nessee. As was said at the time : " We were accustomed 
to turning; down our own men for Democrats who were 
not so good, but who were better than the majority of 
their party." 2 

This suggests the whole matter — very difficult in ac- 
tual practice — of party management in the conduct of 
war and government. Governor Morton, who was a strict 
partisan, early laid aside all party spirit, appointing De- 
mocrats to places, when his Republican allies strongly 
objected. " Democrats must take part in the struggle as 
well as Republicans and receive equally fair treatment." 3 
After experience, he said of all appointments : " I tried 
to please everybody and his friends, but I soon found 
that would not do. I found that out almost immediately, 

1 Rhodes, vol. iv, p. 462. 

2 Cited, ibid., p. 470. 

3 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 150, 153. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 253 

and I then determined that I would follow the dictates 
of my own judgment without fear or favor." 

Ostrogorki, a disinterested and philosophical observer, 
remarks that Mr. Lincoln's " eminent qualities " could 
not subvert party policy. " He could not appoint Re- 
publicans and Democrats to office indiscriminately." * 

A very peculiar and instructive dispute involving 
national control, state-rights, and the coordinate powers 
of the executive and legislative branches of government 
culminated in the Wade-Davis manifesto, August 5, " a 
bitter attack on the President." It embodied the mali- 
cious undercurrent of opposition to Lincoln within the 
Republican ranks, even after his nomination, and used 
the political occasion of a bill vetoed by pocket merely 
as an opportunity. The bill provided for the reorgani- 
zation of a state in rebellion with a prohibition of slav- 
ery. The President, supported by his cabinet, claimed 
that Congress had " no constitutional power over slav- 
ery in the States." When reminded that he had con- 
trolled it in his own action, he replied that he could, " in 
an emergency, do things on military grounds which 
cannot be done constitutionally by Congress." The 
radical leaders seemed to have forgotten the kingly sur- 
vival in the executive and to have imagined that Con- 
gress had evolved into an exaggerated " town-meeting." 
The paper manifesto of the bolting leaders termed the 
President's course 2 "a grave executive usurpation. . . . 

1 Ostrogorki, Democracy and Political Parties, vol. ii, 113, 115. Lincoln's 
final wisdom was so thoroughly proven that even his " bad " appointments 
must be judged cautiously- Julian objected in a certain case, only to draw 
out, "There is much force in what you say; but in the balancing of 
matters I guess I shall have to appoint him." 

2 An amusing illustration of the inflexible courage and practical humor 



254 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

He must understand that our support is of a cause and 
not of a man ; that the authority of Congress is para- 
mount and must be respected." * 

All this and similar culminated in a private call from 
New York city for a new convention in Cincinnati, 
September 28, to nominate a new Republican candidate 
for President. Greeley, Chase, Winter Davis, D. S. 
Dickinson, Governor Andrew, directly, others partially, 
supported this movement. 2 The proposed convention did 
not meet. The Democrats reviled Lincoln the " tyrant " 
oppressing his individual subjects. The little congres- 
sional magnates 3 reproached him, as usurping their pe- 
culiar functions of government. Lust of power might 
and would corrupt the best man. Power for Abraham 
Lincoln was not an intoxication of the individual will ; 
it was the domination of every personality, including his 
own, for the actual good of the state. Mistakes in such 
crucial times are inevitable, but the high exercise of all 
the popular prerogatives, concentrated in one person, 
must not be confounded with the doings of an old-fash- 
ioned half-civilized tyrant. To call Lincoln a tyrant or 
usurper was mere detraction, as the people discovered 
and vindicated at the polls in November. 

of Lincoln was current at the time. His intimates asked if he was not 
troubled by the manoeuvres of Wade & Co. " It reminds me of a story. 
A boy excited by what he had seen through a microscope said to his father 
who was eating cheese, ' Do you know you take in thousands, perhaps mil- 
lions of little animals at every bite ? ' But the father answered, ' I can 
stand it if they can,' " and the victim continued eating as quietly as if he 
were the victor. 

1 Cited, Rhodes, vol. iv, 487. 

2 Cf. ibid., -p. 518. 

3 Wade had long sneered at the President, claiming that Congress 
should not wait for the " royal pleasure." — Globe, 1862, p. 3375. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 255 

Greeley, Thurlow Weed, Raymond, and many other 
leaders said in August that Lincoln's defeat was certain. 
The dire obf uscation of the Republican leaders 1 is finally 
summed up, September 21, in a private letter from a 
prominent radical : — 

. . . The apparent certainty of Mr. Lincoln's defeat. All 
this is changed. The outrage on the nation perpetrated at 
Chicago, the fall of Atlanta, the success of the cause in Ver- 
mont and Maine, render that impossible and unreasonable 
which then seemed our only safety. We must now place our- 
selves in the van of the fight. 2 

All this in a month, through a mere change of the 
point of view. 3 Was there ever more complete confes- 
sion that people cannot comprehend the causes and 
true meaning of events as they occur? The occasion of 
this mighty change was not its cause. The cause of 
change was in the patriotic insight of the Northern 
people, aroused to new consciousness and always trust- 
ful of the people's servant, Lincoln. The same water, 
deep in the trough of the sea, in a moment becomes 
the towering crest of the wave. Farragut's victory at 

« Cf. McClure, Our Presidents, p. 183. " Chase, Wade, H. W. Davis, 
Greeley were bitterly opposed to Lincoln's renomination. In addition, 
Sumner was not heartily for him; Stevens was earnestly opposed, and the 
extreme radical wing of the party was aggressive in its hostility. Lincoln's 
strength was with the people." 

2 Cited, Rhodes, vol. iv, 528 n. 

3 September 7 Governor Andrew proposed to Governor Yates that he, 
Brough, Morton, and any Western governors should meet him at Wash- 
ington to talk over " the present attitude of our public affairs with the 
President." Nothing came of this apparently. " I would spurn the bare 
suggestion of ceasing hostilities now, and the very thought of dealing with 
the rebel chiefs with peace ; but I would seize the occasion for an appeal 
to all the people both North and South." His motive was to influence 
the coming election. — Schouler, Mass. in the Civil War, pp. 575, 576. 



256 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Mobile, Sherman's capture of Atlanta only concentrated 
expression of the deep and powerful sentiment inherent 
in the people ; the victories then produced an effect 
beyond the ken of superficial politicians that manifested 
itself in an overwhelming rush to reelect the well-tried 
leader, Abraham Lincoln. 

We have narrated this interesting aberration of party 
conduct in the prosecution of the war ; but it should 
not divert us from the main topic of party estrange- 
ment. The Republican opposition to Lincoln greatly 
increased the difficulty of moving forward the burden 
of the state ; yet it did not, like the Democratic resist- 
ance, attempt to change course and carry the govern- 
ment into the sloughs and morasses of peace and failure. 

The Democratic convention met at Chicago, August 
29, and easily nominated General McClellan for the 
presidency. Horatio Seymour 1 presided and Vallandig- 
ham made the substance of the platform. The famous 
Copperhead had returned home from banishment, con- 
temptuously overlooked by the executive. His con- 
demnation and practical release served the cause of 
order and good government equally well. He forced 
the weak-kneed Democrats to " explicitly declare that 
after four years of failure to restore the Union by the 
experiment of war . . . convention of the States that 
. . . peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal 
Union of the States." 2 

1 He declared in his speech : " This administration cannot now save this 
Union if it would. It has by its proclamations, by vindictive legislation, 
by displays of hate and passion, placed obstacles in its own pathway, 
which it cannot overcome, and has hampered its own freedom of action 
by unconstitutional acts." — Thomas, Die. Biography. 

2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix, 254. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 257 

At first McClellan and Pendleton was a popular ticket, 
for the hesitating people did not perceive what it all 
meant. The Republicans, as above stated, hastily got 
into line ; and with their customary polemical skill con- 
strued the manifesto of the Democracy for instant com- 
prehension. As they put it, the Democrats said, " The 
war is a failure." This statement might or might not 
be true ; but it was purely a question of fact, to be in- 
terpreted by Grant, Sherman, and Farragut. That the 
misfortunes of the war should be used virtually to 
turn the Union over to rebels and traitors was a time- 
serving proposition quickly repudiated by the average 
voter. That the controversial pause should be improved 
by calling Union-saving conventions after the manner 
of 1860 — ignoring the momentous fact that thousands 
of slaves had been freed and armed — was a scheme so 
ridiculous that it was soon thrashed out in the breezy 
common sense of an election canvass. " Blood and 
Iron" do not reason after the fashion of the Demo- 
cratic convention. That men of the intellectual capa- 
city of Horatio Seymour and Robert C. Winthrop 
should have been muddled thus by events is a curiosity 
of history. 

Seymour and the old Whigs arraigned the inevitable 
contractors and profit-makers with their supporters in 
the Republican party, as if these birds of prey made the 
war, instead of the rebels who raised the standard of 
the Confederacy and the Copperheads who malignantly 
supported the rebellion. From these larger activities 
the petty followers descended to slander. The " New 
York World," a would-be respectable journal, asserted 
Honest Old Abe ' has few honest men to defend 



a i 



258 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

his honesty/' x — a slander so foul that the paper almost 
shrivels under the words. 

The people who had been so depressed in August 
met in November and pronounced their verdict on their 
rulers, and upon the agitators who would have sub- 
verted those rulers. Education, the intellectual enlight- 
enment of the individual man, is not easy ; how much 
more difficult the effective instruction of the civic body 
politic. When we concede that party and " extra-con- 
stitutional organization " 2 in our country enters into 
every process of political action from the choice of a 
constable to the election of a president, 3 the repudiation 
of the Democracy by the people at this time was mar- 
velous. Party dogmas in this intense political atmos- 
phere have the binding force of " creeds." 4 Well might 
the sage of Concord say : " Seldom was so much staked 
on a popular vote. I suppose never in history." 5 

Lincoln won 212 electoral votes, McClellan 21, and 
there was a popular majority for the Republicans of 
494,567. 6 In the comparative figures given below, there 

1 N. Y. World, September 22, 23 ; October 1, 1864. 

2 Ostrogorki, Democracy and Pol. P., vol. ii, 540. 

3 Ford, A merican Politics, p. 302. 

4 Cf. ante, p. 11. 

5 Cabot, Emerson, p. 609. "Thomas Hill Green used to say that the 
whole future of humanity was involved in the triumph of the federal 
arms." — Bryce, Contemporary Biography, p. 90. 

6 It will be interesting to compare the votes of the States we are study- 
ing, in the elections of 1860 and of 1864 : — 

I860. 1861. 

Lincoln. Douglas. Breckinridge. Bell. Lincoln. McClellan. 

Massachusetts, 106,533 34,372 5,939 22,331 Massachusetts, 126,742 48,745 

New York, 362,646 312,510 New York, 386,726 361,986 

Pennsylvania, 268,030 16,765 178,871 12,776 Pennsylvania, 296,389 276,308 

Indiana, 139,033 115,509 12,295 5,306 Indiana, 150,422 130,233 

These figures are taken from McClure, Our Presidents, pp. 175, 193. 

The comparison is very suggestive. Roughly McClellan's vote in Mas- 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 259 

will be found more political problems than we have 
space to expound. 9 

The development in Massachusetts was the natural 
outcome of the whole political situation in these years. 
Indiana showed a wonderful education of its whole 
people in the great principles underlying this contest, 
as they were represented and vindicated by Oliver P. 
Morton. Senator Grimes's significant words * of Iowa in 
1863 should be remembered in this connection. Penn- 
sylvania has been noticed already. But New York ! It 
is fair to consider all the circumstances and condition 
of events treated in this chapter, which puzzled the 
Democrat and affiliated him with the Copperhead. 
Nevertheless the facts stand. The " Empire " State 
absorbed the noxious personality of Seymour and his 
fellows and cast some 360,000 votes in indorsement. 

A tremendous consequence of this election was in the 
return of enough Unionist members to the House of 
Representatives to give the requisite majority for a two 
thirds constitutional amendment, and to effect the abo- 
lition of slavery. 

This course of events, from the summer of 1862 to 
the autumn of 1864, is more interesting, if possible, 
than the first period of rebellion and war. The great 
forces of the nation were grasped by the administration 
at Washington and managed for the restoration of the 

sachusetts equals the whole opposition of 1860, less two fifths of the 
Douglas vote. In Indiana, where the Copperheads did their worst, the 
opposition of 1860 was actually diminished. In both New York and Penn- 
sylvania, McClellan gained heavily over Lincoln's opponents in 1860. A 
portion of the result in Pennsylvania may be ascribed to McClellan's 
personal popularity in his own State. 
1 Cf. ante, p. 232. 



260 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Union. At the same time, a certain mutinous spirit, 
latent in the North, sometimes by secret association, as 
in the West, always and everywhere by treacherous ef- 
fort sought to embarrass the administration in its pro- 
secution of the war. These embarrassments culminated 
in the condemnation and banishment of Vallandio-ham 
on the one hand. In other respects, an undisguised 
opposition under the forms of constitutional right was 
established by Seymour and his kind. Either and all 
these forces naturally sought the Democratic party for 
an outlet and instrument of the mutinous forces threat- 
ening the regular administration. They used arbitrary 
arrests, emancipation, corruption in contracts, for dis- 
playing their constitutional and legal garments, as 
fashion-figures are used in the shops. 

Seymour and the moss-grown antiquaries reverted to 
the old types of state sovereignty 1 in constructing 
any form of opposition to the Union enforced by arms. 
Their political comprehension was well portrayed in the 
couplet : — 

" pale antiquaries pore 
Th' inscription value, but the rust adore." 

The adoration of political conservatives of this period 
for the civic rust and mould of previous generations is 
as ludicrous as it is painful. The practical political out- 
come of this sort of leadership, when rendered into 
action by the common citizen, was manifested in resist- 
ance to the draft. 

Lincoln was freely anathematized as a " tyrant," who 
usurped the nation's rights, by these Pecksniffian pa- 
triots. Morton actually did the work of a tyrant at this 

1 Cf. ante, p. 240. 



PARTY ESTRANGEMENT 261 

time, when leading the State of Indiana in the way its 
people wished, but where a momentary fickle majority 
of Democrats, possessed of the legislative machinery, 
would have repudiated his action. Not since the early 
Greek kingdoms has more wholesome tyranny been ex- 
ercised by a people's representative in the interest of a 
people. Names do not always convey things. Morton 
did these things without sovereignty, while Seymour was 
laboring to explain to the "Empire" State in what 
sovereignty consisted, for its millions of people. Tn 
1863, the more salient of these exciting forces were 
marked out, contested, and subdued by great popular 
victories in the Western elections. 

An extraordinary political tremor affected the body 
politic, in the revolt within the Republican party against 
Lincoln's leadership that occurred early in 1864. Like 
all misdirected political strategy, it proved to be a 
boomerang. Chase, Wade, Stevens, Wilson, and the 
rest, in exalting themselves and in magnifying their own 
political parts to depress Lincoln, finally raised the plain 
man of the West to a higher elevation, and into the 
very best appreciation of the American people. 

The presidential campaign against the Democrats in 
1864 was a thorough popular course of instruction in 
the issues of government. The subtle fallacies of Sey- 
mour and Hendricks, wrapped in the smooth garments 
of party representations and colored by party phrase- 
ology, deluded too many sincere Democrats, as it was. 
But, on the whole, the people comprehended that any 
assertion of state sovereignty, however modified and 
veiled, while other States were in armed rebellion, would 
certainly end in some form of resistance to the law. 



262 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

And with General Dix they perceived that to be, at this 
juncture, "the very blackest of political crimes." 1 

The able, candid, masterful words of Lincoln, 2 uttered 
in this period, that " force, dissolution, compromise " 
were the only sufficient categories to convey and con- 
trol passing events; that force, having been under- 
taken, must be accompanied and completed by force ; 
that force in its imperative straits had embraced the 
black man enslaved, then had rendered him into the 
freedmair and armed patriot ; that " white ones with 
malignant heart and deceitful speech " had hindered, 
but could not prevent, this triumphant progress of hu- 
manity, — these positive affirmations, interpreted aright 
and converted into executive action, by the greatest 
statesman of the time, saved the United States in 1864 
from dissolution and from possible anarchy. 

1 Cf. ante, p. 238. 2 Cf. ante, p. 247. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 

THE progress of our discussion moved beyond the 
succession of events, through the necessity of as- 
certaining the new developments of party organization, 
brought about by the efforts for suppressing the rebel- 
lion. We have been occupied mainly with the relations 
of the administration with the governments of the States. 
We are now coming to its direct contact with the people 
of those States. 

The Union in the first year, or thereabouts, after the 
election of Lincoln, found a way to coerce a state. In 
the twenty months following, more or less, it confronted 
another problem, whose successful issue was not. less es- 
sential to its existence. As we have attempted to show, 
if events in the first year had so shaped themselves, 
there might have been a comparatively easy struggle, 
overcoming the Confederacy, before it could organize its 
whole strength to resist the forces of order and good 
government. It was not so to be ; and after volunteer- 
ing had exhausted the ready supply of men available 
at the North, the administration was urged eagerly, 1 
by its loyal supporters in the summer of 1862, to draft 
for military service. It proved, after some disastrous 
troubles, that it was as easy to compel each individual 
citizen to support a central government as it finally was 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, pp. 212, 223, 422. 



264 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

to show that each State must support that government. 
This was not a new discovery or application of govern- 
mental force. The fathers of the republic had foreseen 
that, to make it a competent government, it might be 
necessary to bring every citizen capable of bearing arms 
into the service of the whole people. 1 

But peace had been so general in the happy conditions 
of the isolated republic, so long continued, excepting 
the petty Mexican War, that the individual citizen had 
come to believe that political liberty was the free exer- 
cise of his individual will. How could there be a theo- 
retical harness for body and limbs which had never 
known gall or pressure. The will of the people had 
been exerted magnificently in 1861, when individual 
volunteers had been carried along by currents of en- 
thusiasm, which exalted and possibly substituted them- 
selves for the exciting force of individual impulse. 

Now the situation had changed. The causes of con- 
troversy had widened and deepened until the whole 
organization of society and the constitutional founda- 
tions of government were imperiled, as it seemed to 
some timid and conscientious citizens. There were not 
wanting fair-weather preceptors who could prove that 
it was the business of a written constitution, not to save 
the life of the country, but to save the least of its own 
technical details. 

These differing opinions had passed beyond the sphere 
of regular political action. They had come to affect the 
proper allegiance of the citizen in the very essence of 

1 An act in amendment was passed in 1795, to call forth the militia 
" to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel in- 
vasions." — O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 280. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 265 

his connection with government itself. We must re- 
member that rebels North and rebels South were crea- 
tures absolutely different. History may deal with one 
sort as mistaken rebels and failing revolutionists. The 
other sort were recreant and apostate citizens. Official 
position and representative trust only increased their 
proper responsibility. It could not diminish the obliga- 
tion of their duty. As early as January 8, 1862, Thomas 
A. Hendricks had said in a Democratic convention in 
Indiana, " Fanaticism, bigotry, and sectional hatred are 
doing the work of evil upon a great, generous, and 
noble people. ... If the failure and folly and wicked- 
ness of the party in power render a Union impossible, 
then the mighty Northwest must take care of herself." 1 
We have noted the effect of these arguments on each 
individual as they affected recruiting in Iowa. 2 July 9, 
Governor Morton and his state officers sent a memorial 
to the President urging the " vital importance " of a 
law for enrollment and draft. " We send you this as 
the result of our conclusions from what we know of the 
condition of the Northwest. This is confidential." 3 

The loyal element of the Northwest had set forth the 
simple fact, the " government needs men." Then, as 
always, these stalwart patriots, bred from all the blood 
and bone of the whole American stock, embodied the 
strongest current of the national life. Like the absorb- 
ing current of their own Mississippi, their national de- 
sire flooded every source ; and would burst all barriers 
in its way to the gulf, in its onward course toward 
national power and prosperity. 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 173. 2 Cf. ante, p. 220. 

3 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 212. 



266 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Traditions, institutions, improvised organizations — 
supporting the administration — had failed gradually 
in developing the largest possible army. The essential 
characteristics of an army, in the European sense, are 
" its national character — that is its representing more or 
less the will and the power of the nation or its rulers." 1 
In America, the actual foundation of the army must be 
in the people, " the mass of persons inhabiting a place ; 
subjects or citizens, as distinguished from their rulers 
or from men of rank and authority in any profession ; 
the commonalty ; the populace ; usually preceded by 
the definite article." 2 Is the definition sufficient ? 

The wisest may well pause and study the significance 
of the word. It carries within its etymological structure 
a whole leaf out of the history of civilization, an em- 
bodiment of political progress. In the early days of 
the Roman Republic, being included with the Senate, 
it formed a governing class entirely distinct from the 
populace or plebeians. In those primitive times, when 
coordinated with the Senate in the business of govern- 
ment, it was socially and politically a subordinate aris- 
tocracy. From this strict classification, the word has 
gradually widened its scope, until it includes all the 
effective members of the American body politic. In 
royal governments, kings always said, " My People." 
This phrase was a political ideal toward which the actual 
socio-political fact has constantly tended. 

Do not imagine that this historical evolution is easily 
traced, or that it always moves in plain, direct lines. 
Blackstone, reflecting the movement of the eighteenth 
century, loosely defines people in two senses. The first 

1 Encyclopedia Britannica. 2 Century Dictionary. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 267 

includes all human beings in a country, governors or 
subjects, male or female. These he divides again into 
aliens and natural born subjects, or into clergy and laity. 
The second definition puts king and parliament into one 
class, while all other members of English society are 
included in the term people. These classifications have 
been severely criticised, but they were perhaps the best 
working- definitions of the time and circumstance. The 
subtle evolution of the word is fairly reflected in a 
phrase uttered about 1825, by Viennet : " The people 
is now proud as a gentleman. In the greatest lord, 
it would see only a man." 

We shall better comprehend the great political signif- 
icance of the term, if we separate and distinguish the 
purely social part of the meaning. The United States 
was formerly classed, by capable thinkers, under the 
aristocratic forms of government. 1 In a political sense, 
our country has almost literally realized the royal phrase, 
" my people." Excepting the South, with its abnormal 
race problem, no American community would think of 
excluding from the people as a political society any one 
who was not an alien or a criminal. Socially, the word 
is used in a different sense. To define and exclude the 
rich, we say " common people ; " or we say rich and 
poor people ; or people of a city, as distinguished from 
that of the country. Though wealth is potent in Amer- 
ica in many ways, rich persons have no political recog- 
nition. 

The French distinctions, stated so forcibly by Viennet, 
could not have the same significance here. If we con- 
strue them in the broadest sense, to embody the intan- 

1 Lewis, Political Terms, p. 79. 



268 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

gible results of wealth and culture, — a fine expression of 
social refinement, — yet they would not apply in Amer- 
ican society. The term gentleman has often been re- 
stricted to the ways of a particular class; then to an 
affectation of the manners of that class. But there is a 
larger signification of the noble term, in which all would 
agree, and would apply it to universal manners. A bare- 
foot boy, yielding the privilege of the pavement to a 
lady, would be called a gentleman by every one. This 
is the popular aspiration for the ideal embodied in the 
French apothegm, where the people would bring itself 
to the imaginary perfection of a lord, and itself realize 
and put forth the completed man. 

People, in a political sense, must not be confounded 
with the electorate. People includes men, women, and 
children, and it means the basal form, the raw material 
of the whole political organism. Voting electors are the 
first defined political organ, the people being an amor- 
phous political substance. If we consider it as plasma, 
and the electorate as protoplasma, then representatives 
— in town, county, state, or national government — are 
the rudimentary organs and expressions of the popular 
will. The American representative has gone through 
various forms and methods of responsibility, but he has 
tended toward a more and more direct obligation to his 
principal, the electorate. An American politician never 
says " my patrons " or " my fellows," he always addresses 
" my constituents." There have been many aristo- 
cratic tendencies in different parts of the United States, 
which might have grown into oligarchy under favoring 
circumstances. The reason of the contrary drift, and the 
wholesome democratic growth of our country, is to be 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 269 

found in the ordered autonomy of the people. The 
simple personal element, the innate dignity of man, has 
been gradually growing and expressing itself better and 
better. This mastering factor of personality has pre- 
vailed over institutions and environment, and it is con- 
stantly renewed from the people. 

So forcible an illustration out of our own time of the 
essential power of man in politics and state-craft is 
ready to our hand that it must be mentioned, for it 
will accord with the consciousness of every one and 
harmonize with his aspiration. Theodore Roosevelt was 
a simple man, out of the best sort of people. He took 
politics simply, doing the nearest duty manfully. Of- 
ficial position adopted him, on account of his excellence ; 
for the bosses not merely neglected him, they despised 
him and his whole scheme of political evolution. He 
made mistakes, but they were forgiven. War stimulated 
and made manifest his sterling qualities ; then the bosses 
of his native State made him governor. Likewise the 
greatest bosses made him second officer of the republic, 
to secrete him neatly, to conceal this honest scion of 
the people, to hold him out of the political current, 
which might carry him to the headship of the nation. 
Circumstances made him president; then he outgener- 
aled the bosses at their own game. The people, out of 
its great heart, recognized a man, and made him chief 
by a magnificent majority. Secure in this preponderat- 
ing representative capacity, he led the nation to a task 
considered impossible in the old world. He arrested two 
great empires — battling with the largest armies ever 
known — and brought them to confer peaceably at a 
little town in America. When conference flagged, his 



270 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

courageous initiative and persistent energy entreated the 
magnaminous spirit of the protagonists into the ways of 
reason, and finally brought peace to the anxious world. 
The T§ar of Russia congratulated him on the " success- 
ful conclusion owing to your personal efforts." Iu all 
the wonderful career of Roosevelt, the man has pre- 
vailed. 

The term nation has a certain meaning which must 
be considered in this connection. It might be argued 
that nation is coming to mean in these days a type of 
structure instead of a line of descent. " Each nation 
has its customs, its manners, and each people has its 
government." Lineage, language, historical tradition, 
inherited laws, at times any or all of these make a na- 
tion. In this sense, we ascend from the family, through 
the tribe and horde, into a nation. Something more 
than this makes a people. The office of king, elective 
or hereditary, as distinguished from a tribal chieftain, 
came from the people. 

Nation and nationality are often improperly con- 
founded with the idea of the state. Helie well says : 
" The nation is the moral body, independent of political 
revolutions, because it is constituted by inborn qualities 
which render it indissoluble. The state is the ' people 
organized into a political body.'" The exigencies of 
European politics do not allow the full force there 
of this definition. As examples we have the relations of 
Alsace and Lorraine to the German and of Ireland to 
the British Empire. In a composite government and a 
composite society like the United States, these factors 
are necessarily merging rapidly into one new order. I 
give below a large definition of the state. It suffices now 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 271 

to consider in this relation the specific analysis of Helie. 
The South, animated by the will of the moral body, — 
impelled by slavery, — attempted to control the people 
organized into a political body, which was the United 
States. The attempt failed, for the whole mastered the 
parts. 

Various causes formed the European nations and 
states ; one overwhelming political cause formed the 
United States. This controlling political factor modified 
the previous traditional, hereditary, or circumstantial 
causes that shaped the life of European communities. 
In Plato's twofold idea of the state — i. e., individuals 
leaning together for the satisfaction of many differ- 
ing wants — stability and desire were balanced. The 
despotic form of state, where individuals were remorse- 
lessly sacrificed to stability, was passing away in the 
more enlightened Grecian time. For thorough stability 
it is necessary to give to the modern state or political 
entity much of the personal and moral quality con- 
stituted in the nation-element, as it is rendered in 
Helie' s definition I have cited. Contrariwise, when a 
state is surely grounded politically, it can allow much 
latitude to personal and individual freedom. 

We shall understand our own peculiar conditions if 
we study separately the very different affairs of Europe. 
No one has weighed this serious problem more carefully 
than the thoughtful Renan, or set it forth in more bril- 
liant expression. 1 He holds it a great error to confound 
race with nation and to attribute sovereignty to ethno- 
graphic or rather linguistic groups. France, England, 
Germany, and Russia will be for hundreds of years 

1 Lalor, Cyclopedia, vol. ii, 924. 



272 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

" historic individuals." This, as will be perceived, is a 
modern and is not the ancient rendering of the term na- 
tion. The Germanic peoples, in the period fifth to tenth 
centuries, did not change the races of France, Italy, or 
Spain, but, imposing aristocratic government upon them, 
they made a " fusion of the peoples." A French citizen 
may be a Gaul, Burgundian, or Visigoth, or all of these 
tog-ether. The essence of a nation is that individuals 
must have many things in common, "also must have 
forgotten many tilings." In this sense the nation is the 
historic result, a series of facts all tending to the same 
end. Dynastic causes may prevail ; they are not abso- 
lute, as we see in Switzerland and in the United States. 
Nation is not based on race ; there is no pure race. 
Nor upon language ; language invites to union but 
does not compel it. Languages are historic formations 
that " give little indication of the blood of those who 
speak them." * Religion, which once comprehended the 
very existence of the social group, is not the key ; nor 
is community of interests nor geography. A nation, ac- 
cording to Renan, is a great " solidarity," constituted 
by the sentiment proceeding from sacrifices that have 
been made, and anticipating those the community is 
still disposed to make. It supposes a past. " Man is 
not the slave of his race, his tongue, his religion, or 
of rivers or mountain chains. A great aggregation of 
men, of sound mind and warm heart, creates a moral 
conscience, which is called a nation." Another French 
writer, M. Block, has said that nationality is an impor- 

1 " The Poles are a nation, speak one language, broadly of one race, 
but are citizens of their separate states. The Swiss are a nation, citizens 
of one state, but they speak at least three languages." — Wyndham. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 273 

tant political element, not necessarily a controlling one. 
It is a sentiment of doubtful purity and " does not flow 
generally from justice or personal dignity, but from 
hatred of the foreigner, and frequently from ignorance." 
Barbarisms and despotisms often nourish powerful 
nationalities. Authorities generally agree that it is a 
hindrance rather than a help in the higher course of 
political development, which is coming to inspire and 
regulate civilization. 

We may now define people in its largest political 
significance. It includes peoples, nations in the lineal 
sense, and races in one amalgam. This is a new sover- 
eign or governmental stuff. It may make kingdoms, 
empires, or republics, according to the nature and cir- 
cumstantial development of the stuff. Mr. Roosevelt x 
has shown an exact socio-political parallel to this 
genesis and evolution of a political people in his study 
of the settlements formed on the Western slopes of 
the Alleghanies. The Scotch-Irish race mingled with 
English, a few German, Dutch, and Huguenot French 
families formed the social fringe of the Atlantic col- 
onies and States. This pioneer vanguard of civiliza- 
tion made a singularly homogeneous mass of back- 
woodsmen. Whatever their origin or previous locality, 
they were all alike and were all American backwoods- 
men in the socio-political work which had fallen to 
them. To hunt bear or Indian, to plant corn, to call 
a county meeting, to marry their children, to preach 
and pray, to organize courts of justice, — all these 
varying steps in civilized life became their daily walk 
by almost preternatural intuition. The people moved 

1 Winning of the West, vol. i. 



274 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

forward with one purpose and generally with one 
method. 

While the process was more dramatic and picturesque 
in the limited opportunity of the eighteenth century, it 
was essentially similar in the nineteenth century. An 
equivalent fusion of race characteristics and previous 
experiences has been proceeding and working itself out 
in all the United States. This elastic backwoods ele- 
ment, mingling with itself citizens from the old At- 
lantic States and a constant stream of immigrants from 
Europe, has settled and improved our section of this 
continent, especially the portion called the West and 
Northwest. Combining blood, hereditary experience 
and national tendency, it has formed the amalgam of 
the American people ; and as President Walker pointed 
out, has made the formation of the completed Amer- 
ican character. The experience of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, colonial settlement, revolution^and 
establishment of the Union, all led up to the formation 
of these great Western communities, on a new basis and 
through a new ideal. These new States did not look to 
the American past, — such as it was, — to the historic 
consciousness of Atlantic communities, or to the embers 
of European nationalities and races, for life and inspira- 
tion ; the new States looked to the Union, the American 
mother of their political being. The Anglo-American 
George Washington of 1789 became the Western Amer- 
ican Abraham Lincoln of 1861. Thus, though we may 
have had no national past in Renan's sense, his ideal 
of a nation with a distinct moral purpose has been 
perhaps more fully realized here than anywhere else in 
the world. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 275 

We have treated of the social and political population, 
with the underlying nation grown out of historic causes 
and more or less sentimentally developed. This process 
gave us the American people, a moving political amal- 
gam, living with a moral purpose diffused and circu- 
lating through the States, then concentrating and cher- 
ishing its ideal in the heart of the States — the Union. 
We must now consider our people as one family, in 
which a great and significant admixture of blood has 
been made. The facts of this historic mixture have 
constituted a problem which has vexed many thinkers, 
and has brought terror and blind fears to the hearts of 
many patriotic Americans. I believe this race-problem 
can be solved by the same great and overruling politi- 
cal principle which has prevailed in our history, and 
especially in our Civil War. 

Any study of races and the progress of races must 
regard the great truth, that character always surpasses 
mere intelligence in the development of humanity. 1 De- 
clining Rome had more intelligence, finer minds, and 
better culture than the Republic, but there was far less 
of character and that virtue which builds and sustains 
communities. The Eastern empire — the most cultured 
region of its time — was easily overcome by Moham- 
medan barbarians, ignorant of literature and art, but 
possessing the faculties fitted both for conquest and for 
self-control. 

When we enter the advanced period of a civilization, 
intelligence and the work of the intellect assume a 
new importance. So much force has been engendered 
through the progress of society itself, that intelligence 

1 Le Bon, Les Premieres Civilisations, p. 151. 



276 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

in individuals must be had to direct and move forward 
the great mechanism which the progress of society has 
created. Creative and not mere assimilating intelligence 
then becomes the directing power in a society possess- 
ing the dominant energies which generations of char- 
acter have accumulated. 

This hasty survey indicates some features of the 
paths trodden by the great races or types of mankind 
in their past development. Doubtless, the main subdivi- 
sions of the Aryan race, like the Latin and Germanic, 
or Celtic and Teutonic branches, were fixed long ago — 
at an early period in the great business of race mak- 
ing. Yet it is an essential part of this study to bring 
out the modifying tendencies which have characterized 
sub-races. In illustration of this great process, we can 
almost see the Saxon Englishman, seeking and adopting 
those social conditions that tended toward self-govern- 
ment. His Frankish kinsman implanted his gallant, 
chivalric nature in the very bosom of the Gaulish Celts. 
The Armorican Celt engrafted his loyal chieftain- 
loving self upon the stronger, deeper, never yielding 
Iberic — that toughest of races, so far as we know. 
The Norseman varied from the great Teutonic stock in 
a way and fashion peculiarly his own. 

These races, — with others, — acting under the condi- 
tions of feudal society, made our modern Europeans, 
i. e., the men of England, France, Germany, Ireland, 
etc. The Roman culture, through government, law, and 
religion, affected them all, but affected them in very 
different proportions. As I have indicated, this concur- 
rent movement of civilization made the conditions of a 
breed — an environment which moved alono; with the 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 277 

race movement and tendency. It was a social and po- 
litical breed, and the resulting progeny was transferred 
to America. The English Teutons — not only by their 
numbers, but through their self-governing capacity — 
took the political lead in the new colonies. All the 
larger features of these differing races came into action 
here under new conditions. The positive changes of 
life here stimulated the strong elements, and at the 
same time tended to slough off the weaker elements of 
race. 

We are to remember this was not a mere welding of 
the race-metal, a new arrangement of the layers of the 
old structure. The American crucible, driven by a fierce 
political heat, was reducing these old organisms into a 
molten stream, a new form of life. Race itself, the root 
structure, was modified and worked over into new forms 
and new social organisms. The elastic nature of Amer- 
ican society enabled it to vary the plastic races into new 
types of individuals and families. For example, Andrew 
Jackson was an Irishman, but what biologist or philoso- 
pher can identify him with any Celtic stock in Europe ? 
The American social and political crucible changed the 
old institutions of family tribe and nobility, intended 
to perpetuate power in classes. In consequence, only 
the strongest individuals survived to inherit and perpet- 
uate the new system. Weak scions, depending on old 
institutions, had not enough vitality to project them- 
selves into the new social life. Accordingly the American 
race, as such, was being bred from the stronger indi- 
viduals of the old races. 

It was inevitable that the positive change in the 
American state, a change going to the foundations of 



278 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

society, should alter many conditions of heredity, as 
they had existed. The revolution was a political change 
with far-reaching consequences. Personal organization, 
personal force embodied in the state, as above men- 
tioned, was relegated to individual citizens. The state, 
instead of representing the few, had become the pro- 
perty of the many. Neither property nor privilege con- 
trolled the state now. The tribal ascriptions of chief- 
tains became the inheritance of electors and voters. All 
this was an essential political development. The citizen 
was now a constituent of the political power, exerting 
political force — as distinguished from tribal, aristo- 
cratic, or theocratic powers, putting forth social forces. 
From the new political conditions there came new 
social opportunities and new energies. The individuals 
and families of the United States were in a new social 
atmosphere. Whether immigrants were English, Irish, 
Dutch, or French, their children took a new bent from 
the life surrounding- them. The evolution of individual 
and family life, conflicting with as well as assimilating 
to social conditions, has been the constant theme of 
drama, romance, and novel. Especially in Europe, and 
in local districts of England, has the struggle of individ- 
ual freedom with necessary social environment been de- 
picted in fiction truer than common life. Race has been 
the main stem from which these social fibres were drawn 
out. The political race or people thus brought out from 
the liquefying and annealing process of American life 
has moulded the nation into the solid structure of the 
state. The controlling political element — the flavor, 
so to speak — of the racial development was in the An- 
glo-Germanic tendency toward self-government. The 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 279 

impulse of the individual citizen moved from his own 
centre, but always tended toward the political action 
and conduct of his fellows. This political tendency, 
strangely difficult for Latins and Celts, became easy 
enough for any stock of Americans, carried into new 
racial grooves by the movement of the Anglo-Germans, 
including the Dutch. The political race-tendency was 
extended by its new opportunity, then reacted upon 
this opportunity in the formation of the American state. 
Local institutions firmly grounded the individual citizen 
in his right of initiative and in its corresponding re- 
straint of self-control. Thus person, family, race, nation 
were fused into one grand political current — the peo- 
ple. The people took on a majesty more than human, 
and less than divine. 1 

We have been dealing chiefly in our study with the 
larger human elements of the people, as this great 
passionate body-politic was summoned to sustain the 
government of the Union. Now we must take up the 
average, and include the lower part of the populace, 
which in any long tide of human affairs must help to 
govern as well as be governed in working out its destiny. 

August 4, 1862, under the authority of Congress, 2 
the President called for 300,000 militia, giving the 

1 Since this was written, President Roosevelt, December, 1904, has 
defined an American eclectic ideal in his message : " Good Americanism 
is a matter of heart, of conscience, of lofty aspiration, of sound common 
sense, but not of birthplace or creed." 

2 " After a protracted searching and animated discussion, extending 
through nearly the whole of the short session of the Thirty-seventh 
Congress, the enrollment act was passed, and became a law by which the 
government of the United States appealed directly to the nation to 

create large armies without the intervention of the several States." — 

O. R., Series III, vol. v, 611. 



280 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

States opportunity to fill their old quotas by volunteer- 
ing until August 15. ! As has been noted, great efforts 
were made to escape the draft in the East. Vermont, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island nearly filled their 
quotas, while New Jersey exceeded by a few. New York 
furnished few men, and the West substantially none. 
August 9, the order for enrollment and draft was is- 
sued. 2 Applications were made from many States for 
postponement. Orders were issued to all the governors, 
August 27, that the department could not postpone 
generally, but would " leave the responsibility of any 
delay with those who make it." ! New York, as well as 
others, proceeded rapidly with the enrollment, according 
to the circumstances of each ; and all the governors 
sharpened their pencils to figure closely populations, 
quotas, deficits, etc. Morton expressed the feeling of 
all: — 

As long as volunteers were called for, we were unwilling 
to consider quotas, and desired no limit but our capacity to 
furnish men ; but the idea of drafting is offensive to our 
people, and should not be extended so as to require us to fur- 
nish more than our proportion of the whole number called for 
under the several calls. It is not the fault of our people that 
the old regiments are not full. Every regiment is full that 
has had recruiting officers here for the past three weeks. 4 

And he said, August 31, " We not only desire, but 
will insist, on furnishing our full quota." 5 Governor 
Curtin reported 6 a large number of volunteer substi- 
tutes to avoid draft in their locality. He was obliged to 
hasten the department in its musters to " relieve us 

i 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 291. 2 Ibid., p. 333. 3 Ibid., p. 471. 
4 Ibid., p. 485. B Ibid., p. 495. 8 Ibid., p. 596. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 281 

from much trouble and dissatisfaction. We must treat 
the draft delicately in this State." 1 He was none too 
careful, for resistance by force in several districts was 
reported October 22. 2 But the serious troubles from 
resistance did not come until the following summer. 3 

The actual business of the enrollment and draft was 
begun anew after the Act, March 3, 1863. Colonel 
James B. Fry, Asst. Ad. G. U. S. A., a most able and 
impartial officer, was detailed as Provost-Marshal-Gen- 
eral of the United States. 4 He asked the cooperation 
of various officials in the States, especially Governor 
Curtin and Mayor Opclyke of New York city. 5 He sug- 
gested a definite course of action, especially for making 
up deficiencies under the various calls of the President 
for troops, before making a " regular " draft. May 2, 
he reported a full balance-sheet showing the excess and 
deficiencies of the several States in filling quotas. 6 This 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 651. 

2 Ibid., p. 679, and Series I, vol. xix, pt. ii, p. 468. Governor Curtin 
called on General Wool at Baltimore, September 3, for assistance in 
enforcing enrollment. The general reported that with other troubles to 
the War Department in a captious manner : " If a State cannot enforce 
its own laws without U. S. soldiers, we may as well give up at once. 
The odium ought not to be thrown on the U. S. troops ; there is no 
necessity for so doing." — Ibid., p. 509. Quite like an old-fashioned 
" regular." 

3 In his report, December 1, the Secretary of War said : " A chief 
hope of those who set the rebellion on foot was for aid and comfort from 
disloyal sympathizers in the Northern States, whose efforts were relied 
upon to divide and distract the people of the North, and prevent them 
from putting forth their whole strength to preserve the national exist- 
ence. The call for volunteers and a draft of the militia afforded an occa- 
sion for disloyal persons to accomplish their evil purpose by discouraging 
enlistments and encouraging opposition to the war and the draft of sol- 
diers to carry it on." — Ibid., p. 903. 

4 Ibid., vol. Hi, 74. 5 Ibid., pp. 166, 169. 
6 Ibid., pp. 180, 185. 



282 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

is a very curious statement of the results of the great 
popular demonstrations of 1861-62. The localities of 
these figures should be mentioned with bated breath, 
for many circumstances affected the operations, which 
were at last condensed into columns of figures. Illinois 
was far ahead of all her sisters, with an excess of 40,000 
men. New York had a small surplus, and little Rhode 
Island exceeded according to her population. As in- 
dicated above, we should not inquire too curiously why 
Massachusetts and Vermont were in arrears. 

Governor Seymour had been in office in New York 
since January, and he was asked by Secretary Stanton, 
May 20, to " visit him in Washington for conference." 
He postponed acceptance, as he was " organizing a 
vigorous system of recruiting, which I hope will do 
away with the necessity of making any draft in New 
York." > 

Law seems to be fated in its nature to excite violence, 
and a very few criminals can convulse a whole com- 
munity of good citizens. June 11, two of the officers 
employed in making the enrollment in Indiana were 
murdered by only two men ambushed in a wheat field. 
The enrollment proceeded quietly in the " subdistrict in 
which the murder was committed, the people affording 
every facility in their power to insure its speedy com- 
pletion." There were many cases of resistance in 
Pennsylvania, even taking the " shape of intimidation 
by secret incendiarism and attempted assassination." 3 
In almost all the districts of Pennsylvania the enroll- 
ment proceeded " slowly and regularly." In one district 

1 O.R., Series III, vol. iii, 214. 2 Ibid., pp. 340, 347. 

8 Ibid., pp. 350-353. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 283 

" the people are defiant — so much so as to frighten any 
who feel disposed to undertake it. . . . They are part 
of an organized society in the county to resist the con- 
script act." 1 

In Indiana the outrages ending in the murders of 
Rush County were not as severely rebuked by the Demo- 
crats as was hoped for. " The Democratic gentlemen 
fear their own party friends, and, I think, are appre- 
hensive that obedience to law is a doctrine to preach 
which might impair their party standing. The nomina- 
tion of Vallandigham in Ohio has, I think, increased 
their doubts." 2 Men drafted and failing to appear were 
treated as deserters. Writs of habeas corpus, claiming 
these culprits on various grounds, were applied for in 
New York State. 3 

June 18, another murder was committed in Sullivan 
County, Indiana. General Burnside of the Department 
of Ohio advised the proclamation of martial law in that 
county. Hon. Daniel Voorhees, representing the sev- 
enth district in Congress, " professes to greatly desire to 
avoid the effusion of blood, and pledged himself to go 
immediately to Sullivan County. ... If he keeps his 
promise, I have no doubt the enrollment will be made 
without resistance." 4 Hon. Schulyer Colfax, a distin- 
guished Republican, was likewise asked to stimulate the 
" efficiency " of enrollment in his district. In Sullivan 
County a resistance was organized that the " enroll- 
ment should not take place." They were drilling and 
claimed " 2000 already armed and as many more in 
Illinois, who will come to their assistance when neces- 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. Hi, 357. 2 Ibid., p. 354. 

8 Ibid., pp. 378-380. 4 Ibid., pp. 391-394. 



284 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

sary." Governor Morton was absent from home when 
matters threatened most. Marshal Baker reported, June 
22, that the enrollment would be completed without 
" serious conflict," l though he thought careful prepara- 
tion should be made against resistance when the actual 
draft should take place. The draft was ordered July 7, 
1863. 2 Any person drafted could furnish a substitute, 
or could pay the government three hundred dollars to 
be freed from the draft. Colonel Fry divided the loyal 
States into districts, and appointed assistant provost- 
marshals, who were selected with great care in concert 
with the governors of States. 3 

In Massachusetts there was no difficulty in the enroll- 
ment. When the draft was ordered, Governor Andrew 
took every precaution to prevent disturbance in the cities. 
The only serious disturbance was in Boston, July 14. 4 
An immense throng of rioters stoned the armory in 
Cooper Street, and tried to force an entrance. The 
troops fired, and several rioters were killed, which vir- 
tually scattered the mob. The police were very efficient, 
and in a few days the military were relieved from ser- 
vice, as quiet prevailed. 

If we would comprehend the force of incidents in 
the prosecution of the draft, and the causes of the riots 
consequent in New York city, we must study the char- 
acteristics of Horatio Seymour, governor of the State. 
In the era of good feeling it became sometimes the 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 397. 

2 Ibid., p. 467. 

3 " The law made it the duty of the bureau to take, but did not make 
it the duty of any one to give the names of those liable to draft. Every 
imaginable artifice was adopted to deceive and defeat the enrolling offi- 
cers. Open violence was sometimes met with." — Ibid., vol. v, 618. 

4 Schouler, Mass., p. 479. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 285 

fashion to treat him as " a patriot," misguided but true 
in his affections and in his desire to sacrifice himself 
in his country's interest as he conceived it. This is an 
absolute contradiction. I have been particular in de- 
scribing the incidents which occurred in other States. 
These affairs showed that the troubles incident to the 
draft, or to any strong measure of government, could be 
met, and were met, by a firm exercise of governing 
powers in the action of those responsible for good order. 
If we take the plain statements of Governor Sey- 
mour's message on entering office, January 7, 1863, we 
perceive a new kind of political animal, hardly conceived 
of by Aristotle. He imagined himself to be not a mere 
citizen of the United States, but a kind of subordi- 
nate sovereign — governor of New York State — bound 
to work out a policy differing from the then policy of 
the Union, or from any policy possible for the govern- 
ment of the Union, constituted as it was and must be 
for years to come. I claim that this was the most super- 
human scold ever uttered, but as proper political evolu- 
tion it was inconceivable. Davis and Stephens, with the 
governor of South Carolina, — under the curious cate- 
gories of Calhoun, — had found a way to enforce their 
ideas of a-overnin<r the United States at the cannon's 
mouth. In their case the great arbiter of politics — 
force — was trying out the issues of government. But 
there was no such issue possible for the peaceful 
Seymour. In his conception, New York, a constituent 
State of the loyal Union, — participating in its legisla- 
tion, — should undertake to maintain by its own dixit 
that the federal laws were unconstitutional. A draft 
must not be executed, because the governor of a partic- 



286 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

ular State considered that the laws authorizing* such 
draft were unconstitutional. This is not a mere theoret- 
ical view of a pragmatical situation. The people is our 
main theme in this connection, and the people must 
have chieftains and champions. The color of the one 
suffuses the other in this real situation. 

Governor Seymour considered that a dissolution of 
the Union was inevitable, and in the interests of peace 
it should be forwarded by him through the exercise of 
the constitutional rights of the State of New York. In 
his first message he begins, the constitutions of the 
United States and of New York are " equally sacred." 
Each is "to be upheld 1 in its respective jurisdiction." 2 
He urges "the inequality and injustice" 3 of the laws 
under which a draft was proposed. He states that the 
causes of the war were in a "pervading disregard of 
the obligations of laws and constitutions . . . above 
all in the local prejudices, which have grown up in the 
Atlantic States, the two extremes of our country. . . . 
We shall weaken the rebellion ; we shall unite our peo- 
ple ; and the world will recognize our capacity for 
self-government, when we show that we are capable 
of self-reform." 4 Then follow glittering generalities 
against all evils of government, with the maxim, it is 

1 Robert E. Lee said before the Committee of Congress on Reconstruc- 
tion, February 17, 1866: The advocates of secession considered " the act 
of the State (in seceding) as legitimate, that they were merely using the 
reserved right, which they had a right to do." — Boutwell, Sixty Years in 
Public Affairs, vol. ii, 83. This view of Lee and his associates corre- 
sponded with Seymour's. This "reserved right" in the local State was 
what Seymour was trying to bring out in New York. 

2 Message, p. 1. Original N. Y. Archives. 

3 Ibid., p. 11. 

* Ibid., pp. 15, 16. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 287 

"worse that a government should be overturned by 
corruption than by violence." 1 We " must restore the 
Union as it was before the war." 2 There are vague 
adjustments of political and other interests in case of 
" division of our Union into two or more confederacies." 3 
In these are threats against New England and the smaller 
States. Yet his conception of what a future Union — 
a whole or the dissolved parts — was to be is as uncertain 
as his executive course in maintaining law proved itself 
to be. " Let no one think that the people, who have 
refused to yield this Union to rebellion at the South, 
will permit its restoration to be prevented by fanaticism 
at the North." 4 In this particular line of his arguments 
the Union seemed to be a kind of sentimental fetish, like 
liberty or any abstract conception. All practicable mea- 
sures for restoration of the Union — except by subjection 
of the armed Confederacy — were repudiated virtually 
by one or another of the governor's arguments. 

We will now examine several reports from districts 
in the State, which manifest the feeling among the 
people, whose elected chief set forth his personal con- 
victions and official position in the manner related. 
These reports are dated a day or two after the riots in 
New York city and elsewhere, but they should be enter- 
tained now, in order that we may comprehend the actual 
situation of the people of the State, in so far as the 
elective majority represented them. From Albany As- 
sistant Provost-Marshal-General Townsend says : — 

The government of this State is in the hands of individ- 
uals whose party has not manifested at all times a cooperative 

1 Message, p. 19. 2 Ibid., p. 32. 

3 Ibid., pp. 37-39. 4 Ibid., p. 42. 



288 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

interest in the measures of the administration. . . . The draft 
of course has furnished to the leaders the pretext of a potent 
opposition to the general government. It is sufficiently ap- 
parent throughout the whole of this division that this oppo- 
sition is deeply seated among the great mass of the people, 
whose recklessness of consequences is wholly unaccountable, 
excepting upon the suspicion that it rests upon the security 
of numbers. 1 

He states that the local militia is not to be relied upon, 
and that the draft cannot be enforced without " a suf- 
ficiency of reliable troops." Marshal Richardson reports 
from Utica "a very large portion of the population, 
composed of the working and lower classes, including 
of course nearly all of the Irish and German element, 
are aroused to a dangerous degree in opposition to the 
conscription law. It is not to be doubted that there 
are many men in the district in the higher walks of life 
who secretly aid and abet the ignorant and designing 
persons who are combined against the laws." 2 

There was " desperate and. powerful organization," 
the local militia could not be depended upon, and 500 
troops would be needed to enforce the draft. 

The actual draft began, July 7, in Rhode Island, and 
on the 8th in Massachusetts, proceeding without serious 
resistance in most districts throughout the country. 
July 13, the riots in New York city began and lasted for 
four days. The results are well known : 3 a loss of 1000 
in killed and wounded, mostly of the mob, and damage 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. iii, p. 516. 2 Ibid., p. 528. 

8 " His (Seymour's) terror and his sympathy with the mob in conflict 
with his convictions of public duty completely unmanned him." He 
begged of his " friends: " "Wait till the adjutant-general returns from 
Washington, and ' you shall be satisfied.' " — Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii, 
22. James T. Brady, a prominent Democrat, wrote Secretary Stanton, 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 289 

to private property roughly estimated at JljSOOjOOO. 1 
These troubles only caused temporary interruption to 
the draft. It went forward throughout the country, 
and while it brought into the armies comparatively 
few recruits, it powerfully stimulated enlistments. 2 The 
States assisted these by bounties, and considerable 
money accrued to the general treasury, in payment for 
substitutes. 

If any think that the provost-marshals cited, and the 
present writer, failed or fail to construe aright the true 
situation in the State of New York, let them look into 
the statement of a competent observer on the spot and 
to the manner, born. John Jay, July 18, said to Sec- 
retary Stanton : — 

The restoration of order in the city is about being accom- 
plished by the aid of Governor Seymour, Judge McCunn, and 
Archbishop Hughes, and with the approval of the leaders of 
the rebels in New York. The riot had unexpectedly assumed 
a character which they could not safely indorse, and they pro- 
pose to stop it as quickly as possible. . . . The existing riots 
were not contemplated (in a secret organization) in the shape 
they took, and have interfered with the original plan. . . . 
This (the plan) is the last great card of the rebellion, and 
demands careful play on the part of the government, so that, 
without any surrender of the rights and dignity of the admin- 
istration, the proposed collision shall be rendered impossible. 
The rebels in this city have from the first been entirely con- 
condemning the governor's use of " friends." He thought the riot was 
the result of premature development of schemes to resist the draft. — 
Gorham, Stanton, vol. ii, 108. 

1 Cf. Rhodes, vol. iv, 321-330, a spirited account of the riots in New 
York and their suppression. I differ from Mr. Rhodes absolutely in his 
estimate of Seymour and the bearing of his executive acts. 

2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii, 7. 



290 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

fident of their final success. I was told a year ago by one of 
the most wealthy and fashionable bankers of New York that 
this administration would not be allowed to complete its 
term ; that it would be overthrown by an armed revolt in this 
city, and when I asked, " When and how will this be done?" 
he said sadly and solemnly : " I do not know when it will be 
done, nor how it will be done, but that it will be done I am 
as certain as that I stand here." This man has been assisting 
Governor Seymour to suppress these riots. . . . The Copper- 
heads (not counted as in the above " rebel " element) count 
on the remarkable reverence of the American people for the 
decisions of our courts as insuring them an immense support 
from all classes, in case the President should refuse to delay 
the enforcement of the draft until the new and disputed 
points were decided. 1 

Mr. Jay recommended temporizing and postponing 
further enforcement of the draft until decisions of .the 
courts could be had maintaining its integrity. Mean- 
while events could not wait for an entire stoppage of 
executive action to Avait for judicial action. A citizen, 
E. F. Bullard, reported from Saratoga Springs to Hon. 
Henry Wilson, July 21 : " There is more difficulty 
about the draft in this State than the authorities at 
Washington suspect. Our state militia is mainly offi- 
cered by open secessionists recently appointed by the 
governor. They will lead the mob in these counties. 
... I write this at the request of our leading men in 
the State." 2 The communication was indorsed by two 
provost-marshals. 

General Dix had been summoned and placed in com- 
mand of the Department of the East. July 30, he asked 
of Governor Seymour direct military assistance : — 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 540-542. 

2 Ibid., p. 553. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 291 

I am very anxious that there should be perfect harmony of 
action between the federal government and that of the State 
of New York, and if, under your authority to see the laws 
faithfully executed, I can feel assured that the act referred to 
will be enforced, I need not ask the War Department to put 
at my disposal troops in the service of the United States. 1 

Meanwhile Horatio Seymour had been going through 
almost every phase of hesitation, infirm purpose, and 
erratic will, possible to man. Called suddenly from 
Long Branch, he addressed the mob from the steps of 
the City Hall in a speech which his friends have never 
been able to explain, nor his critics to understand. He 
truckled to " my friends," the mob, and yet he issued 
on the same day proper proclamations, sustaining the 
cause of order. Many years after these events, Marshal 
Fry collected the evidence, and calmly set forth the 
whole story of the governor's action in the riots, which 
has not been contradicted, and which merits attention. 
He cites Governor Seymour's statement to a correspond- 
ent of the " New York Herald " 2 that " the riot was 
caused not only by an unjust enrollment, but by the 
way the draft was made." And it was begun without 
notice to General Wool (then commanding the Depart- 
ment of the East), Mayor Opdyke, or the governor of the 
State. These statements are rebutted 3 by the notices 
sent to Governor Seymour, July 6, 10, 13. Moreover, 
it was common report that the draft began in Rhode 
Island and Massachusetts, July 7,8. The "Herald" 
and " Times " said the provost-marshals " threw pru- 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 592. 

2 Fry, New York and the Conscription, p. 2, and cf. Nicolay and Hay, 
vol. vii, 14. 

3 Ibid., p. 23. 



292 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

dence, propriety, and common sense to the winds." 1 
The draft was conducted in New York and Brooklyn 
by Colonel Robert Nugent, an Irishman and war Demo- 
crat. Nor was there any good ground that the nature 
of the enrollment had any influence in producing the 
riot. " No complaint of the enrollment was received by 
the War Department from Governor Seymour or any 
one else until the riots had occurred." 2 The excuse was 
an afterthought. 

It is true that the draft was a Republican measure in 
the main, as all positive legislative measures were, but 
it was in no sense a partisan movement. President Lin- 
coln, in a letter to Count A. de Gasparin, said : " It seems 
strange even to me, but it is true that the government 
is now pressed to this course (a draft) by a popular 
demand." 3 Senators Richardson and McDougal, Demo- 
crats, both favored a draft, the latter regretting that 
" when this war was first organized the conscription 
rule did not obtain." 

Governor Seymour, on the other hand, was of those 
" who were against the wisdom of forcing men into the 
army, if not against the right of the government to so 
do." 4 Marshal Fry cites letters from Dix, Diven, and 
Canby, officers in the army, to show that the governor's 
hostility " was to the measure itself rather than to the 
manner of its execution." 5 The testimony of an eye- 
witness, Provost-Marshal Townsend, August 1, should 
be considered here : — 

1 The situation in New York was carefully weighed in advance by the 
President and the War Department. " The conclusions were that no ex- 
ception in the application of the law should be made in New York." — 
Fry, New York and the Conscription, p. 30. 

2 Ibid., p. 32. 3 Ibid., p. 10. * Ibid., p. 33. 5 Ibid., p. 35. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 293 

I have not, nor have I had, the slightest confidence in the 
state authorities in regard to the question of draft. I say this 
unofficially as a citizen, because I have no other evidence to 
base my feeling of distrust than what is patent to everybody 
in this State, and I suppose equally so at Washington, and 
also because I know Governor Seymour personally. . . . He 
and Fernando Wood are identical in sentiment, both suffi- 
ciently daring to attempt anything, but when the moment for 
action arrives, too cowardly to direct and execute. 1 

Fry states positively that the only guarantee to be 
obtained from Governor Seymour was that there should 
be " no infractions of the laws of the State." He was 
asked whether he would " aid in enforcing a law of the 
United States. He gave no assurance on that point." 

The governor authorized the statement by the " New 
York Times " in 1879 : " The draft riots of 1863 were 
put down mainly by the boldness and skill of the police 
department." 3 

The efforts do not appear to have been directed 
toward any improvement of matters at home. They 
tended toward the greatest pressure on the President 
to suspend the draft entirely until New York could 
make up her quotas through voluntary enlistment. It 
was necessary to bring out the foregoing facts — under- 
lying the social and political conditions of New York 
State — before we should entertain the important docu- 
ments to follow. August 1, the governor wired the 
President for delay in drafting, until he could send for- 
ward his appeal. The President asked how long. The 
remonstrance and appeal was dated August 3, though 

i 0. R., Series III, vol. Hi, 608. 

2 Fry, New York and the Conscription, p. 43. 

3 Ibid., p. 68. 



294 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

the President did not receive it until the 6th. 1 It is a 
very long and labored plea to put the administration in 
the wrong and to apologize for the riot, while claiming 
credit to the State for quelling disorder without help 
from without. If the community could so readily quell 
the trouble, we may ask why it was not guided in the 
right direction to prevent it in the beginning : — 

It gives a gratifying assurance of the ability of the greatest 
city of our continent to maintain order in its midst, under 
circumstances so disadvantageous, against an uprising so un- 
expected, and having its origin in questions deeply exciting 
to the minds of the great masses of its population. 2 

He directly charges unfair and gross mismanage- 
ment : — 

The provost-marshal commenced the draft without consult- 
ing with the authorities of the State or of the city. . . . Dis- 
regard for law and the disrespect for judicial tribunals pro- 
duced their natural results of robbery and arson, accompanied 
by murderous outrages upon a helpless race ; and for a time 
the very existence of the commercial metropolis of our coun- 
try was threatened. 3 

To make the supposed constitutional aberrations of 
Congress 4 and the misconduct of provost-marshals di- 
rectly responsible for the murder of the poor negroes 
was a flight of fancy worth} 7 of Seymour. Yet to obtain 
ground for such a grave charge, facts should be essen- 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 666. 2 Ibid., p. 613. 8 Ibid., p. 613. 

4 Mr. Lincoln prepared, though he did not publish, an elaborate argu- 
ment for the draft and the measures enforcing it. It was directed espe- 
cially toward conscientious loyal Democrats. The manuscript says: " They 
tell us the law is unconstitutional. It is the first instance, I believe, in 
which the power of Congress to do a thing has been questioned in a case 
where the power is given by the Constitution in express terms." — Nico- 
lay and Hay, vol. vii, 51. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 295 

tial even to a romancer. In another connection the 
governor says : " I do not doubt the impartiality of Colo- 
nel Fry." x The whole charge is groundless and is dis- 
proven absolutely by Colonel Fry, as we have noted. 2 
The idea that the germ of discord in the brain of the 
mob originated in unfair treatment was an excusing 
afterthought and not a true discovery. 

He asks that the draft " be suspended in New York," 
bringing out vaguely, and with much circumlocution, 
that the citizen is mainly affected by the fact that "the 
guilt of the rebellion consists in raising an armed band 
against constitutional or legal obligations." That the 
citizen believes the draft to be unconstitutional and in 
some way must be " protected " against this breach of 
the constitution. And we must bear in mind that much 
of this special pleading of Seymour bears against the 
inevitable burdens of government, administered how- 
ever it may be. All of this is to force the administra- 
tion to abandon its executive functions, while its armies 
are battling in the field, and to submit the draft laws 
to the courts for adjudication : 4 — 

The refusal of governments to give protection excites citi- 
zens to disobedience. The successful execution of the con- 
scription act depends upon the settlement by judicial tribunals 
of its constitutionality. 5 With such decisions in its favor, it 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 615. 

2 Ante, p. 292. 3 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 617. 

4 Secretary Stanton wrote Seymour that he had always intended to sub- 
mit the conscription law to judicial interpretation, whenever a "case" 
could be properly brought. Meanwhile "the executive is bound in its 
ministerial measures to assume the law to be constitutional." — Gorham, 
Stanton, vol. ii, 109. 

5 Two decisions in the U. S. Circuit Court in Pennsylvania and Illinois 



296 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

will have a hold upon the public respect and deference which 
it now lacks. A refusal to submit it to this test will be re- 
garded as evidence that it wants legality and binding force. 1 

He concludes with an admirable, general statement — 
sufficient in administrative force, if all citizens were 
Seymours. Unfortunately, the Bismarck element — in- 
volving "blood and iron" — cannot be neglected in 
time of war. " It will be but a little price to pay for 
the peace of the public mind; it will abate nothing 
from the dignity, nothing from the sovereignty, of the 
nation to show a just regard for the majesty of the laws 
and a paternal interest in the wishes and welfare of our 
citizens." 2 

Mr. Lincoln, a wise contestant, avoiding all meta- 
physic or eloquent expression, August 7, one day after 
receiving the appeal, answers it and goes to the root 
of the matter: — 

I cannot consent to suspend the draft in New York, as you 
request, because, among other reasons, time is too important. 
By the figures you send, which I presume are correct, the 
twelve districts represented fall into two classes of 8 and 4 
respectively. The disparity of the quotas for the draft in 
these two classes is certainly very striking, being the differ- 
ence of 2200 in one class and 4864 in the other. ... I shall 
direct the draft to proceed in all the districts, drawing, how- 
ever, at first, from each of the four districts, to wit, the sec- 
ond, fourth, sixth, and eighth only 2200, being the average 
quota of the other class. After this drawing, these four dis- 
tricts, and also the seventeenth and twenty-ninth, shall be 
carefully reenrolled, and, if you please, agents of yours may 
witness every step of the process. ... I do not object to 

finally affirmed the constitutionality of the law. An adverse decision in 
Pennsylvania was reversed afterward. — Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii, 13. 
1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 617. 2 Ibid., p. 619. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 297 

abide a decision of the United States Supreme Court on the 
constitutionality of the draft law. In fact, I should be will- 
ing to facilitate the obtaining of it, but I cannot consent to 
lose the time while it is being obtained. We are contending 
with an enemy, who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied 
man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher 
drives bullocks into a slaughter pen. No time is wasted ; no 
argument is used. This produces an army which will soon 
turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the field, if 
they are not sustained by recruits as they should be. It pro- 
duces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, 
if we first waste time to reexperiment with the volunteer sys- 
tem already deemed by Congress, and palpably in fact, so far 
exhausted as to be inadequate ; and then more time to obtain 
a court decision as to whether a law is constitutional which 
requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the 
aid of those who are already in it ; and still more to deter- 
mine with absolute certainty that we get those who are not to 
go. My purpose is to be in my action just and constitutional, 
and yet practical, in performing the important duty with 
whicli I am charged — of maintaining the unity and free prin- 
ciples of our country. 1 

Governor Seymour did not know when he was beaten. 2 
Incapable of comprehension and conviction, he contin- 
ued to declaim against "dishonest perversion of the 
law." His position was on shifting sands, and must be 
overwhelmed inevitably in the patriotic currents of 
popular feeling, even though he represented for the 
moment the selfish portion of the community ready to 
avoid military service by any expedient. If a tithe of 
Seymour's assertions had been true, the elections of the 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 635. August 11, the President reviewed 
and rebutted the technical arguments of Judge-Advocate-General Water- 
bury which complained of the enrollment. — Ibid., p. 666. 

2 Ibid., pp. 636, 639. 



298 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

autumn would have shown it. But there was no fur- 
ther substantial resistance to the draft. Had there 
been such actual trespass on the rights of the Amer- 
ican citizen as Governor Seymour and the lawyers of 
his kind deliberately charged, there would have oc- 
curred a sub-rebellion more ominous than the Southern 
revolt. 

Abraham Lincoln often manoeuvred as a politician for 
particular ends ; but he always held in mind the great 
principles underlying the state, and they ever carried 
him in unerring course to the successful lead of the 
people. This business of compelling the people against 
prepossession in a new political direction through a 
draft is a complete illustration of the greatness of the 
man and the president. It was a very difficult situation 
everywhere ; the difficulties culminated in the great 
State of New York. The State was under semi-hostile 
control and the friends of the Union advised compro- 
mise. Mr. Jay and his Republican neighbors had good 
reason for dreading the veiled secession-element in their 
State, and they naturally recommended some conces- 
sion to obtain an advantage over these half-alien citi- 
zens. But Abraham Lincoln knew better. He best 
comprehended the great governmental issues of the 
occasion as they underlay the life of the State, while 
he guided the people to a victorious solution of the im- 
mediate embarrassment. He prostrated the governor, 
and overthrew the little argument brought forward — 
in apology for half-hearted support of the administration 
— by his masterly conduct of detail in this controversy. 
He carefully separated the practical " disparity " actu- 
ally incurred through mistakes in the New York enroll- 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 299 

ment. The districts which had suffered were strictly 
discriminated and " protected " from the consequence 
of errors which had passed. 

Seymour, Fernando Wood, the " fashionable banker " 
of Jay, and their kind, must have gnashed teeth in rage, 
as their covert assaults on the necessary administration 
of the Union missed effect. It was the grave fault of 
these men, and not a mere misfortune, that they utterly 
failed to comprehend Lincoln, thinking him a "weak 
though well-meaning man." 1 It was not the business 
of a citizen of New York — much less of the governor 
of the State — to make critical estimate of the Presi- 
dent of the United States. Their duty was simple ; 
their course ought to have been to pay their taxes and 
to serve in the army for subduing the rebellion and 
sustaining the Union. Whether Lincoln was grotesque 
or elegant was not germane to the question. Like all 
statesmen and popular leaders who neglect the main 
point and follow side-issues, they wasted strength, lost 
touch with the popular movement, and almost uncon- 
sciously found themselves across the main current, and 
contending against the abounding convictions of the 
American people. The representative of the West, the 
newly developed citizen of a Democratic Republic, dis- 
tinguished himself throughout this controversy, and 
stood forth in magnificent contrast with the faltering 
Democrats — following their partisan name — of this 
great Eastern and Middle State. 

The near and surest view and the best judgment of 
the governor was in his own community, and among 
neighbors forced to operate with him under their re- 

1 Rhodes, vol. iv, 332. 



300 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

sponsibility to the federal government. 1 General Dix 
represented the administration, and was obliged to call 
on the governor of the State to discharge his duty after 
the President's announcement. August 8, he arraigned 
the governor in severe but necessary terms: — 

Whatever defects the act authorizing the enrollment and 
draft may have, it is the law of the land, framed in good faith 
by the representatives of the people, and it must be presumed 
to be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution until 
pronounced in conflict with them by competent judicial tri- 
bunals. Those, therefore, who array themselves against it are 
obnoxious to far severer censure than the ambitious or mis- 
guided men who are striving to subvert the government, for 
the latter are acting by color of sanction under legislatures 
and conventions of the people in the States they represent. 
Among us, resistance to the law by those who claim and 
enjoy the protection of the government has no semblance of 
justification, and becomes the blackest of political crimes. 
. . . That the military power of the State will, in case of 
need, be employed to enforce the draft. I desire to receive 
the assurance because, under a mixed system of government 
like ours, it is best that resistance to the law should be put 
down by the authority of the State in which it occurs. 2 

1 Colonel Nugent and Captain Erhardt, provost-marshals, had an in- 
terview with Governor Seymour, October 16, 1863. The governor recom- 
mended the appointment of four men from each Congressional district 
in New York to supervise recruiting. " Without hazarding an opinion 
on the motive of his Excellency, the desire that the government should 
appoint two Union men, and he two, seemed to indicate too strong a 
disposition to draw a line between the government, seeking to protect its 
integrity, and the disloyal." He discussed the whole enrollment and draft. 
" The conversation, occupying more than three hours, was in substance 
what I have written, yet long as it was, little was said to justify the belief 
that discrepancies in the enrollment were the cause of his dissatisfaction, 
but much that captiousness was the secret of his opposition to the law." 
— Rhodes, vol. iv, pp. 80-83. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 654. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 301 

Seymour either knew too much for the office of gov- 
ernor of a State while other States were in rebellion 
against the federal power, or he did not know enough 
to perform his simple duty. As Marshal Fry reported, 1 
he could not be induced to declare that he would sup- 
port a federal statute with the military power of the 
State. August 12, General Dix was obliged to call on 
the War Department for 5000 more troops. " That 
there is a widespread disaffection in this city, and that 
opposition to the draft has been greatly increased by 
Governor Seymour's letters cannot be doubted." 2 He 
justly said that, by ample preparation on the part of the 
federal authorities, those " embittered by party prejudice 
would be overawed," as the result proved. August 18, 
Dix 3 wrote the governor a very pungent letter acknow- 
ledg-ing; one " not found." In this last document it 
would appear that the governor promised to put down 
riotous proceedings, etc., " as infractions of the laws of 
this State " (cited from Governor Seymour). Dix con- 
cludes by hoping that the mere presence of the national 
forces will convince "those who intend to uphold the 
government, as well as those who are seeking to sub- 
vert it," that the federal authority would be firmly 
maintained. 

Whatever reluctant concessions toward the mainte- 
nance of order that stalwart official, General Dix, extorted 
from the governor, he was not convinced of the patriotic 
love of country so often claimed for the state func- 
tionary. September 1, he reported to General Halleck : 4 
" The course of Governor Seymour ought to be more 

1 Ante, p. 293. 2 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 673. 

3 Ibid., p. 690. 4 Ibid., p. 755. 



302 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

thoroughly canvassed and exposed than it has been. 
. . . He was elected on the platform of a ' more vigor- 
ous prosecution of the war ; ' he has practically put him- 
self on the platform 'a vigorous prosecution of peace.' " ' 
General Dix not only spoke out of his manly sense of 
duty, but he represented fully the sentiment of the loyal 
North. Whatever the Democrats thought they meant, 
when they canvassed for more vigorous prosecution of 
the war, all their practical efforts looked toward peace. 
Meanwhile these backward movements embarrassed the 
administration in the immediate and absolutely neces- 
sary conduct of the war. 

The President at no time assumed any petty ascend- 
ency over Seymour. Long before these incidents, he 
had written him a grave and magnanimous letter, ask- 
ing to be " better acquainted " that they might together 
maintain the "nation's life and integrity." 2 A year 
later, Governor Andrew wrote a long letter to Seymour, 
asking for personal acquaintance, for friendly confer- 
ence to help " conquer a peace." 3 There was no result, 
apparently ; the record shows none. It was within my 
knowledge that other eminent Republicans sought ear- 

1 In this report General Dix severely criticises in detail the governor's 
official acts in raising troops. He then gives this curious bit of history. 
" When Madison and Monroe proposed a draft, it was attacked by tbe 
Federalists in Congress. Among others, Morris S. Miller, of Utica, with 
whose family Seymour is connected (I think by a double marriage), 
attacked it as a. conscription, as unconstitutional, etc., very much as Sey- 
mour is doing now. There is this difference — Judge Miller was resist- 
ing a legislative proposition in legitimate debate, whereas Seymour is 
resisting the law of the land." — 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 755. 

2 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii, 10. 

8 Schouler, Mass. in the Civil War, p. 591. According to Lee, Governor 
Seymour called on Andrew, who said " he seemed very sincere. I think he 
is carried away by his own subtlety, perhaps." — Morse, Henry Lee, p. 237. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 303 

nestly to bring the governor into moral accord with the 
administration. 1 It was not in him, for he was not 
large enough to contain the noble idea of Union, which 
permeated and possessed most of the common voters of 
the Northern States. 

Horatio Seymour, though extraordinary and not 
easily comprehended, was not an anomalous character. 
He cast many broken lights across a mischievous and 
disastrous background, which is permanent, and which 
must be indestructible matter of history. We must 
sketch the ground and clarify the traits of character 
exhibited upon it, according to the best knowledge of 
our own day. He has been charged with " inordinate 
ambition " by some who ought to have known him well ; 
but there was never a greater error in analyzing char- 
acter. While he possessed some of the better traits of 
an ambitious demagogue, he was too much refined, in 
heredity and essence, to sink to the level of a vulgar 
populace. And something more kept him from the 
great ambition which controls heroes, for he had not 
the fibre of the forcible men of history. When we con- 
sider some of his daring acts in attempting to obstruct 
the necessary course of the national administration, this 
may appear at first sight to be an uncertain statement. 
But the notion, more or less prevalent, that audacious 
daring partakes of and consists in courage, is totally 
wrong. The words differ essentially, and they differ in 
meaning. In one derivative language daur is " to 

1 Thurlow Weed reported Lincoln as saying that if Seymour would 
wheel the Democracy into line for suppressing the rebellion, then be 
would help Seymour to become bis successor as president. Nicolay and 
Hay think Weed exaggerated, but are sure that Lincoln was very anxious 
to be supported by Seymour. — Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii, 12. 



304 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

stun," in another dare is " a fool." Courage comes out 
of the heart of heroes, and has no possible variant 
meaning. We had two marked illustrations of auda- 
cious daring in the episodes of the Civil War. The sub- 
ject of this discussion was one, General Butler of most 
varied fame was another. On the other hand, the calm 
courage, coming from the inmost nature of our people, 
was fully represented in the persons of Abraham Lin- 
coln and Ulysses S. Grant. 

As above said, Seymour was not a mere factious agi- 
tator. He may not have been so far committed to the 
secret intrigues of semi-secession Democrats, plotting 
" to brino; about a collision between the national gfov- 
ernment and the government of the State of New York 
in such a shape that they can only rely upon the coop- 
eration of Governor Seymour," 1 as Mr. Jay deliberately 
states. Seymour may not have been so far entangled 
as these words indicate; but it is certain that he was 
seriously affected by these meteoric influences. We 
cannot award him judgment, but we must consider that 
his intellect was duly perceptive. There was some rea- 
son for his discordant acts as governor from day to day. 
The cause was not in his own creative reason, but in 
the errant, disturbing forces of a powerful social fac- 
tion, which sent his wits wool-gathering, instead of into 
the calm, considered action of a statesman. 

Not a demagogue, he was too much respected and 
respectable, too much fettered by morbid conscience, to 
become inflamed by the passions of that sort of crea- 
ture. Rather, he was moved by sentiment, when he 
ought to have been anchored by solid thought. His 

i 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 541. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 305 

imagination worked rapidly toward changing the im- 
pending order of things, the necessary, hard evolution 
of political circumstance ; this inevitable course he 
sought to alter by some fancied amendment, he knew 
not what. The maundering complaint, 1 when he sums 
his case against the President, after decision had been 
rendered and the die had fallen, illustrates this mental 
condition. 

This morbid tendency — this respectability, not medi- 
ocre but endowed with talent — these tendencies may 
become most dangerous in the crises of great affairs, as 
we have seen. Such tendencies are more perilous in 
lawyers than in other classes of men, on account of 
their great opportunities in our country. A good lawyer 
cannot be a poet. An active but incomplete poetic 
faculty, seeking expression in new creations of law, 
clothed by precedent, can work almost any mischief 
through the legal misconception. A legal misconcep- 
tion — enforced by party discipline — can work the 
greatest injury in the development of political practice, 
if the emergencies of great affairs give it opportunity. 
A statesman, who thinks after formulas, feels in the old 
forms, then acts as if creating for the new emergency, 
as if impelled by the producing power of the present, 
does infinite harm. He conserves not the old, and he 
spoils the new. 

1 " However much I may differ from you in my views of the policy of 
your administration, and although I may, unconsciously to myself, be in- 
fluenced by party prejudices, I can never forget the honor of my country 
so far as to spare any effort to stop proceedings under the draft in this 
State — particularly in the cities of New York and Brooklyn — which I 
feel will bring disgrace, not only upon your administration, but upon the 
American name." — 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 636. 



306 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

General Dix set forth the governor's course as " the 
blackest of political crimes." ! These were not the reck- 
less words of a vaporing publicist ; they were the mani- 
festation of political deeds, interpreted by a man of 
action, who knew whereof he spoke. At that moment, 
Governor Seymour was being hammered into his proper 
place, forced to do his duty as governor of a State by 
the immediate presence of the federal troops. The State 
of New York was not " independent," as he constantly 
asserted, but it was a constituent part of the American 
Union. 

These plain facts of historic evolution cannot be neg- 
lected or condoned, however benevolent the student and 
critic may be. They must stand out in dark and darker 
tints, as time goes on, and as the perilous achievements in 
these periods of revolution become more valuable. Lee, 
Jackson, Gordon, and the like, were misguided heroes, 
following a mistaken course. As time passes, as the his- 
torical perspective changes, — the lesser details growing 
dim, as in the Wars of the Roses or the struggles of 
Cromwell, — the Muse will award increasing fame to 
these men who might have been the paladins of any 
time. But their political mistakes were founded on 
deep principles, inherited from the generation educated 
by Calhoun. Whatever their constitutional basis, revolu- 
tion, " blood and iron," might have established these 
principles as the basis of a new state. No such issue 
can be possible for Seymour, Hendricks, Vallandigham, 
and the like. Fame will worship the much enduring 
heroes of the Confederacy. The reverse of fame must 
cling to those dawdling Northern Democrats who 

1 Ante, p. 300. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 307 

vainly tried to build a new party out of their country's 
agony, and to cement it with the blood of their fellow- 
men. It does not palliate that they knew not what they 
were doing. It was their business to know, through and 
through, what must be the effect of their political ac- 
tion while their brothers were sacrificing life in battle. 

The doing of the contestants in war, the deeds which 
establish the fame and preserve the memory of the brave 
and self-sacrificing, must not be confounded with deeds 
which hampered and obstructed the necessary progress 
of that war. Homer portrayed the craft of Ulysses, the 
wisdom of Nestor, as hardly inferior to the glory of 
Achilles. The sage advisers in turn bore the shock of 
battle, shoulder to shoulder with Achilles. The coun- 
cilors were not ensconced safely at home ; yet less were 
they hindering and impeding heroes in action. 

Seymour and his party in New York were not alone 
or peculiar in misconstruing the political situation at 
this time. A strange hallucination — a historic problem 
of problems — possessed the " Constitutional Demo- 
crats," as they fondly called themselves. At their con- 
vention in Massachusetts, September 3, 1863, they said, 
" We most earnestly desire peace." 1 Where else can we 
find such a phantasm, possessing men of the homely 
sagacity evinced by the average American politician ? 

1 Judge Abbott said: "I mean to be true to tbe Union by, tbrougb, 
under tbe constitution — nothing more nor less." Dr. George B. Lor- 
ing said: "We are still free, sovereign, and independent States under the 
constitution. Do they ask, are we Peace or War Democrats ? Tell them 
we are Constitutional Democrats. This administration (of the U. S.) 
will pass away as the idle wind." Abbott and Loring, both candidates 
for governor, lost the convention and Paine, an old Whig, whose demo- 
cracy was not so pronounced, was nominated. — Schouler, Mass. in the 
Civil War, pp. 498-500. 



308 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Apparently, after myriads had been slaughtered in the 
field, and the miseries of such war had been endured at 
home, these maudlin state-makers conceived that the 
whole disunited States might return to the Union- 
saving, peace-making methods of 1860. What a dog, 
and what a vomit ! The new evolution of a Democrat, 
who should be neither war nor peace, but a " constitu- 
tional," had formed a most fantastic image in their 
fevered brain. 

In Indiana there was some violence, but in no degree 
approaching the troubles of New York city. Several 
lives were lost. The executive was loyal, but the legis- 
lature was entirely controlled by the Peace Democracy. 
The Emancipation Proclamation was denounced, and a 
Northwestern republic was bruited. The legislature 
claimed to reject Governor Morton's message, and a 
member offered a resolution, which was not passed, that 
they adopt the " exalted and patriotic sentiments " 1 of 
Governor Seymour's message in New York. When we 
consider the divided government in Indiana, and the 
jarring elements working beneath the surface, the 
escape from extended riot and bloodshed is remarkable. 
August 20, Marshal Baker reported, " The disloyal ele- 
ment under the name of Democracy are holding large 
mass-meetings in different parts of the State, at which 
the people are urged to arm and drill, which they are 
doing in many places in large numbers." 2 The secret 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, pp. 213, 217. 

2 O. R., Series III, vol. iii, 697. He inclosed a bill for an " Old-fash- 
ioned Barbecue." " The watchword given on the bill is, I am assured, 
the watchword of the Knights of the Golden Circle." The bill' reads, 
"This is a time for mutual understanding and concerted action on the 
part of the friends of the constitution and the white man's liberty. The 
watchword of the day will be ' United we stand in defiance of tyrants.' " 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 309 

organizations, of which we shall hear more, put forth 
their new shibboleth, " United we stand in defiance of 
tyrants." The general condition of the Northwest 
brought out a noble letter from Abraham Lincoln, 
which we have cited heretofore. 1 We cannot give it 
too much attention, for it is a complete epitome of the 
argument from facts in the most persuasive form, a 
thorough and logical exposition of the cause of the 
Union. It was in answer to an invitation to a meeting 
of unconditional Union men at Springfield, 111. : — 

Of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the 
Union, and I am sure my old political friends will thank me 
for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other 
noble men, whom no partisan malice, or partisan hope, can 
make false to the nation's life. . . . Let us not be over san- 
guine of a speedy final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let 
us diligently apply the means, never doubting that a just 
God, in His own good time, will give us the rightful result. 2 

In Pennsylvania the turbulent districts were kept in 
order by stringent military control. General Couch, 
commanding the Department of the Susquehanna, gives 
a lively picture of the attendant difficulties. " The 
ignorant miners have no fear of God, the state author- 
ity, or the devil. The Democratic leaders have not the 
power of burnt flax over them for good. A strong mili- 
tary power under the general government alone keeps 
matters quiet." 3 This dilemma was integral and far 
beyond regulation by political or partisan development. 
For once, we must not hold the Democratic leaders 
responsible for the faults of their constituency. 

1 Ante, p. 247. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, pp. 731-734. 
» Ibid., p. 629. 



310 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Quakers were excused from bearing arms ; but there 
was a class of non-conformists — much more trouble- 
some — who used conscience as a cloak for disloyalty. 
In November, at Pottsville, one Hughes, " who early de- 
sired that Pennsylvania should secede and join herself 
with the South, only at the close of July last declared 
' that he did not want to furnish the army with soldiers ; 
he was conscientiously opposed to the war, and would 
not furnish the means to carry it on.' " 1 

It is more than doubtful whether the charge of secret 
machination, often made against the rebels, was well 
grounded ; but there was so much plotting in the cities 
and on the Canadian border, that loyal men suspected 
a rebel hand wherever plots appeared. Alarming con- 
spiracies were manifest at Mauch Chunk, and were re- 
ported to the President. 2 

Generals testified that the men drafted into service 
acquitted " themselves well and made good soldiers." 
Secretary Stanton reported, December 5, 1863, " At 
the time the law was enacted it was known to be very 
imperfect, many intelligent persons considering its exe- 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 1006. 

2 " Since the commencement of the draft, a large majority of the coal 
operatives have been law-defying, opposing the national government in 
every possible way. The life of no Union man is secure among them, 
and the murder of such a citizen is almost a nightly occurrence. Our 
' civil authorities ' here seem to have too much sympathy for these men, 
and they know it, and are not slow to take advantage of it. They have 
closed up several large collieries, and threaten that all must suspend 
work until the national government suspends the operations of the draft 
against them. . . . This is a part of the rebel programme." — 0. R., 
Series III, vol. iii, 1009. " In Pennsylvania an attempt was made to ob- 
struct the draft by means of a bill in chancery ; and an injunction was 
granted by a majority of the Supreme Court of that State, which, how- 
ever, was not obeyed." — Ibid., vol. v, 630. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 311 

cution wholly impracticable, while few dared to hope for 
any important benefit. The law has been enforced in 
twelve States. It has brought from these States 50,000 
soldiers, and has raised a fund of over $10,000,000 
for procuring substitutes. With all its imperfections it 
is demonstrated that the act can be made an efficient 
means for recruiting our armies and calling out the 
national forces." 1 He expressed the conflicting views, 
concerning the clause of exemption and the procuring 
of substitutes; these conflicts have never been recon- 
ciled. The business of substitutes immensely stimulated 
the payment of bounties and " bounty- j umping " there- 
after. The consequent abuses can hardly be overstated. 

In the winter of 1863-64 the Confederacy gathered 
its remaining strength for a final struggle. Morton 
thought the administration did not recognize this suf- 
ficiently, and begged it to call for more troops, saying, 
January 19, " A terrible conscription is putting almost 
the entire male population of the rebel States in the 
army." 2 In February, General Dix at New York could 
perceive that " the leaders of the rebellion are making 
the most desperate efforts to bring into the field every 
man capable of bearing arms." 3 

February, 1864, the President ordered a draft, nomi- 
nally for 500,000 men, which by deductions, etc., actu- 
ally called out 200,000. 4 

There were secret organizations formed throughout 
the Northwest, which opposed the draft with all their 
force. Colonel Baker, March 5, 5 reported their inten- 
tion " to revolt against the government," and that they 

» O. R., Series III, vol. Hi, 1131. 2 Ibid., vol. iv, 39. 

8 Ibid., p. 121. 4 Ibid., p. 181. 5 Ibid., pp. 162, 163. 



312 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

would even attempt " the assassination of the governor 
of this State" (Indiana). There was less open demon- 
stration against the authorities than there was in 1863, 
but it was " better organized and more determined." 

There seemed to be different purposes prevailing 
west and east of the Alleghanies, according to General 
Dix. 1 Secret organizations in New York city were sus- 
pected by the provost-marshals of planning resistance 
to the draft. They were watched by detectives, and 
the general concluded that their purpose was "to pro- 
mote the election of General McClellan to the office of 
president." 

In conflict with soldiers, blood was shed in Indiana 
July 20, and Captain Thompson 2 reported large num- 
bers with as many as 200 malcontents riding together 
at one time, shouting for Vallandigham and Jeff Davis, 
and threatening " the most terrible consequences to 
every man connected in any way with the government." 

J. Holt, for the Bureau of Military Justice, person- 
ally investigated the ramifications of these treasonable 
associations in the Northwest, and gave, August 5, 3 a 
graphic account of their doings. " The Sons of Liberty 
may be regarded as a successor to the Knights of the 
Golden Circle, with a very large increment of malig- 
nity and practical treason." They used every strata- 
gem, getting public appointments to betray official 
secrets and inculcating " the assassination of United 
States officers." Eight of these were murdered secretly 
in two weeks in Missouri. The order existed " alike in the 
North and in the South," being numerous in Indiana, 

1 O.R., Series III, vol. iv, 483. 

2 Ibid., p. 529. 3 iud., pp. 578, 579. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 313 

Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, Kentucky, and New York. The 
facts he discovered " unveil a conspiracy as atrocious as 
that of Catiline." Governor Seymour and his friends 
were not guilty of planning such treachery as the mur- 
derers of Missouri practiced. This was proven by Gen- 
eral Dix and his police, but it is significant that such 
foul birds gathered about the political activities of the 
Democrats. 

Major-General Heintzelman, commanding the North- 
ern Department, August 9, 1 advised the arrest of the 
leaders of these associations in Indiana and Illinois. 
As late as October 2 there was a rising of 500 men in 
Indiana 2 to resist the draft, "taking horses, arms, and 
money from citizens and home guards." 

Governor Curtin inquired if ministers of the Gospel 
could be excused from service when drafted, and Fry 
answered that they would be detailed for "charitable 
and benevolent duties." 3 The Protestant Episcopal 
Church in the diocese of Western New York passed 
resolutions September 3, and petitioned the President 
as commander-in-chief, that the clergy when drafted 
might be assigned "as chaplains, or to duty in hos- 
pitals, or in the care of f reedmen, or in such clerkships 
or other special duties," etc. 

Among the most curious and suggestive manifesta- 
tions for government of the people by the people were 
the outcries for and against the postponement of the 
draft in various sections. Apparently the differing 
temperaments of individual citizens came out to in- 
fluence their views of the situation, and to warp their 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iv, 1286. 2 Ibid., p. 752. 

3 Ibid., pp. 682, 688. 4 Ibid., pp. 692-694. 



314 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

political diagnosis and judgment of the exigencies of 
the occasion. A local cloud of hostility would become 
in their imagination a fearful storm of national wrath, 
unless their own particular district should be relieved 
for a few days from the pressure of the national duty. 

As often happened, when he participated in domestic 
affairs, Mr. Seward blundered. He stated at Auburn, 
September 13, that there would be no draft. This re- 
duced recruiting materially, and the Secretary of War 
was obliged to inform Generals Grant and Sherman that 
the " declaration was unauthorized and most unhappy." 1 
September 8, the Union League of Illinois begged the 
President to postpone the draft for thirty days " as a 
matter of the greatest political importance." 2 On the 
27th, the mayor of Philadelphia and Morton McMichael 
asked Secretary Stanton to postpone for only two 
weeks. 3 

On the other hand, John A. Kasson, having traveled 
from Massachusetts to Iowa, urged a prompt levy of 
the draft. " The country now wants rigid, straightfor- 
ward, prudent, but decisive leadership." 4 Governor 
Doolittle of Wisconsin called for enforcement in trum- 
pet-tones. "While pending, all fear it; when over, all 
who are drafted and go will be cured of their reluc- 
tance, and it is the best medicine in the world for sickly 
patriotism, and has been known to cure even copper- 
headism." 5 Riley, a special agent sent through Illinois 
and Indiana by Marshal Fry, advocated prompt execu- 
tion, October 8. 6 The alert and plucky James G. Blaine 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iv, 713. 2 Ibid., p. 701. 

3 Ibid., pp. 746, 747. * Ibid., p. 680. 

6 Ibid., p. 715. « Ibid., p. 757. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 315 

struck hard, as might have been expected. " The 
dreaded draft is now going on all over the country, and 
I 'm glad of it. Like the old ladies' tea party, ' it will be 
good to have it over with.' ... If it goes on in the 
slow process, it will about ruin us in the October elec- 
tions of Pennsylvania and Ohio, whereas if the quick 
process were adopted, we should have fifteen or eigh- 
teen unembarrassed days for marshaling our political 
forces in those States, and would close with a ' blaze of 
glory and a big victory.' " ! 

Governor Doolittle and Mr. Blaine voiced the loyal 
consciousness, as it brought itself to the support of the 
Union, after some three years of wearisome endurance. 
All were not patriotic ; and as Governor Doolittle sug- 
gests, the varying grades of patriotism — even to that 
of the inconsistent Copperhead — were stimulated and 
renovated by the draft. 

The Secretary of War, in discussing the merits of the 
draft in 1863, 2 did not overrate the reluctance of the 
whole country in accepting the conscription, for a large 
majority of citizens at first regarded it as " arbitrary 
and unjust." 3 Yet after the bureau had extended the 
enrollment and conscription throughout the country, its 
officers could say that it brought the administration 
and people nearer together in prosecuting the war for 
the Union. 4 It was a severe but necessary process in 
the education of the people to the support of a well- 
founded and powerful government. The administration, 
by direct demand on the resources of the nation, showed 
the necessity of the occasion ; the people responded, 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. iv, 742. 2 Ibid., vol. iii, 1131. 

3 Ibid. vol. v, 723. 4 Ibid., p. 601. 



316 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

though at first reluctantly, to the imperative need. 
There was a certain mutual confidence created, which, 
though constrained in the beginning, became a natural 
and proper bond between government and people. The 
necessary effort of government — compulsory on the 
representative rulers, when extended to the citizens 
through the draft — was brought home to each individ- 
ual, and became his own particular business. 

The enrollment showed 1 that besides 1,000,516 men 
actually in the field, April 30, 1865, there were at home 
2,245,063 men. The marvelous fact was revealed that, 
notwithstanding losses, there were more men properly 
subject to draft in the loyal States at the close of the 
rebellion 2 than there were at its beginning. Immigra- 
tion had repaired the waste, while industrial invention 
and improvement had largely increased the product of 
each man at home. 

Far different was the condition of the revolted States, 
as it was shown in the report of their Bureau of Con- 
scription at Richmond, April 30, 1864. 3 Complaining 
of lack of means, it had used every effort to investigate 
the whole " society or civil economy " within its reach. 
The conclusion was that "fresh material for the armies " 
was no longer to be had. " Necessity demands the in- 
vention of devices for keeping in the ranks the men 
now borne on the rolls." Appeal might be made to the 
States for volunteers, but conscription from the general 
population must cease with the year 1864. 

On the whole, our draft was a great act of admin- 

« O. R., Series III, vol. v, 620. 

2 Ibid. 

8 Ibid., p. 695. 



THE PEOPLE UNDER COMPULSION 317 

istration, executed as well as possible, 1 under the prac- 
tical conditions prevailing* at the time. The involuntary 
recruiting, indirectly compelled by the conscription, 
and substituted for the first spontaneous efforts of the 
States, practically reinforced the armies. The great 
State of New York — badly led and influenced as it 
was by some recalcitrant citizens — blundered and op- 
posed ; but it could not stop the progress of the draft. 
Nothing is more significant, as revealing the counter 
currents of opinion and action than some results in 
loyal Pennsylvania. A majority of the Supreme Court 
of the State established technical objections, and en- 
joined against the practical execution of the law. 2 But 
the citizens would not obey and stop the enforcement 
of the conscription. The great, legitimate power of the 
Union was overwhelming in this function as it was in 
others, and it could not be controlled and thwarted by 
a petty array of legal quibbles. 

A volume might well be devoted to the relations of 
militia, volunteers, and regular soldiers in the States 
and in the federal Union. Family and home are the 
final outcome of a state ; but the individual soldier 
must be the actual representative of these corner-stones 
of society. China, refined by ancient culture, thought 
a state could dispense with brutal warfare and rest 
itself on educated intelrio-ence. Such a state soon had 
to surrender to men capable of bearing arms. The 
loyal interaction of its fighting elements made feudal 

1 A committee of the House of Representatives, Messrs. Speed, Dela- 
field, and Foster, investigated the work of Provost-Marshal Fry. They 
reported that they "find it has been done with fairness." — Nicolay and 
Hay, vol. vii, 9. 

2 Ante, p. 295. 



318 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

society possible, and every solid state of the time 
brought a good military organization into being. In 
the Revolution George the Third, and in the Civil War 
the Union, discovered that the soldier was the substan- 
tial essence of the citizen. In the rebellion the Union, 
as well as the Confederacy, relied on voluntary military 
service, before the conscription rallied every citizen to 
support the government. This inbred reliance on vol- 
untary military service was worked to support the ad- 
ministration at the North, then reversed by antagonistic 
partisans to oppose the enforcement of a draft. 

Many decades passed before our military experience 
was worked out into a better administration of the army, 
and especially into a better organization of the citizen 
soldiery. The Spanish war found us unready, and the 
century had turned before the skill of regular officers 
and the personal element in the citizen could cooperate 
in bringing out the military strength of the particular 
States. At the beginning of the year 1904, the new army 
levied by Congress consisted of 107,422 enlisted men 
and 9120 commissioned officers "exactly like regular 
troops." x Each governor of a State or Territory could 
procure a regular officer of high rank to advise him in 
military affairs. This act provided a great and effective 
reinforcement of the regular army, quite unlike the old- 
fashioned " militia," except in its high loyalty and self- 
hood. The United States could call out these troops at 
any time for a service of four months. 

1 Rene Bache, Providence Journal, January 31, 1904. 



CHAPTER VIII 

GOVERNMENT 

IT seemed natural, when affairs began their course 
at Washington, on the inauguration of Lincoln, to 
speak of the directing power as prosecuting the busi- 
ness of administration. Events crowded upon the new 
officials, and they were forced to minister to them as 
speedily as possible, often without precedent. This sort 
of designation corresponded to the technical terms 
established by due authority. Said Hamilton : " The ad- 
ministration of government, in its largest sense, com- 
prehends all the operations of the body politic, . . . 
but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise, sig- 
nification, it is limited to executive details." Of gov- 
ernment in the strict use of the term, there was little at 
the capital in the early days of the rebellion. Affairs 
of state no sooner came than they went. The President 
was severely criticised, especially by Mr. Seward out of 
his fancied omniscience, that he had not a policy of di- 
rection and control, during March and early April, when 
the rebellion was at work, and open revolt was culminat- 
ing. All that was changed after the attack on Sumter. 
The rebels took the move, precipitating the game. Dur- 
ing the winter season the North, in combination with the 
border States, had vainly tried to anticipate and avoid 
this imminent and deadly breach by some sort of con- 
cession. Rebellion, the fracture and antithesis of gov- 



320 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

ernment, assumed control of the affairs of state, espe- 
cially in the Cotton States. It was perhaps the highest 
and wisest of Mr. Lincoln's faculties that he was not 
moved to direct and control too soon. The South had 
been long protesting against the extra-constitutional 
use of the powers of Congress — as they conceived it 
— in placing any limit on the extension of slavery. By 
disruption, in a moment, they put more power into the 
legislative and executive functions of the government, 
more opportunity, than practical statesmen had ever con- 
ceived to be possible. The President called for troops ; 
they sprang to arms as eagerly as Roderick Dhu's own 
henchmen and clansmen. Buchanan's calculating and 
alien-hearted Secretary of the Treasury had left the 
finances of the Union in as poor condition as those of 
a church mouse. But money poured forth freely from 
every source of supply in the loyal States. 

Affairs of state multiplied and complicated. The occa- 
sion must be administered, if not in the best way, at least 
speedily, or the delay would generate another occasion 
more imperious than the first. The legislature assisted 
loyally, and a virtual dictatorship was conferred on the 
plain man of the prairies. 

We have set forth the course of events, especially as 
it involved the interplay of federal and state action. 
It was unavoidable that, if the rebellion should not be 
subdued presently, a larger and more efficient govern- 
ment 1 would be evolved out of the circumstances of 



1 According to Lieber, Political Ethics, vol. i, 238, the state is the 
jural or political society, which the whole community constitutes. The 
government is the instrument through which the political society acts, 
when it does not act directly. 



GOVERNMENT 321 

the rebellion. After the g^reat forces of the States — 
the individual commonwealths — had been developed 
and concentrated, so that they merged in the larger 
federal functions, there must be adequate direction and 
government, something more than the mere administra- 
tion of affairs from day to day. As the bounds of the 
struggle extended, and the great civic foundations of the 
republic began to be disturbed, a larger policy became 
inevitable. Then the whole people were brought under 
direct legislative and executive control by the draft, 
and the government of the nation was consolidated at 
Washington. I propose to treat some of the larger 
questions, which grew out of the issues developed after 
the second year of the war. 

The paramount directing power must always be in 
the command of the forces of a state. King or consul, 
the head of a state who did not fully command its 
armies on land and its navies on the sea would be no 
better than a headless monarch. In initiating legis- 
lation our President has very little direct power, and 
that is in the form of influence. He can recommend 
forcibly, but the fountain of law is in Congress. Be- 
tween the military responsibility and this negative, 
civic sphere of action, there came in the middle course 
of the Civil War one of the greatest opportunities of 
change in the social and political destiny of a state, 
known to history. The absolute Tsar of all the Russias 
had not more actual power in freeing the serfs of his 
empire than Abraham Lincoln exercised when he put 
forth the Proclamation of Emancipation in the begin- 
ning of the year 1863. Strange fate ! The rebels had 
brought about this opportunity ; had brought into 



322 WAR GOVERNMENT. FEDERAL AND STATE 

their own homes the destruction of their property and 
the freedom of their slaves, by a process just as inevit- 
able as had induced the coercion of the individual 
States when they fired on Sumter. Such civic agi- 
tators as Greeley considered a State to be invincible, 
and not to be coerced, in the winter of 1860-61. 
When Lincoln was inaugurated, hardly any one out- 
side Garrison's scanty band of abolitionists thought 
that negro slaves could be controlled or freed by the 
national government. Such generative political force 
arises from the Jovian element — the omnipotent and 
irrevocable powers of government — never precisely 
formulated and never formally withheld from a fully en- 
dowed sovereign, since the ideal imagined and sketched 
in the life of Olympus prevailed among mankind. 

This military decree of emancipation was a special 
instance of personal government based on the extraor- 
dinary confidence of the people in the man of their 
choice, even though he might be separated from them, 
and withheld from direct cognition at times, by poli- 
ticians and managers of the machine. As we have 
noted, 1 generals in the field had attempted to break 
into this central prerogative, and to cut out with the 
sword bits of imperial control in their sincere desire to 
befriend the negro. These incidents are so interesting 
in the history of actual government that we should 
consider carefully the case of Major-General Hunter, 
who had strong political support. May 9, 1862, he 
issued a general order : " The persons in Georgia, 
Florida, and South Carolina, heretofore held as slaves, 
are therefore forever free." 2 

1 Ante, p. 106. 2 0. R., Series III, vol ii, 42. 



GOVERNMENT 323 

As soon as the news came, May 19, before official 
information, the President nullified the proclamation in 
the most positive terms. 1 

I further make known that whether it be competent for 
me, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to de- 
clare the slaves of any State or States free, 2 and whether at 
any time, in any case, it shall have become a necessity indis- 
pensable to the maintenance of the government to exercise 
such supposed power, are questions which under my respon- 
sibility I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified 
in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. These 
are totally different questions from those of police regulations 
in the armies and camps." 

He then cites the resolution recommended by him to 
Congress and passed by large majorities in March. 
This act provided for pecuniary aid to any State which 
would adopt "a gradual abolishment of slavery." He 
now makes the most pathetic appeal to all States which 
hold slaves to " embrace " this offer. " This proposal 
makes common cause for a common object, casting no 
reproaches upon any. So much good has not been 
done by one effort in all past time as in the providence 
of God it is now your high privilege to do." The great 
issues of government were never more judiciously 
handled and pondered, and never expressed in nobler 
form. It was this masterly conduct of the largest 
affairs which lifted the politician Lincoln out of the 
ruts of expediency, brought the statesman into freest 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 43. 

2 So early as November 15, 1861, George Bancroft suggested to the 
President that the " war shall effect an increase of free States." Mr. 
Lincoln replied, " with which I must deal in all due caution and with the 
best judgment I can bring to it." — Lincoln, Complete Worte, vol. ii, 90. 



324 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

communication with the people, and moved the popular 
heart to trust the man Lincoln. 

Secretary Chase addressed a letter, June 24, to Major- 
General Butler commanding at New Orleans, and who 
was in the position of those commanders whom the 
President so forcibly meant to restrain. The secretary 
evidently believed that the matter should be treated as 
mere administration, as a momentary military necessity 
of police control, and not from the larger point of view 
taken by the President. As subsequent events showed 
in the divided state of mind at the North, the manage- 
ment of slavery in these half -conquered districts in- 
volved some of the very largest issues of government 
which could engage the attention of rulers. 

The secretary said, "In my judgment, the military 
order of Hunter should have been sustained. The 
President, who is as sound in head as he is excellent in 
heart, thought otherwise, and I, as in duty bound, 
submit my judgment to his. The language of the 
President's proclamation, however, shows that his mind 
is not finally decided." 1 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 174. The influential position of Mr. Chase, 
both in the cabinet and in his representation of the Anti-Slavery party of 
the North, gives interest to his whole expression to Butler concerning 
this matter. " Until long after Sumter, I clung to my old ideas of non- 
interference with slavery within state limits of (sic) the national gov- 
ernment. But the Civil War was protracted far beyond my anticipation, 
and with the postponement of decisive results came increased bitterness 
and intensified alienation of nearly the entire white population of the 
slave States. With this state of facts came the conviction to my mind 
that the restoration of the old Union with slavery untouched, except by 
the mere weakening effects of the war, was impossible. . . . Meanwhile, 
my dear general, I trust you will so proceed as you begun. Let it be 
understood that you are no pro-slavery man. Let all be done that can 
be done for the loyal people of whatever condition or complexion." 



GOVERNMENT 325 

An interesting phase of the progress of emancipation 
is revealed in Massachusetts, and in the action of Gov- 
ernor Andrew. In treating the matter precipitated by 
General Hunter, he made the greatest mistake of his 
lifetime, as he placed himself for the moment in pseudo- 
opposition to the national government. There was a 
scare at Washington, and as usual they wired Andrew 
for an instant dispatch of troops. On the day that the 
President's proclamation just cited was issued, Andrew 
answered hastily and in heat, not declining but hesitat- 
ing as to whether he could furnish the men. 

Our young men are all preoccupied by other views. . . . 
The people felt that the South would use their negro slaves 
against them, both as laborers and fighting men, while they 
themselves must never "fire at the magazine." I think they 
will feel that the draft is heavy on their patriotism. But if 
the President will sustain General Hunter, recognize all men, 
even black men, as legally capable of that loyalty the blacks 
are waiting to manifest, and let them fight, with God and 
human nature on their side, the roads will swarm, if need be, 
with multitudes whom New England would pour out to obey 
the call." » 

Such inconsistent patriotism could not long occupy 
John A. Andrew, and in four days he was working as 
vigorously as ever " in advance of directions " to for- 
ward the men. We must consider these incidents that 
we may understand the growth of opinion favoring 
emancipation, which consolidated the loyal majority at 
the North, while it tended to irritate and increase the 
alien or Copperhead element. So recently as October 
1, 1861, the Republican convention at Worcester 2 " did 

1 0. R. Series III, vol. ii, 45. 

2 Schouler, Mass. in the Civil War, p. 248. 



326 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

not favor the abolition of, or the interference with 
slavery." Resolutions in that direction were lost, and 
the respectable "Boston Advertiser" said the convention 
refused to indorse " the fatal doctrines of Mr. Sumner." 

When we compare this feeling- of Massachusetts 
with the opinion of Mr. Chase at this time, as expressed 
to General Butler, the necessary progress of emancipa- 
tion in the public mind is most remarkable. In another 
direction, this situation emphasizes the practical ineffi- 
ciency of the administration in 1861-62. While the 
whole question of slavery was in abeyance, then if 
they had used vigorously the force oifered by the North 
unanimously, they might have done any and everything. 

These opinions of Governor Andrew in favor of im- 
mediate emancipation were circulated among the gov- 
ernors of the New England States, and doubtless took 
effect in the informal conference held at the Com- 
mencement of Brown University in June. This occa- 
sion was preliminary to the meeting at Altoona, Pa., in 
September. 

All this agitation came to the surface in the confer- 
ence of the loyal governors at Altoona, Pa., in Septem- 
ber. It does not appear that Morton of Indiana was 
much interested by the call, though he sent a represent- 
ative who acted for him. Governor Curtin made the 
first formal suggestion for such a meeting to Mr. 
Seward at New York. 1 " He brightened at the thought " 
and wired the President, who approved. Curtin wrote 
the address and Andrew read it to the President when 
the conference closed and nearly all the governors 
went to Washington. Without doubt, the political and 

1 Egle, Curtin, p. 309. 



GOVERNMENT 327 

practical effect of the conference was weakened and 
scattered by the actual issue of the Proclamation of 
Emancipation at the very moment when it assembled. 
According to Blair of Michigan, the attempt to induce 
the President to remove McClellan, immediately after 
Antietam, failed on account of difference of opinion 
among the governors. 

This positive action of the Northern States, in so far 
as they had loyal administrators, was a strong, moral 
reinforcement of the national government. The inward 
state of public opinion on those delicate questions is 
shown in one of Governor Andrew's free revelations to 
his constituency. 1 Directly after the conference, Daniel 
Henshaw wrote and charged him as trying for the dis- 
missal of General McClellan. The governor replied 
that he went to the meeting on the invitation of the 
governors of Ohio, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. He 
then discussed in very sarcastic terms the conduct of 
Hon. Joel Parker and others in criticising' the execu- 
tive. The governor alleged that the conservative gov- 
ernors were greatly pleased at the prospect of supporting 
the President at Altoona. After the proclamation was 
published they got more than was bargained for. Now 
he states the truth, — first, he read the President's Pro- 
clamation on the morning of the 23d, and was as much 
surprised 2 as Judge Parker, though he was more pleased, 
probably ; second, he did not formally and directly, nor 
indirectly, move for dismissing General McClellan or 
other officers from the army or navy. Again, — first, 

1 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 127, p. 153, Oct. 22, 1862. 

2 Andrew had written Secretary Stanton, August 28, " God only knows 
whether the President will ever burst his bonds of Border-Stateism and 
McClellan." — Schouler, Mass. in the Civil War, p. 366. 



328 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

he denies the moral right of gentlemen to carry on 
political controversies by penetrating private circles or 
promulging private conversations ; second, the gentle- 
men in question need not have sent " a third person to 
find out what I said at Altoona." He concludes in a long- 
and eloquent protest against the tendency " to obtrude 
matters mainly personal upon the attention of the 
people. ... It interests no public man, civil or mili- 
tary, nor demands the thought of a loyal human being 
among us." 1 All of which seems to be good govern- 
ment, as we consider it, after some forty years of calm 
interval. 

In the early part of 1862, the radical Republican 
leaders, as we have seen, had striven in every way to 
force the hand of the executive and bring about eman- 
cipation. So far the President had been content to 
administer, and not to govern. In such an emergency, 
it would seem that counsel and encouraging support 
should come from the cooperating departments of the 
administration. But our cabinet is a body for admin- 
istration strictly, a staff of officers for delegated duties. 2 
There is no copartnership in the executive. 

We may note in this connection the position and 
relative influence in the cabinet of Secretary Chase. 
Among the many pregnant events in the administration 
of affairs in the beginning of the war, hardly any are 

1 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 127, p. 153. 

2 " In the United States, the cabinet is a collective popular name for 
the heads of the eight executive departments. They have as a body no 
legal functions, but by custom meet the President at stated times for con- 
sultation. They are appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and are removable at the pleasure of the President." — Century Dic- 
tionary. 



GOVERNMENT 329 

more su^o-estive than those issuing from the acts of 
Seward and Chase. Chieftains in the Republican party, 
well experienced in public business, the country expected 
much from them ; and for themselves, these statesmen 
expected more to come in the opportunities of the new 
administration. Mr. Seward tried his hand early * at 
exploiting the new and raw President, and became ever 
after a loyal and most useful supporter of his chief. 
His great facility in affairs, his agreeable readiness in 
adapting himself and his views to the slow-moving Lin- 
coln, made his practical assistance most valuable in 
working out the incidents of presidential action. What- 
ever Mr. Seward's expectant ambition might have been 
at the start, — and we have shown from his intimate 
correspondence that it was considerable, — he soon 
adapted himself cheerfully to sustain the leading role 
of the President, and supported him faithfully. 

Far different was the outcome of Mr. Chase's action. 
He gave efficient service to the country, and might have 
given greater, if he had been content with his proper 
sphere of influence, and had supported his superior offi- 
cer with a single heart in the loyal manner initiated by 
the great Secretary of State. Both the secretaries dif- 
fered from the head of the government in habit of mind, 
and yet more in culture and experience. But the dif- 
ferent character of Salmon P. Chase caused much the 
greatest disparity in the resulting action of the two 
men. Mr. Chase, sedate, pompous, accomplished, never 
forgot his personal ambition, nor the possible opportu- 
nities opening to promote it. Afterward, when he 
dragged the ermine of the Supreme Court of the United 

1 Ante, p. 54. 



330 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

States through the mire of party politics, as he sought 
the Democratic nomination for the Presidency in 1868, 
he revealed the passing motives of the aspiring politi- 
cian in the Treasury Department. He persisted in pat- 
ronage of, and constant communication with, generals 
in the field, 1 apart from the regular and proper informa- 
tion of the commander-in-chief, and without the know- 
ledge of his brother members of the cabinet. He 
grasped the financial situation 2 better than his cowork- 
ers, and his efforts were effective in sustaining the 
Treasury. Great though he was, and greater as he 
thought he ought to be, he was continually imposed 
upon by the wretched political followers, who were 
always tempting him to the presidency. He was at the 
mercy of " the knaves and fools in whom he confided," 3 
according to his biographer. Yet he assumed, uncon- 
sciously perhaps, that he was the natural head of the 
nation, notwithstanding that he was very deficient in 
commanding courage 4 at the serious crises of affairs. 

Mr. Chase's peevish criticisms of the President's man- 
agement and procedure are best revealed and met in 
Lincoln's own sincere and calm utterance. When offi- 
cials were exclaiming that the secretary's resignation 

1 Hart, Salmon P. Chase, pp. 295, 297. As new officers came forward 
in 1862 and 1863, " Chase made it a point to get into relations with 
them." 

2 Out of his large experience in the Internal Revenue System, Mr. 
Boutwell could say, " Mr. Chase's mental processes were slow, but time 
being given, he had the capacity to form sound opinions." — Boutwell, 
Sixty Years, vol. i, 304. 

3 Warden, Chase, p. 521. 

4 Governor Boutwell from his immediate observation told me: "After 
Bull Run, every one was frightened but Lincoln. He was never so. Im- 
perturbable, he never showed fear. Nor did Stanton afterward. But then 
Chase and all were scared." 



GOVERNMENT 331 

from the Treasury, June 29, 1864, would cause a finan- 
cial panic, he said : — 

Chase thinks he has become indispensable to the country ; 
that his intimate friends know it, and he cannot comprehend 
why the country does not understand it. He also thinks he 
ought to be president ; he has no doubt whatever about that. 
It is inconceivable to him why people have not found it out ; 
why they don't as one man rise up and say so. He is an able 
financier ... he is a great statesman, and, at the bottom, a 
patriot. Ordinarily he discharges a public trust, the duties of 
a public office, with great ability — with greater ability than 
any man I know. Mind, I say ordinarily, but he has become 
irritable, uncomfortable, so that he is never perfectly happy 
unless he is thoroughly miserable, and able to make every- 
body else just as uncomfortable as he is himself. He knows 
that the nomination of Field would displease the Unionists 
of New York, would delight our enemies, and injure our 
friends. He knows that I could not make it without seri- 
ously offending the strongest supporters of the government 
in New York, and that the nomination would not strengthen 
him anywhere or with anybody. Yet he resigns because I 
will not make it. He is either determined to annoy me, or 
that I shall pat him on the shoulder, and coax him to stay. 
I don't think I ought to do it. I will not do it. I will take 
him at his word. 1 

Remembering that after these occurrences Mr. Chase 
was forced by his conscience or by circumstance to urge 
warmly the reelection of Lincoln in the canvass, we 
perceive that the man from Illinois comprehended the 
situation much more clearly than the stately and pol- 
ished politician from Ohio. 

In considering what Mr. Lincoln did, we shall enter 
into the occasion, and comprehend it more fully, if we 

1 Chittenden, Rec. of Lincoln, p. 379. 



332 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

know from what he escaped ; in other words, what able 
contemporaries believed should have been done through 
constituting anew the methods of the administration. 
In the matter of working out the business of govern- 
ment through cooperation of the cabinet as a whole, 
Mr. Chase has recorded his views fully and clearly : 1 
" It seems to me that the President and cabinet ought to 
be well advised of all matters vital to the military and 
civil administration ; but each one of us turns his own 
machine, with almost no comparison of views or consulta- 
tion of any kind. It seems to me all wrong, and I have 
tried very hard to have it otherwise — unavailing." 2 

He remarks that the President had a poor faculty 
for organization of executive action. 

Two serious objections obtained against this plan, 
attractive as it appeared on the surface. The chief 
weakness in republican governments is in their divided 
responsibility and in the lack of that forcible action 
which a more absolute executive maintains. The talk of 
a board always tends toward hesitating delay and to the 
loss of opportunity. In the great operations of our Civil 
War, a cabinet embracing great men and allowing them 
freedom of action through departments escaped the 
worst consequences of this disability. And in spite of 
the President's manifest lack of organizing power, he 
generally had the marvelous faculty of doing the right 
thing when the occasion forced him to act. 3 

1 On the other hand, Mr. Seward opposed regular meetings of the 
cabinet, and had his way in the early days of the administration. — Tar- 
bell, Lincoln, vol. ii, 27. 

2 Hart, Salmon P. Chase, p. 293. 

3 " Mr. Lincoln treated every one of them (the cabinet) with unvary- 
ing candor, respect, and kindness; but, though several of them were men 



GOVERNMENT 333 

The greater objection was in the character of Chase 
himself and of all similar statesmen. If Chase could 
have subordinated his ambition and his cherished hopes 
to the good of the Union as completely as Abraham 
Lincoln did, it might have helped, if the cabinet could 
have worked as one man, to push the administration of 
daily affairs. That was impossible. Knowing Chase as 
we know him now, in the light of history and of his 
own revelations, it would seem to have been better that 
he was kept in his own department and in doing his 
own especial and proper work. In other words, instead 
of creating a group of little presidents, working into 
the affairs of government through the cabinet, it was 
better as it was. Abraham Lincoln " assumed " the re- 
sponsibility of full action at the crucial moment, better 
than any facile Seward, or scheming Chase, or fiery 
Stanton could have inspired or dictated that action. To 
this complexion we come at last, — government is in 
man, and the rough child of the prairie was the man of 
them all. 

And the President counted little on the assistance 
of the more progressive governors of the States. After 
brooding over the proclamation for months, after giving 
moral warning to the loyal slaveholders in the border 
States, he brought it before the board of his official 
advisers. Then he did not ask their opinion in the mat- 
ter of government, but upon a simple detail of adminis- 
tration. Specifying his own decision, he desired their 

of extraordinary force and self-assertion, — this was true especially of 
Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Stanton, — and though there was no- 
thing of selfhood or domination in his manner toward them, it was 
always plain that he was the master and they the subordinates." — C. A. 
Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, p. 171. 



334 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

advice as to the proper time of making it known, as to 
the occasion for putting forth the decree, which was to 
become effective January 1, 1863. And he followed the 
judicious suggestion to make the occasion after a vic- 
tory, which, in the course of events, occurred at Antie- 
tam. The all-important decision, the governing power 
of the decree, was his own act, out of his matured con- 
sciousness. Lincoln was the centre of opposing as well 
as forwarding influence. He had to consider not only 
Curtin and Andrew, but unwilling Republicans like 
Blair, and persistent opponents like Seymour. The im- 
pelling force of the act, the magnificent courage of the 
occasion was in Lincoln. 1 And he was disappointed by 
the immediate result, for he expected increase in the 
recruiting. In the closest intimacy he wrote : " The 

1 To appreciate the heavy responsibility incurred and discharged by 
Lincoln, we only have to refer to the reception of the proclamation in 
England and expression of the time. The opinion of controlling minds is 
given with serene candor by Dr. Martineau in letters to a friend in Massa- 
chusetts, lately published. English opinion was inexplicable then, and is 
incomprehensible now. 

" Apr. 14, 1863. A war which aims at impossible objects — be they ever 
so intrinsically good — is self-condemned. We believe Slavery to be truly, 
as you say, the cause of the struggle: we do not believe it to be the stake 
at issue. On the contrary, we regard the division between North and 
South as the one gleam of hope that has opened on the sad history of the 
colored race in America." 

" July 8, 1863. The removal of Slavery is, in their opinion, no proper 
object of a war; and is, on the other hand, far too serious and responsible a 
change to be resorted to incidentally, as a mere instrument of war. It is 
preeminently a work of peace needing deliberation, time, and organized 
vigilance and control; and to inaugurate it in the heat and haste of con- 
flict, to impose it as a military penalty, to identify it with confiscation and 
attainder, is to do all that is possible to make it hateful and hopeless. 
This, at least, is the view taken, so far as I can observe, by all the most 
experienced and high-minded men of affairs, including the anti-slavery 
leaders themselves." — Trans. Colonial Soc. of Mass., vol. vi, 428, 434. 



GOVERNMENT 335 

North responds to the proclamation sufficiently in breath, 
but breath alone kills no rebels. 1 

In his message, December 1, he fulfilled his pledge to 
strive for compensated emancipation. He refers to the 
great announcement, " All persons held as slaves within 
any State or designated part of a State, the people 
whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United 
States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free." 2 
He affirms, 3 "A nation may be said to consist of its ter- 
ritory, its people, and its laws. The territory is the only 
part which is of certain durability. . . . Physically 
speaking, we cannot separate." He argues at length, 
and forcibly, the great prospective increase of popu- 
lation in the whole United States, and the physical im- 
possibility of giving the large interior districts — so 
prolific in every resource — outlets to the ocean, except 
through continuous territory and united government. 

While it cannot be foreseen how much one huge example 
of secession, breeding lesser ones indefinitely, would retard 
population, civilization, and prosperity, no one can doubt that 
the extent of it would be very great and injurious. The pro- 
posed emancipation would shorten the war, perpetuate peace, 
insure this increase of population, and, proportionately, the 
wealth of the country. 4 

He recommends a definite plan for compensating loyal 
slave-owners, possibly to include colonization. This was 
not to exclude any military or forcible measures, but to 
reinforce and strengthen them. His responsibility 5 as 

1 Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii, 242. 

2 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 584. 

3 Ibid., p. 890. 4 Ibid., p. 895. 

6 Mr. Wilson recognizes the profound change wrought hy the procla- 
mation. " When it came it was no law, but only his deliberate declaration 



336 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

the head of the government ' is amply set forth in this 
noble paragraph : — 

I do not forget the gravity which should characterize a 
paper addressed to the Congress of the nation by the Chief 
Magistrate of the nation. Nor do I forget that some of you 
are my seniors ; nor that many of you have more experience 
than I in the conduct of public affairs. Yet I trust that in 
view of the great responsibility resting upon me, you will 
perceive no want of respect to yourselves in any undue ear- 
nestness I may seem to display. 2 

Emancipation closed one of the greatest ethical 
movements the world has ever known, in that it substi- 
tuted itself for the abolition sought by so many brave 
spirits a generation earlier. As Whittier stated posi- 
tively for that party, 3 " it cannot be said that we did 
it." These earnest persons builded better than they 
knew. They influenced the state but little, in all their 

of policy, for himself and for his party; and changed, as he meant that it 
should change, the whole air of the struggle, and of politics as well." — 
History of the American People, vol. iv, 232. 

1 April 4, 1864, Mr. Lincoln wrote: "Right or wrong, I assumed this 
ground. ... I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even 
tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save slavery or any minor matter, 
I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution alto- 
gether." — Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii, 508. 

2 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, p. 897. 

8 Whitter wrote Lydia Maria Child in 1875: "The emancipation that 
came by military necessity and enforced by bayonets was not the emanci- 
pation for which we worked and prayed. But, like the apostle, I am glad 
the gospel of Freedom was preached, even if by strife and emulation. 
It cannot be said that we did it; we indeed had no triumph. But the 
work itself was a success." — Higginson, Whittier, p. 90. Whittier was 
the embodiment of the ethical resistance to slavery. Not even Garrison 
represented so thoroughly the inward spirit of abolition as did Whit- 
tier. This spirit made Garrisons, as the great agitator made Mortons, 
Andrews, and Curtins; but that belongs to another phase of the question. 



GOVERNMENT 337 

agitation ; but they moulded men and women into new 
creatures, who in the Sanitary Commission and on the 
field of battle made a new state, as has been shown. 
Blood and iron are not agreeable agents of civilization, 
•but they are the means by which the great movements 
of mankind are worked out. 1 

The President bore the heaviest burden, but some of 
the governors successfully met exigencies which would 
have crushed ordinary men. The conduct of the State 
of Indiana for some two years by Oliver P. Morton was 
an essay in the art of government which must be famous 
always. The legislature assembling in January, 1863, 
was controlled absolutely by the Peace Democrats, who 
had elected their " state ticket " also. The governor 
reported to Secretary Stanton that it was intended to 
pass a resolution acknowledging the Southern Confed- 
eracy and urging the States of the Northwest " to dis- 
solve all constitutional relations with the New England 
States." 2 

The legislature adjourned in the spring, without 
making appropriations, and having made every positive 
effort to embarrass the executive. It would have been 
useless to call it together again, for it would not appro- 
priate except after securing assent to a military bill which 
would have deprived Governor Morton of all control 
of the forces of the State. The Democratic politicians 
little knew the power and resource of the man with 
whom they were dealing. As it proved, the old power 
of tyrants might yet be revived for the public good. 

1 Cf. Rhodes, vol. iv, 215. He sums the conduct of emancipation by 
the President. It was necessary, wisely done ; and, on the whole, could 
not have been better timed. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 4. 



338 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

April 18, the governor established a bureau of finance 
with his own financial secretary, collected the arsenal 
and other funds from the national government, bor- 
rowed money from individual citizens and from coun- 
ties. The national government assumed the state debt 
for arms and took the property. But some unique 
methods of finance were planned at Washington, though 
they were not carried into effect owing to more favoring 
circumstances. 

Indiana then owed $160,000 for interest, and $90,000 
incurred for military operations. Stanton persuaded 
President Lincoln to make an advance from an appro- 
priation of two millions made by Congress for supply- 
ing arms to loyal States and for organizing citizens 
against domestic insurrection. June 18, the President 
issued an order for the money. It was not used as 
anticipated, funds for the interest being furnished by 
bankers in New York. The money was used afterward 
for the expense of repelling Morgan's raid into Indiana. 
In the course of the negotiations Morton said to Stan- 
ton, 1 " If the cause fails, we shall both be covered with 
prosecutions; " and Stanton replied, " If the cause fails, 
I do not wish to live." 

It avails not to charge that the opposition in the 
Northwest grew out of arbitrary arrests or any misdi- 
rection of the functions of o-overnment. Whether the 
arrests were wise measures of administration or not, they 
were an effect and not a cause. The campaign of the 
Peace Democrats was a deliberate effort to turn back 
the loyal North, to substitute some ill-digested compro- 
mise and the probable recognition of the Southern 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 261. 



GOVERNMENT 339 

Confederacy for support of the Union. June 18, 1862, 
Governor Morton reported confidentially to Secretary 
Stanton, 1 as " deeply concerning " both the State and 
general government, the existence of a secret political 
association in Indiana, estimated and claimed to be ten 
thousand strong, bound to oppose all recruiting, to em- 
bitter public sentiment, and "generally to create dis- 
trust in and bad feeling toward the government and 
its recognized and legally constituted authorities." The 
newspapers supported by it were of more than doubtful 
loyalty. The "Sentinel" was as "thoroughly opposed 
to our government as the ' Charleston Mercury ' or 
' Richmond Enquirer.' " They considered the Legal-ten- 
der Act to \)e unconstitutional, and that " the responsi- 
bility of the war rests wholly upon the North." They 
charged repeatedly that "the sole aim and object is to 
interfere with Southern rights by securing the abolition 
of slavery." In the midst of this half-concealed treason, 
the governor believed the time to be " the most critical 
period since the commencement of the present war." 
He asked for at least ten thousand stand of arms to 
equip militia, " under the law creating the ' Indiana 
Legion.' " 

This was not Anglo-Saxon political opposition ; dif- 
ference of opinion seeking to change government within 
legitimate limits. Treason is betrayal, and this agitation 
sought to create a revolution within a rebellion. Jesse 
D. Bright, a senator of the United States from Indiana, 
expelled January 29, 1862, may serve as an authority 
for construing Northern opinion, as viewed by this 
revolutionary element. He defined three parties in the 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. ii, 176, 177. 



340 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

North. 1 1. Abolitionists, who would invade the South, 
free slaves, etc., called the Sumner type. 2. Those op- 
posed to abolition, but who would invade and free negroes 
as a military necessity, represented by Senator Sherman. 
3. Those opposed to invasion of the South, 2 favoring 
war for defense only, and the furnishing of men and 
means to keep off invasion of the loyal states. Loyal 
men termed this class three " Copperheads." Mr. Wood- 
burn finds a middle class, between the War Demo- 
crats and the Copperheads, who were fond of calling 
themselves "Constitutional-Union Democrats." 3 These 
were men who insisted that opposition to the civil and 
political measures of the administration 4 did not con- 
stitute opposition to the war. Probably their constitu- 
tional basis was quite similar to that of Governor 
Seymour. 

Whatever minor differences might range between 
the Constitutional-Union position and that of the radi- 
cal Copperheads, the men controlling the Democrats 
held forcible opinions which could not be reconciled 
with any practical, possible government of the Union 
at this time. Rebellion and revolution know no middle 
ground. Accordingly the Democratic party resolved in 
1862 that " in considering terms of settlement we will 
look only to the welfare, peace, and safety of the white 
race without reference to the effect that settlement may 

1 Woodburn, Party Politics in the Civil War, American Historical 
Association, 1902, vol. i, 231. 

2 Many associations in 1863 passed resolutions against the " abolition 
war " and in favor of peace. — Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 382. 

Contrariwise, many soldiers in the field sent the strongest resolutions 
sustaining the administration and rebuking opposition. — Woodburn, 
p. 231. 

8 Ibid., p. 232. 4 Ibid., p. 229. 



GOVERNMENT 341 

have upon the condition of the African." l Doubtless 
this sentiment came not only from the conditions of the 
war, but from a strong antecedent tendency, the social 
and political heredity of the Southern immigrant in 
Indiana. Like begets like, even in opposition. George 
W. Julian and the radical Republican leaders would 
have made no compromise with nominal Union-loving 
Democrats. They advocated the sending of outspoken 
Copperheads across the lines, into the Confederacy. 2 

Secession and rebellion did not constitute crime in 
the view of the fully developed Copperhead, 3 and he 
certainly belonged morally in some territory where 
secession was a virtue and not a political fault. The 
" Sentinel " indorsed the statement of Harrison H. 
Dodd : " I would stop the war if it were in my power 
to-morrow, upon the basis of the sovereignty of the 
States, as contradistinguished from a centralized power, 
sufficient to reduce the States to Territories, by any 
process and for any purpose." 4 The same journal had 
proclaimed, a year before, that it was ready to throw over 
the constitution of the United States for that of Mont- 
gomery, as being decidedly better. Such insurrectionary 
doctrines could not be expressed and contained within 
the political forms practiced by any civilized govern- 
ment. In 1864 J. J. Bingham, chairman of the Demo- 
cratic State Central Committee, published an address to 

1 Woodburn, p. 235. 

2 Ibid., p. 243. 

3 Governor Stone of Iowa shows the practical and political position of 
the Copperhead. " Several counties and townships are behind on all for- 
mer calls because they are Copperheads. This embarrasses me." — Ibid., 
p. 284. 

* Ibid., p. 240. 



342 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

the people of Indiana, 1 apprehending " attempts by those 
in authority to interfere by military power with the free- 
dom of elections." And he recommended citizens to 
" cooperate in open and lawful organizations for protec- 
tion and preservation of order." Governor Morton 2 
counterwarned all " to keep aloof from all military 
bodies contemplating resistance to federal or state 
authority." 

These political convulsions — compelled at last to stop 
short of open war and resistance to constituted author- 
ity — were inspired and maintained by the Knights of 
the Golden Circle, the Sons of Liberty, and other secret 
orders. 3 They were a significant contrast to the numer- 
ous open associations like the Sanitary Commission, 
which brought the social force of their communities to 
support the cause of the Union. The one sort was open- 
hearted and benignant, helping the cause of order, while 
the other, secret, dark, and treacherous, would have 
dealt death to the Union. It was a desperate and vain 
attempt to build up a new kind of independent state, 
amid the crash of rebellion and the tumult of bloody 
war. Such as they were, these socio-political bodies 
brought the power of association and affiliated organi- 
zation to the rearing of a bastard state sovereignty. 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 356. 

2 The people rendered their verdict in November, 1864, by reelecting 
the governor by a double majority. In the words of the Wabash Express : 
" No other man could have done more — who could have accomplished so 
much ? This great change in popular opinion is owing more to the mas- 
terly manner with which he handled the thrilling issues of the day, than 
to anything else." — Ibid., p. 365. 

3 The District Court at Indianapolis reported that the Knights num- 
bered 15,000. Signals of the order were recognized by Confederate pris- 
oners. — Ibid., p. 381. 



GOVERNMENT 343 

The numbers of the secret partisans emboldened them 
to plan a general rising under cover of a Democratic 
mass meeting, projected at Indianapolis, August 16, 
1864. 1 These movements were aided directly by Davis's 
commissioners of "peace," Thompson, Clay, and Hol- 
combe. 2 Thompson spent about half a million for arms, 
etc. The general plan was to rise in Ohio, Indiana, Illi- 
nois, and Missouri, to overthrow the state governments, 
to release the Confederate prisoners, and to organize a 
Northwestern confederacy, — big job for a treasonable 
conspiracy ; but these restless politicians, seeking to be 
statesmen, undertook it cheerfully. The plan was dis- 
covered and nipped in the bud. Afterward arms were 
seized in Indianapolis, with the ritual of the Sons of 
Liberty, etc. This broke the power of the order, for it 
could live and breathe only in secrecy. 

These subterranean operations were ferreted out by 
the sleepless enterprise of Morton, aided by the skill of 
General Carring-ton and his detectives. 3 It is so difficult 
for Americans to imagine and comprehend this kind of 
treason and stratagem that the plain citizens of Indiana 
could not believe before the explosion that such treach- 
ery was working beneath and around them. An old 
friend of Morton's protested that no such secret order 
existed. The governor crushed his skepticism by simply 
reading a stenographic report of a speech denouncing 
Morton, delivered in a conclave the night before. 

The Knights of the Golden Circle were merged in 
the larger order of American Knights, or " Sons of 
Liberty." 4 The movement for organization culminated 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 375. 2 Ibid., pp. 399^02. 

3 Ibid., pp. 405-407. 4 Ante, p. 342. 



344 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

in a convention at New York, February 22, 1864. Val- 
landigham was elected supreme commander. In the 
ritual these pregnant words were embodied : " The gov- 
ernment designated ' United States of America ' has no 
sovereignty, because that is an attribute belonging to 
the people in their respective state organizations, and 
with which they have not endowed that government as 
their common agent." * 

This stated in regular form the doctrine previously 
and openly avowed by H. H. Dodd in Indiana. 2 The 
concealed treason finally manifested itself in these at- 
tempts at rebellion and open resistance against state 
and federal authority. Such resistance could result only 
in arrests, whether " arbitrary " or other. We can reason 
calmly now on the methods adopted, and condemn the 
mistakes. But Morton had to act then, to move at once, 
like a man who seizes the first vessel capable of convey- 
ing water, when he must put out a fire. Dodd and other 
Sons of Liberty were tried by a military commission, 
assembled September 22, 1864. Some were condemned 
to death, but Judge David Davis convinced Governor 
Morton that the commission was illegal, and he finally 
induced President Johnson to commute the sentence 
to imprisonment, which was more substantial justice 
probably. 

Yet Morton, though compelled to adopt the sternest 
executive policy, — justifiable under the forms of civil 
government, — was a just and honorable citizen, seeking 
to bring order out of a seditious time. When Lincoln 
was assassinated, a great meeting was assembled to 
express the mournful feeling of the community. Mc- 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 393. 2 Ante, p. 341. 



GOVERNMENT 345 

Donald, a Democrat, said that he never had personal 
differences with Morton, and hereafter he would have no 
political differences. Hendricks, the embodiment of Cop- 
perheadism, arose to speak in the " uncontrollable fury " 
of the multitude. Men rushed with weapons, shouting, 
" Kill him ! Don't let the traitor speak ! " Morton raised 
his hand, and with " his terrible eye and ringing voice," 
says the biographer of Hendricks, " commanded and 
besought and quelled the crowd." x In political develop- 
ment he was a type of those Western men whom the 
aggressive movements of slavery educated to become 
the final destroyers of the institution. Abraham Lincoln 
was a Whisf of Kentuckian descent. Morton was a con- 
servative Democrat, who became at last a strong advo- 
cate of the fifteenth amendment to the constitution ; 
Hoosier-born, he was now "born again." It was said 
that his political course corresponded roughly with the 
steady advance of the Republican party, first " free ter- 
ritories," then " emancipation," finally " enfranchise- 
ment." 2 This progressive political " pillar of fire," this 
largeness of idea, made him " splendidly inconsistent." 
He led not only the people, but the strongest and ablest 
leaders of the people. When Secretary Stanton's resig- 
nation was bruited, late in 1862, 3 he wired : " I believe 
that your duty to your country and the best interests 
of the nation require you to retain your position." His 
sympathetic and militant brother-patriot answered : "I 
shall never desert my post. Of this you may be sure." 
When he was stricken by disease, Salmon P. Chase and 
Edwin M. Stanton agreed that " no governor had ren- 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 439. 2 Ibid., p. 452. 

3 0. R., Series III, vol. ii, 953, 954. 



346 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

dered such services or displayed such courage or ability 
in administration." * These labors would have prostrated 
most men of strength, and they laid this paladin low, 
only to rise again. He bore his full burden until Octo- 
ber 10, 1865, when he was stricken by paralysis, and 
never walked again without aid. In almost constant 
physical suffering until his death, in 1877, these unto- 
ward circumstances seemed to increase rather than dimin- 
ish the power of his intellect and the force of his will. 

Naturally, he went to the Senate of the United States, 
and I well remember him as he addressed that body, 
leaning on a peculiar iron frame for support. A keen 
observer, who knew closely most of the great men of 
the period, said to me, " There is something Websterian 
in that brow." With a large head and high forehead, 
dark searching eyes, voice not loud but deep, natu- 
rally powerful and commanding in presence, though 
infirm then, he was active thought and will incarnate. 2 
A voracious reader, quickly sucking the life from books, 
industrious, devoted to his family and writing his wife 
daily when absent, caring for soldiers in the field as if 
they were his children, he was a strong hater and was 
feared by his enemies. Like many great leaders of men, 
he had no definite creed. The, " Evidences of Chris- 
tianity," read in his youth, were too strong for his ten- 
der faith and kicked backward, like an overloaded gun. 
He believed in immortality and a religion of love. With 
every opportunity for acquiring riches, he died possess- 
ing a moderate independence. His proud nature despised 
corruption in any form. 

A mighty force impelling him to steadfast, onward, 

1 Foulke, Morton, vol. i, 456. a Ibid., pp. 507-532. 



GOVERNMENT 347 

political progress was in his confidence in the Union. 
He never doubted that, as constituted, it contained 
within itself the means for its own preservation, and 
all powers necessary to ward off attack. Such serene 
faith in the largest powers of government carried him 
in a higher atmosphere, more perspicuous and lucid 
than the doubts of common men. He consulted nobody ; 
but gathered his facts and digested them, then fixed 
his purpose " within his own mind." And this mind 
rose above circumstance and environment. Adverse 
conditions, which depressed others, inspired him to 
greater effort. His persistent will was bold, and it went 
onward. Intense were his ambition and love of power ; 
but he used these faculties for the good of the people. 
He was literally a public servant. Julian knew the 
whole business, and in his history of Indiana he called 
this career "The Reign of Oliver P. Morton." He 
made himself master of the Democratic party, includ- 
ing its rebel element, and controlled his own party at 
the same time. 

Perhaps no administrator — whether king, general, or 
governing orator — ever threw himself more absolutely 
and without reserve into his work. When arguing a 
cause, or acting as the head of his people, he knew 
nothing of self or selfish purpose. The end, the coun- 
try's need, the indomitable compulsion of affairs mis- 
called " destiny " drove him to the unavoidable act, 
the impulse of genius. 

The matter of arbitrary arrests — especially as con- 
ducted by Stanton and Morton — will be interesting 
and important, as history moves on. While it may be 
impossible to formulate a right of control and seizure 



348 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

of the person under a free government, which can sat- 
isfy enlightened jurists, it is equally certain that no 
government can be carried through privy conspiracy, 
treason, and rebellion, without using some methods of a 
despotism. Civilization has spent its best strength in 
limiting and binding executive power. All this has 
been done by willing citizens, contributing themselves 
to the state, for common service with the executive. 
When the individual citizen revolts and seeks to destroy 
the state, his relation with the executive changes abso- 
lutely and of necessity. The executive cannot be bound 
in the interest of a person whose will would subvert 
the state. 

The arbitrary executive simply substitutes his own 
will in action for a properly constituted power issuing 
from the ordinary civic source. 1 But the exigency is 
extraordinary, demanding immediate executive action. 
Though the means are absolute, it does not follow that 
the end created will be despotic and tyrannical. Judge 
Parker of Massachusetts said the President is a " mon- 
arch. His is an absolute, irresponsible, uncontrollable 
government; a perfect military despotism." 2 Judge 
Curtis argued to the same effect. But was it " despot- 
ism " ? The people did not so conclude, after clue de- 
liberation. It was the work not of a despot, but of 
" Honest old Abe," trying in the interest of his con- 
stituents to get through a bad predicament. He was 

1 Mr. Wilson remarks that the President had exercised the full pre- 
rogatives of the executive in suspending the Habeas Corpus Act when 
necessary. " Congress now gave him (in May 1863) explicit authority to 
set aside the rights of individuals whenever it seemed necessary to safe- 
gard the Union." — History of the American People, vol. iv, 236. 

2 Cited by Rhodes, vol. iv, 169. 



GOVERNMENT 349 

far from " irresponsible," and only acting firmly under 
a sense of his responsibility to the people. Here we 
should consider what kind of political entity is consti- 
tuted by our people. Our polity was English by hered- 
ity ; quite as English in development. Let us go back 
to 1789 and find out in what manner the sovereign 
people got under way in America. 

The people — reservoir, deep-current, and ground- 
swell of sovereignty — the people were recognized in 
1789 for the first time since the days when the horde 
elected chieftains or accepted laws. The great work of 
civilization had created certain governmental organs of 
state, assemblies, representatives, barons, counties, mu- 
nicipalities, and guilds ; these were massive bulwarks and 
bastions between governors and the governed. English 
government was based on orders and classes, not upon 
the nation as a whole. Crown and parliament, lords 
and commons- — the common men being knights of 
shires or burgesses of towns — ruled England. In 
America, town-meeting and county, constable and sher- 
iff, legislatures and governors of states, — these latter 
being little descendants of kings, according to Mr. 
Freeman, — these historic organs stood between the 
people of 1789 and the coming central power, desider- 
ated and craved, yet feared lest it might prove more 
oppressive than the royal power they had just escaped. 

A great general principle in federal government was 
now enunciated. In the words of a thorough student 
of institutions, it was " the most important and far- 
reaching political principle to which our career as a 
nation has given birth." * Curiously it came from New 

1 Taylor, Origin and Growth of the English Constitution, vol. i, 65. 



350 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

England ; for our district has given few general ideas 
to the Union, though it has contributed excellent spe- 
cial principles. The Websters — Pelatiah and Noah — 
published tracts advocating that the Congress of the 
United States should not only enact laws, but should 
execute them through its own officers, upon the persons 
of the citizens of the United States. Not only states 
but individuals should be directly responsible to the 
supreme power — the apex of the popular pyramid. 
The idea once proclaimed speedily enforced its own 
adoption. The historic organs of state, as described 
above, were corporations, in substance if not in form. 
A state government, a sheriff of a county, was a shell 
outside which the imperial government must stay, — so 
long as the shell was incorporate, — and staying wait 
for its rights until this direct service of writs, etc., 
brought the federal authority home to the people. A 
strong presidential executive, a survival of kingship, 
necessarily followed the same idea. " The community 
of all, not a society of the better " — we repeat — has 
been the practical ideal of the American state. The 
people, through the onset and advent of federal action, 
have become an essential part of the most thoroughly 
imperial system yet established in political development. 
The least and the lowest are constantly being swept 
from stagnant social eddies by the great stream of 
politics, and carried into responsible offices of the state. 
The process is full of danger; yet it rarely fails of tol- 
erable success, and often achieves brilliant results. 
Man — the child and image of God — is the basis of 
our state, and man returns and repays the generous 
confidence that society has given him. 



GOVERNMENT 351 

The people, this mass of humanity and community of 
all, — articulated into organs and political functions, — 
found their natural executive in Abraham Lincoln. To 
call that man a monarch and despot showed a jurist 
intoxicated with the musty fumes of legal lore ; inebri- 
ate with texts and unfitted for the necessary deeds of 
any desperate time. And the simple, uninstructed, but 
not ignorant people knew it. Mr. Lincoln, in another 
connection, stated exactly how he recognized the power 
of the compelling situation, and his conscientious sense 
of the duty imposed. He said to Horatio Seymour, the 
type of these hesitating counselors and worshipers of 
precedent: " My purpose is to be in my action just and 
constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the im- 
portant duty with which I am charged." * 

The rebellion was the impelling power of action and 
not the self-moving arbitrary will of the executive — 
whether federal or state — when a traitor had forfeited 
his personal liberty, and was outlawed in presence of 
the state. It was because the rebels knew so well that 
James Buchanan in his nature could not put forth the 
executive arm as Andrew Jackson would have done that 
the rebellion took its way without let or hindrance in 
the beginning. Virginia never could have been dragged 
at the chariot wheels of South Carolina if there had 
been an arbiter in the White House instead of an incom- 
petent timid seeker after precedents like Buchanan. 

We should not condemn the jurists without reserve, 
for good men of action, strong supporters of the exec- 
utive objected to the methods, if not the principle. 2 

1 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 636. 

2 Governor Andrew was opposed to the " power of arbitrary arrest so 



352 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Governor Curtin, in a message to the Pennsylvania 
legislature, recommended an Act of Congress providing 
for trial of "persons charged with such offenses in 
the loyal and undisturbed States, so that the guilty 
may justly suffer and the innocent be relieved." * 

Congress converted "arbitrary" into legitimate ex- 
ecutive power, by passing an act approved March 3, 
1863, authorizing the President to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus and requiring the Secretaries of State 
and War to furnish lists of political prisoners to the 
courts for trial. It was claimed that these provisions 
for trial were never carried out, showing that, as I have 
stated, it is not easy to formulate laws which can actu- 
ally control the necessity of the trial. September 15, 
in the face of the coming elections, the President was 
obliged to issue a proclamation suspending the writ 
throughout the United States. His manifesto was super- 
vised by Secretary Chase, 2 an opponent of arbitrary ar- 
rests, and doubtless was the best form of using prompt 
executive authority which could be made practicable. 
My object in this discussion has been, not to trespass 
on the province of jurists, but to set forth the compel- 
ling circumstances which actual necessity and the con- 
sequent use of these abnormal methods of government 
have created for conscientious officials. 

Some insight in studying the difficulties of these 
officials may be gained if we compare the necessary 
principles of war with the established custom of peace. 
The times were out of joint, and the varying conditions 

loosely exercised in the loyal States by the federal " Secretaries of State 
and of War." — Browne, Andrew, p. 113. 

1 Cited by Rhodes, vol. iv, 236. 

2 Ibid., p. 417. 



GOVERNMENT 353 

of the States required different methods of administra- 
tion. Governor Andrew could discuss constitutional 
procedure with Judge Parker, having enormous major- 
ities at his back; but Morton, holding only the tattered 
rags of his gubernatorial mantle, must act against men 
secretly armed for overthrowing the civic government. 
John Sherman, a statesman who opposed arrests, wrote 
his brother, November 16, 1862 1 1 "No doubt the 
wanton and unnecessary use of power to arrest without 
trial and the ill-timed proclamation contributed to the 
general result [of the elections]." Sherman was a patriot 
and a bright example of the temporizing Republican. 
But it will be observed that he liked the Proclamation 
of Emancipation no better than the arrest of secret seces- 
sionists — persons who aided the rebellion in the way 
which might most damage the Union. Treason, directly 
aided by the Confederacy, 2 was working to undermine 
federal and state authority so that Seward and Stan- 
ton, and afterward Morton, felt obliged to strike at 
secret treason in any way they could control. 

To revert to the military analogy, the arbitrary arrest 
in civic life was the offensive-defensive so desiderated 
by strategists in its most stringent form. It brought 
instant force to bear on the occasion, as General Sher- 
man contended for a timely use of the direct assault, 
instead of constant, cautious manoeuvring. Some critics 
condemn direct assaults on the field, but General Sher- 
man, more than a critic, was a man of genius, possess- 
ing all the resources of strategy and tactics. Hear his 
opinion of Grant's bloody reverses in the campaign of 
the Wilderness: — 

1 Sherman, Letters, p. 167. 2 Ante, p. 343. 



354 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

If General Grant can sustain the confidence, the spirit, 
the pluck of his army, and impress the Virginians with the 
knowledge that the Yankees can and will fight them fair and 
square, he will do more good than to capture Richmond on 
any strategic advantage. This moral result must precede all 
mere advantages of strategic movements, and this is what 
Grant is doing. Out here the enemy knows we can and will 
fight like the devil, therefore he manoeuvres for advantage of 
ground. 1 

Fear is a tremendous motive and moral factor among 
mankind. Will it ever cease to be so? Executive or 
ruler, judge or general, must always reckon it as a la- 
tent but imperative factor among rebels and criminals, 
as well as soldiers and honest citizens. 

The subterranean movements of the Knights of the 
Golden Circle and other treasonable conspirators natu- 
rally produced changes within the Democracy proper. 
The radical few opposing the draft and initiating trea- 
son impelled the serious and patriotic members of the 
party to an efficient support of the administration. 
There was a lull in political development in the spring 
of 1863; which was proven by subsequent events to 
have been deceptive in its hopeful aspect. August Bel- 
mont wrote Rothschild that " the few peace-at-any-price 
men " were silenced altogether. And Sumner could say 
the " Democracy is insisting upon the most strenuous 
support of the war." 2 These differing characters, ob- 
serving the current of public affairs from very different 
points of view, were both impelled to a more sanguine 
estimate than the facts warranted. For some of the 
most potent facts, as we have seen, were concealed from 

1 0. R., vol. xxxviii, part iv, 294. 

2 Citations, Rhodes, vol. iv, 243. 



GOVERNMENT 355 

their view, and hardly could have been anticipated 
from previous knowledge of the American people. Yet 
the open conduct of the Democracy improved in 1863. 
There was no factious opposition in Congress, and John 
Sherman could say to his brother in November : " The 
war was never more popular than at this moment." 
That keen observer, James Russell Lowell, could record 
that " the progress of years has outstripped the expecta- 
tion of the most sanguine, and that of our arms, great 
as it undoubtedly is, is trifling in comparison with the 
advance of opinion." 1 

The general movement of the national finances be- 
longs to history proper, but one aspect of finance enters 
into our study. The States, through their representatives 
in Congress, opposed the organization of the National 
Banking System at the start, and thus embarrassed the 
Treasury for some two years. 

The business of the United States was carried on in 
1861, virtually by $200,000,000, of state bank notes, 
based on a sufficient reserve of specie. This specie was 
not evenly distributed, but was held in the moneyed cen- 
tres. There was no system of mutual support among 
the banks, and. no adequate provisions for control of 
circulation or speedy redemption. It was estimated 
that there were seven thousand kinds and denomina- 
tions of notes, not to speak of counterfeits, which were 
in general circulation. 2 This ragged currency broke 
down under the political shock of secession and rebellion. 
It was contended by some authorities, especially in the 
West, that all issues of state banks had been in violation 

1 Rhodes, vol. iv, 423, 424. 

2 Hepburn, Coinage and Currency, p. 177. 



356 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

of the constitution of the United States. This general 
financial condition of the country greatly aggravated 
the difficulties of the Treasury and the administration. 
Secretary Chase also pushed his dislike and distrust of 
state banks to the extreme, and would not use them as 
temporary depositories in handling his loans. Standing 
by the Sub-Treasury, with every technical limit, he 
obliged lenders to furnish loans in specie directly to his 
assents. He enforced mediaeval finance with all the in- 
creased power of modern resource. This course, when 
there was such insufficient means for transacting public 
and private business, was a severe hardship ; and it pre- 
cipitated a partial panic for specie, December 16, 1861. 
The market was much excited then by the possibility 
of war with England, caused by the Mason-Slidell inci- 
dent. 

In 1862-63, the administration, as well as Congress 
and the people, became conscious that the burden of 
subduing the rebellion would require the largest finan- 
cial measures to carry the task to a successful issue. 
Every kind of nice particularism must yield in finance, 
as it had yielded in the fancied inviolability of states 
and persons, in the desperate necessities of the Union. 
Early in 1863, the House of Representatives was in- 
formed that a billion of dollars must be borrowed in 
eighteen months ; 1 that the national expenses were 
then two and one half millions per day, Sundays not 
excepted. The income was six hundred thousand ; so 
nineteen hundred thousand must be borrowed daily. 

1 Beyond the national outlay the individual States had spent freely. 
The writer's father was Chairman of the Commitee on Finance in the 
House of Representatives of the General Assembly of Rhode Island. He 



GOVERNMENT 357 

Legal-tender notes, fractional paper currency, treasury 
notes were being issued in alarming aggregates. 1 

Probably a mistake was made by Secretary Chase in 
changing the rate of interest on bonds redeemable at 
option in five to twenty years, — popularly known as 
5-20s, — from six per cent, to a lower rate at five per 
cent, with a longer term at option, after ten years to 
forty years. The national banks were forced into taking 
the lower-rate bond to get a basis for business, and the 
10-40s might have been limited to them. But the rate 
of six per cent., then being accepted, was low enough. 
Enthusiasm for contributing financial aid was chilled, 
and the popular supply of money lessened. The penny- 
wise saving in interest was lost hundreds of times by 
increased premiums on gold and the consequent advance 
in prices paid by the nation. Meanwhile the latter end 
of the 5-20s loan was placed by the secretary through 
popular subscription. This was fostered by energetic 
agents and commissions, by advertising and all the 
ingenious methods of modern finance. It was another 
move toward concentrating the resources of the people 
by large national methods, and so deserves mention here. 

As noted, the main difficulty was in the lack of stable 
currency and of large financial machinery ; to meet it 
Secretary Chase had proposed in his report in Decem- 
ber, 1861, to establish the system of national banks. 

drew the bill which was to put the little State into debt for one million, 
an unknown extravagance in those days. The act passed with little com- 
ment. After adjournment, Orray Taft, a wealthy, prudent, and provident 
capitalist, came toward my father. He said, " My heart sank in prospect 
of the interview." But the cheery citizen accosted him, " Weeden, that is 
right ! We shall need more yet." 

1 Spaulding, Paper Money, pp. 174-176. 



358 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

Herein he was opposed and hindered by petty particu- 
larism and state prejudice. It was not until February, 
1863, that this obstacle to a larger national government 
was overcome, and the act creating the national banks 
passed. 

It was a principle considered broadly, like the draft- 
ing of the people into the service of the Union. It 
brought the financial force of industrial enterprise and 
the fecundity of exchange into a larger moneyed system, 
which could be and which was used to support the gov- 
ernment. Had this powerful system been created in the 
beginning, it would have averted probably the passage 
of the Legal-tender Act, and it certainly would have 
lessened the depreciation and the consequent evils of 
the United States notes, or " greenbacks." The cost of 
the war was enormously increased by the depreciation 
of paper money and the advance of the premium on 
gold to 185. A large fraction of this cost, aggravated 
by depreciated public credit, would have been saved, 
had the States, through their representatives in Con- 
gress, been wise enough to follow Secretary Chase in 
his enterprising and sagacious recommendations in the 
beginning. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 

IN the administration of affairs at the crisis of rebel- 
lion, in the management of vast resources put forth 
to subdue revolt, the central power of the United States 
necessarily took on new responsibility and exercised new 
powers. The far-sighted Hamilton outlined these possi- 
bilities even better than he knew. " The wants of the 
Union are to be supplied in one way or another: if by 
the authority of the federal government, then it will not 
remain to be done by that of the state governments." 
National unity, the product of " Union the bond of all 
things and of man," came into renewed life in the western 
world. In the travail of battle and the sacrifices of war 
the conception of government was broadened ; it was 
even created anew, in order that the enlarged energies 
of the American people might be employed. 

The war was not completed until nearly two years 
after Gettysburg ; but the issues were initiated and the 
consequences shadowed forth by that victory, as Lincoln 
clearly perceived. He was bitterly disappointed in the 
immediate and material result. In the intimate revela- 
tions recorded by Hay, he said : " I regret that I did 
not myself go to the army and personally issue the order 
for an attack." * In his patient resentment he was just, 

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii, 278. . 



360 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

for he said later: "Still, I am very grateful to Meade for 
the great service he did at Gettysburg." 1 

In his masterly utterance at the dedication of the 
cemetery on the ground, about four months later, — an 
utterance heard in this country, but immediately felt 
and comprehended throughout the civilized world, as 
words have hardly ever been understood, — he said : — 

Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth 
on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedi- 
cated to the proposition that all men are created equal. . . . 
In a larger sense we cannot dedicate. ... It is rather for us 
to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us . . . 
that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom ; 
and that government of the people, by the people, for the 
people, shall not perish from the earth. 2 

The heroes had spent their lives, leaving a battle- 
field not to be fed by soft dedication, but for an endur- 
ing memorial in the hearts of their fellows ; a treasury 
of deeds, whence more and greater deeds should build 
up the future of the common country. 

In the words of this stalwart apostle of national 
unity, a new birth of freedom came out of the throes of 
revolution and was assured permanent life in the epoch 
established at Gettysburg. In his second inaugural ad- 
dress, delivered more than a year later, he only enlarged 
and extended the momentous thought inspired by that 
great triumph. He said that in the beginning " both par- 
ties deprecated war ; but one of them would make war 
rather than let the nation survive ; and the other would 
accept war rather than let it perish. And the war came. 

1 Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii, 278. 

2 Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii, 439. 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 361 

. . . Neither party expected for the war the magnitude 
or the duration which it has already attained. Neither 
anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease 
with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. 
' Woe unto the world because of offenses.' . . . With 
malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness 
in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive 
on to finish the work we are in." ' 

Government by the people had incurred a new re- 
sponsibility and was to take on new powers through 
the enlarged and perfected Union of the States. 

Mr. Lincoln refers briefly to the facts we have treated 
at length, stating that the administration as well as the 
rebels did not comprehend the innate magnitude and 
force of the revolt, nor the latent might of the Northern 
purpose to subdue it. Neither party foresaw the con- 
sequences, impending and inevitable in emancipation 
and the destruction of slavery ; for as far as possible 
slavery had been avoided in the organization of the 
Confederacy, and in the uprising of the Northern people 
to overcome the revolt. The ascendency of government 
exclusively, the defeat of the rebellion, and the restora- 
tion of order inspired the Northern people and impelled 
their representative armies in 1861-62. 

The partial defection from the cause of the Union of 
the Peace Democracy late in 1862 and in 1863 was at- 
tributed to the reentrance of the demon of slavery, and 
to the struggle for emancipation. But in the final 
result, the strength of public order in the North, the 
deep-laid foundations of Union were more completely 
revealed in consequence of the thorough revolution. 

1 Lincoln, Complete Works, vol. ii, 657. 



362 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

As the President indicated above, had the revolt been 
subdued at the beginning, emancipation would not have 
been compulsory. Probably there would have been 
some form of graduated and compensated emancipation. 
In that case, the tremendous power of the Union — in 
the States and through the States — would not have 
been revealed and put forth, as the people were com- 
pelled to put it forth in the year 1863. 

Like an immense turbine wheel, running in a fall of 
water from above and dragging through a backward 
flow of water below, the government of the Union, 
becoming national as it spent " blood and iron," went 
its course, overcame the backward currents, and estab- 
lished the irresistible will of the people. These were 
the issues of a tremendous historic problem. Fascinat- 
ing as the military exposition of campaigns and of 
battle is and will be always, the incidents of local state 
and central national evolution are much more impor- 
tant. The germs of government are in these events 
which the loyal peoples, the war governors, and Abra- 
ham Lincoln finally marshaled to the ascendency of the 
American Union. 

In his famous letter of August 26, 1863, the Presi- 
dent showed his appreciation of the gains at Vicksburg 
and Gettysburg, and his confidence in the renewed 
Union dedicated to freedom. " Peace does not appear 
so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come 
to stay ; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all 
future time. It will then have been proved that, among 
free men, there can be no successful appeal from the 
ballot to the bullet." l 

1 O. R., Series III, vol. iii, 734. 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 363 

As we leave the immediate personality of the President 
we may consider the kingly power which he used so 
sparingly and so well. 

I have referred at times to the survival and occasional 
operation of the kingly power in our method of execu- 
tive government. It cannot be considered too carefully, 
as we approach the end of these studies. Serious ob- 
servers of our time are coming to attach more and more 
importance to the rarely existing survivals of the ancient 
kingly power in the executive. It is the true Jovian 
principle, the divinity that doth hedge a king. It can- 
not be formulated in statute nor embodied in a techni- 
cal privilege, for it is too ethereal for the ponderous 
mace of established authority. It is the power of the 
people, directly represented by their own chosen leader 
and ruler. It is one of the few romantic and sentimen- 
tal franchises left to the common citizen, the every-day 
man, whether of a republic or a kingdom. As its true 
historic significance is beyond the comprehension of the 
petty politician, so he hates it, tries to ignore its exist- 
ence or to repudiate its legitimate exercise. These self- 
considering patriots could not comprehend Lincoln in 
times of war ; they equally misconstrue Roosevelt in the 
few occasions when the conditions of peace have opened 
the way for this godlike faculty. 1 

It works so naturally in the American system that, 

1 Facts suddenly reveal deep principles, hardly surmised in the super- 
ficial indications antecedent to the deed. Who accomplished the late 
solution of peace, — not only in Asia, but possibly in Europe and the 
world, — a solution considered impossible until it was undertaken ? Not 
the war-lord of Germany, not the constitutional king of England, nor the 
paradoxical president of France, but the chosen representative of the 
American people. 



364 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

like the functions of a healthy animal organization, 
it is generally not recognized. When it does not exist 
by heredity, the vacuum is sufficiently apparent and 
calls for something beyond the common idols of popu- 
lar representation. Mr. Froude x said : " If I were a New 
Zealander, I should desire an elective president like the 
President of the United States, uncontrolled except in 
taxation by a popular chamber." And the same clear 
expositor believed that Canada and the Australias left 
to themselves would have preferred American methods. 
" In the President rests the supreme executive authority. 
He chooses his own ministers ; he is responsible to the 
nation and not to Congress." 

Whether it would have been a better stroke in civili- 
zation to have suppressed rebellion speedily, and to 
have reestablished Union in 1861-62 with a limited 
and regulated system of slavery instead of enforced 
emancipation, is beyond the ken of human kind. The 
problem is speculation pure and simple. Never was a 
great emergency in history more fully developed and 
precipitated by the inexorable logic of events. Out of 
the agony of a nation divided against itself, out of the 
fiercest throes of battle, came the freedom of the slave ; 
for no one man decided the issue. 

It is true that we are disposed to treat the whole 
problem of our relations with the negro much more mod- 
estly now than was the custom in the third quarter of 
the last century. New issues of state-rights have arisen 
which cannot be treated here. Yet we are to remember 
that as slavery was accidental in the union of the States, 
so the race problem is incidental now. The great issuse 

1 Oceana, Tauchnitz ed., pp. 203, 236. 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 365 

of the government of the Union must be developed and 
worked out on their own merits, and over and above the 
incidental contact of race with race. The blundering 
exclusion of Chinese and Japanese is only a little worse 
than our management of the negro race. 

The whole matter of personal contact between peoples, 
civilized and partly civilized, must vex the twentieth 
century almost to desperation. Scientifically instructed 
men, bred under industrial systems, are meeting tribal 
organizations in their primitive ways all over the world. 1 
Even Christianity, the greatest of civilized systems, can 
afford no immediate and specific solution of the diffi- 
culty. After the Renaissance and Reformation, it was 
fondly imagined that the Christian faith had but to pro- 
claim itself and all would be well ; tbat the world, reno- 
vated and repaired thereby, would adapt itself to ideal 
living. 

Fully as we trust the essential power of the faith, we 
begin to doubt its practical administration in a world 
not adapted to it. The Mohammedan faith is as vigorous 
and thrifty as the Christian. Its mahdis and delusive 
prophets very well offset the Mormon Joe Smiths, West- 
ern Dowies, and Yankee Mother Eddys, in exploiting 

1 The war gave an interesting physical illustration of the difference 
between savagery and civilization on this continent. Sherman marched 
through the hostile Confederacy with a column of 60,000 men; the then 
unit of warlike force, powerful enough for defense, not large enough to 
be unwieldy. Lewis and Clark in 1806 " found the natives extremely nu- 
merous and generally friendly, though we have on several occasions owed 
our lives and the fate of the expedition to our number, which consisted of 
31 men." — Century Mag., vol. lxviii, 875. 

Yet we put a rifle and an alphabet in the hands of a savage, and expect 
him to keep step with civilization developed away from him for thousands 
of years. 



366 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

popular credulity. Miraculous pigs no longer run about 
in Judea, but Lourdes musters thousands of Christian 
pilgrims in enlightened France. Japan, nourished by a 
religion x instituted long before the birth of Christ, can 
organize a state wonderfully, can send forth citizens of 
all grades of intelligence, animated by a spirit of patri- 
otic sacrifice surpassing the devotion of all the Crusades. 
China, possessing the oldest and in many respects the 
most permanent system of civilization, wants our West- 
ern science, but repudiates our religion. When we re- 
member and mortify ourselves over the greedy rapacity 
and semi-barbarous action of some of the highest cul- 
tured Christian nations in the Boxer times, we blush 
and hardly wonder at Chinese skepticism. 

To get at the true significance and force of Lincoln's 
masterly phrase, embodying popular government, it 
may help us to consider other uses of the term, and 
some potential issues of government which have been 
sloughed off as civilization advanced ; or at least have 
been developed into new organs, holding due place and 
a defined work in the body politic. The world was 
shocked by a brutal massacre, which the government of 
Russia thought proper to inflict on its people in Jan- 
uary, 1905. The issue would have been a simple matter 
of government to a western trained mind — a function 
in the right of petition. Not so in Russia where East 
and West meet and produce many curious political 
manifestations. Every one knows that the Tsar is or 
was the " little father " of his people. In the church 
this function of government has one signification, in the 

1 " The ancient Japanese term for government, matsuri-goto, signifies 
liberally matters of worship." — Hearn, Japan, an Interpretation, p. 38. 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 3G7 

daily walk of life it has or has had others. Few of us 
supposed that this phrase, figurative to a western mind, 
would become a modern economic function, a practical 
governing essence of imperative force. The orthodox 
Russian workman had believed that the fountain of jus- 
tice, the " little father," could solve troubles in labor 
and wages, just as implicitly as the believer trusted that 
the autocrat could smooth his way to heaven. So in 
western countries an industrial community believes or 
pretends that their fetish, the trade union, can bring 
about political development, imponderable and impos- 
sible. Or perhaps the confidence prevailing in the at- 
mosphere of Russia was more like the faith of a North 
American Indian in the miracle of his " medicine-man." 
The practical result under Russian administration was 
not a mere failure of the right of petition, but bloody 
butchery of the suppliants, with their wives, children, 
and neighbors. According to governing Russia, all this 
was a necessary incident of industrial development con- 
founded with mistaken political aspiration. 

In highly developed Great Britain, the term gov- 
ernment is used to indicate in a definite way the cab- 
inet or working ministry, apart from the sovereign. 
Cabinet is a limited term. Burgess shows that the com- 
mon ideas of publicists are hazy and confusing, as they 
set forth the terms state and government. 1 

In America, the circumstances of our history have 
prescribed and controlled the development of govern- 
ment. It was not easy for us, as it is now difficult for 
Russia, to assign and ordain the functions of govern- 
ment. Blood was shed freely in the revolution against 

1 Burgess, Political and Constitutional Law, vol. i, 57. 



368 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

George III to assign the limitations of royal preroga- 
tive. Greater yet was the sacrifice in the massive rebel- 
lion of state-rights and slavery, when, as Lincoln boldly 
predicted at Gettysburg, the last appeal was made from 
the ballot to the bullet. Never was more momentous 
issue brought into civilization, and it was worked out 
" with malice toward none, with charity for all." 

As Mr. Burgess defines, America has embodied in her 
experience a clear and salient separation of the partial 
functions of government from the great powers of the 
state as it exists in its entirety. In our polity govern- 
ment is not the sovereign organization of the state. 
" Back of the government lies the constitution, and 
back of the constitution the original sovereign state 
which ordains the constitution both of government and 
of liberty." l 

The state is the whole, the massive result of civiliza- 
tion. " Divine right," whatever that was, could only 
produce practical government. Even a king or emperor 
— royal and peremptory — was and is only a function 
of the state. Before this principle was stated formally, 
Lincoln perceived and grasped it actually. He saw that 
this principle was the corner-stone of the United States, 
and he formulated it in the term Union. In the crisis 
of affairs, July 3, 1861, he said to the members of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, who were "fellow- 
citizens," the " States have their status in the Union, 
and they have no other status. The Union and not 
themselves separately procured their independence and 
their liberty." 2 

1 Burgess, Political and Constitutional Law, vol. i, 57. 

2 0. R., Series III, vol. i, 317. 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 369 

The supreme executive in modern organization — be 
it president, king, or kaiser — is one with the people, 
the expression of the whole, through its legitimate head. 
Lexicographers, seeking positive definition, say of the 
state : " The whole people of one body politic, the 
commonwealth ; usually with the definite article ; in a 
particular sense, a civil and self-going community; a 
commonwealth." Our American colonies, after snapping 
the umbilical connection with the Crown of Great Brit- 
ain, assumed much in taking the name of States. They 
could not have taken these names, had they not been 
virtually parts of the United States. Independent as 
these communities were in the development of personal 
liberty, they were even more dependent on their com- 
mon union, in their autonomy as States. The incipient 
troubles of the first confederation proved this absolutely. 
It was not until the genius of Hamilton — cautiously 
followed by the skillful Madison — welded into one sub- 
stance the differing faculties of would-be independent 
communities that a genuine state was formed in the 
body politic of the American Union. It was impossible 
that the whole grandeur of a state, which is the " organ 
of our collective best self, of our national right reason," * 
could be comprised in a local community and exercised 
within the limits of particularism. The conformation of 
the free individual, the modern political man, might be 
in local society ; his habitat must extend over the na- 
tion, must possess the greatest opportunities of empire, 
as it exists potentially in the Union of the States. 

This fusing and welding of local communities into 

1 No one excelled Matthew Arnold in phrasing the popular conscious- 
ness of the nineteenth century. 



370 WAK GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

one state, potential and imperial, has been justly appre- 
ciated and admired by disinterested observers in Europe. 
Mr. Froude says 1 that England must regard our ex- 
perience, more or less, in her inevitable combination 
of "self-governed communities into a single common- 
wealth." He considered that the original bond of the 
American Union under the Declaration of Independence 
was even looser than the ties now binding Canada 
and Australia to the Crown, though time and custom 
strengthened that bond. It was resisted by the sword, 
was sustained, and now the "American Republic is, and 
is to continue, so far as reasonable foresight can antici- 
pate, one and henceforth indissoluble." 2 

The partial blindness which could recognize the 
state only in particular and local States affected Sey- 
mour, 3 Vallandigham, and Dodd, as well as Davis and 
the apostles of Calhoun. With their inadequate political 
vision, they could not perceive that a state half sover- 
eign in a shorn and plundered Union could not equal a 
state which should be an integral part of a larger and 
more commanding Union. 4 The greater the whole, the 

1 "No monarchy or privileged order could have dared to take the mea- 
sures necessary to maintain the American Union. They would have infal- 
libly wrecked themselves in the effort." — Froude, Oceana, Tauchnitz ed., 
p. 346. 

2 Ibid., p. 313. 

8 In the draft Seymour declared he would put down all resistance to 
state laws. He would not promise to enforce a federal law. — Cf. ante, p. 
301. 

4 Even patriotic New England, ingrained in particularism, felt and 
appreciated the change wrought by the war in federal and state relations. 
Governor Andrew, in addressing the 29th Massachusetts in 1863, said : 
" The pride in the fact that they were Massachusetts men could have no 
proportion to the fact that they were United States soldiers." — Schouler, 
Mass. in the Civil War, p. 418. 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 371 

greater would be the participating parts. This principle 
was so little understood, in fact so ignored by the Cop- 
perheads in the war, that it ought to be explained now 
and enforced beyond the possibility of doubt for all 
time. 

The marvelous growth of our country from 1789 to 
1861 was the outcome of its unified strength. The 
body politic vibrated in its remotest part, as in the 
human body the heart-beat sends currents of life through 
all the members. Secession tried to break the Union, 
but it only induced further expansion of power, through 
temporary subversion. As Mr. Lincoln stated after eman- 
cipation, we were forced "to think anew and to act 
anew." The enlarged government of the Union after 
1865 embodied more power in its various functions. It 
was larger in effect through the discipline and subordi- 
nation of its parts. At first the " stateish spirit "of 
Indiana, 1 patriotic as it was, could only care for its own 
people in charitable work, but in the broad currents 
of a Western Sanitary Commission this feeling found 
larger life and was organized into a larger state. 

In federal and state functions, Mr. Lincoln's process 
of new thinking and acting was at work throughout the 
Civil War, and necessarily changed the administration 
of the Union. We gave many details in the case of 
New York. The opinion of Attorney-General Bates — 
already cited in annulling the deposition of a regimen- 
tal colonel by the governor of Kansas — dealt with the 
large question of federal or state control of volun- 
teers. He was obliged to repel " the loose idea that the 
governors of the States have the right to control the 

1 Ante, p. 131. 



372 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

organization of the troops from their respective States, 
even after they are received into the service of the 
United States." 1 This principle of unification of the 
functions of the federal government was working 
throughout all the departments of state during the 
Civil War. Such process does not make theories, it is 
the crucial practice of constitutional law. 

The States did not lose by abnegating their partial 
sovereignty in certain cases, as was feared by Seymour 
and Vallandigham. They became greater in themselves 
as they renounced a separating individuality and merged 
themselves in the imperial greatness of an inclusive 
Union. 

Enormous and preponderating issues, proceeding from 
emancipation, were embodied in the changes made in 
the Constitution. The thirteenth and fourteenth amend- 
ments were enacted in 1865 and 1866 ; and it would be 
a very faulty survey of the Union, as affected by the 
rebellion, which should overlook and neglect the scope 
and consequences of these changes. The amendments 
were capable of an interpretation which would subject 
all state legislation to a federal control. Without doubt 
the original intention of the legislature was to protect 
the negro in his new relations to the republic, without 
going farther and without disturbing the judicial rights 
of the white race. 2 Like many plans laid out for Sambo 
alone, the accomplishment went beyond the project and 
took in humanity at large, with all its restless wants and 
capabilities. As in the military outgrowth of the nation 
black troops brought new national powers to accord 
with the new national opportunity, so in the peaceful 

1 0. R. f Series III, vol. ii, 150. 2 Freund, Police Power, p. 65. 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 373 

outcome of law the new citizen carried new development 
and consequence into the procedure of the courts. In 
the time of the famous Slaughter-House Cases, it was 
expected that the mighty arm of Columbia, stretched 
over the black man, would stop in its course and would 
not affect old judicial rights, relations established by 
more than a century of American law. Not so the re- 
sult ; in railroad litigation the Supreme Court took new 
departure from the fourteenth amendment, and con- 
trolled the police power of particular States. 1 
The poet said truly, — 

" The individual withers, and the world is more and more." 

The individual citizen's grasp and reservation of his 
own chosen opinion, after he had surrendered his life 
to his country, was suggestive at times. Some Massa- 
chusetts volunteers early claimed the right to " refuse 
to serve except under officers of their own election." 
Governor Andrew subjected particularism to patriotism 
in the beginning. He told them promptly that such 
course " would subject the guilty to consequences from 
which I could not save them." 2 

Yet there are strong cross-currents in favor of the 
individual citizen, as the massive development of insti- 
tutions goes on. The individual, instead of losing scope 
in the tremendous centralization of power attained by 
the Union at Washington, gained greater liberty. Par- 
ticularism in the States suffered, but the liberty of the 
individual man gained new capacities. 3 Equality, which 

1 Frennd, Police Power, p. 65. Also cf. Baldwin, Two Centuries of 
American Law, p. 35. 

2 Mass. Exec. Files, vol. 15, p. 11. 

3 The fourteenth amendment " protects individual rights, as in no land 



374 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

was a glittering generality in France, has become a 
working element more and more in American political 
progress. It checks governmental powers, and the " con- 
trolling jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked 
with increasing frequency to give it effect." * Pregnant 
as the principle is, it has not yet been defined fully in 
a le^al sense. It counter-checks and even reverses the 
" crystallization " of feudal times. 2 

We may rest assured that the individual man in 
America will take care of himself, in the long run, 
corporations, trusts, and occasional institutions to the 
contrary notwithstanding. The world has long accus- 
tomed itself to the idea of a state embodied in the per- 
son of one man, king or tsar. The " state is I " seemed 
to be a natural dogma, when taking it by the head. It 
was the mission of America to change, even to reverse 
the process. Democracy is defective in some respects, 
but it extends and magnifies in the lowest order of its 
integral citizens that sense of " reasonable responsibil- 
ity" desiderated by all statesmen. Whitman, the demo- 
cratic poet, had many shortcomings, but he touched the 
heart of the people with a sure hand. 

" Copious as you are I absorb you all in myself, and become the master 

myself, 
America isolated yet embodying all, what is it finally except myself; 
These states, what are they except myself ? " 

The pendulum did not swing too far, actually, in 
determining these planetary motions of the federal sys- 

were they ever in any age protected before. But this is only by the sacri- 
fice of other rights of Individualism; only by the exclusion of the sover- 
eignty of the Union at the cost of the sovereignty of the State." — 
Baldwin, Modern Political Institutions, p. 114. 

1 Freund, Police Power, p. 631. 

2 Ibid., p. 626. 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 375 

tern. Though it was feared at first that these momen- 
tous changes might " reset the very foundations of our 
political system," * the calm atmosphere of the courts 
soon brought the oscillating bodies into a proper bal- 
ance of power. Corporations and persons were separated 
in the final outcome of judicial action. 2 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court expressly abnegated the functions which 
might undo proper state legislation. 3 The great agen- 
cies of local self-government proved to be more vital 
and enduring than the momentary action of race re- 
lations, and these profound influences assumed their 
proper place in political development. 

The Union was thoroughly established by the Civil 
War, and its binding power was immensely increased 
thereby. Possibly by no peaceful experience could the 
essential force of a democracy, working through Whit- 
man's units, — masters in their own circles, — could the 
democratic force have carried that mastering power 
through state and federal relations, into the larger ar- 
ticulation of the developed Union. War brought out 
all the latent powers of individuals in communities; 
these powers becoming active, first impelled States and 
finally swept the Union itself into larger and wider 
operation. But the nature and character of the Union 
was no sudden or abnormal creation. 

1 Baldwin, Two Centuries of American Law, p. 36. 

2 Ibid., p. 295. 

s The Supreme Court decreed : " If the laws enacted by a State be within 
the legitimate sphere of legislative activity, and their enforcement be 
attended with observance of those general rules which our system of 
jurisprudence presents for the security of private rights, the harshness, 
injustice, and oppressive character of such laws will not invalidate them 
as affecting life, liberty, or property without due process of law." — Wil- 
loughby, American Constitutional System, p. 189. 



376 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

It has been an efficient motive of these pages to show 
that the spirit of the Union, this sublime inceptive and 
coalescing principle, came early into being. The " flag 
of the Union" — not of Massachusetts or Great Britain 
— was hoisted by Pepperell over the fortress of Louis- 
burg and over the prostrate power of France. The 
spirit of the Union was fostered by Franklin and his 
coworkers long before sugar-duties and tea-taxes, stamp- 
acts and port-bills harassed the grumbling colonies, thus 
imposing an encroaching prerogative of the Crown, as 
the colonists conceived it. The political philosophers of 
Europe saw clearly, when they recognized in the Ameri- 
can Revolution a new principle of government, a new 
directing force in the large affairs of man. It was not 
merely that Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry disagreed 
with George III and Lord North. The largest govern- 
ing force possible, the representation of the common 
people, — a representation groped after by France in 
bloody conflict, a force not empowered and utilized by 
England until after 1830, — this political renaissance 
was achieved in America when independence was pro- 
claimed and sustained. 

Such pregnant ideas, such dominating germs of gov- 
ernment were more or less inchoate in the first periods of 
Union life. They subsisted, though latent and inactive, 
in all the communities of the United States. Calhoun 
and his school found these undeveloped functions of 
government ready to hand. It suited the aspirations of 
slavery to exalt itself through the unsubjected func- 
tions of particular States. As individuals and as com- 
munities, the propagandists revolted and rebelled. Mr. 
Lincoln proclaimed a mighty hope when he ventured 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 377 

the forecast that the war would be the last appeal from 
ballot to bullet. 1 As he viewed it, government by the 
people was being established on firm foundations. In 
their wayward interpretation of the Constitution, the 
Southern rebels dragged many Northern politicians into 
sympathy with them and into support of their hazard- 
ous creed. Seymour of New York, Abbott and Loring 
of Massachusetts, the Knights of the Golden Circle 
would not sustain the Union positively against a par- 
ticular State. 2 

It is difficult to comprehend the problem now as it 
stood in 1864, as the course of events has so changed 
the perspective. But the Democratic presidential con- 
vention of 1864 said directly that there was " failure 
of the Union by the experiment of war," then advised 
a convention of States to " restore peace on the basis of 
the federal union of the States." Here would appear 
to be a difference between restoration of the Union 
simple and a federal union of the States brought into 
being by a peace. 

This great constitutional problem has been worked 
out in the conflict of war, and through the consequent 
legislative and judicial action. The contrary or state- 
rights doctrine, supported by the antique social and the 
modern unsocial institution of slavery, was overcome 
by the Union, which prevailed over the functions of 
particular States. The whole state — the Union — in- 

1 August 26,1863. A peace " worth the keeping in all future time. It will 
then have been proved, among free men, that there can be no success- 
ful appeal from the ballot to the bullet; and they who take such appeal 
are sure to lose their case, and pay the cost." — 0. R., Series III, vol. iii, 
734. 

2 Cf. ante, p. 307. 



378 WAR GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND STATE 

herited all the powers of civilization descended from 
centuries of tribal hordes, kingdoms, and empires, from 
cities and republics. This historic evolution, including 
and embodying our Civil War, cannot be studied too 
much or pondered too thoroughly. The past involves 
the future of a powerful commonwealth. I have shown * 
that it is a practical question in that politicians and pub- 
licists even now ignore the true causes and effects which 
wrought the changes in our Constitution and yet more 
produced our modern constitutional atmosphere. The 
renovated and extended Union has become so natural 
and normal that these censors have forgotten the signifl- 
cant throes of the body politic in producing its second 
birth. 

The State of Texas, one of these particular commu- 
nities, will have soon — as time goes in the experience 
of nations — a population larger than that of the South- 
ern Confederacy when it attacked the basic principles 
of the United States. Every individual person, in this 
• future aggregation of American citizens, ought to study 
and comprehend the principles of this contest — federal 
and state — which shook the whole world in the first 
two years of its course. But Texas is singular only in 
its size. Little Rhode Island — small in bulk, great in 
achievement and historic inheritance — is founded on 
the same principles. New York in its cosmopolitan aspi- 
ration, Massachusetts in its critical and criticising excel- 
lence, the Northwest in its imperial yearning, each and 
all of these particular communities may well study the 
history of this great struggle at arms, and the greater 
problems of civic evolution involved therein. The par- 

1 Cf. ante, p. 4. 



THE UNION VINDICATED AND DEVELOPED 379 

ticular States at last found their true distinction, not 
in independent governmental action, but in their be- 
coming the majestic parts of that magnificent whole — 
the American Union. 



INDEX 



Abbott, J. B., on Constitutional Demo- 
cracy, 307 n. 

Abolitionists, moral issue, 12, 15 n. ; and 
the Civil War, 148 ; service, 336. 

Adams, C. F., on Crittenden Compromise, 
25 n. ; and Andrew, 149. 

Adams, J. Q., on party obligation, 11. 

Administration. See Draft, Volunteering, 
and administrators by name. 

Agnew, C. R., Sanitary Commission, 174. 

Albany, draft resistance, 287. 

Altoona conference, 228-232, 326-328. 

Amendments, effect of fourteenth, 372- 
375. 

Anderson, Robert, at Sumter, 56-58. 

Andrew, J. A., early touch with Wash- 
ington, 67-71 ; executive genius, 74, 207 ; 
and troops for North Carolina expedi- 
tion, 75-77, 198, 199 ; and treason, 93 ; on 
Bull Run, 95, 96; and Stanton, 104; on 
emancipation and recruiting, 117, 168, 
325, 326 ; on incapacity of the administra- 
tion, 123 n. ; as an anti-slavery type, 147, 
148; counselors, 149, 155; preparation 
for war, 150 ; Democratic indorsement, 
151 ; on welfare of volunteers, 151 ; and 
Cushing, 152 ; and Butler in Maryland, 
153; and complaints of women, 154 ; on 
his critics, 154 n., 164 ; and federal red 
tape, 155, 213 ; urges more troops, 161 ; 
energy, 164; response to call of May, 
1862, 168 ; character, 191-193 ; character 
of appointments, 192 ; official self-con- 
sciousness, 193; and independent re- 
cruiting, 197; recruiting controversy 
with Butler, 199-208 ; and federal inter- 
ference, 213 ; and control over organized 
volunteers, 216-218 ; and the draft (1862), 
218,219; (1863), 284; as a war minister, 
222 ; and Altoona conference, 229, 326- 
328; on Emancipation Proclamation, 
231, 327 ; and election of 1864, 254, 255 n. ; 
and Seymour, 302 ; and arbitrary ar- 
rests, 351 n. ; on federal loyalty, 370 n. 

Arbitrary arrests, Lincoln on, 84; cessa- 
tion, 236 ; action of Congress, 242 n., 352 ; 
not a cause, 338; Vallandigham case, 
242, 243 ; Copperhead action as cause, 
344 ; military trial of Copperheads, 344 ; 
a necessity, 347, 351-354. 



Arms, Morton's complaint, 162, 163; state 
and federal importation, clash, 164. 

Army. See Draft, Sauitary Commission, 
Volunteering. 

Bache, A. D., Sanitary Commission, 127. 

Baker, Conrad, on enrollment in Indiana, 
284 ; on draft resistance, 308 ; on secret 
organizations, 311. 

Baltimore riot, 63. 

Bancroft, George, on war and slavery, 
323 n. 

Banks, state, currency (1861), 355; and 
Chase, 356; national, and centraliza- 
tion, 357, 358. 

Bates, Edward, on control of volunteers, 
216. 

Beecher, H. W., and secession, 27. 

Bell, John, and secession, 20 n. 

Bellows, H. W., Sanitary Commission, 
126-129, 174. 

Belmont, August, and Copperheads, 239 ; 
on the peace party (1863), 354. 

Bingham, J. J., urges Copperhead organi- 
zation, 341. 

Bird, F. W., on Andrew, 192. 

Black, J. S., as a Union-saver, 24. 

Baine, J. G., on the draft (1864), 314. 

Blair, F. P., on approaching emancipa- 
tion, 230. 

Blatchford, R. M., Union Defense Com- 
mittee, 156. 

Block, Maurice, on nationality, 272. 

Border States, and secession, 20 n. ; troops 
from, 159; Morton's influence in Ken- 
tucky, 163 ; trade with, 178, 179. 

Boston draft riot, 284. 

Boutwell, G. S.,as Andrew's Washington 
agent, 70; on Chase as a financier, 100; 
on the Vallandigham case, 243 n. 

Bowditch, H. I., Sanitary Commission, 
129. 

Brady, J. T., Union Defense Committee, 
152 ; on Seymour and the rioters, 288 n. 

Bright, J. D., on Northern parties, 339. 

Buchanan, James, and the Union, x, 2, 23 ; 
disastrous feebleness, 351. 

Bull Run, causes of defeat, 94, 95 ; effect 
in Europe, 95 ; in the North, 96. 

Bullard, E. F., on the draft, 290. 



382 



INDEX 



Burgess, J. W., on reserved powers of 
the President, 66 n. ; on the state in 
America, 308. 

Burke, Edmund, on party politics, 9. 

Butler, B. F., on slaves as contraband, 94; 
and the Maryland slave insurrection, 
153 ; character, 193-195 ; as a military 
man, 195-197, 207 ; authorized to recruit, 
197 ; controversy with Andrew, 199-208. 

Cabinet, function of American, 328 ; Lin- 
coln and his, 332. 

Calhoun, J. C, and the Union, 7 n. ; on 
party obligations, 11 ; on society and 
government, 125. 

Cameron, Simon, House censures, 85; 
checks volunteering, 87, 112, 160, 166; 
and Curtin, 88 ; incapacity, 102, 158 n. ; 
and Sanitary Commission, 127; checks 
state support, 165; investigated, 169; 
interference with state recruiting, 180, 
183, 189, 190, 191 n., 197 ; and Sickles's 
brigade, 183; and appointment of gen- 
eral volunteer officers, 184, 185 ; and But- 

. ler's recruiting, 197, 199, 200, 206 ; and 
Seward's War Department meddling, 
209,210; and regimental commissions, 
210. 

Campbell, Eobert, and appointment of 
volunteer officers, 186. 

Carrington, H. B., and the Copperhead 
rising, 343. 

Chamberlain, D. A., on the Union, 4, 5. 

Chandler, Zachariah, on the Peace Con- 
vention, 27. 

Chase, S. P., statesmanship, 54 ; solution 
before Sumter, 65 ; financial policy, 99- 
101 ; and sub-treasury system, 101, 356 ; 
and Fremont's proclamation, 107 ; and 
Hunter's order, 117, 324 ; and Lincoln's 
renomination, 251, 254; as a cabinet 
officer, 329-333. 

China and Christianity, 366. 

Christian Commission, work, 131. 

Christianity, prospects as a world faith, 
365. 

Cisco, J. J., Union Defense Committee, 
152. 

Civil War, underlying reasons, 28 ; deemed 
inevitable, 52, 58; onus of aggression, 
57, 81; prolonged through administra- 
tive defects, 113, 123, 124; and recru- 
descence of state sovereignty, 241. 

Clay, C. C, Jr., and the Copperhead ris- 
ing, 343. 

Clay, Henry, and the Union, 7. 

Clifford, W. K., on secession and Jacob- 
ism, 33 n. 



Clubs, Union, 133 n. 

Coercion, question (1860), 21 ; popular de- 
mand, 72-74. 

Colfax, Schuyler, interference in recruit- 
ing, 190 ; and the enrollment, 283. 

Commerce, Yates regulates, at Cairo, 178; 
with enemy forbidden, 178 ; illicit, 178 ; 
with Border States, 178, 179. 

Compromises, and slavery issue (1850), 
13; spirit and plans (1861), 20, 24-28; 
forces opposing, 28-31. 

Confederate States, factors of failure, 
xxiii ; and slavery, 37, 58 ; patriotism, 
59 ; conscription, 316. 

Congress, sustains the administration 
(1861), 85 ; and emancipation, 116 ; and 
executive war powers, 116; red-tape in- 
vestigation, 169; reconstruction veto, 
253 ; enrollment act, 279 n. ; and arbi- 
trary arrests, 352. 

Connecticut as a Puritan community, 136. 

Constitutional Democracy, 307, 340. 

Copperheads, historical judgment on, 
xxiii-xxv, 306, 307; segregation (1861), 
22-24; organization in Indiana (1862), 
224; in campaign of 1862, 226; propa- 
ganda, 234 ; and perversion of patriotic 
enthusiasm, 237 ; corrupting principle, 
238; and Democratic opposition, 239; 
Vallandigham case, 242, 243 ; movement 
in Pennsylvania, 245; and Morgan's 
invasion, 246 ; Lincoln on, 248 ; issue in 
1864, 261; and arbitrary arrests, 338; 
Morton on newspapers, 339; treason- 
able opposition, 339, 341; attitude to- 
ward, of radical Re publicans, 341; secret 
organizations, 342-344; plan for a ris- 
ing, 343 ; leaders condemned, 344 ; blind- 
ness to true sovereignty in the Union, 
370. 

Couch, D. N., and the draft in Pennsyl- 
vania, 309. 

Crittenden Compromise, 24-26. 

Cummings, Alexander, and Cameron, 85. 

Curtin, A. G., executive force, 74; char- 
acter, 88; and Cameron, 88; and ad- 
ministrative check to volunteering. 
87-92 ; patriotic energy, 158 ; and state 
finances, 158; and Stanton, 170; and 
control of state recruiting, 191 n. ; as a 
war minister, 222 ; and Altoona confer- 
ence, 229, 326 ; on the draft (1862), 280, 
281 n. ; and drafted ministers, 313 ; and 
arbitrary arrests, 352. 

Curtis, B. R., on executive usurpations, 
233. 

Cushing, Caleb, offers services, 152 ; oppo- 
sition to, 153 n. 



INDEX 



383 



Dana, C. A., on Lincoln's education, in p., 
42 n. ; on Lincoln and his cabinet. 332 n. 

Dana, It. 11., on emancipation issue, 118; 
on Lincoln, 250. 

Davis, H. Winter, manifesto against Lin- 
coln, 253, 254. 

Davis, Jefferson, as President, xxiii ; 
Southern defense (1860), 15; on North- 
ern aggression, 28; on right of seces- 
sion, 33 n.; inaugural and slavery, 38. 

Debt, public, increase in 1863, 356 ; state 
loans, 356 n. 

Democracy, security in America, 268, 
373-375. 

Democratic party, and the administra- 
tion (ism), 182; recrudescence, 227 ; re- 
sult on the war, 241; Constitutional 
Democracy, 307, 340; opinions incom- 
patible with Union (1802), 340; and 
slavery (1862), 340 ; attitude (1863), 354. 
See also Copperheads, Elections, Sey- 
mour. 

Dickinson, D. S., opposition to Lincoln, 
254. 

Dix, Dorothea, services, 132. 

Dix, J. A., Union Defense Committee. 
156 ; commission, 184, 185 ; ou Copper- 
heads, 238 ; on Seymour and state pro- 
tection of the draft, 290, 300-302. 

Dodd, H. H., on the warandState-Kights, 
341 ; trial, 344. 

Doolittle, J. K., on the draft (1S64), 314. 

Douglas, S. A., and slavery issue, 13, 14; 
plea for peace, 26 n. ; and public opinion, 
30 ; on Lincoln as a debater, 42 ; and 
popular sovereignty, 49; on Lincoln's 
inaugural, 52; patriotism, 60 n., 83. 

Draft, Andrew deplores threatened, 218 ; 
urged (1862), 263, 265; and the "people," 
264,265; call for (1862), 279 ; enrollment 
act, 279 n. ; applications for postpone- 
ment, 280 ; close scrutiny of quotas, 
280-282; violence and progress of en- 
rollment, 281-285; Boston riot, 284 ; Sey- 
mour's attitude, 284-287 ; resistance in 
New York State, 287; New York City 
riots, 288 ; result of draft, 289 ; Jay on 
riots, 289; postponement urged, 290; 
Seymour and the riots, 291-293 ; not a 
partisan measure, 292 ; popular support, 
292, 297-299, 313-315 ; Seymour's appeal 
for suspension, 293-296 ; and submission 
to adjudication, 295, 296 ; Lincoln's reply 
to Seymour, 296-298 ; Seymour and state 
protection of, 300-302 ; resistance in In- 
diana, 30S ; in Pennsylvania, 309, 310 ; 
drafted men as soldiers, 310; in 1864, 
311 ; drafted ministers, 313; stimulating 



effect, 315; and support of the adminis 
tration, 315; number liable, 316; in 
South, 316; as an act of administration, 
316-318. 

Eggleston. Edward, on "yellow " Indian- 
apolis, 142. 

Elections, (i860) issue, 14-16; vote, l<; ; 
Lincoln's minority election considered 
36; (1862) issues and effect, 225, 226; 
renewal of party allegiance, Copper- 
heads, 226-228; conference of govern- 
ors, 228-232; emancipation as issue, 
'_'.;■_•; in New York, •_>;!•_>; military despot- 
ism as issue, 233 ; in Indiana, 233; (1863) 
Ohio, 244; Lincoln's letter, 246-249; 
(1864) opposition to Lincoln's nomina- 
tion, 251, 252, 261 ; Johnson's nomination, 
252; Wade-Davis manifesto, 253; new 
convention movement, 254; Lincoln's 
popular strength, 255 ; Democratic plat- 
form and candidates, 256, 257, 261, 377 ; 
side issues, 257 ; results, 258, 259. 

Ellis, G. E., on Puritans and the Bible, 
136 n. 

Emancipation, under war powers, xvii. 
116,321, 324; Fremont's proclamation, 
106 ; its effect, 107 ; development of 
issue, 115-118; Hunter's order and Lin- 
coln's annulment, 117, 322-325; not 
probable through act of Congress, no ; 
Lincoln's policy, 118-120, 122; Greeley's 
letter, 119; Proclamation, 120; neces- 
sary, 120, 364; military result, 121, 334 ; 
effect abroad, 121, 334 n. ; and election 
of 1862, 225, 232 ; and Altoona confer- 
ence, 230-232, 327 ; Lincoln's confidence 
in, 247, 249, 335; abolition secured, 
259 ; Lincoln and compensated, 323, 335 j 
Chase's idea of the power, 324 ; popular 
progress concerning, 325, 320 ; Lincoln's 
self-reliance, 333 ; and the abolitionists. 
336; effect on the Union, 361 ; and the 
sacrifice, 364. 

Erhardt, J. B., on Seymour and the draft, 
300 n. 

Erie Canal, social effect, 134. 

Evarts, W. M., Union Defense Commit- 
tee, 152. 

Everett, Edward, and the war, 150. 

Fessenden, W. P., on utilizing the patri- 
otic outburst, 72. 

Finances, difficulties (1861), 98, 99 ; Chase's 
mistakes, 99-101, 356; effect of sub- 
treasury system, 101, 356 ; support of 
the government (April. 1861), 150, 156; 
Pennsylvania, 158 ; Indiana, 337, 33s ; 



384 



INDEX 



State currency (1861), 355 ; loans (1863), 
356 ; effect of reduced rate of interest, 
357; popular subscriptions and in- 
creased federal power, 357; national 
banks, 357, 358; possible avoidance of 
legal-tender act, 358. 

Fish, Hamilton, Union Defense Commit- 
tee, 152. 

Floyd, J. B., as a Union-saver, 23. 

Forbes, J. M., patriotic work, 69; and 
Andrew, 149, 154 ; and voluntary offer- 
ings, 152. 

Foreign affairs, Lincoln on (1861), 84, 93; 
British attitude, 94 ; effect of Bull Run, 
95 ; and of emancipation, 121, 334 n. 

Franklin, W. B., and Sickles's brigade, 
183; and Union Defense Committee's 
regiments, 184. 

Fremont, J. C, character, 105, 106 ; procla- 
mation, 106, 107. 

French, J. H., command, 200. 

Froude, J. A., on American government, 
364, 370. 

Fry, J. B., Provost-Marshal-General, 281 ; 
on Seymour and the draft riots, 291- 
293. 

Garrison, W. L., and the Union, 12, 15 n. ; 
as a product of Massachusetts, 139. 

Gaulden, W. B., on slavery, 15 n. 

Gettysburg, result, 244, 359. 

Gibbs, Wolcott, Sanitary Commission, 
174. 

Giddings, J. R., and beginning of slavery 
issue, 13. 

Gordon, J. B., on cause of the Civil War, 
64 n. 

Government, stage in Russsia, 366; in 
Great Britain, 367 ; in America, 367. See 
also Lincoln, People, Union. 

Governors, war functions, xi, xii, xv, 222 ; 
and federal red tape, 156 ; conference, 
228-232, 326-328 ; Lincoln's attitude, 333. 
See also governors by name. 

Grant, U. S., Vicksburg, 243; lieutenant- 
general, 251 ; Sherman on his Wilder- 
ness assaults, 353. 

Gray, Asa, on Lincoln, 249. 

Great Britain, and the Civil War, 94; 
and emancipation, 121 ; stage of govern- 
ment, 367. 

Greeley, Horace, demand for emancipa- 
tion, 119 ; political folly, 241 ; and Lin- 
coln's reelection, 251, 254, 255. 

Green, T. H., on the Civil War, 258 n. 

Grimes, J. W., on election of 1862, 232. 

Grow, G. A., on utilizing the patriotic 
outburst, 71. 



Habeas Corpus. See Arbitrary arrests. 
Hallet, B. F., indorses Andrew, 151. 
Hamilton, Alexander, on possibilities of 

federal power, 359, 369. 
Harlow, A. H., on enlisting, 153. 
Harris, Elisha, Sanitary Commission, 126- 

128. 
Hay, John, on Lincoln's greatness, 47. 
Heintzelman, S. P., and secret organiza- 
tions, 313. 
Helie, F. A., on term nation, 270. 
Hendricks, T. A., on the Civil War, 235 ; 

sentence of history on, 306 ; and Morton 

compared, 345. 
Henshaw, Daniel, and Andrew, 327. 
Herndon, W. H., on Lincoln's qualities, 

45. 
Hoar, E. R., on Stanton, 105. 
Hoar, Joanna, as a type, 137. 
Holcombe, J. P., and Copperhead rising, 

343. 
Holt, Joseph, on Sons of Liberty, 312. 
Hooker, Thomas, polity, 136. 
Howe, S. G., on voluntary contributions, 

152 n. 
Hughes, John, and the draft, 310. 
Hunter, David, emancipation order, 117, 

322-325. 

Illinois Central Railroad, patriotism, 157. 

Indiana, Sanitary Commission, 131; so- 
cial structure, 139-143 ; patriotism after 
Sumter, 145 ; first troops, 146 ; military 
condition, 147; attitude toward slav- 
ery, 147 ; Democratic success (1862), 233 ; 
and election of 1864, 258 n., 259 ; draft 
resistance, 282, 283, 308. See also Mor- 
ton. 

Indianapolis, " yellow," 142. 

Iowa, movement against volunteering, 
220; election and emancipation (1862), 
232. 

Jackson, Andrew, and the Union, 7. 

Japan, advance, 366. 

Jay, John, on Seymour and the draft 

riots, 289. 
Johnson, Andrew, nomination, 252. . 
Johnston, J. E., and McClellan (1861), 

110, 111. 
Julian, G. W., Ohio election of 1863, 244; 

and Copperheads, 341 ; on Morton, 347. 

Kasson, J. A., on the draft (1864), 314. 
Kentucky, question of loyal trade, 178 n. ; 

Morton's influence, 163. 
Knights of the Golden Circle. See Secret 

organizations. 



INDEX 



385 



Law and necessity, 243, 245, 

Leavitt, Joshua, on the administration, 
72. 

Lee, Henry, and Andrew, 150. 

Lee, R. E., as a general, xxiii ; on re- 
served rights of States, 286 n. 

Luicoln, Abraham, as dictator, x, xvi, 66, 
67, 80, 189, 254 ; inadequate conception 
of task and use of powers, xiii, xviii, 67- 
69, 86, 92, 100, 146, 159, 175, 176 ; revolt 
against, xvii ; as emancipator, xvii ; war 
powers, xviii, 116; character, xix, xxii; 
and territorial slavery, 15, 31-33 ; elec- 
tion, 16 ; and compromise, 25, 82 ; pre- 
presidential influence, 29; and public 
opinion, 30, 31, 53, 56, 82 ; and slavery in 
States, 32 ; on secession, 33 n., 52, 159 ; 
minority election considered, 30 ; train- 
ing, 38, 39 ; depression, 39 n. ; education, 
40,41 ; Parker's influence, 40 ; object les- 
sons and " motive," 42 ; humor, 42 ; con- 
duct, 42 n. ; and fellowmen, 43 ; double 
nature, 44-46 ; greatuess, 46 ; grasp of 
slavery question, 46-49; and popular 
sovereignty, 50 ; prescience, 51 ; and 
Seward's scheme of policy, 54 ; and Sum- 
ter, 56, 57, 81 ; call for troops, 61, 83 ; 
and relief of Washington, 63 ; executive 
defects, 68, 75-77, 124; petty interfer- 
ences, 68, 74, 75, 188 n., 190, 191 ; inade- 
quate appreciation of popular rising, 70, 
92 ; urged to utilize it, 71, 72 ; factor of 
his personality, 77 ; effect of poor polit- 
ical manner, 78, 79 ; first message, 81 ; 
on loyalty of forces, 83 ; on suspending 
habeas corpus, 84; on foreign affairs, 
84 ; on extra-legal actions, 85 ; silence on 
slavery, 86; checks volunteering, 87, 
113 ; popular support after Bull Run, 
96 ; and Stanton, 103 ; and Fremont's 
proclamation, 106 ; and McClellan, no ; 
effect of Order No. 3, ill n.; and Hunt- 
er's order, 117, 322, 323; emancipation 
policy, 118-120, 122, 321-323, 333-335; 
and Greeley's letter, 119 ; and effect 
of emancipation, 121, 334, 335 ; and mil- 
itary affairs, 123; and Sanitary Commis- 
sion, 127 ; boyhood surroundings, 141, 
142; contrasted with Morton, 143, 144; 
lack of creative spirit, 144 ; benumbs 
state support, 159 ; and reenlistment of 
three-months' men, 162 ; and Union De- 
fense Committee, 169 ; and the call for 
300,000 troops (1862), 171, 211 ; and pa- 
triotic Democrats, 182 ; and appoint- 
ment of general volunteer officers, 188 ; 
and independent recruiting, 198; and 
Andrew-Butler controversy, 204, 206 ; 



censures delay, 218 ; evolution of larger 
powers, 219, 221-223, 320 ; interest in 
progress of volunteering, 220 ; and elec- 
tion of 1862, 225 ; and Vallandigham, 
240, 242, 243 n. ; and Gettysburg crisis, 
244, 359; Illinois letter (1863), 246-249, 
262, 309 ; contemporary portraits (1864), 
249, 250 ; and Grant, 250 ; opposition to 
renomination, 251, 252, 261 ; and party 
policy, 253 ; and Wade-Davis manifesto, 
253 ; reconstruction veto, 253 ; appoint- 
ments, 253 n. ; popular strength, 255- 
322; reelected, 258, 259; on popular de- 
mand for a draft, 292; on constitu- 
tionality of the draft, 294 ; reply to Sey- 
mour's draft appeal, 296-298 ; advances 
to Seymour, 302, 303 n. ; draft of 1864, 
311 ; caution in policy and control (1861), 
319 , exercise of power in Emancipation 
Proclamation, 321; reserves power to 
himself, 322, 323; mastery of large af- 
fairs, 323 ; attitude toward his cabinet, 
328, 332, 333; and Seward, 329; and 
Chase, 329-331 ; self-reliance, 333, 335 ; 
no despot, 348, 351; necessity of arbi- 
trary action, 351 ; Gettysburg speech, 
360 ; second inaugural, 360, 361 ; idea of 
the " state," 368. 

Lodge, H. C, on nature of the Union, 3, 4. 

Loring, G. B., on Constitutional Demo- 
cracy, 307 n. 

Lowell, J. R., on Southern aggression, 28 ; 
on Lincoln, 56, 249 ; on progress of pub- 
lic opinion (1863), 355. 

McCall, G. A., question of command, 91. 

McClellan, G. B., on commanders for 
volunteers, 96: as an organizer, 109; 
and Scott, 109 ; defects as . commander, 
109-111 ; effects of delay, 111 ; governors 
urge his removal, 231, 327 ; candidacy, 
256. 

McDougal, J. A., and the draft, 292. 

Madison, James, on the Union, 4 n. 

Magoffin, Beriah, and Morton, 163. 

Malet, Sir Edward, on Lincoln, 46. 

Marshall, John, and the Union, 34 n. 

Marshall, John, of Quincy, as a type, 
138. 

Martindale, J. H., on utilizing the patri- 
otic outburst, 71. 

Martineau, James, on the Civil War and 
emancipation, 334. 

Massachusetts, social structure, 135, 155 ; 
liberal fraction, 136; classes, 137-139; 
anti-slavery attitude, 147, 148; and out- 
break of war, 150-155 ; arming of 
recruits, 165; enrollment and draft, 



386 



INDEX 



284; Constitutional Democrats, 307. See 
also Andrew. 

Mauch Chunk, Copperheadism, 310. 

Meade, G. G., Gettysburg and after, 244, 
359. 

Meigs, M. C, as Quartermaster-General, 
97 ; on red tape, 97 ; on financial diffi- 
culties, 98, 99; and Sanitary Commis- 
sion, 129, 130 ; on military force of ne- 
groes, 121. 

Methodist Church and the Civil War, 
133 n. 

Military trials, Vallandigham, 242 ; of 
Copperheads, 344. See also Arbitrary 
arrests. 

Militia, recent reforms, 318. 

Ministers drafted, 313. 

Morgan, E. D., on effect of Bull Run, 96 ; 
on New York's financial aid, 156 ; re- 
cruiting, 157, 161 ; and red tape 157 n. ; 
and the check on purchasing arms, 165 ; 
urges more troops, 165 ; on volunteers 
and regulars, 166 ; and hurry call of 
May, 1862, 168; and Union Defense 
Committee, 181, 183 ; and appointment of 
generals, 184-189 ; and Cameron on Sew- 
ard's mediation, 209, 210; on commis- 
sioning regiments, 210, 211 ; and call for 
300,000, 212 ; executive ability, 221 ; and 
State-Rights, 228 ; and Altoona confer- 
ence, 231, 232. 

Morgan, J. H., raid, 246. 

Morton, O. P., executive force, 74, 347; 
and Stanton, 104, 214, 215 ; training and 
character, 143-145 ; preparation for war, 
145-147 ; adequate conception of the 
task, 146; embodiment of state sup- 
port, 146 ; and federal red tape, 155 ; re- 
sponse to first call, 162; and delay in 
arms, 162 ; influence in Kentucky, 163 , 
response to call of May, 1862, 168 ; pro- 
tests check on recruiting (June, 1862), 
171; wants a commission, 171 ; and 
trade with the Border States, 178 ; and 
control of state recruiting, 190 ; and 
appointment of officers, 191 n. ; as a 
war minister, 222; and Copperheads, 
224, 234, 339, 342-344 ; government by 
prerogative, 234, 236, 237, 260, 337; on 
State-Rights, 240 n. ; on a third party in 
war, 246; character of appointments, 
252 ; on the draft (1862), 280 ; (1864), 311 ; 
and enrollment resistance, 284; and 
Democratic legislature, 308; and Al- 
toona conference, 326 ; financiering, 
338 ; reelection, 342 n. ; and Hendricks 
compared, 344; political development, 
345-347; paralyzed, 346,- in the Senate, 



346 ; religion, 346 ; necessity of arbi- 
trary action, 353. 
Motley, J. L., on Lincoln, 249. 

Nationality, meaning of term, 270; polit- 
ical cause of America, 271 ; and race, 
271 ; a hindrance to progress, 273. See 
also People, Union. 

Navy as a factor in the war, 109. 

Negroes, as contraband, 94; in the war, 
121, 247. See also Emancipation, Slav- 
ery. 

Neutrality, Lincoln on state, 82. 

New England, colonial communal feel- 
ing, 5. 

New York, social influence, 134 ; financial 
support of the war, 156 ; first-call troops, 
157, 160, 161; election of 1862, 232; of 
1864, 259. See also Morgan, Seymour. 

New York City, draft riots, 288, 289; 
secret organization, 312. 

" New York Herald " and the patriotic 
outburst, 60. 

North Carolina expedition, Massachu- 
setts troops for, 75-77, 198, 199. 

Nugent, Robert, conducts the draft, 292; 
on Seymour's attitude, 300 n. 

Officers, control of commissions, 90 ; char- 
acter of, at Bull Run, 95 ; regular, as 
commanders of volunteers, 96 ; appoint- 
ment of volunteer general, 184-189, 
191 n. 

Ohio, reenlistment of three-months' men, 
162 ; election of 1863, 244. 

Olmsted, F. L., Sanitary Commission, 
128, 174. 

Opdyke, George, Union Defense Commit- 
tee, 156. 

Ostrogorski, M., on Lincoln and politics, 
253. 

Owen, R. D., and war in Kentucky, 171. 

Parker, Joel, and Andrew, 327; on Lin- 
coln's despotism, 348, 351. 

Parker, Theodore, influence on Lincoln, 
40. 

Party organization, defined, 9 ; inevitable, 
9; function, 9; influence of creed obli- 
gations on, 10 ; development, 11 ; conserv- 
ing force, 11 ; control of nominations, 
12 ; hold, 12, 227 ; development of slavery- 
issue, 12-14 ; issues and results of 1860, 
14-17; superficial calm, 224, 354; and 
war management, 252 ; review of pro- 
gress (1862-64), 259-262 ; war parties, 339. 
See also Democratic party. 

Patriotic outburst, after Sumter, 64-66, 



INDEX 



387 



73, 145, 150, 160 ; after Bull Run, 96. See 
also Volunteering. 

Patterson, Kobert, requisition for troops, 
89. 

Peace Convention, 26. 

Pendleton, G. H., candidacy, 256. 

Peninsular Campaign, work of Sanitary 
Commission, 129, 130. 

Pennsylvania, war feeling, 87; social 
character, 134; financial condition 
(1861), 158 ; Copperhead movement, 245 ; 
election of 1864, 258 n., 259 ; enrollment 
resistance, 282 ; draft in, 309, 310. See 
also Curtin. 

Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, Cameron's 
action concerning, 90, 91. 

People, historical evolution of the term, 
266 ; social sense of the term, 267 ; politi- 
cal sense, 268, 273 ; factor of personality 
in America, 269 ; and nationality, 270- 
273; amalgam of American, 273, 274; 
and race admixture, 275 ; character and 
intellect as factors, 275; transfer of 
racial tendencies to America, 276 ; their 
fusion into one people, 277-279 ; rise of 
sovereignty of, through federal action, 
349 ; through war, 362 ; and Lincoln, 351 ; 
and kingly power of the executive, 363, 
369. 

Phillips, Wendell, and the Civil War, 148. 
Pierrepont, Edwards, Union Defense Com- 
mittee, 152. 

Police power and the fourteenth amend- 
ment, 373. 

Politics. See Copperheads, Democratic 
Elections, Party organization. 

Popular sovereignty, and slavery issue, 

13 ; fascination, 49 ; Lincoln probes, 50. 

Presbyterian Church in the Civil War, 

133 n. 
President, kingly power, and the people, 

363, 369. See also Lincoln. 

Pryor, R. A., and attack on Sumter, 57. 
" Punch " on British sentiment, 94. 

Quartermaster Department, Meigs's suc- 
cess, 97; red tape, 97; foreign and 
home purchases, 108. 

Race problem, evolution, 275; considered, 

364, 365. 

Raymond, H. J., and Lincoln's reelection, 
255. 

Reconstruction, Lincoln's veto, 253. 

Recruiting. See Draft, Volunteering. 

Red tape, federal, and the loyal govern- 
ors, 95, 155, 213. 

Renan, J. E., on race and nation, 271. 



Resources, at Lincoln's command, 66, 73, 
80; failure to utilize, 67-69, 74; neces- 
sity of using, fully urged, 71, 72; con- 
sidered ample (1861), 113; war pro- 
longed by neglecting, 175, 176. See also 
Draft, Finances, Volunteering. 

Rhode Island, war loans, 356 n. 

Rhodes, J. F., on the Vallandigham case, 
243 n. ; on Seymour and the draft riots, 
289 n. 

Richardson, J. P., on the draft, 288. 

Richardson, W. A., and the draft, 292. 

Riley, W. H., on the draft, 314. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, factor of personal- 
ity, 269; on backwoodsmen, 273; on 
good Americanism, 279 n. ; use of kingly 
power, 363. 

Russell, W. H., on State-Rights, l n. ; on 
the South and slavery, 8 n. 

Russia, stage of government, 366. 

Sanitary Commission, origin, 126-128; 
services, 128, 129, 132, 174 ; Meigs on, 129, 
130 ; motives, 130 ; western branch, 131 ; 
advice on recruiting, 171-174 ; attitude 

. of administration, 174. 

Scott, Winfleld, inadequacy, 70; confi- 
dence in, 93 ; and McClellan, 109. 

Secession, factors of failure, xxiii ; South 
Carolina, preparation, 17 ; slavery basis, 
18, 37, 58 ; not a conspiracy, 18 ; sincer- 
ity, 19, 59; right, 33 n. ; and Lincoln's 
minority election, 30; Lincoln's inaugu- 
gural on, 52; develops power of the 
Union, 371. See also Union. 

Secret organizations, Copperhead, in 
1864, 311, 342; in New York City, 312; 
in Northwest, 312 ; plans for a rising, 
343 ; Morton's knowledge of, 343 ; con- 
vention of Sons of Liberty, 343; and 
state sovereignty, 344; condemnation 
of leaders, 344. 

Seward, W. H., and threats of secession, 
15 ; and compromise, 27 ; and irrepres- 
sible conflict, 48 ; vanity of leadership, 
52, 55, 56, 76, 77, 208 ; scheme of policy, 
54, 55, 65; inadequate conception of the 
task, 71 ; and Lincoln's mastership, 84, 
329; and the call for 300,000, 171, 212; 
question of premiership, 209 ; Cameron 
resents interference of, 209, 210 ; on the 
political calm, 224 ; on the draft (1864), 
314; necessity of arbitrary action, 353. 

Seymour, Horatio, campaign cry, 225; 
and state sovereignty, 228, 233, 240, 260, 
261 ; political character, 239, 303-305 ; 
and election of 1864, 256, 257 ; and Stan- 
ton's invitation, 282 ; recruiting system, 



388 



INDEX 



282 ; on the draft and State-Eights, 284- 
287; and the draft riots, 288 n., 289-293; 
appeal for suspension of the draft, 293- 
296; Lincoln's reply, 296-298; failure 
to grasp the situation, 297-299; and 
state protection of the draft, 300-302 ; 
and Lincoln, 302, 303 n. ; and Andrew, 
302 ; coerced to his duty, 305 ; historical 
judgment on, 306. 

Sherman, John, on arbitrary arrests, 353; 
on popularity of the war, 355. 

Sherman, T. W., Massachusetts troops 
for, 75-77, 198, 199. 

Sherman, W. T., on duration of the war, 
114 ; on Grant's Wilderness assaults, 
353. 

Sickles, D. E., political attitude (1860), 
21 ; volunteers, 182 ; controversy over 
brigade, 182. 

Simpson, Matthew, in the Civil War, 
133 n. 

Slavery, and State-Eights, 1, 18 ; develop- 
ment of issue, 12-14 ; issue in 1860, 14, 
15; as a blessing, 15 n. ; Lincoln and 
territorial, 25, 31-33 ; Lincoln and state, 
32 ; as corner-stone of Confederacy, 58 ; 
attitude of Indiana and Massachusetts, 
147-149 ; Lincoln's reconstruction veto, 
253; Democratic attitude (1862), 340. 
See also Emancipation, Negroes. 

Smith, Goldwin, on the Union, 3, 4 n. 

Smith, E. K., as Curtin's agent, 158. 

Society, force, 125, 132; use in the Civil 
War, 126, 132, 176 ; women in the Civil 
War, 126, 131, 154, 174 ; Christian Com- 
mission, 131 ; Union Clubs, 133 n. See 
also People, Sanitary Commission. 

Sons of Liberty. See Secret organiza- 
tions. 

South Carolina, preparation for seces- 
sion, 17. 

Sovereignty. See People, State. 

Stanton, E. M., and the Union-savers, 23, 
24 ; appointment, 101 ; character, 102, 
170 ; and Lincoln, 103 ; as Secretary of 
War, 103-105; and the governors, 104, 
170,213-215; Puritan spirit, 104; stops 
recruiting, 114 ; on military force of the 
negroes, 121 ; on the Sanitary Commis- 
sion, 130; and Jackson's raid, 167, 169; 
on necessity of red tape, 213 ; influence 
on centralizing tendencies, 223 ; on re- 
sistance to enrollment (1862), 281 n. ; 
and Seymour, 282 ; and adjudication of 
draft law, 295 n. ; on efficiency of the 
draft, 310, 315 ; and Indiana finances, 
338; on rumor of his resignation, 345; 
necessity of arbitrary action, 353. 



State sovereignty, and slavery, 1, 18 ; re- 
crudescence, 240 ; effect on the war, 

. 241 ; reserved right, 286 n ; Sons of Lib- 
erty on, 344; impotent without Union, 
370, 372 ; dogma overthrown by the 
Civil War, 377. See also Union. 

States, war functions, x-xii ; disuse as 
recruiting agencies, xiii, xv ; opposition 
to federal measures, xiv ; clash with 
national authority, 177 ; early independ- 
ent action, 177 ; opposition to national 
banks, 358 ; term possible only in the 
Union, 369. See also State sovereignty, 
Union, Volunteering, and states and 
governors by name. 

Stephens, A. H., " corner-stone " speech. 
58 ; on Altoona conference, 232. 

Stevens, J. A., and recruiting, 221. 

Stevens, Thaddeus, agitator, 225; and 
Lincoln's renomination, 251. 

Stone, W. M., on Copperheads, 341 n. 

Strong, G. C, and Andrew-Butler contro- 
versy, 204. 

Strong, G. F., Sanitary Commission, 174. 

Sumner, Charles, and Fremont's procla- 
mation, 107 ; and the war powers, 116 ; 
social taboo, 193; on Democrats (1863), 
354. 

Sumter, Fort, necessity of action, 56 ; at- 
tempt to supply, 57 ; attack, 57 ; moral 
effect, 59 ; patriotic effect, 64-66, 73, 145, 
150 ; Lincoln, on 81. 

Tappan, Lewis, remonstrance to An- 
drew, 153. 

Territories, slavery issue, 13 ; Lincoln on 
slavery in, 25, 31-33. 

Thayer, J. S., political attitude (1861), 
21. 

Thompson, Jacob, and Copperhead ris- 
ing, 343. 

Townsend, Frederick, on draft resist- 
ance, 287, 293. 

Trade union as a fetish, 367. 

Treason, and Copperheadism, xxiv, 238, 
339, 341 ; subsidence of hatred of, 92, 
93. 

Union, idea (1860), x, 1-3 ; legal basis, 2 n. ; 
no compact, 3, 4 ; colonial sentiment 
for, 5, 376 ; continental force, 6 ; inevit- 
ableness, 6 ; Marshall formulates idea, 
6; sentiment to 1850, 7,12; and compro- 
mises, 13, 20, 24-28, 30 ; education per- 
verted by slavery, 17-20; Northern 
types of savers (1860), 20-24; latent 
forces during slavery control, 34-36; 
Lincoln's statement, 159 ; and volunteer- 



INDEX 



389 



ing, 219, 221; and the draft as an act 
of administration, 315-318 ; Democratic 
opinion (1862), 340; and sovereignty 
of the people, 349 j influence of popular 
loans, 357; of national banks, 358; 
development of power through war, 
359-362, 371, 375, 377 ; effect of emanci- 
pation issue, 361 ; and the " state," 368- 
370; necessary to the welfare of the 
States, 370, 372, 378 ; effect of the war 
amendments, 372-375; and Democratic 
platform (18C4),377. See also Copper- 
heads, Lincoln, Secession, State sover- 
eignty, States. 

Union Defense Committee of New York, 
committee of correspondence, 152 ; 
extra-legal activity, 161 n., 179, 180; 
Lincoln upholds, 170 ; and call for 
300,000, 171 ; conflict with state author- 
ities, 180, 183; and Sickles's brigade, 
183. 

Upfold, George, crudeness, 142. 

Utica, draft resistance, 288. 

Vallandigham, C. L., arrest and banish- 
ment, 240, 242 ; candidacy for governor, 
244; return, 256; and the enrollment, 
283 ; sentence of history, 306 ; and Sons 
of Liberty, 344. 

Van Buren, W. H., Sanitary Commission, 
126, 127, 174. 

Volunteering, national mismanagement, 
xiii ; disuse of state agencies, xiii, xv ; 
ninety-days call, 61 ; three-years call, 62 , 
eager response, 71-74, 150, 157, 160 ; re- 
peatedly checked by administration, 
87-92, 114, 159, 166, 169, 171 ; States urge 
acceptance of more troops, 90, 146, 161, 
165 ; spirit after Bull Kuu, 96 ; and eman- 
cipation, 117, 121, 168,325, 326; effect of 
administration discouraging, 122-124; 
welfare of the soldiers, 151; reenlist- 
ment of three-months' men, 162 ; hurry 
call (May, 1862), 167; response, 168 ; call 
for 300,000 (1862), 171, 211-213, 221 n.; 
Sanitary Commission on recruiting, 
171-174 ; necessity of steady activity, 
173,174; federal interference in state 
recruiting, 180-184, 189-191, 197-200, 206, 
221 ; control of appointment of general 
officers, 184-189; Andrew-Butler re- 
cruiting controversy, 199-208 ; state 
right to commission, 210, 211 ; and fed- 
eral red tape, 213, 214 ; national control 
of troops after organization, 215-218 ; 
and growing central control, 219, 221 ; 
Lincoln's personal interest, 220 ; clash 



in recruiting new and old regiments, 
220, 221; movement to prevent, 220. 
balance sheet (1863), 281. 

Wade, B. F., manifesto against Lincoln, 
253, 254. 

Wadsworth, J. S., question of appoint- 
ment, 184, 185. 

War and a third party, 246, 247. 

War powers, Lincoln's use.xviii, 116,219, 
221-223, 320; necessity, 243, 245, 348; 
kingly function, 363. See also Arbitrary 
arrests, Emancipation. 

Washington, George, and the Union, 6. 

Washington, relief (1861), 62, 63 ; scares, 
92, ill, 167. 

Webster, Daniel, on source of the Consti- 
tution, In., 4: and the Union, 7; and 
doctrine of nationality, 34 n. 

Webster, Fletcher, regiment, 150, 162. 

Webster, Noah, on direct action of the 
federal government, 350. 

Webster, Peletiah.on direct action of the 
federal government, 350. 

Weed, Thurlow, compromise plan, 27 ; on 
Lincoln after election, 29 ; and call for 
300,000, 212 ; on volunteering spirit 
(1862), 221 n. ; and Lincoln's reelection, 
255. 

Weer, William, removal, 216. 

Whittier, J. G., on abolitionists and 
emancipation, 336. 

Willis, N. P., on Lincoln, 44. 

Wilmot Proviso, 13. 

Wilson, Henry, and Lincoln's renomina- 
tion, 251. 

Wilson, J. F., reports Copperhead move- 
ment, 220. 

Wilson, Woodrow, on secession, 14 n. ; on 
the Union, 34 n.; on the Emancipation 
Proclamation, 335 n. 

Winthrop, R. C, and election of 1864, 257. 

Women in the Civil War, 120, 131, 154, 174. 

Wood, Fernando, and the draft, 293, 299. 

Woods, R. C, and the Sanitary Commis- 
sion, 127. 

Woodburn, J. A., on war parties, 340. 

Wool, J. E., on relief of Washington, 02 n. ; 
and Union Defense Committee, 180; 
and enrollment resistance, 281 n. 

Wright, J. A., and recruiting, 90, 91. 

Wyman, Jeffries, Sanitary Commission, 
127. 

Yates, Richard, regulates commerce pass- 
ing Cairo, 178. 
Young, J. R., on Altoona conference, 228. 



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